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**Abstract**

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT PLAN  
TO GENERATE SUPPORT FOR AND SOLUTIONS TO  
THE PROBLEM OF HOMELESSNESS

by

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SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA  
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### **Abstract**

A four part monograph: a futures study assessing what impact California's homeless problem will have upon California Law Enforcement by the year 2000; development of a model "Homeless Crime Prevention Plan" to address the problem; construction of a transition management plan to guide implementation of the strategy; and conclusions/recommendations. Seven trends will increase in the next ten years: homeless population size, availability of shelter, community apprehension, law enforcement workload, funding for programs, police involvement and homeless activism. Events which could impact the future problem are: a significant state budget deficit, cut in POST reimbursement, a state supreme court decision, receipt of government owned homes and funding for homeless service hubs. Mock policy application leads to construction of the Crime Prevention strategic plan, its focus being programs designed to build support for the development of solutions to our homeless problem. The transition plan presents a two-tiered management structure and supporting technologies. Research data; non-extrapolative forecasting results; with graphics, data and other instruments in the appendixes; references and bibliography.

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**This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.**

**Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.**

**Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.**

**The views and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).**

## INTRODUCTION

A brief examination of the problem of homelessness, past to present, with specific development of several component parts deemed most critical to the conduct of the futures study and development of strategic and transition management plans which follow.

### PART ONE - A FUTURES STUDY

What impact will the problem of homelessness have on California Law Enforcement by the year 2001?

### PART TWO - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A model strategic plan for addressing the problem of homelessness, and its potential future impact, is developed for the City of Mountain View Police Department. A positive approach, designed to expand through the use of new and existing infrastructures.

### PART THREE - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

A plan is developed to manage the implementation process: includes identification of the critical mass; commitment planning; selection of an appropriate management structure; timetable; and technologies which can be employed to ensure that support and commitment required for successful implementation and movement to the future state is forthcoming.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An overview of the study, in chronological retrospect, summarizes the purpose of the monograph, offers answers to the issue and sub-questions, and addresses premises upon which the strategy and its parts are based. Opinion and recommendations address issues of opportunity, feasibility, "risk," and connecting areas which might be worthy of further study.

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Executive Summary

Presented in five sections, this monograph examines the problem of homelessness and what impact its progression might have on California Law Enforcement by the year 2001. Presentation of data and perspective culled from research provides an understanding of the nature of the problem and its dimensions, law enforcement's relationship to it, and a base from which to examine what the "homeless" future might look like by 2001. Conduct of a futures study results in the development of alternative future scenarios and leads to construction of a strategic plan designed to address the problem by developing support and solutions to create a desired future (state). Finally, a companion transition plan is formulated to implement the strategy.

Introduction:

Analysis of those component parts of the problem deemed most pertinent to the problem and law enforcement's relationship to it provides the historical perspective which lays the foundation for the futures study. What is homelessness - a definition; how many homeless are there; who they are; why they are (homeless (causes)); and how the problem currently impacts law enforcement are questions addressed in completing the examination.

Part One - A Futures Study:

Various methodology are utilized to set the issue for study and develop sub-issue questions to further define the issue question and study parameters. A nominal group panel identified seven trends and five possible future events, as follows:

Trends: (1) size of California's homeless population; (2) availability of alternative shelter; (3) community apprehension; (4) law enforcement workload impact;

(5) regional funding for homeless solutions; (6) police involvement in solutions; and (7) level of homeless activism.

Events: (1) budget deficit; (2) POST training reimbursement - cut; (3) Supreme Court decision; (4) cities receive government-owned homes; and (5) state funds for service "hubs."

Analysis of trends and events leads to the formulation of alternative future scenarios, selection of the normative future as the focus for strategic planning, and selection and "testing" of mock policy designed to bring about such a desired future. Policies selected form the "rough" beginnings of the Crime Prevention Strategy developed in the next stage of study.

### Part Two - Strategic Management

A Special Homeless Crime Prevention Plan is designed to serve as a pliable model for use by California Law Enforcement as one means of addressing our homeless problem - the City of Mountain View Police Department is used as the specific location for case study. The model plan was selected following identification of alternative strategies which focused on the following three as being most feasible and desirable: (1) create a Special Homeless Crime Prevention Program; (2) create and deploy a Homeless Field Services Unit; and (3) establish a Public Safety Committee on Homelessness. Various approaches, to include specific negotiation strategies, are utilized in weaving a connecting plan designed to ensure support for the strategy by key stakeholders.

### Part Three - Transition Management

Planning for successful implementation of the Crime Prevention strategy includes: identification of the critical mass; selection of a two-tiered transition management structure headed by a Project Director; and the utilization of technologies (Team-building Workshops & Fireside Chats; Community Meetings; Role Modeling; Surveys; and a Performance/Feedback mechanism are most essential) deemed best for generating support for the plan and facilitating movement through a structured, 31-month implementation cycle, and beyond.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions are drawn that, absent strategic action, the size of California's homeless population will grow markedly by the year 2001 and with it, workload generated by the population, further compromising law enforcement's ability to manage such workload (and workload in general). Recommendations are made that the problem be addressed, via the proffered Homeless Crime Prevention Plan and that several connecting subjects are worthy of study in pursuit of more complete resolution to the problem.

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EPIGRAPH

"Leave no one behind"

Motto - National  
Council of Negro Women

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## INTRODUCTION

When reports of homelessness were first reported in the media in the early 1980's, the problem seemed to be a temporary phenomenon, likely to subside as the economy improved. Research has demonstrated, however, that the perception of homelessness as a passing blemish on the national scene is in error. Despite the temporary recovery from the '82-'83 recession, the numbers of homeless continue to increase<sup>1</sup> and, with them, the escalation of public and social service problems created by and associated with the condition.

The homeless dilemma confronting California mimics that faced by the nation as a whole: its progression, virtually unchecked to date and accelerated by an array of environmental factors, has resulted in the widespread growth of a now very visible and "foreign" body of homeless through our communities. As a result, all "franchised" sectors of our communities are becoming more alarmed and, in the end, their apprehension translates to increasing numbers of calls for service to public service agencies.

Law enforcement bears the weight of handling not only these service demands, but those generated by the homeless and other aspects of the condition as well. Generally, operating without adequate support or mission, response often takes the form of an all or nothing - enforcement or neglect - approach. As the problem has escalated, energy law enforcement has been required to expend on actions which generally leave all involved wanting and frustrated. Several crucial component parts of the homeless problem are examined in the sections which follow in order to better define its scope, severity and critically, impact on law enforcement.

What is Homelessness? A homeless person is: one who lacks a fixed nighttime residence or whose nighttime residence is a temporary shelter, welfare hotel, transitional housing or any public or private place not designed as sleeping accommodations for human beings.<sup>2</sup> However, it is essential to understand that to be homeless is much more than the literal (definition) absence of shelter. Homeless people become the object of scorn, ridicule and aversion. They experience "diminished safety, comfort and privacy - a social disaffiliation,"<sup>3</sup> the collective impact of which is, in many cases, the loss of hope and self-respect as well.

How many Homeless are there? A variety of current estimates place national (2-3 million) and California (250,000) homeless populations at exorbitant levels. More disturbing are various reports documenting significant growth of the population during the past decade and which project continued growth of similar proportions.

Anna Kosof (Homeless in America, 1988) found that the number of homeless have been doubling nationwide each year since 1980.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Conference of Mayors reports past annual increases of 20+ % in a wide range of cities,<sup>5</sup> some of which have exhibited increases as high as 28 % during the 1980's.<sup>6</sup> Further, a survey of 444 California cities found that homelessness increased 49 % in those cities between 1982-1987.<sup>7</sup> Projections that the number of homeless will continue to increase at a rate of 25 % per year,<sup>8</sup> that the national homeless population may balloon to 19 million by 2003,<sup>9</sup> and that California's population will advance by some five million by 2000<sup>10</sup> does not bode well for California. Application of this history and projections, coupled with the opinion that growth in homeless numbers generally increase with growth of the general population leads to the assumption that California's homeless population will inflate markedly during the 1990's.

Who are the Homeless? "Homeless people in the 1980's no longer matched the 1970's stereotype of the single, unattached middle-aged alcoholic living primarily in urban hobo mansions or skid rows."<sup>11</sup> The contemporary homeless population is quite diverse, being comprised of real people -- veterans, children, adults, the disabled, single women and mothers, all who share a common affliction, that being the absence of housing.<sup>12</sup>

While single men do still account for more than half the homeless population, 25 % of single homeless are women<sup>13</sup> and homeless families may now account for as much as one-third of that population, representing its fastest growing sub-group.<sup>14</sup> Surprisingly, 78 % of homeless have been found to be indigenous to the areas they frequent.<sup>15</sup> Not surprisingly, many homeless do indeed suffer from mental disability (25 %) and substance abuse (30%),<sup>16</sup> and Blacks are overrepresented, comprising roughly 60 % of the population.<sup>17</sup>

In summary, the homeless now mirror the face of our poor<sup>18</sup> and the situation of

homelessness results from an escalation of those factors which define the condition of poverty and those impoverished.

Why are they Homeless? While the two most frequently cited etiologies regarding reasons for homelessness are sociodemographic (drug/alcohol abuse, mental disorders, etc.) and societal risk factors (lack of affordable housing, decreases in publicly financed benefits, criminal justice response, deinstitutionalization of mental patients, etc.),<sup>19</sup> a recently proposed "chain of events" theory<sup>20</sup> seems to offer a more "complete" rationale for its cause. The hypothesis combines exposure to the risk factors noted above in suggesting the following problem-event sequence:

1. start: low-modest resource base --
2. complications: family break-up, job loss, health problems --
3. result: move out or lose home --
4. conditions: no affordable housing, no job, no deposit refund --
5. outcome: **homeless** --
6. now endangered: personal safety, health, job and safety of children.

Ultimately however, solutions which address causal factors and the resulting problem require budget appropriations and action at all levels of government and society, the prerequisite for which is public and political support and consensus. It seems, then, reasonable to presume that the lack of such support must be focused upon as the primary reason for the problem's existence in present form and magnitude.

Supporting this contention are recent reports documenting growing opposition to and frustration with urban homelessness,<sup>21</sup> the ranking of neighborhood opposition ("not in my neighborhood") as the number one block to development of low income housing,<sup>22</sup> and the finding that such opposition results from community fear of the homeless.<sup>23</sup> Further evidence mounts, indicating that the affluent and middle class no longer wish to support the needy and less productive. Indeed, results of California's election of November, 1990, indicate that the population has an aversion to supporting any new programs at the expense of an increased tax burden.

Both federal and state governments have chosen to address other social and political targets, virtually abandoning programs which address the homeless problem and causal ("risk") factors. Counties (especially) and cities, too, have cut or eliminated vital

programs, having grown tired or incapable of sustaining the burden of mandated services in the face of disappearing federal and state funding.<sup>24</sup> Research presents the following examples of the result.<sup>25,26,27</sup>

- \* Counties statewide operate with some 782 million less in fiscal year 1990-91 than they did the year previously, 236 million of which impacts programs addressing "risk" areas.
- \* California cities are getting by on budgets 17.5% lower in the new fiscal year than they did in fiscal year 1978-79.
- \* Only 2 % of California's low income housing has been constructed since 1980, and federal support for low income housing has decreased 60 % since 1979 - our stock of such housing has been reduced by 2.5 million units since 1980 alone.
- \* 100,000 more units are projected for loss by 2000 when subsidies are due to expire.

How does the problem of Homelessness impact law enforcement? Panhandling, loitering, substance abuse, trespassing, crimes of violence, theft, child abuse and neglect, medical calls, the incidence of death - natural and otherwise, and extreme basic life- support needs of the homeless themselves are representative of the array of problems which the homeless present to law enforcement. Their presence sometimes signals neighborhood deterioration, may prompt increases in crime by real criminals, results in avoidance of business and park areas, and, absent legal and social avenues by which police can "treat" problems, results in a lack of attention and an escalation of the dilemma.

Police contacts and service demands pertaining to the homeless, a field tracked by very few police agencies, are increasing. Two documented examples: (1) the Santa Monica Police Department, although an example in the extreme, recently reported that 26.9 % of all calls-for-service during the first five months of 1990 were homeless-specific,<sup>28</sup> and (2) San Jose Police Department's Street Crimes Unit spends approximately 25 % of its time dealing with the homeless.<sup>29</sup> Further, as the problem escalates and frustration mounts, violent contacts with the homeless are increasing and police are more frequently faced with addressing incidents of civil disobedience staged to draw attention to the issue of homelessness.

Ultimately, as more diverse and growing homeless populations have become

increasingly noticeable and attached to our communities, police agencies have, by default, been delegated the enormous task of "dealing" with the problem. The desired method of response does, however, vary, dependent upon perspective: traditional segments of most communities desire strict enforcement; service providers and advocates pressure for attention and delivery of "social" services; and elected and government officials vacillate between the two, sending the unspoken message to neglect or avoid unless directed to do otherwise. In the end, it would appear that a three-pronged problem has been created for law enforcement by the homeless situation: (1) a unique and growing demand for police service has developed; (2) our responsibility and capability to manage such demand is compromised by a glaring lack of legal and social service support; and (3) we occupy the tenuous middle ground between factions which wish us to "do something" but who differ dramatically as to what it is we should be doing.

The subject of "workload" will be critical to the conduct and results of the study. As such, the following definition has been generated: **Workload = the total amount of time spent by law enforcement on service demands generated by or about the homeless, or, as a result of their presence, to include administrative time spent on the problem's internal and external address.**

Exposure to the homeless problem, discussion with colleagues and the scanning of literature, which resulted in the establishment of an extensive futures file, prompted selection of the homeless topic for study.

More extensive research, which followed undertaking of the study project, culminated in the construction of fact and perspective presented to this point.

The present study examines what form the homeless problem might take by the year 2001: an assumption is made that the problem will escalate during the next decade. Assessments are made as to what impact the future face of the problem might have on law enforcement and ways in which we might best respond to it. In the end, model strategic and transition management plans will be presented to suggest one manner in which one agency imparticular, and California law enforcement in general, might wish to confront and manage the homeless problem.

PART ONE

A FUTURES STUDY

The performance of a "futures study" is one way in which we can bridge the gap which should generally exist between the points of problem recognition and the decision to address the problem with specific change or, as the case may warrant, by retaining the status quo. Informed strategic planning, which follows decision-making, benefits greatly from study which is focused by the attachment of an appropriate timeline and sub-issue questions which more clearly define needs expressed by the general issue question. Ultimately, meaningful data is developed from which alternative "pictures" of the problem's future are constructed and, preliminary insight into what actions might best serve our problem-solving agenda.

## **WHAT IMPACT WILL THE PROBLEM OF HOMELESSNESS HAVE ON CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT BY THE YEAR 2001?**

### **STRUCTURING THE ISSUES FOR STUDY**

The review of literature and research; contact and communication with law enforcement agencies, the homeless, homeless advocates and service providers; and involvement with homeless support groups and networks led to the identification of the following group of issues which seem to be most important to the defining of law enforcement's past and current relationship to the problem of homelessness:

Service Ethic - surprisingly, the homeless, advocates/providers and police do, almost without exception, agree that law enforcement as a whole views homeless people as less than viable members of society or their respective communities. The extension of this is the sense among the homeless and advocates/providers that the level of service (ethic) expressed by law enforcement towards the homeless and homeless problem falls significantly short of that expressed towards "franchised" segments of society. Police seem split on the issue as to whether or not our "homeless" ethic matches "public" ethic, this despite overwhelming agreement (above) as to perception or "view" of the homeless.

Community apprehension - fear, concern and other ill feelings harbored by the public towards the homeless are perceived as causing increased requests for police involvement with the homeless as a contributor to the "enforce or ignore"

quandary experienced by police agencies. Also viewed by all as a block to the development of support for homeless solutions to the homeless problem.

**Law Enforcement: Involvement in Solutions** - limited to activities primarily targeted on response to service requests and attendant enforcement activities. Police seem divided over the need or desirability to become involved in other than enforcement based solutions. Advocates/providers feel strongly that police possess the credibility, influence and networks to impact the problem and should become involved. There is the shared sense among many that law enforcement has or will become part of its problem by virtue of its ethic, perception and lack of "positive," proactive involvement.

**Resource Base** - social service support, relationships with advocates/providers and liaison with the homeless are deemed to be almost nonexistent. Even those departments with severe homeless problems respond primarily with enforcement only activities. Further, while most departments now offer crime prevention, education and liaison activities which focus on special problems, such efforts have not been extended to address the homeless problem.

**Education** - a perception shared by law enforcement and the homeless sector alike is that the public (especially) and the police lack an understanding about and empathy for the problem of being homeless. Specifically, the problem's implications, its causes and the difference between the chronically homeless and recent/borderline homeless are advanced as subjects requiring attention. Lack of understanding feeds community apprehension, which in turn blocks support, and, relative to law enforcement, plays a part in promoting perceived sub-standard service ethic and lack of involvement.

**Workload** - the critical issue, especially as perceived by law enforcement. Most police agencies are experiencing increasing demands upon their time and resources as a result of the expansion of the homeless population and consensus exists that such workload will continue to escalate, in some locations dramatically. Specific comments from some to the effect that police must become involved in other than enforcement-based solutions, if only to reduce

exposure to this increasing burden. Advocates/providers believe that homeless-police contact is on the increase as well.

Assessment of these issues provides a clearer understanding of the problem, law enforcement's relationship to same, implications which rise from the nexus and, possibly, the sense that we are indeed part of the problem. This broadened perspective supports development of the issue question for further study and provides the basis for construction of sub-issue questions designed to control the parameters of the study and to offer focus for futures forecasting.

Sub-issue questions are presented as follows:

1. Resources - what impact will response to the problem have on the way in which law enforcement resources are allocated and deployed?
2. Training and Education - what specific programs, policies and/or procedures might be utilized by law enforcement to address the homeless problem?
3. Community Apprehension - how can law enforcement address this critical dynamic?
4. Service Ethic - must the service ethic or level now expressed by law enforcement towards the homeless change as a prerequisite to positive response to the problem of homelessness?

#### FORECASTING: TRENDS AND EVENTS

Many trends and single events have commingled to form the complexion of our present day homeless problem. An example: in retrospect, federal policy resulting in the deinstitutionalization of mental patients (an event) greatly affected the size and nature(trends) of the nation's current homeless population. What contemporary trends and future events are and will be most pertinent to the issue questions under study? A

nominal group of nine individuals (Appendix A) was convened to answer the question and to provide forecasts of those trends and events selected.

Trends. Seven trends, distilled from an original list of forty-two (Appendix B), were selected for forecasting by the group. Selections, and their relationship to one another, reflect the opinion of the group that law enforcement's problem with homelessness can and must be addressed at the grass-roots level - waiting for significant help from federal or state governments will prove futile, protracting the scope of the problem and resources required to treat it. They provided a range of forecasts for each trend (Appendixes C & D), their combined perspective described in the interpretations which follow.

Trend 1 - Size of the Homeless Population in California. Panelists suggested that the homeless population has doubled during the past five years and that continued growth of much more significant proportions can be expected during the next five- (75%) and ten- (150 %) year periods. The trend is viewed as the the most critical to police, as growth of a population already out of control and our means to service will result in greatly increased homeless-specific workload (Trend 4). "Should be" forecasts denote a collective desire to see homeless population growth retarded and belief that law enforcement can play an important role in developing the support required to bring about this end.

Trend 2 - Availability of Alternative Shelter. Increasing the total number of bed and/or shelter spaces available for the homeless in California was thought to be the key to managing the homeless problem. Police involvement in solutions (Trend 6) could impact progression of the trend. Problem: while "should be" forecasts indicate the need to triple shelter levels by 2001, "will be" projections note the panel's feeling that the trend will increase only 50 % by then.

Trend 3 - Community Apprehension. A trend which fuels both police workload increases and the blocking of support for and solutions to the homeless. Specifically, fear and other ill feelings (paranoia, repulsion, dislike; etc.) harbored in our communities for the homeless promote both problems.

Apprehension was rated as having increased some 50 % during the past five years and is projected to advance by another 50% by 2001. Treating this factor becomes the prerequisite for developing solutions to the problem and police agencies can play a large role in doing so. "Should be" forecasts reflect this opinion and sense that apprehension levels must be cut by more than half by 2001 to achieve success in creating this end.

Trend 4 - Law Enforcement Workload Impact. Defined as the total amount of

time expended by law enforcement each year on service demands connected to the homeless. Forecasts suggest that workload has increased 80 % during the past five years, note made that demands on police time and resources have expanded due to increases in response needs AND lack of resources with which to treat problems generated by and in this unique community. Workload is projected to increase some 150 % by 2001.

“Will be” forecasts indicate the belief that police involvement in solutions (Trend 6) can result in the reduction of homeless-specific workload: projections show the desire to maintain overall workload demands consistent with present-day levels during the next ten-year period.

Trend 5 - Regional Funding for Homeless Programs. The trend statement is indicative of the belief that critical funding must be generated to and just above county levels. Counties and cities must cooperate in this effort. The note that funding five years ago was just 30 % of that available today is footnoted by the sense that today's funding level is almost nonexistent. Projections for the future are bleak - with most counties facing tougher economic times, funding is expected to increase just slightly over the next five and ten years (20 and 40 %, respectively). Normative forecasts promote optimism funding can be increased (3x) to match projections for homeless population needs by the year 2001.

Trend 6 - Police Involvement in Solutions. Defined as the level of involvement by law enforcement in solutions which address both causes and affects of the homeless problem. Police must play a lead role in bringing about change and can do so at the grass-roots level, that being in our neighborhoods, city governments and business communities. Such involvement could positively impact the course of all other trends addressed: critically, such involvement may be the key to reducing exposure to increasing workload demands. Problem: members agreed that police service ethic relative to the homeless is substandard and that both ethic and understanding must be improved as a precursor to meaningful involvement. Members were asked to rate ethic expressed towards the homeless in relation to that expressed towards the public at large. The result: homeless ethic was rated (panel median) at 55%.

“Should be” forecasts represent the group's belief that involvement must advance quickly (double by 1996) and markedly (250 % by 2001) in order to affect meaningful change. The group did, however, believe that involvement “will be” much lower than required: projections were made for an increase of “just” 100 % by 2001.

Trend 7 - Level of Homeless Activism. The amount of militant activity displayed

in advancing the homeless cause is viewed as having increased by 60 % during the past five years. Activism produces both positive and negative consequences, examples of the latter being problems presented to law enforcement by acts such as demonstrations, the taking over of vacant housing, etc. While the group forecasted the trend to increase markedly with the corresponding escalation of the homeless problem over the next ten years, hope that solutions (perhaps some involving activists) will diminish the homeless problem resulted in "should be" projections showing a static level of activity to 1996 and a 75 % reduction by 2001.

Events. Five events, distilled from an original candidate list of thirty- two (Appendix E), were selected for forecasting, the results of which (Appendixes F & G) are interpreted below.

Event 1 - State Budget Deficit Exceeds 10 Billion Dollars. Probability of occurrence was rated at 60 % for the next five years and 80 % by the year 2001, 1993 being the the earliest time the event might occur.

Funding for homeless programs and city/county budgets have suffered during "good" times illustrated by budget surpluses. The panel felt that: a budget deficit of such magnitude would result in the virtual abandonment of funding for all requisite programs and hope for solutions for many years to come; and that the event would most certainly inflict damage to law enforcement budgets, the result of which would be staffing and new program cuts and the deterioration of service levels, all of which would impact ability to address the homeless problem. The group thus forecasted the event to have the potential of impacting the issue area most negatively (-9).

Event 2 - POST Training Reimbursement to Police Agencies Cut 75 %. Following the line of thinking and probability expressed above, the group forecasted probability for the "cut" at 20 and 60 % for the next five- and ten-year periods, respectively. A reduction in funding would impact the issue area in significant fashion. Loss of funding would, in all likelihood, result in police budget cuts and, again, the ability to address the homeless problem.

Event 3 - Supreme Court Decision. Described as a decision by the California Supreme Court which would legalize the use of publicly owned, unimproved lands by the homeless to establish "temporary" residences (tents, tent villages, etc.).

Although discussion focused upon the fact that homeless are already living or "squatting" on public lands in many California cities with virtual impunity, the group viewed the possibility of this event occurring as

somewhat low. Projections indicate that the event might first occur in 1995, its chance of occurring being just 40 % by 2001. Impact projections were split between the negative (-5) and positive (+3): while the event would promote gatherings in centralized areas, increased focus on homeless needs and the ability to better coordinate services, it might also result in significant increase in public hostility and resentment.

Event 4 - Cities Receive Government - Owned Homes. Advocates, activists, the media and some cities have recently suggested, even demanded, that the the federal government donate its stock of vacant structures/homes to cities and counties for the express purpose of providing homes for the homeless. The forecast probability was quite low for the next five years - 20 %, with the first opportunity of occurrence three years out. Probability escalated to 75 % (one member rated chance at 85 %) by 2001. Members believed that the inevitable and extreme advance of the homeless problem, coupled with marked increase in building takeovers and other militant activity, would "encourage" the government to eventually provide some of its housing for the homeless. Minor negative impact (-2: resentment; administrative function) outweighed by the positive (+7: precedent; example; increased housing stock).

Event 5 - State Funds for Service "Hubs." The establishment of full-service "hubs" for the homeless, wherein the availability of shelter is combined with on-site services (medical; counseling; child care; etc.) so critical to health and recovery, was viewed by the group as one of the most viable starting points for solving the homeless problem. Action taken by the state to provide matching funds to cities or counties for the purpose of establishing such service centers was viewed as most desirable and quite probable. The possibility of occurrence first exceeds zero in 1994, with probability jumping from 45 % by 1996 to 75 % by 2001. Impact (+10) on the issue area was judged as being beneficial in the extreme: a real solution results in reduction of homeless numbers; access to and relationship with the homeless by police in central locations; establishment of community among the homeless and integration (a beginning) of the homeless back into communities in general.

## CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

Current trends and future events become the critical pieces to our homeless future and, specifically, the issue areas, when in fact, they interact at points distant in time. Hypothetically, mingling the two, now, provides assessments necessary to gauge what affect the occurrence of each event will have on the probability and level forecasts already attributed to each other event and trend.

A cross-impact analysis was conducted for the purpose of making such assessments. Three members of the nominal group were held over and utilized to provide impact projections.

CROSS IMPACT EVALUATION TABLE

|                  |    | <b>MATRIX</b><br>(Panel Medians) |          |          |           |    |    |           | <u>Maximum Impact (% change+/-)</u><br>Years to Maximum |            |            |            |            |            |                |  |
|------------------|----|----------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|----|----|-----------|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|--|
| **               | E1 | E2                               | E3       | E4       | E5        | E6 | E7 | T1        | T2  | T3         | T4         | T5         | T6         | T7         | "ACTOR TOTALS" |  |
| E1               | X  | +75<br>1.5                       | +15<br>4 | +20<br>5 | -80<br>1  | X  | X  | +50<br>5  | -10<br>2  | +10<br>5   | +15<br>5   | -30<br>0.1 | -10<br>4   | +30<br>3   | E1 11          |  |
| E2               | -  | X                                | -        | -        | -5<br>1.5 | X  | X  | -8<br>1.5 | -5<br>4   | -15<br>3   | +20<br>4   | -5<br>4    | -80<br>2   | +15<br>4   | E2 8           |  |
| E3               | -  | -                                | X        | +60<br>1 | +80<br>2  | X  | X  | -         | -   | +15<br>0.5 | +25<br>0.5 | +30<br>2   | +25<br>0.5 | -          | E3 6           |  |
| E4               | -  | -                                | -5<br>2  | X        | +5<br>1   | X  | X  | -3<br>3   | +60<br>2  | +10<br>0.5 | -5<br>1.5  | -10<br>0.2 | -          | -20<br>0.5 | E4 8           |  |
| E5               | -  | -                                | -5<br>2  | +5<br>1  | X         | X  | X  | -5<br>3   | +70<br>2  | +10<br>0.5 | -50<br>3   | +50<br>2   | -          | -25<br>3   | E5 8           |  |
| "REACTOR TOTALS" |    |                                  |          |          |           |    |    |           |   |            |            |            |            |            |                |  |
|                  | E1 | E2                               | E3       | E4       | E5        | E6 | E7 | T1        | T2  | T3         | T4         | T5         | T6         | T7         |                |  |
|                  | -  | 1                                | 3        | 3        | 4         | X  | X  | 4         | 4   | 5          | 5          | 5          | 3          | 4          |                |  |

\*\*Legend

- |    |                                 |    |  |
|----|---------------------------------|----|--|
| E1 | State Budget Deficit            | T1 | Size of California's Homeless Population |
| E2 | POST Training Reimbursement     | T2 | Availability of Alternative Shelter      |
| E3 | Supreme Court Decision          | T3 | Community Apprehension                   |
| E4 | Cities Receive Government Homes | T4 | Law Enforcement Workload Impact          |
| E5 | State Funds for Service Hubs    | T5 | Regional Funding for Homeless Programs   |
|    |                                 | T6 | Police Involvement in Solutions          |
|    |                                 | T7 | Level of Homeless Activism               |

The completed cross-impact matrix identifies rank-ordered lists of "actor" events and "reactor" events and trends, as follows:

"Actor Events: E1 (11), E2 (8), E3 (6), E4 (8), E5 (8)

"Reactor Events: E2 (1), E3 (3), E4 (3), E5 (4)

"Reactor Trends: T1 (4), T2 (4), T3 (5), T4 (5), T5 (5), T6 (3), T7 (4)

All events are significant relative to the frequency in which impact is assessed. Event one, "State Budget Deficit..." stands out as the prolific "actor" however, this by virtue of its +75 percent impact on event two, -80 percent impact on event five, and +50 percent

impact on trend one. Event five (State Funds for Service "Hubs") follows, having an assessed impact of +70 percent on trend two, -50 percent impact on trend four and +50 percent impact on trend five.

Event five stood out as the most impacted event, having been impacted at rates of +80 percent and -80 percent by events three and one, respectively.

Of critical importance, especially as they pertain to later policy and strategy development, are all trends. All are impacted in significant fashion by all events, this with the possible exception of trend six. Trend six (Police Involvement in Solutions) is, however, impacted significantly by event two (POST Training...) and, in lieu of its apparent key to addressing the other trends, must not be discounted.

Consensus of the group was that: (1) in reverse fashion, all trends are quite potent by virtue of their reaction to possible events; (2) the relationship between trends is very extraordinary; and (3) the application of strategy keyed to trend six may offer the key to positively addressing other trends and increasing the chance of events four and six.

## SCENARIOS

Three scenarios which depict what the future nature and impact of our homeless problem could have been developed by analyzing information produced through research and forecasting. These "snapshots" offer variations which are: (1) surprise free - nominal, (2) based on assumed application of policy - normative, and (3) "what if" - in this case the most grim future - hypothetical. They provide us with a view of dissimilar destinies and, ultimately, the choice as to the manner in which we address the future.

### Exploratory (Nominal) Mode

#### **County Board of Supervisors - Emergency Session on Homelessness: February 7, 2001.**

... homeless - young, old, women, children, the disabled, their advocates, clergy, members

of the Militant Homeless Front, city and county politicians and staff, and, of course, a cross-section of public safety representatives, all present to discuss, more certainly do battle, over the smoldering problem of homelessness. What could have been - more responsive public safety services, expansion of public and private social services, more shelter, significant reductions in homeless numbers, and the scope of the problem, had evolved into what was - a much more pronounced dilemma which would require resources, cooperation and understanding of now more extreme proportions to turn around.

As the meeting was called to order, the room still buzzing with talk and some obvious posturing, especially on the part of several advocates, three members of the Militant Front stormed to the dias, dumping trash (symbolic of the squalor in which homeless were forced to live) in front of the Board and screaming demands for immediate appropriations for shelter and medical services. Their ejection, by police (who else?), cleared the way, some fifteen minutes later, for staff and city reports.

Reports chronicled the ten-year progression of the homeless problem to its current, gloomy state: regional funding had expanded only marginally, this due to continuing state and county budget woes and, critically, the significant advance of apprehension and opposition from the public at-large; the cost of rental housing had increased 30 percent; many of the area's high-tech firms had fled to the central valley between 1991-1995; and the availability of shelter, which had increased by just half since 1991, still lagged woefully behind need. The result: the regional homeless population had increased by roughly 150 percent.

The homeless were now everywhere. Once rarely seen in neighborhoods, usually confining themselves to living unobtrusively in cars, creekbeds or "out-of-the-way" places, they now camped in parks, in and around vacant properties and city facilities, and loitered in large numbers in residential and business areas day and night.

Public Safety departments reported last, to a round of boos from the homeless, some advocates and the Militant Front. All reported homeless-specific workload increases, some as high as 150 percent. More crime by and against the homeless, increase in population size, and more fear-based calls-for-service were cited as contributing factors. Agencies represented lamented the lack of resource and time their departments had with which to address the problem, consensus being that its advance had escalated to the point where the homeless agenda seriously impacted general police service capabilities in all cities.

As the meeting concluded, follow-up sessions set and ad-hoc committees empaneled, most left with hope bolstered, gloomily, by the sense that the problem was now surely too big to ignore for another decade.

Normative (desired and attainable) Mode

**Governor to present Service Excellence Award.**

**Second Service "Hub" Opened.**

The opening of the homeless family service "hub" was a source of much pride and now, notoriety for the city. The "hub," financed almost entirely by area businesses and industry, would, in combination with the cities' other "hub," actually reduce the "street" homeless population to below pre-1991 levels. The Governor's presentation to Mayor Gaffin earlier in the day would, as stated by the mayor, "...stand as a symbol of dedication shared by public and private sectors alike to weaving the disenfranchised into the social fabric of the community."

As Chief Crowe mingled over coffee and danish with the other guests, to include Ruth Kitchen - coordinator of the now less Militant Homeless Front, Dr. Drake - Chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce, Ralph Duncan - an ex-transient, now Director of the other "hub," and Councilman Barby, he took a mental tour, in retrospect, of the decade now consummated by the day's events.

In May of 1991, spurred by police (then Chief Nelson) forecasts describing the potential for enormous escalation of a then moderate homeless problem and prodding to act, the city had formed a steering committee to address the issue. The committee constructed a three-pronged plan which focused on developing city-wide support for action, including budget appropriations; the upgrade of local and county social service support; and promoting the development of more homeless shelter. In addition to taking the initial point position on the issue, the police department had played a major role in accomplishing these tasks. The initiation of internal and external programs had raised department-wide ethic, instilled better understanding of and compassion for the homeless plight in all sectors of the community, reduced apprehension levels significantly, and played a pivotal role in the identification and involvement of the homeless community. Chief Crowe, as well as many others, homeless included, felt certain that police efforts in reducing apprehension and moving to the front as examples had provided the key to developing support and readiness so crucial to the Council's movement to match state funding offered for the establishment of service "hubs" in 1994 and acceptance of some eight government-owned homes for homeless housing in the same year.

Indeed, what a turnaround. Two service "hubs," the Job Introduction Program sponsored by Big Ed's Emporium and, while the department's homeless-specific workload had remained consistent with that experienced in 1991, most of the resources now being expended were funneled towards a real variety of positive programs, not the least of which was the homeless domestic violence counseling services jointly sponsored with the Militant Front.

## Hypothetical Mode

**Date: March 16, 2001**

**Offense: Assault with a deadly weapon**

**Victim: Martha Sumer, white female, age 34**

**Address: none (Baylands Homeless Encampment)**

Officer Jacobs scraped the mud - he hoped that's what it was, from his shoe as he scanned the vast, tent-adorned Baylands Encampment, a ten-acre area proximate to the Amphitheater and Shoreland City Park. The city-owned property became the "legal home" of some 800 homeless, this following the California Supreme Court's decision in May of 1996 which allowed homeless to live and erect temporary shelter on publicly owned, unimproved lands. The ruling, which most thought was provoked by the Court's frustration and revulsion with the extreme inattention and neglect offered the burgeoning homeless epidemic, followed a five-year period wherein a 7 billion dollar state budget deficit (1993) and the throes of the unacknowledged recession resulted in virtual elimination of all funding for homeless-related programs at all levels of government. Most critical, at least to Jacobs, had been the loss of two officers due to department budget cutbacks caused by the reductions in POST training reimbursement rates effected in 1995.

As his partner wrapped up the investigation - no witnesses, of course, and the victim's refusal of medical treatment, Jacobs lamented the plight he and the rest of the city endured because of these homeless "bums:" the public now avoided the park, amphitheatre and downtown; merchants had fled the once revitalized downtown (1990) in droves - homeless were living in many alleys and openly begged for money during the daylight hours; and, with the homeless population having increased over 200 percent, the weight of their presence and affect had seriously impacted the department's ability to deliver service city-wide. Why, the Baylands alone now required much of the time and attention of officers assigned to beat five.

Jacobs, a 29-year veteran, couldn't understand it. How had it all happened? As he and Elmer headed back to the station, the shift almost over, he began to relax. Not even the sight of several homeless huddled in the corner of the 7-11 lot bothered him ... much. As they turned into the yard, they received the broadcast, assigned to them: "... fight in progress; two homeless males; 7-11 lot; ..." Elmer acknowledged the call and turned the cruiser out of the lot, northbound. Jacobs, swallowing his fifth and sixth antacid tablets of the day, cursed loudly, expressing his disgust for the homeless and hope that somebody (else) would do something about these "scum" soon.

## POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The normative scenario presents one example of a future which is, by definition and in reality, both desirable and, given the courage and dedication to act, attainable. What policies, or actions, used either individually or in combination with others, could be employed to address the trends and events expressed in the scenario to bring about such a desired future? A range of policies (Appendix H) was developed and considered. The three listed and described below were chosen for mock application, as a group, to assess their impact on these driving, shaping forces. Selection was based on a variety of factors, such as: cost-effectiveness; political and organizational feasibility; local control - to include that related to destiny and outside involvement/participation; and practicality.

Policy 1: police agencies to deliver special homeless awareness education programs to neighborhood and business communities via new or existing crime prevention infrastructures.

Policy 2: police/cities to establish health and public safety task forces to promote local and regional response to the homeless problem.

Policy 3: police agencies (via Chiefs of Police) to take resolute, positive stances in bringing to the attention of local government the scope, impacts and potential impacts of the homeless problem, both as they relate to police agencies and cities in general; update with reports as appropriate.

What effect would the application of these policies, or preliminary strategy, have on the probability of events and level of trends expressed in the desired future scenario? Analysis produced the following assessments:

Trend - Police Involvement in Solutions. Clearly, the actions selected would have profound impact on the level of positive police involvement in solutions. Involvement is so critical to impacting the other trends and events that it could easily be used as the “umbrella” descriptor for the strategy comprised of the three actions suggested.

Trend - Police Service Ethic. The resolute stance taken by departments and their chief executives does, when combined with follow-up action to specifically address the problem, clearly upgrade the level of service and ethic expressed by departments towards the problem and those involved.

Trend - Community Apprehension. As already indicated, apprehension looms as the significant block to solutions and all levels and a factor which increases police workload related to the homeless. Awareness and education programs would, in combination with example set by police involvement and city efforts, significantly lower apprehension levels, setting the stage for support, solutions and, eventually, lessening of police workload.

Trends - Availability of Alternative Shelter and Funding for Homeless Solutions. Involvement, increased understanding and empathy, and lessening of community apprehension set the stage for support for solutions in the community and, critically, at local and regional levels of government.

Actions can lead to increased funding, both in the private and public sectors, for homeless solutions, to include shelter. Such an environment also produces the ability to orchestrate the acceptance and employment of other, unique alternatives - in this case the receipt of vacant homes. Absent support and consensus in the community for example, the infusion of homeless into homes in various parts of our communities would face much opposition, balking and delay at all political levels and, in many cases, dissension in communities impacted.

Trend - Homeless Activism. Positive police involvement, better liaison, service and ethic and eventual solutions reduce the causes which spur militant expression and the level of the trend itself. As captured in the ideal future, the belief exists that success of suggested actions would lead to a circumstance where militant expression is reduced and could be replaced by involvement in non antagonistic efforts.

Trend - Police Workload Impact. In the desired future, the actions suggested lead to increased support, shelter, housing, involvement, and, ultimately, the lowering of homeless populations. Fewer homeless, less activism, better relationships between law enforcement and homeless, providers/advocates and activists would, in the end, result in a lessening of homeless specific workload. Resources previously **demande**d by virtue of the scope of the problem would be allocated, **by choice**, to provide non enforcement alternatives with other than field personnel.

Event - State Funding for Service "Hubs." While actions might not directly affect state decision-making processes, they would lessen apprehension, build support and create an environment wherein local and regional governments move to allocate funding and take actions with reduced opposition and much more support. Actions do, therefore, increase the probability of such an event occurring. (Note: Actions employed statewide to create such an environment could, in the end, even effect state policy-making).

Event - Cities Receive Government-Owned Homes. Again, absent grassroots support which builds to such extreme that it influences decision-making at the national level (possible), actions would not directly affect the probability of the event. As indicated previously, however, actions would produce a setting wherein local governments could move speedily to accept and disperse such housing to homeless: lessening of neighborhood opposition, increased support, and enhancement of infrastructures and communication with the homeless community, their supporters and providers/advocates are projected by-products of the actions.

PART TWO

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Analysis of the homeless problem and the need to change in response to what our homeless future might be, led to the decision to effect immediate, self-initiated change. Choice of the desired and attainable future state results in the challenge of how to change or, more specifically, poses the question of what plan (strategy) of action will best serve to bring about such a future.

Strategic planning requires still more analysis, in this case an audit of the specific "situation" in which change is to be initiated. Ultimately, the plan will rest on a foundation which best assures address of needs expressed by the problem, objective, organization and all those impacted by the change and related processes.

In the instant study, strategic planning to address the homeless problem will involve the City of Mountain View Police Department. The plan developed is drawn for a two-fold purpose: (1) meet the specific needs of the department and its environment, and (2) to serve as a model for use by other California agencies, the prerequisite for which would be the application of similar planning processes and "environmental" modification.

## THE ENVIRONMENT

The City of Mountain View, comprised of a predominately middle class population of 70,000, sits at the northern end of "high-tech" Silicon Valley in Santa Clara County. The city, which operates under a manager-council government structure, faces the following key issues: follow-up to recent downtown revitalization; address of an increasingly more diverse population, to include recent notice of a growing homeless segment of roughly 300-500; future tax base: high tech-firms are leaving the valley for locations where the costs of housing and doing business are cheaper; future development; and the cost of rental housing - the city housing element is comprised predominately of multi-family dwellings.

The City does, at least in principal, share concern for a county-wide homeless problem marked by: (1) an estimated population of 13,000-20,000; (2) shelter space for only 2,000; and (3) a 39 % increase in the number of families applying for homeless aid

between 1989 and 1990.<sup>30</sup> However, no movement has yet been made to confront the issue.

The police department has experienced a significant increase in homeless workload over the past two years. Homeless now appear in neighborhoods, sometimes loiter around downtown businesses, and "live" in vacant structures, cars, along the Cal-Train right-of-way and in riverbeds. Persistent problems are also experienced in some city parks, where toilet and/or shower facilities are available. Complaints from merchants, neighborhoods and other city departments have become quite frequent. With resources available to treat the problem limited to three regional armories (in the winter months - accounts for the previously mentioned 2,000 bed spaces) and a local, rotating church shelter program serving 15, police response to cries for action has been limited to the usual - contact, warning and enforcement.

## SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Analysis of the situation focuses on: the department's external environment - threats and opportunities; organizational capability - strengths, weaknesses and mission; and stakeholders, those individuals, groups or entities present in either area who will be impacted by the change and/or who will be able to influence the change process. Analysis was accomplished with the assistance of panel comprised of four department and city staff members familiar with the study and its results, to this point.

Threats and Opportunities. The panel developed a candidate list of threats and opportunities (Appendix I), and rationale which supported the ability of each to affect eventual construction of strategy. Review of the panel's perspective resulted in the selection of the following deemed most critical:

Police Homeless Workload (Opportunity & Threat) - increase in type and weight provides both the impetus for problem-solving and threat of eventual "overload."

Regional Committee on Homelessness (Opportunity) - support for solutions and actions escalating. Churches, citizens and politicians represented.

Establishment of Homeless Service "Hub" (Opportunity) - would provide

shelter, services and focal point for police-homeless interaction.

Community Response to Police Crime Prevention Programs (Opportunity) - great "track records" for education, support-building and problem-solving.

Media Coverage (Opportunity) - builds and focuses attention on homeless problem and can foster supportive climate and pressure for solutions.

Community Apprehension (Opportunity & Threat) - addressing the problem by raising awareness may result in its reduction or escalation.

Budget (Threat) - Governments at the Federal, State, County levels have cut social service funding dramatically in the face of budget deficits generated by legislative spending mandates, reduced revenues and ever-increasing service demands.

Regional Funding for Homeless Programs (Threat) - Inadequate, by far, to meet need; demand to funding gap extreme and increasing.

Homeless Activism (Threat) - militant actions promote negative backlash in the community and activity generally requires police response.

Redevelopment (Threat) - regional and city (downtown) actions have resulted in an increase of homeless numbers, especially in core areas.

Not surprisingly, threats, defined primarily by lack of financial and public support for solutions, seem overwhelming. However, resources and networks are in place which, if involved to advantage, could greatly assist in not only reducing apprehension, but capitalizing on the increased support which might result from the effort.

Strengths and Weaknesses. Again, which are most critical to the organization's ability to construct and implement strategy? The panel produced a candidate list (Appendix J), supporting rationale and perspective. Analysis of the input resulted in selection of the following:

Chief of Police (Strength) - progressive thinker, and "futurist" sensitive to the homeless problem. His recent return to the department greatly improved morale. He enjoys excellent support, both internally and throughout the city.

Representation: Committee on Homelessness (Strength) - involvement has produced understanding, staff involvement and strong ties to this support group.

Budget (Strength) - while revenues have decreased, city and department budgets are and will remain quite adequate. Support exists for new programs which produce service level increases.

Community Support (Strength) - ethic, reputation of the chief and staff, and involvement in the schools and delivery of special educational programs have resulted in excellent relationships with council, neighborhoods and business community.

Training and Education (Strength) - coupled with leadership expressed by the Chief, has resulted in strong service ethic and professional, high-quality service level. Overall member skill level is high.

Crime Prevention Unit (Weakness) - staff of two is most inadequate; incapable of meeting basic needs, compromising potential effectiveness of the department.

Lack of "Homeless" Mission (Weakness) - ethic, direction and plans not yet in place to address the problem (see below).

Line Insensitivity to the Homeless Problem (Weakness) - presents an opposite to the position occupied by the Chief (and staff): officers and, in general, their supervisors, lack understanding of and sensitivity towards the homeless. Service ethic suffers as a result. Staff sense of mission not formalized.

Department Budget Process (Weakness) - now quite centralized, uncoordinated process results in budgets which have been shortsighted.

Department Staffing Matrix (Weakness) - while overall staffing is sufficient to support address of service needs and some new programs, the current allocation matrix, wherein divisions are staffed in a fashion inappropriate to need, results in imbalance of workload, discontent and dysfunction.

Review reveals a department with a multitude strengths and few weaknesses. While parts of the infrastructure and, more critically, homeless service ethic, require attention, the organization, which is skilled, motivated and very well led, is in excellent position to address and implement change.

Mission. The department's mission is built upon five statements, three of which are pertinent to the problem and its address. They are: to provide superior police service; to foster an environment of cooperation and trust within the community; and to challenge the future with a spirit of optimism and innovation. While philosophically applicable to the homeless and the homeless problem, the panel's assessment was that the tenets are not, in fact, being so applied. Positive address of the problem will indeed require "challenging the future," many in our external environment, and the organization. Measures which result in the raising of ethic, service levels and the building of "cooperation and trust" with the homeless, advocates and providers should be the cornerstone of our preferred strategy. In turn, selection of strategy, and its eventual implementation, could be guided and enhanced by a "micro - mission" composed of the following tenets:

- \* to recognize the homeless as a viable segment of the community
- \* to realize that there are unique problems associated with being homeless and to strive to understand and bring about solutions to them
- \* to promote involvement by the city and community in problem solving and to seek ways in which to integrate the homeless into the community
- \* to build the concensus for support and action which will allow us to manage the future service needs of the homeless community

Stakeholder Analysis. Concluding the final step of the audit, the panel developed a list of candidate stakeholders (Appendix K), which was refined, by concensus, to the following list of key stakeholders and assumptions attributed to each. The list contains stakeholders who might seem insignificant, but could dramatically impact both the development and implementation of strategy and action.

1. Chief of Police : (a) will support development of a plan to address the problem; (b) will not support plans which can only be implemented through cuts or obstructions to other priority services or programs.
2. Police Line Personnel: (a) they do not truly recognize the homeless as a viable service element; (b) they will not favor addressing the problem at the expense of cuts to street staffing components.
3. City Manager: (a) understands the need to address the homeless problem; (b) support for strategies demanding increases in personnel must be justified by the ability to increase other service capabilities.
4. Regional Committee on Homelessness (COH): (a) will support, in any way possible, efforts to address the problem; (b) absent involvement, their "help" may be counterproductive.
5. Downtown Business Coalition: (a) they desire strict enforcement approach as means to address the problem; (b) will not support programs which compromises police presence levels in downtown areas.
6. The Homeless: (a) are skeptical of police; (b) they will prefer that our contacts (at least initially) be accomplished via the COH or other agents.
7. City Department Heads: (a) view homeless as nuisance; (b) will fight plans which may negatively impact their pieces of the budget "pie."
8. \* Media: (a) will respond to our requests to cover the issue and problem resolution; (b) will vigorously seek out and publish contrary viewpoints.
9. \* Homeless Activists: (a) will seek media coverage, whether involved or not; (b) will influence our ability to obtain the cooperation of the homeless.
10. Council Neighborhoods Committee: (a) will be guided in their support or

opposition by the posture of neighborhood groups; (b) their support will not guarantee support of full council, but their opposition will guarantee its veto.

How important these stakeholders are to the issue, and how certain we can be of assumptions attributed to each, are measures which, once plotted, provide insight most valuable to the selection of a strategic plan and companion strategies which might be employed to gain support for approval of the plan. Stakeholders were assigned coordinates on a Strategic Assumption Surfacing Plot Map (Appendix L) in order to visually depict individual positioning and the nexus between each.

Mapping resulted in the placement of all stakeholders, with the exception of the Business Coalition and department heads, in the quadrant denoting both certainty and importance to the issue. Of these, the chief, city manager, line personnel, Council Neighborhoods Committee and COH occupy coordinates of the most certainty and importance: the city manager, Council Neighborhoods Committee and chief control approval; the chief also provides leadership - the critical ability to influence; line personnel must support, by their actions, implementation of any plan; and the COH will be required for their advocacy and connection to the homeless and advocates/providers. The homeless, the object of our efforts, occupy a point of much less certainty. Initial contact and interaction with them will test assumptions and offer the ability to reevaluate positioning.

The media and activists are relatively certain to be predictable, unpredictable and difficult to manage. They do, however, offer great resource if positively harnessed. This will require constant monitoring and attention.

Department heads, whose help could be quite helpful, will probably offer resistance and obstruction. Their influence, while probably limited, should be evaluated further. The Downtown Business Coalition may offer objections to strategy not enforcement based, but will probably exert little influence if planning is not detrimental to downtown interests. Their support would be valuable - contact, reassess and readdress.

## STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Alternative strategies were identified by utilizing a six-member panel comprised of law enforcement and non-law enforcement members. The panel, briefed in advance relative to the content of the study to the point of addressing strategic alternatives, developed a list of six potential strategies, discussion thereafter leading to consolidation which reduced the candidate list to five. Voting (Appendix M) resulted in the identification of three strategies for more detailed analysis. A description of those policies, accompanied by the panel's assessment of advantages, disadvantages and critical stakeholder positioning follow.

Strategy #1. Create and present a Special Homeless Crime Prevention Program. Expand the size, function and service capabilities of the existing crime prevention unit. Design specific "homeless" education, awareness, prevention and outreach programs for delivery to city staff, police personnel, neighborhoods, business community and the homeless. Objectives: increase awareness, understanding, concern and attention to the homeless problem city-wide; decrease apprehension; raise support levels; increase connection, understanding and interaction between the homeless, providers/advocates and police/city agencies; and raise police service ethic. The ultimate development of solutions can address the homeless problem in general and police problem (workload; delivery of services; relationship) in particular.

### Advantages:

- \* requires very minimal (one civilian service officer) staffing increase.
- \* positive, nonenforcement approach.
- \* addresses apprehension and internal (service) ethic.
- \* focuses on problem causes and precursors to problem solving.
- \* involves the homeless, advocates, providers and, hopefully, activists.
- \* expands existing infrastructures and overall crime prevention service abilities.
- \* addresses police workload issue and homeless service capabilities.
- \* addresses the need to integrate the homeless into the "formal" community.
- \* utilizes existing infrastructures and expands scope of community involvement.

Disadvantages:

- \* requires staffing (although minimal) increase and relocation of a supervisor.
- \* doesn't address immediate workload demands or external desires for enforcement or quick "fix."
- \* nontraditional approach.
- \* requires involvement of many factions.
- \* requires procurement of additional physical resources.

Stakeholder Positioning:

While the Business Coalition and department heads may offer some opposition, their involvement presents the opportunity for support and commitment, and addressing their concerns, downtown enforcement and avoidance of overall budget impact, respectively, should reduce opposition. The Media should express strong, positive interest. Activists can be expected to show initial skepticism, should wish to be involved and to support. The homeless will support the effort, but will be difficult to involve during initial stages.

The chief and manager who will focus upon the "positives," - the innovative approach and expansion of service capabilities. He should support, with scrutiny given to the manner in which resources are allocated. Support also, in the extreme, can be expected from the COH (also advocates and providers). Police line personnel will be reluctant, but belief in the chief will ensure initial support and involvement.

Strategy #2. Create and deploy a Homeless Field Service Unit. A two person unit, attached to the field services division, assigned to perform enforcement, outreach, problem resolution, interdepartment liaison and referral functions. High priority to neighborhood and business areas and to homeless family service (referral) needs. Objectives: address immediate homeless workload demands; enhance, as able, delivery of social service referrals; increase communication with and identification of the homeless community; initiate connection to service providers and advocates; address community apprehension; and serve as a stage for possible escalation of programs and attention to the homeless problem.

### Advantages

- \* addresses present homeless workload demands.
- \* addresses immediate business and neighborhood community concerns.
- \* presents basic, albeit very inadequate connection to social service system and advocates/ providers.
- \* increases communication with the homeless community and will help to identify same.
- \* addresses present concerns of field personnel.

### Disadvantages

- \* will definitely require staffing increases.
- \* will, for the most part, be viewed as the usual negative enforcement approach by homeless, activists, providers and advocates.
- \* ability to enhance referral, delivery of social services and connection to other departments and advocates/providers will be minimal.
- \* does not address causes or solutions to the homeless problem itself. Addresses symptoms only.
- \* will not address future police problem with the homeless (workload; service capabilities).
- \* will not generate broad based support.
- \* increases department commitment enforcement measures.

### Stakeholder Positioning:

Unless evolution of the program is extremely unusual, activists, the homeless, and COH will not render much, if any, support. In fact, although this approach will initially garner the support of the business group, line personnel and the interest of the media, the threat exists that this "business as usual" enforcement approach may become old and taken for granted quite quickly. The program offers little incentive, and retains the preexisting budget threat, for the department head group.

The chief may support the program, if only to address a "futures" problem with a program which may provide a stepping stone to a later, more novel and advanced effort. The city manager will be reluctant to increase enforcement

programs without increasing real overall service capabilities.

Strategy #3. Establish a Public Safety Committee on Homelessness. To be chaired by the chief of police, a committee comprised of members of the police, fire, city manager's offices, parks and housing departments and a representative from the COH. Objectives: identify homeless problems, service needs and potential avenues and resources with which to address them; liaison with the City Council, Council Neighborhoods Committee and other groups; and support and plans for problem solving and treatment of forces shaping the problem.

#### Advantages

- \* does not require staffing increases.
- \* notices and addresses the homeless problem as a city issue.
- \* increases interdepartment coordination.
- \* will involve participants external to the city structure.
- \* will address present-and future-oriented solutions and issues.
- \* will be viewed as positive step.

#### Disadvantages

- \* does not address immediate and near future police workload issue.
- \* does not address community apprehension or, in full, police or city service ethic. May raise apprehension levels.
- \* does not involve the homeless, activists, or advocates/providers in immediate planning.
- \* does not address ability of police to offer enhancement of services to homeless
- \* may be viewed as an "empty" solution.
- \* large committee could become bogged down with issues, territorial concerns and "red tape." Could become quite unworkable.

#### Stakeholder Positioning:

Certainly the safest plan, both politically and economically, to implement. The city manager, chief (reluctantly, in lieu of other alternatives), Neighborhoods Committee and department heads would all support, although support and real interest after startup would be expected to decline considerably. So also

would the interest of the media, absent real action or progress. Support of line personnel would be irrelevant to implementation. Although the COH would welcome the advance and involvement, support would fade and become superficial absent progress.

The Downtown Business Coalition could be expected to continue its demands for enforcement and perhaps demand involvement. Its support is, however, not required. While homeless and activist support would not be required, activists could be expected to use the Committee's birth to press for action.

## SELECTION OF PREFERRED STRATEGY

Analysis and consensus led to the panel's selection of Strategy #1 (which was bolstered by the addition of a committee quite similar to that proposed as Strategy #3), as the vehicle deemed most appropriate to address the homeless issue.

The addition of a Public Safety Steering Committee on Homelessness to the Special Homeless Crime Prevention strategy bolstered an approach which was identified as having the most potential for: addressing root causes of the homeless problem; maximizing use of external opportunities; taking advantage of organizational strengths while addressing weaknesses; garnering the broadest range of stakeholder support and involvement; and eventually bringing about a form of the chosen desired and attainable future. Clearly, while the strategy requires the greatest degree of involvement, expenditure of resources (relatively) and exposes the department and city to the most political risk, it also provides the best opportunity for real, long-term success and thus, rewards. (Refer to Appendix N for a more detailed outline the strategy.)

## IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

The selection of preferred strategy, in effect comprised of several policies or action agendas, leads to the issue of how best to implement the plan and lay groundwork

for managing transition from present to future states, which will follow. The implementation plan selected for this purpose is presented below and addresses, in a very broad sense, action steps, resources and commitments necessary to invoke the Special Homeless Crime Prevention Program.

### Action Steps

1. **Commitment and Approval:** presentation of the strategy to the chief and then staff for review and approval; strategy outline, which includes timelines, objectives, action steps and other requirements, developed and approved (Appendix O); chief to present to the city manager and obtain support and approval to continue with administrative and negotiation actions required to obtain stakeholder support and eventual approval from council during budget process (note: implementation to be timed with fiscal year budget cycle; proper planning addresses budget process weakness previously identified and, coupled with cycle planning, greatly improves opportunity for council approval).
2. Chief to select a project manager and additional infrastructure to address implementation and transition (see: Section Three - Transition Management).
3. Presentation and address with stakeholders: starting point is the body of the department (line stakeholder group critical) and extends outward, progressing from department heads and Neighborhoods Committee to those external to the city. External focus will be limited to those required for budget approval and involvement in program presentation.  
  
Initial contacts will invariably result in reassessment of positions and, in some cases, modification of approach and readdress.
4. Budget Preparation: process flows, through stages, to the point of approval.
5. Steering Committee and crime prevention unit: selection of personnel and/or members results in start-up and expansion, respectively.

6. Acquisition of resources: expansion of crime prevention office space; desks, vehicle, phones, supplies, etc. Preliminary meetings with external stakeholders (COH; Activists; Homeless) and also advocates/providers to begin to address involvement and development of educational presentations.
7. Marketing the program: draws in media; initial overview to business, neighborhoods and other stakeholders, to include those involved and addressed, above. Negotiation process continues with all stakeholders to continue support and, critically, requisite involvement.
8. Presentation of Program: follows developed schedule and attending timeline. Successful delivery requires constant evaluation of objectives (development and delivery of training programs) and their measures (numbers of presentations, feedback, etc.), to include, as time progresses, such things as homeless referrals, placements, contacts, increasing support networks, and decreasing street workload.

The program's 31-month cycle concludes with critique and, hopefully, regeneration to continue support and solution building process.

## STAKEHOLDER NEGOTIATIONS

The homeless problem and the strategy developed to address it, do and will evoke both objective and emotion based responses, support and opposition. Successful implementation of the Special Homeless Crime Prevention plan will require various levels of support, commitment and/or involvement from each identified stakeholder. Negotiation to secure such support must be based upon an understanding of positions and assumptions held by each, reassessment of those positions, assessment of the position to be negotiated (needs of the strategy) - the department's position and, above all, the employment of sound judgment and common sense.

"Opposing" positions and approaches are examined below. While the process of negotiations which would attend the implementation of the strategy would most

certainly be quite time consuming, complex and involve the address of each stakeholder, time and space limitations resulted in the construction of the following condensed model depicting positions of the negotiator and several stakeholders viewed as both critical and most interesting to the process.

### Negotiator's Position.

Not negotiable: (1) addition of a sergeant (transfer from inter-division assignment) and an additional community service officer to the crime prevention unit - addition of the new positions absolutely essential to proper supervision, management of workload and enhancement of overall crime prevention effort; (2) necessary resources; (3) chair of the Steering Committee - assures proper "public safety" focus, coordination and continuity, and control closest to the the program's source; (4) use of COH, county service personnel and the homeless in program start-up and delivery - absent involvement, the program will lack credibility, advocacy, those most intimate and knowledgeable with the problem, and those who are the object of our focus.

Negotiable: (1) budget - while a two-year cycle is preferred, approval for one-year package is acceptable; (2) staffing - the crime prevention unit is presently supervised by a police agent. Addition of the new sergeant and other member will allow replacement of the agent with a police officer is deemed necessary to secure approval; (3) use of homeless activists - their use as presenters and for formal use elsewhere (other than advocacy, liaison a activities) is not desired; (4) phase-in - while immediate allocation of staffing and resources for start-up is most preferred, program building and the infusion of resources over a two-versus requested one-year cycle is acceptable.

### Stakeholder Positions

Activists - they have deep, sometimes selfish concern for the cause and mistrust the police. This and the desire for involvement in and identification with "success" or solutions will mold their posture. It is anticipated that they

will desire placement of activist or homeless individuals with the Steering Committee (not negotiable); may wish to negotiate desired involvement as liaisons with the homeless; will demand formation of homeless "neighborhood" or area groups, with attendant attention (desired and negotiable); and will desire their own involvement (not negotiable) and that of the homeless (desired and negotiable) in program presentations.

Activists must be persuaded that their involvement will truly benefit the homeless and convinced of our sincerity. Their involvement greatly enhances the program's credibility.

As unreasonable demands or actions may cause negative response within city government or the community, delay or withdrawal tactics may be useful. Included in this approach would be apparent withdrawal, used cautiously, as a means to soften strict positions which might be taken by activists. While their cooperation will be most useful, it is not absolutely essential - a lack of cooperation or our understanding that they lack the ability to assist might support severing of their involvement and adjustments to move forward without them.

Homeless - real hunger for solutions, diluted by mistrust of police, some hostility for the system and lack of cohesiveness are but some of the many factors affecting their perspective and our ability to get them involved. They may desire initial inordinate, formal representation (not negotiable), but, given effective liaison and development of relationship with them, can be expected to agree to be involved as presenters, used as agents to involve others, to be involved in program development, and assist in coordinating homeless "neighborhood" or area groups.

The homeless must be convinced of our sincerity and that their participation will serve them greatly. The endorsement of selected agents (COH; activists; providers/advocates) and very candid approach are viewed as most appropriate.

Chief of Police - advocacy for homeless solutions and desire to expand the service capabilities of the crime prevention unit, tempered by the usual

realities of budget and related processes and line insensitivity are concerns which frame his position. He will not agree to staffing increases which come at the expense of high priority service functions or the formal involvement of activists in the early stages of the program. He is however, supportive of suggested staffing increases and mechanisms suggested for their procurement and other needs.

His inclusion, faith and support are critical. A straightforward, candid approach which stresses his involvement, ability to expand the crime prevention unit and our ability to generate a "model" for law enforcement is most appropriate.

City Manager - the usual social, political and budgetary "bottom lines" will influence his eventual decision, which overshadow his personal and professional concern (don't read as city priority) for the problem. Will be influenced by ability of the program to expand overall service levels. It is anticipated that he can support the nature and suggested manner of necessary staffing increases and the approval of the plan's training agenda. He, too, will not support very formal use of activists or the placement of homeless on or near the Steering Committee. He may wish to negotiate on the phase-in of resources, and will be tough to sell on formalization of homeless neighborhood groups within the city. He will be most attentive to input from the Council Neighborhoods Committee.

Key: Employing the chief as a very candid primary negotiator and stressing of the program's ability to broadly increase crime prevention efforts in all sectors of the city. Advocacy of COH, other regional groups, to include churches, and the employ of two councilmembers who occupy positions on both the COH and Neighborhoods Committee will greatly serve to sway him. The willingness to make concessions (again, phase-in of resources) will help to solidify his support.

Line Personnel - their concern and lack of motivation will flow from lack of understanding and concern for the homeless (read: reduced ethic), focus on more parochial, conservative concerns which they might see as more appropriate for address, and the usual, understood anxiety about change.

However, their fresh and almost unlimited support for the chief, implementation and transition technologies which address their concerns, questions and need for involvement, will guarantee their initial and short-term support.

Department Heads - while some concern exists for the problem, their apprehension about the budget "pie" and need for their involvement in planned training and eventual city-wide problem solving frame their position(s). They will desire to add their stamp of approval to training programs (negotiable) and their involvement in training which might eventually (program recycle) include their employees (desired and negotiable). Might mildly express concern over projected staffing increase of one and would strongly oppose formal use of activists on Steering Committee or other visible position.

The release of information quite early as a "trial balloon" might be effective in assessing true position and planning their address, accordingly. Effectively communicating the limited nature of necessary staffing increases, and the benefits they will accrue from the problem's address (less exposure to the homeless and homeless problems by their departments and employees), will persuade them to withhold opposition and, quite possibly, engender spot support. Should these approaches be unsuccessful, it is anticipated that support can be obtained over their objections.

PART THREE

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

The culmination of the strategic planning process delivers the department to the brink of change. Actual implementation of the Special Homeless Crime Prevention strategy will effect change, but will not result in an immediate or speedy leap to our desired future state. Rather, by virtue of enactment of change, the organization and its environment will be propelled into a state of transition.

“Transition is a lengthy and frequently traumatic process significantly different from (the act of) simple change,”<sup>31</sup> wherein the actual work of implementation, to include the address of concern, chaos and need for information and involvement, must take place. Special planning is required to ensure that pitfalls most common to this change management process are avoided.

Outlined in detail immediately following, the transition management plan constructed for implementation of the Special Homeless Crime Prevention Program employs a management scheme uniquely suited to the circumstance and methods and technologies designed to elicit the attention, support and commitment of all those involved in or impacted by the change process.

#### CRITICAL MASS - IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION

Various levels of support and/or involvement will be required from all who have a “stake” in the change process if implementation of the homeless strategy is to be successful. The critical mass is defined as the minimum number of individuals whose active commitment can provide the energy and influence necessary to ensure that such support is obtained and that the desired change and change state is realized.

Composition of the critical mass is affected by a variety of factors. In this instance, the department’s recent and somewhat extreme change history, to include hire (return) of the new chief, nature of its social system, requirement for budget and staffing approvals, and need for support from stakeholders external to the department influence complexion of the mass. Application of these criteria resulted in the selection

of the following six individuals as critical mass actors:

Investigative Services Division Captain  
Chief of Police  
City Manager  
Councilman "X"  
Chairman of the Regional Committee on Homelessness (COH)  
Field Training Officer (Program) Lieutenant

A precursor to planning for the securing of commitment from each member of the critical mass is the completion of analysis relative to each member's capability and readiness to change. Capability is defined as the level of power, influence and skills required to change, while readiness refers to motive and willingness to change. An assessment of each member's capability and readiness was completed by charting each parameter on a scale of high, medium or low (Appendix P), the results of which are described, very briefly, below:

ISD Captain - involved with the problem as the department's representative to the COH and very much motivated to employ and champion positive solutions, he possesses the skill and, to a great degree, influence required to prompt effective implementation and to see the strategy through.

Chief of Police - while he harbors concerns for budget and ability of the organization to accept and handle the changes which will be required to implement the strategy, he is motivated on several fronts and possesses the management and influence capabilities necessary to move the organization from the present to the future.

City Manager - while concerned and personally motivated to address the issue, political, interdepartment and other concerns affect his readiness level. He does, however, possess the ultimate influence and power base (city infrastructure; business group; budget approval; and leadership) required for approval and support of change.

City Councilman "X" - a member of the COH who is personally and, to a degree,

politically motivated to see change occur. He has the capability to ensure council approval of budget and support necessary to secure other resources, both tangible and intrinsic; however, both his readiness and capability are tempered by political reality and must be addressed to ensure his immediate and long-lasting support.

Chairman - COH - his commitment and "extreme" readiness are self-evident. He offers the ability to generate some political support and will enhance our capability to connect and work with advocates and providers. Most importantly, he (and COH) offers the link which best offers the ability to gather, motivate and involve the homeless (and activists).

FTO Lieutenant - his sensitivity and desire to address the issue (as a priority) are very low. His position as manager of the field training program, a true leader, and ability to influence the many young and energetic officers in the department make it imperative that his position and attitude be addressed.

## COMMITMENT PLANNING

Armed with an identification of the critical mass and understanding of their capability and readiness, strategy can be developed to ensure that the required minimum level of commitment is secured from each member of the critical mass: it is imperative that no member "block" the change effort, and that the level of support needed from each member is obtained. A completed Commitment Chart, which follows, depicts current and minimum commitment levels assessed for each mass member. Following the table, member is listed, coupled with brief explanations as to their importance, position(s), and the particular strategies or approaches which will be used to secure their commitment.

COMMITMENT CHART

| Actors in Critical Mass | Block Change | Let Change Happen | Help Change Happen | Make Change Happen |
|-------------------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| ISD Captain             |              |                   |                    | (X0)               |
| Chief of Police         |              | X—————0           |                    |                    |
| City Manager            | X—————0      |                   |                    |                    |
| Councilman "X"          |              | X—————0           |                    |                    |
| Homeless Chair          |              |                   | (X0)               |                    |
| FTO Lieutenant          |              | X—————0           |                    |                    |

ISD Captain - the captain commands the division in which the crime prevention unit resides and is the department's COH representative. He has been involved with the homeless issue and efforts for many years and advances the instant plan for its address. His dedication, function and leadership position make him the clear choice to "champion" the cause, a role which should be formalized with the Chief's announcement of his appointment as the project's director. Present and minimum commitment levels are both "make change happen." While no movement is required, the captain will need support and encouragement (role modeling) from the chief and COH to sustain him through what promises to be a tedious, energy-intensive change effort.

Chief of Police - following a five-year period wherein the department experienced a nasty labor dispute, poor relations with city government, the reign of an incompetent (hired from the outside) chief and "laundering" of its management staff with the hire of five external managers, the chief (previously a lieutenant with the department) was returned to occupy the position of chief executive. His return validates and resurrects organizational pride and he enjoys the almost unqualified faith, support and trust of the organizational body. He can deliver the initial, if not long-lasting, support of the general body. His present commitment level of "let change happen" must move to "help change happen" to ensure successful implementation. His concerns (resistance) can be overcome by appealing to his dedication to addressing "futures" issues and focusing on his agenda to expand the general service level and function of the crime prevention unit. Specifically, he must be convinced that the Homeless Plan is the proper and timely vehicle to accomplish these objectives. Educational activities and resistance management techniques should be employed.

City Manager - controls the budget process and requirement for council approval of required staffing/budget increases. While he cannot deliver council support without the assistance of Councilman "X," increase and program requests cannot be considered by that body without his approval - generally, his approval equates to their support. Additionally, the manager's support will produce support and involvement required from department heads and critical long-term action agenda by the city. He presently occupies a "block change" position (tight budget

and competition for budget dollars; conservative, "show me" stance on staffing-based service enhancements). Movement to required "help it happen" position can be secured by employing role modeling, resistance management, problem finding and educational activities will be employed. Specifically, a strong sell and evidence of commitment from the chief, captain, Chair -COH and councilman; show that implementation will produce not only the address of the homeless problem, but also, greatly enhance general crime prevention capabilities as well; and suggestion that state/national attention and prestige might follow successful implementation, should produce desired movement.

Councilman "X" - he is the most powerful councilperson and harbors a desire to (eventually) become mayor. Visible advocate for homeless solutions and member of the Regional Committee on Homelessness. He can, working with the city manager, secure council support for staffing/budget increases. His concerns: will the plan succeed?; tight budget and sentiments of neighborhood groups; and political support building. His present commitment level of "let it happen" cant be moved to "help it happen by using problem finding, role modeling, changing rewards and resistance management techniques. Specifically, resistance can be overcome by meetings with the city manager, chief, captain and Chair - COH (individually or collectively) to exhibit commitment, sell, address potential problems, benefits and by alluding to the possible political attention and support which could be gained by "backing this socially sensitive, unique and positive" solution.

Chairman - COH - politically influential at the local and regional levels, he can deliver the support of COH, some activists and providers/advocates and the cooperation and participation, at least initially, of the majority of our identifiable homeless community. Current commitment level of "help it happen" is the level of support desired. He must be kept involved, informed, infusing desired energy and action, but be closely monitored to ensure that his profile does not escalate: such movement could irritate or threaten council and/or neighborhood or business contingents. The employ of private meetings with the project manager and other forms of communication can make this happen.

FTO Lieutenant - an officer possessed with distinct operational and leadership skills, he enjoys the following and respect of the department's most active field officers, this to include the cadre of training officers assigned to educate new officers, deliver internal training to all personnel and serve as role models to all members. His active support (positive attitude) will be required to motivate the trainers and line level to support the Homeless Program (new service ethic and day-to-day field relationships, follow-up, etc.) long after its newness and "built in" support and, as with all new programs, the "rubber hits the road." His current level of commitment must be moved from a "let it happen" stance to one of "help it happen." Role modeling and educational approaches should be delivered by the captain, whom he respects and works closely with. Specifically, appealing to his professional ethic, conveying a clear understanding of program purpose and meaning, as well as the critical role he must play should effect the desired change.

## MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR TRANSITION

As with the process applied to selection of the critical mass, organizational change history, "need to know" environment and complexity of the Homeless Plan (and attendant stakeholders) must be considered when selecting the management structure appropriate to the transition period. Other important considerations are: current organizational structure, size and ability to accomplish the unique tasks and work which will be associated with the change effort; and the absolute need indicated for a strong element of continuity to link present, transition and future states.

Application of these criteria support the establishment of a two-tiered structure to manage the transition: (1) a Project Director - he will report to the chief and be responsible for coordinating implementation; and (2) a Project Committee - to be comprised of a "diagonal slice" of the organization and chaired by the project director, the team will be the working force responsible for actions leading to implementation. Suggestions for several key players on the committee: new crime prevention sergeant; one crime prevention community service officer; the FTO Lieutenant; a field supervisor; and the POA President.

The ISD Captain, whose involvement, commitment and function have been previously addressed, should be selected as the Project Director. He possesses distinct management and leadership capabilities and will bring to the effort external support and commitment which will prove to be very valuable assets. He also provides the critical element of continuity and, by virtue of his roles as Project Director, member of the COH and Chair of the Project Committee, becomes the "linking pin" between internal and external constituencies.

The real need to establish an effective, unclogged infrastructure for organizational feedback, input, the dissemination of information and development of connection to the process justifies the employment of the Project Committee as the second tier of the new management structure. Committee members will ensure instant access to virtually all quarters of the organization and provide the Director with the added base of energy, clout, resource and action necessary for successful implementation of the plan.

## IMPLEMENTATION TECHNOLOGIES

Ensuring that support for implementation is forthcoming and consistent with need requires definitive management of uncertainty, anxiety, indifference and, at best, lukewarm support which will be generated by the advance of change. Management of these symptoms can be accomplished by treating the individual and collective needs which spawn them, this through the application of specific intervention technologies. The technologies listed below have been selected for use because they best address the anticipated needs of the organization, city, community and plan itself. (Note: technologies are to be applied to specific phases of the implementation schedule - refer, previously referenced Appendix O.)

Team-building Workshops and Fireside Chats - these vehicles will be used by the chief (with appropriate, carefully choreographed assistance from the Director) to introduce the plan to the organization and will form the foundation for all technologies employed to support implementation. The chief will "communicate the vision" and his commitment to it, clearly define the plan, implementation schedule and desired future state. Modified confrontation and goal-setting sessions will be conducted

during the TBW meetings (staff/supervisors) and following Fireside Chats (line personnel, groups of 6-12). These forums, coupled with the organization's great confidence in the chief, will diminish anxiety and mistrust, generate faith and connection to mission, and serve as a point of demarcation between the present (old) and future (new). (Phase One - application also for use by the city manager and chief with council and department heads as well.)

Community Meetings - the external version of Team-building Workshops and Fireside Chats: purpose and desired effect the same. To be conducted by the chief and captain (Director). (Phase One.)

Role Modeling - the chief (especially) and staff will "practice what it preaches," displaying the ethic, energy and commitment which will be so vital to the change effort. It will be especially important for the chief to remain visibly connected to the implementation process. Targets are also external constituencies, especially the homeless, who will be most suspect of the change in police attitude and involvement. (Phases One - Six. Again, application for the city manager and councilman with the council, department heads and community.)

Responsibility Charting and Action Planning - employment by the Public Safety Steering Committee (chief chairs) and Project Committee will better ensure that action agendas are set and that specific responsibility (and other roles) are placed for ensuring that designated decisions/actions are made/accomplished. Use will also produce coordination of effort between the two committees and will eliminate the waste of time, energy, confusion (and, of equal import, the look of confusion), and will produce a more directly navigated course of implementation. (Phases One, Two (heavily) - Six.)

Responsibility charting will also be used outside, but in conjunction with, the committee environments. A RASI chart ( Appendix Q) has been completed to designate roles (responsibility, authority, support, inform or irrelevant) for members of the critical mass for several actions/decisions deemed critical to the implementation process. (Also Phases One - Six.)

Changing Rewards - new ethic and mission will produce new individual and organizational priorities and performance objectives. Rating, recognition and reward systems must be changed accordingly. Communication of new expectations (a must), role modeling and appropriate direction and reinforcement will follow. The result: clear expectations will diminish individual and collective apprehension and frustration; desired performance and forward momentum will be built in more immediate, consistent fashion. Application is also made to the COH and especially the homeless, to whom it must be communicated and reinforced that cooperation and involvement will deliver the "rewards" (solutions, service relationship, etc.) we all seek. (Phase One - the future.)

Crime Prevention Bulletin - Project Committee minutes and special information bulletins will issue to provide stakeholders with accurate information about the implementation process, list personal resources for contact and highlight achievement of objectives. This mechanism will serve to dispel rumors, keep the process in the front of the organizational mind and provide all with a contact source for obtaining more detailed information or for providing direct feedback. Finally, it will eliminate the shroud of secrecy and surprise which usually surrounds change processes. (Phases One - Six.)

Managing the Neutral Zone - the delivery of planned internal training, to be followed by a second, much more limited round of Confrontational/Goal Setting sessions, will be scheduled, quite strategically, to renew energy, attention and commitment during the period in transition usually infected by loss of direction and malaise. Visibility of the chief peaks, again. (Phase Four.)

Surveys and Samples - information gathering will be accomplished through the use of formal and informal surveys and sampling, some of which will be completed in connection with the delivery of training to community and homeless groups. Provides two-way mechanism for feedback and involvement. (Phases Four - Five.)

Phase Review - the Project Director will review each phase, and the program in total (as it progresses through phases), making assessments as to progress and effectiveness. (What/how much has been completed? What worked well? What didn't

work? What adjustments or changes need to be made, either with the phase or to the next phase?) A report on the review will be made to the Chief, with distribution to all involved. (Phases One - Five.)

Program Evaluation - the necessary process for critique and follow-up, to include anticipated need for re-cycle of an adjusted program (all or parts), is built into Phase Six of the Timeline and Implementation Schedule. Systems, strategies, technologies, personnel, stakeholders, resources and objectives are just some of the components which should be analyzed. The program should be continued, in whatever form felt appropriate, until initial or new goals have been achieved. The Program Director will be responsible for the process and, as with the Phase Review, making a report of results and recommendations. (Phase Six.)

## SUMMARY

“Managing the Journey” of change requires that we understand where we wish to go, why we need to get there, where we are, have been and, finally, what will be required to get us there. Invariably, the answer to the “what” portion of the puzzle is ... PEOPLE. Successful change, in the instant case implementation of the Special Homeless Crime Prevention Program, will not be accomplished unless those who must carry it out and onward support and embrace it.

The transition management plan outlined should serve as a flexible road map: its employment by those responsible for directing the change effort will better ensure that stakeholders understand the why, where and WHAT involved in the change equation and that they “stay the course.”

CONCLUSIONS  
AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS

The object of this monograph has been to create a plan which can be employed by law enforcement to develop support for and solutions to the homeless problem. The model formulated and presented in the preceding sections addresses a "problem" actually comprised of two parts, those being: (1) the problem of homelessness in general and (2) the problem presented for law enforcement, in the present and especially the future by virtue of the impact the former has and will have on our service (specifically, how will law enforcement manage workload demand generated by the problem in responsible and effective fashion). The premise supporting the plan is that we can successfully manage, and alter projected impact by becoming involved and addressing the general problem.

The study clearly focuses upon the level of workload demand generated by the homeless, about the homeless and as a result of their presence, as the "impact" which the problem will have on law enforcement in the future. Research and forecasting indicate that workload demand has escalated significantly in the recent past with the corresponding advance in the size of the homeless population. More importantly, forecasting predicts that homeless population size and workload levels will both continue to rise, even more dramatically than in the past, by the year 2001. Ultimately, as illustrated by the presentation of alternative future scenarios, the nature and degree of impact, or our exposure to workload demand, will be determined by both the manner and effectiveness of our response to the problem(s).

As exemplified in the normative scenario - our desired and attainable future, impact can in fact be maintained at a level consistent with present day levels. Conversely, exploratory and hypothetical scenarios depict futures wherein exposure to workload demand will be much more pronounced. Each future is presumably the concocted result of inaction and inaction coupled with the occurrence of negative events, respectively. Implications which can be drawn from an assessment of alternative possibilities are that: management of workload requires the dedication and expenditure of human and other resources; response to ever increasing demand will require the expenditure of greater resource levels; and, absent an infinite resource base, greater expenditure on homeless demand will effect response and service capabilities to other problems and sectors of the public.

The method of our response to the problem(s) of homelessness will, as eluded to above, also certainly affect the manner in which law enforcement (as a whole) and its individual parts (agencies) allocate and deploy resources, human and otherwise. In that both the amount of resources (allocation) as well as when and where we choose to use them (deployment) is ultimately determined by workload demand, escalation of the homeless problem, and demand emanating from same, will require that law enforcement: allocate more of its resource pool to the homeless-specific workload; change the pattern of time and location in which existing resources are placed; and affect the manner in which resources are dedicated to other functions and problems. Again, absent an infinite resource base, the need to address one problem or area with more resources generally requires that the difference between present and past allocations be taken from another problem or area and that service capabilities and response are affected in the process.

The plan or strategy developed and recommended herein to address the homeless problem(s) illustrates these points: as with all law enforcement agencies, present demand is managed by patrol members, virtually all of whom handle homeless demand in conjunction with other assigned duties; recognition that demand will drastically increase, affecting response and service capabilities of patrol forces, a plan is drawn to address the problem with resources outside the patrol realm; and implementation requires the addition of resources and transfer of personnel who would otherwise be deployed to address other demands and duties.

The obvious tact of the strategy is to reallocate and deploy today to avoid excessive increase in workload demand and the need to be forced to reallocate and deploy at a later date, after overload has occurred, overall response capability is damaged and application of a "fix" to the problem(s) will be much more difficult and expensive to implement.

The comprehensive Special Home Crime Prevention Program is comprised of several individual "education" programs. Parts include new mission (policy) and the intent to develop new homeless specific procedure/capabilities for police, and resource awareness training for homeless. All are designed to address the critical issues of community apprehension and (its counterpart?) sub-standard police service

ethic. How effective will the plan be in addressing the homeless problem(s) and future needs? The perspective offered by this monograph is that the reduction of apprehension and raising of police service ethic are the prerequisites to success; appropriate and positive ethic, coupled with the implementation of a specific course of action ensure greater, more positive police involvement, connection, example (to the public and city) and long-lasting relationship to the homeless and long-term effectiveness of the program; while a reduction in apprehension levels not only removes the primary block to real solutions, but brings support for them.

The recommendation that law enforcement can and should address the problem(s) of homelessness, conclusion that we can be effective in doing so by attacking the general problem, and following recommendation that the Special Homeless Crime Prevention Strategy be utilized as a model for doing so, are made with the clear understanding that there are those within and outside the law enforcement service who do not believe in or support police address of a "social" problem with other than enforcement-based solutions, and that attending to the problem and implementation of the strategy will be "risky business."

Clearly though, there are many within and outside the profession who support the recommended philosophy and direction, and note is made, from a historical perspective, that the address of social or other issues which in the past seemed inappropriate to what we are all about, have either been forced upon us or found to be most beneficial to our contemporary environment. Examples of those we have been forced to address are too numerous to count, and a recent example to the later is our involvement in cost reimbursement programs - while in the "old days" we relied solely on our city government to provide fiscal resources, we now find it critical to become involved in supporting our own budgets by becoming involved in heretofore unheard of programs of involving fines, collections and confiscation/sale of monies and properties.

Confronting the problem will take courage and, as James Balasco (Command College Session No.7) stated so well, require that we "get our personnel skin in the game." However, in that our mission is **to provide for the service needs of the entire community**, and to plan to be able to do so **in the future**,

recommendation is made that we must address the problem(s) of homelessness. To quote a television pitch, "its the right thing to do," and can do much to ensure that we "leave no one (in our service community) behind." Further, given conclusions derived from forecasting results relative to possible alternative futures, its the smart thing to do, if at the least, to protect ourselves from future negative impact and potential for damage to overall service capabilities and possible forced change.

The plan presented, which includes the provision for continuation in modified (new) form following its 31-month (initial) cycle, is but one of the many ways in which the issue of homelessness can be addressed by law enforcement. Indeed, another Command College student, Charles V. Knuthson of the Roseville Police Department, has already recommended an excellent plan for addressing the potential impact and needs of Family and Youth Homelessness. Further examination of and attention to the issue is however, required. As a manner of concluding this study, several other areas viewed as being worthy of further study have been identified. They are:

- \* the elderly as a growing (?) segment of the homeless population: is or will there be a need to address this issue and its potential impact?
- \* rural homelessness: utilize the census and other materials to determine the size, nature and potential impact of this population.
- \* "real" police homeless-specific workload demand: untracked at present by virtually all police agencies: study, which may entail actual tracking at various sites, to determine real impact.
- \* county jail populations: size of "homeless" jail population(s) and impact upon that system could lead to study of means to mitigate or avoid impact.
- \* police - social service teams: examine the feasibility and potential affect the employment of such teams might have on the homeless problem in urban areas.
- \* political implications: what will be the impact, politically, of the manner in which law enforcement addresses the problem of homelessness. Methods of address range from maintenance of the status quo to much more proactive and involved "solutions," such as the strategy presented herein.

APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX A

### NOMINAL GROUP PANEL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

a police chief from a mid-peninsula police department  
a police captain from a south bay police department  
a professor from a major university on the peninsula  
a police lieutenant from an eastbay police department  
a representative of a mid-peninsula city manager's office  
a representative of a regional junior college board of trustees  
the director of a mid-peninsula homeless support organization  
a police lieutenant from an mid-peninsula police department

APPENDIX B  
LIST  
CANDIDATE TRENDS

number of homeless juveniles

**law enforcement workload impact**

all crime connected to the homeless

police resources expended on homeless workload

**community apprehension**

homeless families (as % of homeless population)

number of homeless mentally ill

acceptance of homeless as part of communities

media attention on problem of homelessness

availability of affordable housing

violent crime committed by or against the homeless

level of service agency cooperation

**size of California's homeless population**

number of medical aid calls connected to the homeless

homeless mortality rate

**police involvement in solutions**

**level of homeless activism**

public pressure to enforce violations committed by the homeless

cost of affordable housing

delinquency in homeless youth

level of substance abuse in homeless population

**availability of alternative shelter**

number of violent police contacts with the homeless

redevelopment

political support for solutions

police department budgets

homeless cooperation with police

police attitude towards the homeless

police service ethic towards the homeless

number of homeless contacts with city workers

age of the homeless population (median)

age of immigration pool (median)

**regional funding for homeless programs**

local funding for homeless programs

state funding for homeless programs

impact of homeless advocates

support by the public for solutions

availability of mental health services at county levels

public awareness and understanding of homeless issue  
number of Californians living below the poverty level  
number of single parent families in California  
mandatory sentencing - impact on custody rates for nonviolent crimes

\* **Bold = trends selected for forecasting**

APPENDIX C  
TREND EVALUATION TABLE

| TREND # | TREND STATEMENT (ABBREVIATED)            | * LEVEL OF THE TREND |       |                  |     |                   |     |
|---------|--|----------------------|-------|------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|
|         |  | 5 YEARS AGO          | TODAY | 5 years from now |     | 10 years from now |     |
| 1       | Size of California's Homeless Population | 50                   | 100   | 175              | 125 | 250               | 125 |
| 2       | Availability of Alternative Shelter      | 30                   | 100   | 150              | 250 | 150               | 300 |
| 3       | Community Apprehension                   | 50                   | 100   | 150              | 70  | 150               | 40  |
| 4       | Law Enforcement Workload Impact          | 20                   | 100   | 150              | 100 | 250               | 100 |
| 5       | Regional Funding for Homeless Programs   | 30                   | 100   | 120              | 200 | 140               | 400 |
| 6       | Police Involvement in Solutions          | 30                   | 100   | 150              | 200 | 200               | 350 |
| 7       | Level of Homeless Activism               | 40                   | 100   | 300              | 100 | 400               | 25  |


\*Panel Median Forecasts N=9

|                        |                            |
|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Nominal<br>("will be") | ("should be")<br>Normative |
|------------------------|----------------------------|

APPENDIX D  
ILLUSTRATIONS  
TREND FORECASTS

# TREND NO. 1 - SIZE OF CALIFORNIA'S HOMELESS POPULATION


## FORECAST



|      | □ Median Nominal | + High Nominal | (T=100)<br>o Low Nominal | Δ Median "should be" |
|------|------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| T-5  | 50               | 90             | 10                       | 50                   |
| T    | 100              | 100            | 100                      | 100                  |
| T+5  | 175              | 400            | 100                      | 125                  |
| T+10 | 250              | 500            | 150                      | 125                  |

# TREND NO. 2 - AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SHELTER


## FORECAST



|      | □ Median Nominal | + High Nominal | (T=100)<br>o Low Nominal | Δ Median "should be" |
|------|------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| T-5  | 30               | 60             | 5                        | 30                   |
| T    | 100              | 100            | 100                      | 100                  |
| T+5  | 150              | 200            | 100                      | 250                  |
| T+10 | 150              | 225            | 100                      | 300                  |

# TREND NO. 3 - COMMUNITY APPREHENSION


## FORECAST



|      | □ Median Nominal | + High Nominal | (T=100)<br>◇ Low Nominal | △ Median "should be" |
|------|------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| T-5  | 50               | 100            | 10                       | 50                   |
| T    | 100              | 100            | 100                      | 100                  |
| T+5  | 150              | 180            | 90                       | 70                   |
| T+10 | 150              | 200            | 80                       | 40                   |

# TREND NO. 4 - LAW ENFORCEMENT WORKLOAD IMPACT


## FORECAST



|      | □ Median Nominal | + High Nominal | (T=100)<br>◇ Low Nominal | △ Median "should be" |
|------|------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| T-5  | 20               | 100            | 0                        | 20                   |
| T    | 100              | 100            | 100                      | 100                  |
| T+5  | 150              | 300            | 120                      | 100                  |
| T+10 | 250              | 400            | 100                      | 100                  |

# TREND NO. 5 - REGIONAL FUNDING FOR HOMELESS SOLUTIONS


## FORECAST



|      | □ Median Nominal | + High Nominal | (T=100) ◇ Low Nominal | △ Median "should be" |
|------|------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| T-5  | 30               | 60             | 0                     | 30                   |
| T    | 100              | 100            | 100                   | 100                  |
| T+5  | 120              | 250            | 75                    | 300                  |
| T+10 | 140              | 350            | 50                    | 400                  |

# TREND NO. 6 - POLICE INVOLEMENT IN SOLUTIONS


## FORECAST



|      | □ Median Nominal | + High Nominal | (T=100) ◇ Low Nominal | △ Median "should be" |
|------|------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| T-5  | 30               | 50             | 5                     | 30                   |
| T    | 100              | 100            | 100                   | 100                  |
| T+5  | 150              | 200            | 100                   | 200                  |
| T+10 | 200              | 275            | 150                   | 350                  |

# TREND NO. 7 - LEVEL OF HOMELESS ACTIVISM

## FORECAST



|      | Median Nominal |
|------|----------------|
| T-5  | 40             |
| T    | 100            |
| T+5  | 300            |
| T+10 | 400            |

|         | High Nominal (+) | Low Nominal (◇) | Median "should be" (△) |
|---------|------------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| (T=100) | 70               | 10              | 40                     |
| T       | 100              | 100             | 100                    |
| T+5     | 400              | 200             | 100                    |
| T+10    | 600              | 300             | 25                     |

APPENDIX E  
LIST  
CANDIDATE EVENTS

state budget deficit exceeds ten billion dollars  
**POST training reimbursement rate cut 75 percent**  
CAL Chief's resolution  
national recession  
drugs decriminalized  
cost of living increases 10 percent statewide  
state funding provided: public/ private partnerships for homeless programs matched  
mayor's resolution in California - demand for homeless program funding  
League of Cities resolution  
federal funding to states for housing programs increases 50 percent  
**state - allocates funds to establish service "hubs" for homeless**  
minimum wage increases to 7 dollars per hour  
closing of county mental health facilities  
**Federal Supreme Court decision**  
state tax credits provided to local and/or private entities for construction  
of SRO hotels  
cost of rental housing increases by 15 percent  
state legislation requires homeless training to all emergency service personnel  
federal (HUD) housing assistance eliminated  
passage of state ballot initiative - requires state funding for family homeless programs  
election of pro-homeless governor  
governor takes pro-homeless budget position  
US involved in declared middle East war  
"great" earthquake results in loss of 15 percent of urban housing in northern  
California  
federal budget balanced  
federal budget doubles  
legislation passed requiring rent control statewide  
reduction in mandatory sentencing requirements for nonviolent crimes  
POST develops and implements "pilot" homeless training program  
**cities receive government owned homes for local homeless housing**  
county funded "bail-out" programs enacted statewide  
reinstatement of state mental health hospital system  
military housing becomes available for use by homeless families

\*Bold = events selected for forecasting

## APPENDIX F EVENT EVALUATION TABLE


EVENT EVALUATION TABLE

| Event # | EVENT STATEMENT                  | * YEARS UNTIL PROBABILITY FIRST EXCEEDS ZERO | * PROBABILITY                 |                             | IMPACT ON THE ISSUE AREA IF THE EVENT OCCURRED |                         |
|---------|----------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------------------|
|         |                                  |  | Five Years From Now (0-100 %) | Ten Years From Now (0-100%) | * POSITIVE (0-10 scale)                        | * NEGATIVE (0-10 scale) |
| 1       | State Budget Deficit -10 Billion | 2  | 60                            | 80                          |  | 9                       |
| 2       | POST Training Reimbursement      | 3  | 20                            | 60                          |  | 7                       |
| 3       | Supreme Court Decision           | 4  | 30                            | 40                          | 3  | 5                       |
| 4       | Cities Receive Government Homes  | 3  | 10                            | 70                          | 7  | 2                       |
| 5       | State Funds for Service Hubs     | 3  | 45                            | 75                          | 10   |                         |
|         |                                  |  |                               |                             |  |                         |
|         |                                  |  |                               |                             |  |                         |
|         |                                  |  |                               |                             |  |                         |
|         |                                  |  |                               |                             |  |                         |
|         |                                  |  |                               |                             |  |                         |

\*Panel Median Forecasts      N=9


APPENDIX G  
ILLUSTRATIONS  
EVENT FORECASTS

# EVENT NO 1. - STATE BUDGET DEFICIT PROBABILITY FORECAST




|               | □ Median Forecast | + High Forecast | ◇ Low Forecast |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Starting Year | 2                 | 1               | 4              |
| Year 5        | 60                | 100             | 40             |
| Year 10       | 80                | 100             | 65             |

## EVENT NO 2. - POST TRAINING REIMBURSEMENT PROBABILITY FORECAST




|                   | TIME IN YEARS   |                |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| □ Median Forecast | + High Forecast | ◇ Low Forecast |
| Starting Year     | 2               | 5              |
| Year 5            | 35              | 0              |
| Year 10           | 80              | 30             |

## EVENT NO 3. - SUPREME COURT DECISION PROBABILITY FORECAST




|               | □ Median Forecast | + High Forecast | ◇ Low Forecast |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Starting Year | 4                 | 3               | 8              |
| Year 5        | 30                | 40              | 0              |
| Year 10       | 40                | 60              | 15             |

## EVENT NO 4. - CITIES RECEIVE GOVERNMENT HOMES PROBABILITY FORECAST



|                   | TIME IN YEARS   |                |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| □ Median Forecast | + High Forecast | ◇ Low Forecast |
| Starting Year     | 1               | 6              |
| Year 5            | 20              | 0              |
| Year 10           | 85              | 30             |

## EVENT NO 5. - STATE FUNDS FOR SERVICE HUBS PROBABILITY FORECAST



Starting Year  
Year 5  
Year 10

| □ Median Forecast | + High Forecast | ◇ Low Forecast |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 3                 | 2               | 4              |
| 45                | 70              | 10             |
| 75                | 80              | 20             |

APPENDIX H  
LIST  
CANDIDATE POLICIES

cities/police: hire designated homeless as temporaries, hourly employees, etc.

regional academies: develop and deliver special homeless awareness and education programs to regional recruits and law enforcement personnel (POST approved)

**local police chief(s): take resolute, positive stance in bringing to the attention of local government the scope, impacts and potential impacts of the homeless problem, both as it pertains to police and cities in general; update with status reports**

police/cities: sponsor/coordinate homeless identification programs with providers/advocates

police agencies: develop and deliver special crime prevention, resource awareness and outreach/education programs to identified homeless populations

cities: establish human service teams to identify, contact and work with homeless and community. Liaison with police

police agencies: establish homeless patrol team(s) to handle homeless-specific workload, referral and liaison functions.

OCJP: develop and offer funding for "pilot" homeless problem management program

police agencies, with service providers/advocates: develop, implement and promote a homeless speakers bureau to address public, government and business relative to homeless needs, problem, etc.

cities/police: open city and/or police facilities for use as nighttime shelters

police/cities: form regional public/private homeless task force(s) to address and develop solutions

**police agencies: deliver special homeless awareness and education programs to neighborhood and business communities via new or existing crime prevention infrastructures**

police agencies: develop and promote new homeless-specific mission relative to response to the homeless problem and homeless individuals

CAL Chief's Association: issue resolution addressing the homeless problem as a top law enforcement priority and request for attention from state government

cities: develop and promote homeless-specific mission

county/regional chiefs: issue resolution and plan for follow-up relative to addressing the problem of homelessness

police agencies: develop and institute homeless liaison position (sworn or civilian) position - coordinate with homeless advocates/providers, social service agencies and internal/external law enforcement personnel.

police agencies: develop and present homeless education and awareness training to agency personnel. Connect to mission and new policies and procedures related thereto

police agencies: develop homeless "booster" programs among local/regional business communities. Publicize plight of homeless, raise funds, sponsorships, etc.

police agencies: unite with media and social service agencies, advocates/providers to form coalition to draw attention to homeless problem and necessary solutions. Keep issue "up front."

**police/cities: establish health and public safety task forces to promote local and regional response to the homeless problem**

police agencies: form enforcement-service provider network: case referral, follow-up, special programs, etc.

police agencies: develop and deliver homeless awareness and education programs to city staff and line personnel.

**\*Bold = policies selected for moc application to normative scenario**

APPENDIX I  
LISTS  
CANDIDATE OPPORTUNITIES & THREATS

Opportunities

**police homeless workload**  
government-owned homes  
alpha omega shelter program  
**regional committee on homelessness**  
**community response to crime prevention**  
**and education programs**  
**establishment of homeless "hubs"**  
size of homeless population  
**media**  
**community apprehension**  
hunger and action coalition  
vacant city-owned homes  
city budget  
local church groups  
city "service excellence" philosophy  
county chiefs  
post training  
regional academy  
county health service groups  
adjoining counties - services  
state representative

Threats

**police homeless workload**  
**budget**  
**regional funding for**  
**homeless programs**  
**homeless activism**  
**redevelopment**  
**court or legislative action**  
supreme court decision  
media  
**community apprehension**  
lack of city action on homeless  
issue  
lack of shelter space  
cost of rental housing  
lack of cohesiveness in  
homeless community  
law enforcement system - ethic  
lack of law enforcement  
coordination with  
service providers  
homeless paranoia of police  
and system  
county budget

\* **Bold = opportunities/threats selected for strategic consideration**

APPENDIX J  
LISTS  
CANDIDATE STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES

Strengths

**chief of police**  
command staff  
**representation - regional committee**  
**on homelessness**  
**budget**  
**community support**  
council neighborhoods committee  
department planning process  
**training and education**  
organizational cohesiveness  
city budget - multi-year  
city managed meeting format  
staffing - overall  
change philosophy  
department service ethic  
morale  
facilities  
equipment  
salary and benefits  
POA  
dare program  
school resource program  
manpower  
officer skills  
technology

Weaknesses

**crime prevention unit**  
**lack of homeless mission**  
**line insensitivity to**  
**homeless problem**  
**department budget process**  
**departmental staffing matrix**  
management turnover  
organizational structure  
mobility  
old guard  
facility size  
turnover

\* **Bold = strengths/weaknesses selected for strategic consideration**

APPENDIX K  
LIST  
CANDIDATE STAKEHOLDERS

**media**

local press  
other local police agencies  
county social service system  
advocates/providers

**the homeless**

**chief of police**

police officer's association  
city workers  
hunger and action coalition  
neighborhood groups

**regional committee on homelessness**

police supervisors  
police management  
city budget officer  
county chiefs

post

board of supervisors

mayor

city council

**city department heads**

**police line personnel**

state senator

seniors

**city manager**

**council neighborhoods committee**

local school board

local real estate board

time tribune

mercury news

**homeless activists**

**downtown business coalition**

parks department

county sheriff's department


county law enforcement executive committee

local landlord's association

county administrative officer

san antonio center

APPENDIX L  
 STRATEGIC ASSUMPTION SURFACING TECHNIQUE  
 (SAST)  
 PLOT MAP




STAKEHOLDERS:

- |                                |                                     |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Chief of Police             | 6. The Homeless                     |
| 2. Police Line Personnel       | 7. City Department Heads            |
| 3. City Manager                | 8. Media                            |
| 4. Regional COH                | 9. Homeless Activists               |
| 5. Downtown Business Coalition | 10. Council Neighborhoods Committee |

The SAST map plots stakeholders based upon two criteria; (1) their importance to the issue (and planning); and (2) the degree of certainty attached to individual assumptions made about each.

APPENDIX M  
 ILLUSTRATION  
 RESULTS OF VOTING\*  
 ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY SELECTION



- S1 - Special Homeless Crime Prevention Program (14=3,2,2,2,3,2)
- S2 - Deploy Homeless Field Service Unit (9=1,3,1,3,1)
- S3 - Establish Public Safety Committee on Homelessness (8=2,1,2,3)
- S4 - Form Homeless Service Team (Police & Social Service Representative) (6=3,3)
- S5 - Form Enforcement-Service Provider Network (1=1)

\*Voting: panelists vote for three on a scale of 3 (high) to 1 (low).

APPENDIX N  
OUTLINE OF COMPONENT PARTS  
SPECIAL HOMELESS CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

Components: (A) Public Safety Steering Committee on Homelessness - Chaired by the Chief of Police; (B) expanded Crime Prevention Unit (add: one sergeant and one civilian service officer); (C) development of special crime prevention programs for delivery to neighborhoods, police, city staff, business community and the homeless; and (D) development of new policies and procedures.

A. Public Safety Steering Committee - to be chaired by the chief of police and comprised of members (specifics to be decided) of police, fire, parks/recreation and public service departments, city manager's office, and one representative of the COH. The committee will coordinate and support program implementation with the police department, and address problem solving on a city-wide basis. Ultimately, the committee should serve to set the city agenda for addressing the problem, taking advantage of new found awareness, support (or, at the least, lessened opposition) and relationships to develop new programs, funding and other elements so critical to the treatment (and avoidance) of the problem.

B. Expanded Crime Prevention Unit - as indicated, text and above.

C. Crime Prevention Programs - description

Program 1 - for Police Personnel:

(a) educational agenda designed to provide awareness and understanding about: the nature and scope of the homeless problem; who are the homeless (real vs. stereotypes); why are they homeless - causes; how many are there; local/regional/state problem; specific components of the problem - families, children, etc; law enforcement's role (existing) and relationship to the problem - what are other agencies doing; and results of "futures" research on the subject - where is the problem going.

(1) in-depth assessment of local problem and regional implications; problem spots; composition of local homeless population - who are they; breakdown by family, children, etc; actions taken in past - alternatives; problems in city facilities - impact on other departments and operations.

(b) address: local, regional (and beyond) social service capabilities - police relationship to them; police service capabilities - what are our options; status of local/regional and state advocate/provider and activist network (brief); future of the problem - current and possible future funding capabilities.

(c) present and address new homeless mission; stress and discuss police service ethic - need to focus on homeless; homeless role in the community - discuss public perceptions, apprehension and connection to problem, both as it is and what it will (should) be. Present new policy and/or procedures.

(d) outline: nature, scope, direction and purpose of the Special Homeless Crime Prevention Program - discuss all parts, police role, infrastructures, city support and involvement of external stakeholders.

(e) set follow-up meeting(s) - cycle with program timeline, final phase.

Note: presentations involve use of homeless and providers/advocates.

#### Program 2 - for City Staff:

(a) same as "a" above.

(b) same as "b" above.

(c) address new police mission, applicable policies, procedures; city support and program implications; direction and focus.

(d) same as "d" above. Add: stress need for department head support; their communication with their staff(s) regarding problem and program; address of homeless problems via attention to homeless and problems encountered by personnel - refer information and requests to police. Focus attention on need for new ethic and central role of Steering Committee in focusing and directing city-wide effort.

(e) address need/desire to expand training to all city employees at later date.

Note: presentations involve use of homeless and advocates/providers. City Manager and Chief used to open meetings.

#### Program 3 - for Neighborhoods (Block Groups):

(a) same as "a" - Program 1.

(1) section follows that described in same section, Program 1, but reduces stress of effect problem has on city departments. Focus on the effect problem has on neighborhoods and "what is the real problem?" - should lead to address of "apprehension" issue, its affect on the problem, service requests and ways in which to differentiate between true need for attention and mere "sightings" as precursor/cause for service, etc.

Discussion, input and problem-solving used to further develop action

planning, police agenda (specific neighborhoods problems, needs for attention) and identification of need for follow-up meetings.

(b) same as "b" - Program 1.

(c) same as "c" - Program 1. Discuss new policy and procedures. Transfer, as appropriate, discussion of need for new police ethic and focus to need for attention and support building in public (neighborhood) sector (obviously quite critical to direction and effect of program).

(d) same as "d" - Program 1. Stress, again, critical role of neighborhood impact, involvement.

(e) same as "e" - Program 1. Minor adjustments: identification of need for and delivery of follow-up meetings ( base on need and eventual program re-cycle agenda). Critical: set specific manner and criteria (loosely) for identification, reporting and follow-up (feedback) regarding homeless problems. Cite infrastructures, highlighting crime prevention and program director's position (identification).

#### Program 4 - for Business Community:

(a) same as "a" - Program 1.

(1) same as "1" for Program 3, with obvious swing to focus on business community and specific problems that area. Focus on desire of this community for enforcement and relieve concerns by noting police/city desire and capability to respond, as usual to enforcement needs - patrol efforts relative to necessary enforcement activities will continue, as usual. Note that ability to provide solutions, enforcement or otherwise, will be enhanced, and that their participation and support for solutions, enforcement-based and otherwise, will provide key to eventual problem resolution. Draw support; build confidence.

(b) same as "b" - Program 1.

(c) same as "c" - Program 1. Discuss new policy and procedures. Transfer, as appropriate, discussion of need for new police ethic and focus to need for attention and support building in business sector (continues from section (a)(1)).

(d) same as "d" - Program 1. Stress, again (throughout) critical role of business sector relative to eventual impact.

(e) same as "e" - Program 1. Minor adjustments, as with neighborhood

groups, to attend to needs and concerns of this particular group.

May wish (advisable) to begin formation of business watch programs to augment general crime prevention effort and homeless effort in particular.

Note: presentations will open with introduction by Chief of Police and, possibly, City Manager or involved Council member.

Presentations will involve advocates/providers and homeless.

Program 5 - for Homeless Community:

(a) same as "a" - Program 1. **However:** presentation will stress that delivery is from research and police perspective (critical not to take position as experts in face of those involved), and that its address will serve to get everyone on the "same page". Same (as other program) stress on our current position, posture, postures of other agencies and law enforcement in general, and results of "futures" research.

Follow-up : again, our perception of local problem. Leads to discussion and "workshop" climate which focuses on identification of local homeless population (demographics, etc.), needs, impact of the problem on city/police, and and suggestions as to how to improve relationship.

(b) same as "b" - Program 1.

(c) same as "c" - Program 1.

(d) present crime prevention, awareness program to homeless (addresses same issues, tailored to homeless environment, as presented to other community groups). Addresses:

- \* personal safety
- \* police policy, procedure, methods of operation, process and structure of criminal justice system, police perspectives, etc.
- \* need for cohesion in homeless community and ways in which to address the issue
- \* identification of resources (service, welfare, advocates/providers, specifics of programs, requirements, etc.) available. Examples: aid to families with dependant children, welfare, grants, psychological and medical aid services, church and regional shelters, food services, etc.
- \* need, desire and capability to start homeless neighborhood groups

(e) same as "d" - Program 1.

(f) same as "e" - Program 1. Add: follow-up meetings will be on-going; design

link to police (project manager and/or crime prevention sergeant), methods of communication, problem solving, further identification of homeless community and coordination which will be so critical to program delivery and re-cycle.

May wish to develop special sub-group for problem solving and coordination comprised of homeless, advocate/provider, police and activist representatives.

Note: presentations involve use of activists, advocates/providers and, possibly, Chief to open meetings (stresses commitment).

D. Development of new policy and procedures - as applicable and necessary. Will flow from delivery of training and connection to all groups addressed by same. Anticipated that this will occur in the later stages of the program and/or in program re-cycle.

APPENDIX O  
SELECTED STRATEGY  
TIMELINES AND IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

Phase One (6 months)

finalize "Crime Prevention" Strategy  
chief/staff approval  
"trial balloon" period and negotiations with stakeholders  
budget approval - city manager and council  
expand crime prevention unit  
steering committee start-up  
designate and start-up project management structure  
initial contacts with advocates/providers, activists, homeless

Phase Two (5 months)

negotiations with some stakeholders continues - for participation (business)  
develop new homeless policy, procedures (police and, as required, for city)  
further contacts with homeless and activists (identification and negotiations)  
develop special education programs ("internal") for police and city staff

Phase Three (5 months)

finalize and obtain approval for "internal" education programs  
training of police and city staff begins  
develop special education programs ("external") for the community and homeless  
contacts and arrangement with homeless and activist groups continues

Phase Four (3 months)

police and city staff training complete  
finalize and approve "external" training programs  
"external" training (community and homeless) begins

Phase Five (8 months)

"external" training continues  
contact and coordination between homeless, business and community groups  
begins

Phase Six (4 months)

"external" training completed  
coordination and contact between homeless, business and community continues  
critique and follow-up: actions, strategies, structures and needs for future assessed  
management structure: delete or continue; follow-up or renewal responsibilities  
crime prevention unit: continue; status; responsibilities  
RECYCLE PROGRAM AS INDICATED: New schedule, timelines, objectives

Note: schedule is 31 months in duration. Culmination with plans to re-cycle or renew which involve need for budget approval flow to next budget cycle.

APPENDIX P  
CAPABILITY / READINESS CHART

| <u>CRITICAL MASS</u> | <u>CAPABILITY</u>          | <u>READINESS</u>           |
|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <u>MEMBER</u>        | <u>HIGH - MEDIUM - LOW</u> | <u>HIGH - MEDIUM - LOW</u> |

|                 |   |   |
|-----------------|---|---|
| ISD CAPTAIN     | X | X |
| CHIEF OF POLICE | X | X |
| CITY MANAGER    | X | X |
| COUNCILMAN "X"  | X | X |
| CHAIR - COH     | X | X |
| FTO LIEUTENANT  | X | X |

APPENDIX Q  
RESPONSIBILITY (RASI) CHART

| DECISION ACTION           | A C T O R S |                 |              |                |                |                |
|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                           | ISD CAPTAIN | CHIEF OF POLICE | CITY MANAGER | COUNCILMAN "X" | HOMELESS CHAIR | FTO LIEUTENANT |
| DEVELOP POLICY/PROCEDURE  | R           | A               | S            | S              | I              | S              |
| INTERNAL SUPPORT          | S           | R               | S            | S              | *              | S              |
| BUDGET                    | R           | A               | A            | S              | I              | I              |
| DELIVER TRAINING          | R           | S               | S            | I              | S              | S              |
| SELECT PROJECT COMMITTEE  | S           | R               | I            | *              | *              | S              |
| CONTENT-EXTERNAL TRAINING | R           | A               | A            | S              | S              | *              |
| SELECT CP SERGEANT        | S           | R               | I            | *              | *              | S              |
| LIAISON W/ HOMELESS       | R           | I               | I            | I              | S              | *              |

- R = Responsibility (not necessarily authority)
- A = Approval (right to veto)
- S = Support (put resources towards)
- I = Inform (to be consulted before action)
- \* = Irrelevant to the particular action

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