

WHAT METHODS OF RESPONSE WILL MEDIUM AND SMALL
SIZE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES USE FOR HIGH RISK INCIDENTS
BY THE YEAR 2004

JOURNAL ARTICLE

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INTRODUCTION

During the late 1960's to early 1970's, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams combined with hostage negotiations personnel became law enforcement's method of responding to unusual and high risk incidents.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Charles (Chuck) Latting wrote one of the FBI's original SWAT Manuals and included a paper titled "What is SWAT ??." The following statements from that paper identify the rationale behind such special law enforcement services:

The use of small, highly trained and skilled groups to perform the most dangerous tasks of societies' confrontations with those wanting to live outside the laws set down by that society is as old as the laws themselves. To effectively isolate or neutralize any individual or groups of individuals bent on destruction of life or property, requires high levels of technical skill and strong leadership at the small unit level.¹

Small unit integrity and leadership is the answer in dangerous unusual situations. One of the most important and far reaching arms of law enforcement can easily exist with a certain degree of commitment on the part of an administration and a very high degree of commitment on the part of the involved officers. The small unit team concept is certainly a valid concept in the tactics of the 70's and will probably save more lives than any emergency unit existing in a county or city.²

Since S. A. Latting wrote the first SWAT Manual in 1970 and began training law enforcement SWAT teams in Northern California, justifications for the SWAT concept have come from many sources. Leonard and More, in *Police Organization and Management*, stated that "even in the most efficiently organized and managed police departments, occasions constantly arise requiring special operational planning and execution."³ Similarly, in an article published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin in September 1977, Boyd noted:

Justification for [tactical] teams is found in the daily encounters that occur in this country between law enforcement personnel and suspects fleeing from crime, mentally disturbed individuals, and those involved in domestic and neighborhood disputes. 'Routine' incidents such as these account for far more gun battles and police officer injuries and deaths than the more newsworthy conflicts between police and militant groups.⁴

¹ Latting, Charles: SWAT Manual, FBI-SanFrancisco, Circa 1970 pg.1

² Latting, Charles: SWAT Manual, FBI-SanFrancisco, Circa 1970 pg. 2

³ Boyd, Gerald W.: "Special Weapons and Tactics Teams: A Systems Approach," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol. 46, No 9, September 1977 pp. 21

⁴ Boyd, Gerald W.: "Special Weapons and Tactics Teams: A Systems Approach," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol. 46, No 9, September 1977 pp. 23

When S. A. Latting wrote the original FBI SWAT Manual, the start up SWAT teams had little equipment and were staffed by a team leader and four team members. The only significant expense was in terms of training time. Since 1970, the size of the core SWAT unit has nearly doubled. The following excerpt is from the current FBI SWAT Training Manual.

SWAT TEAM ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING LEVELS	
POSITION	NUMBER
TEAM LEADER	1
ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER	1
TEAM MEMBERS	6-8

Basic core tactical group considered necessary for most operations and within reasonable span of control for team leader is 6-8 deployed members. Additional personnel are assigned, equipped and trained due to attrition, travel, investigative matters, grand jury and court appearances, injuries, vacations, etc., all of which cut into capability of deploying core tactical group.⁵

In addition to an increase in the size of the core SWAT unit, equipment is much improved and increasingly expensive to purchase⁶. High risk incident management has evolved to the point where large teams, sophisticated equipment and a great deal of training is required to adequately perform in this arena.

Positioning tactical personnel around a building to contain it, using sniper/spotter teams and having an assault team ready to go, if needed, requires twenty to thirty highly trained individuals. Management staff, outer perimeter personnel, tactically trained medical personnel and hostage negotiations team members add to the number required to properly manage these incidents by today's standards.

Small agencies cannot staff these events alone and have difficulty paying for state of the art equipment. Medium sized agencies tax their resources maximally during these events.

Most changes in the tactics and management of high risk incidents have been brought about by large agencies with substantial resources like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

⁵ Tisa, Benedictine T.: San Francisco SWAT Team Training Program Manual, Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Francisco, April 1987

⁶ Pilant, Lois: "Equipping Your SWAT Team", The Police Chief, January 1992, pp. 37-46

Small to medium size law enforcement agencies are finding themselves being judged against the standards set by these large agencies when they answer charges directed at them in law suits as the result of actions taken by their SWAT teams.⁷

Indications are that the numbers of personnel and equipment resources dedicated to these incidents will continue to grow. "On February 28, 1993, some 80 ATF agents stormed a compound near Waco, Texas where cult leader David Koresh was suspected to have had a cache of illegal firearms."⁸

Management of this incident was given to the FBI. In spite of having 60 full time hostage rescue team members and support from many other law enforcement agencies, the FBI eventually resorted to an assault. "An ensuing 51-day stand-off culminated in the death of Koresh and at least 78 of his followers in an inferno that engulfed the compound."⁹

Many reasons were given for the decision to make that assault. One of the factors that was clearly involved in the decision was the fatigue of the FBI agents involved. "Attorney General Reno said Monday her decision to move on the compound also was influenced by the fatigue of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team."¹⁰

FBI Agent Michael Nakamura has been a member of the FBI for over 24 years. He has been involved with FBI SWAT during nearly all of that time and he is currently the training coordinator and the Tactical Commander of the FBI's San Francisco Division Team. He spent 5 years at the national headquarters in Quantico, Virginia working with the Special Operations and Research Unit and the Physical Training Unit.

The researcher interviewed Agent Nakamura on September 28, 1994. As part of the aftermath of the Waco, Texas incident, the FBI decided to increase the size and training of its regional office SWAT teams. They have formed 8 "enhanced teams" and are in the process of increasing their numbers and training and equipping them to a level that will allow them to assist the Hostage Rescue Team during lengthy

⁷ Hillman, Michael Lt., Los Angeles Police Department Metro/SWAT, Lecture "SWAT Team Liability" FBI Tactical Leadership Seminar, Pleasanton Calif. Jan. 1992

⁸ Washington Column (AP): "2 who led raid on Davidians lose their jobs", San Jose Mercury News, November 1, 1994

⁹ Meddis, Sam vincent: "Failed raid's tactics being scrutinized", USA Today, March 4, 1993

¹⁰ Washington Column (AP): "2 who led raid on Davidians lose their jobs", San Jose Mercury News, November 1, 1994

operations. They will also handle operations themselves that might have involved the Hostage Rescue Team in the past.

Agent Nakamura is involved in training local agency SWAT teams from all over California. He says that very few, if any, have the resources to match the training and equipment standards being set by the large agencies.

For a local law enforcement agency of 8,000, the task of mustering 60 or more personnel to manage a high risk incident is feasible. For an agency of 50 it is impossible. For an agency of 150 it is difficult and even for an agency of 300, the numbers cannot be maintained for long.

While decreasing budgets and increasing standards make it difficult for small agencies to stay in the business of high risk incident management, violent crime statistics in this country indicate that the need to manage incidents involving violent persons is increasing.

Violence now rivals academics as the top concern of U.S. public schools, with shootings, stabbings and other serious assaults increasing in number and spreading from urban districts to suburbs and small towns, the National League of Cities reported Tuesday.

More than 80 percent of 700 communities surveyed by the league said violence is a serious problem in classrooms, hallways and playgrounds, and almost 40 percent reported that the problem had increased noticeably over the past five years.

The survey was released just two weeks after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta reported that the homicide rate among young men 15 to 19 tripled between 1985 and 1991, surpassing the rates for men older than 25. That increase was attributed to recruitment of teens into drug markets and the gangs that run them and a more frequent use of guns - instead of fists - to settle disputes.¹¹

In addition to the increased violence associated with youth and schools, the annual National Crime Victimization Survey by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that violent crime rose 5.6 percent in 1993 to 10.9 million.¹²

RESEARCH QUESTION AND FOCUS

The task of mustering a large personnel pool to manage high risk incidents in today's environment raises the question of how is the small to medium sized police agency to successfully manage its high risk incidents? The standards set by large

¹¹ Washington (AP): "Violence increasingly worries U.S. schools", San Jose Mercury News, November 2, 1994

¹² Washington (AP): "Violent crime jumps 5.6%", San Jose Mercury News, October 31, 1994

agencies today is rarely met by the smaller agencies yet the trend is to hold smaller agencies to those standards. As technology and tactics change during the next ten years, how can the small to medium sized agencies hope to keep up?

Will the fear of relinquishing control of local authority prevent them from getting outside assistance? As violent crime increases, will SWAT/HNT in small to medium sized agencies be pushed more and more to handle situations for which they are inadequately staffed, equipped and trained? Will SWAT/HNT in small agencies become so obsolete that their functions are taken over by professional, military, state, or large agency teams? Can some form of regionalism, consolidation or resource sharing provide small to medium size agencies with state of the art services and still maintain the local control desired by most? Will technology provide the answers to these questions or will technology make the entire SWAT/HNT concept an extinct function of law enforcement's past?

The focus of this research evolves around the issue question of: **What methods of response will medium and small size law enforcement agencies use for high risk incidents by the year 2004?**

Several sub-issues are addressed in the research including: How will local control of incidents be maintained, how will law enforcement use regionalization or consolidation, will contracting or another form of collective effort be used to deploy high risk management and how will technology affect high risk incident tactics?

A combination of literature searches, expert panels, a study and evaluation of trends and events, interviews and personal experience led the researcher to focus on regionalization as a means to reach the desired future during the study period. This article will report the highlights of the study with emphasis on the steps to be taken to actually make the transition into the desired future.

SCENARIOS

A data based series of forecasts was used to develop a coherent fictional scenario. The scenario tells a story about the management and outcome of a high risk incident, using a regional team, and is designed to describe the desirable, attainable future of high risk incident management. The scenario is about a fictional organization known as the Alta View Police Department, which is made up of 80 sworn personnel.

Scenario

The program had 55 SWAT personnel and 34 negotiations personnel, not counting SWAT/HNT Commanders. They trained together four times a year for a week each time. Logistics were incredible, but people in the program were dedicated and they all did their part. Lt. Jim Smith had gone from doing almost everything himself to doing almost nothing. He stood back and managed energetic people, who had become experts in their own right in the field. Each department's command staff controlled incidents that occurred in their city. Everyone had developed a sense of trust in each other, communications problems were worked out and everyone knew how to do their job. Equipment purchases were made by committee with everyone sharing the expense and the equipment in their inventory was state of the art. As a positive side effect, relationships were remarkably more cordial in the day to day dealings that the five departments had with each other.

There had been many successful operations by the team over the years, but probably none as dramatic as today. It had not been perfect. Human error apparently will always be with us, but it could have been so much worse.

When the call came out advising that three armed men had just taken over a local electronics store Sgt. Jim Brown figured that the dispatcher was "just screwin up again." When he responded to the call, he pulled up in front of the front glass doors, just like he always had for 25 years. He said hello to Jimmie at the newspaper stand and strolled to the front doors to have a look. When the glass shattered in his face, he turned around to see if someone behind him had thrown a rock. When he heard something buzz past his ear he realized that he was being shot at by someone inside the store. He ran to his car and got down behind it. He was trapped there for over an hour.

Jim Smith arrived at the scene in the team's converted motor home, which he used as a Tactical Command Post. It was staffed by recent additions to the regional SWAT/HNT concept, five specially trained dispatchers. They ran all of his communications for him, kept his command post logs and helped him make sure that the Tactical Command Post was the center of all information regarding the operation.

SWAT had set up an inner perimeter around the store, and the shopping center had been evacuated. Four sniper/spotter teams were in place. One SWAT team was

working on a rescue plan in case it became necessary to rescue the hostages and another was working on a plan to extract Sgt. Brown who was still stuck behind his car at the front doors of the store. The negotiators were set up in the bank next door. Three of them spoke the suspects' language. The negotiations dialogue was being monitored in the Tactical Command Post by the negotiations supervisor, so Jim was getting constant updates.

The overall commander or Incident Commander was Captain Bob Watson. Bob didn't know much about SWAT/HNT tactics, but he knew how to run an Incident Command Post. He had been able to use officers from all five departments to seal off the outer perimeter. The press was staged where they could get the information they needed without being in the way. Bob had lists of everyone involved in his part of the operation, he knew exactly where they were, what radio channels they were on, when they would need breaks and when they would need to eat.

Forty five minutes into the incident, the hostage rescue team had found a way to get into the back of the building covertly. The team assigned to the extraction of Sgt. Brown was ready to go and it was time for the first pre- scheduled hourly meeting of all involved command staff.

Jim updated everyone on the progress of his people. The negotiations supervisor gave a rundown on the negotiations at this early stage. It was decided to let the hostage rescue team enter the rear of the store and stage in a rear storage room. The negotiators would let Jim know if they could talk the suspects into allowing Sgt. Brown's extraction.

Twelve hours into this incident, things were going fairly well. Many of the SWAT members that responded originally had been replaced by members that had been put on standby at the beginning of the incident. Everyone had eaten and had breaks. Jim had turned the Tactical Command over to his peer from one of the other cities and napped for a few hours himself.

The negotiators had talked the suspects into allowing Sgt. Brown to be extracted. He had been extracted, by using the regional armored vehicle without incident. The negotiators had used some of the latest hypnotic and sound wave technology combined with their normal tactics and had convinced the suspects to release some of the hostages.

The hostage rescue team had picked up five people moving toward them with their hand held body heat locaters. These people turned out to be store customers who had been hiding from the suspects. They were evacuated without the suspects finding out about them.

Four of the ten spike mikes that the tactical team fired into the attic crawl space, above the hostages, were working and Jim did not like what they were hearing through them. One of the suspects had been dragging a hostage to the front door, opening the door and taunting the officers for several hours. The conversation inside the store by the suspects lately involved dragging the hostage to the front door and killing him "where the cops could see." They thought that the negotiators were telling lies and that their demands were not being met fast enough. They would continue to kill one every hour until their demands were met. The negotiators believed that hostages would start to die if a tactical resolution was not achieved.

Jim had been authorized to initiate the hostage rescue at the last command staff meeting. He decided that the time had come. The team inside the store knew that no one was between them and the hostages, who were behind a wall at the front of the store. They could move forward with their hand held devices to tell them if anyone moved or came their direction.

They told Jim when they were as close as they could get without being detected and Jim gave his sniper spotter teams the go ahead to initiate the plan. The suspect came to the door with his left arm around the shoulder and chest of his hostage and the gun in his right hand pointed at the hostage's head. The door opened slowly just like all the previous times, and the two snipers with the best shot angles counted down for their simultaneous shot.

Jim could see what his snipers could see through their scopes on his monitors and could have pulled the triggers on both weapons simultaneously from his remote control panel. He was tempted to do it when he could see both scopes on target, but he didn't. He had told his snipers that the decision to make the shot would not be taken away from them. They would always be able to make last second adjustments or stop the shot if the circumstances changed.

When the snipers fired, it sounded almost like one weapon going off. They had performed the real thing as skillfully as they had practiced it. The door had started

to close and one of the bullets hit the door frame shattering the glass. The second bullet, a nanosecond behind and coming from a different angle, was left with an unobstructed flight path. It instantly killed the suspect who fell to the floor leaving the hostage unharmed.

Jim watched through the team leader's helmet cam as the hostage rescue team made its move. They were on the other two suspects before they could get to their guns. One of them made it out the front door, putting himself between the inner perimeter and the rescue team. The bean bags, launched from the 50 mm launchers by the inner perimeter team, actually knocked him back through the door way. He laid there unable to move until after a rescue team member handcuffed him.

Jim regretted the need to kill one of the hostage takers and looked forward to the day when non-lethal technology would make this kind of action unnecessary. Undoubtedly the family would sue, but Jim was not worried about that. It would take a week to review all the audio and video tapes of the incident. Each SWAT member would be critiqued on their performance after all the helmet cam tapes had been reviewed. They would find things that they could have done better and mistakes that they should not have made. They would never quit trying to do a better job. Jim was very proud of his people and the program they had put together. He was convinced that they had saved lives today and served the public well.

THE STRATEGIC PLAN

A mission statement was developed to provide Alta View direction in planning for the selected scenario.

MISSION STATEMENT

The Alta View Police Department is committed to managing incidents created by persons whose behavior causes extreme danger to themselves or others through a coordinated, sophisticated team effort. Specialized tactics and state of the art equipment will be utilized commensurate with a reasonable use of force based on the circumstances present. In all cases, the protection of life will be a primary concern.

Alta View's environment, external to the agency itself, was analyzed for threats and opportunities that might effect accomplishment of the mission. The organization itself was also evaluated for strengths and weaknesses. Before a strategic plan could be completed, those persons who are key stakeholders were considered.

Those most important to the issue and the developing plan were the Chief of Police, the police officers association, the City Manager, the City Council, the police mid-managers, the residents, the police officers, minority community groups, communications center personnel and the Sheriff's Department. Assumptions they might have regarding the issue were analyzed in forming the strategic plan.

STRATEGIC PLAN

A strategic plan involving Alta View and four other nearby agencies located in two counties was formulated.

The five agencies must agree on policies and guidelines for the formation and use of their regional team. A liaison should be designated from each department and one person should be given primary responsibility for working through the preliminary tasks.

There should be written agreement regarding 1) the number of personnel to be committed by each agency, 2) the selection and deselection process for those personnel, 3) individual and team equipment needs, 4) what functions the team will perform, 5) call out procedures, 6) training requirements and 7) command and control during incidents.

These agreements should be documented in the form of a mutually agreed upon mission statement, a general order and a manual outlining who is responsible for what functions during high risk unusual incidents. This information will need to be shared with all personnel from all five agencies so that the program is well understood by everyone.

After selection of personnel and purchase of equipment, training should be scheduled. The training should be designed to qualify team members to perform those tasks agreed upon during the original staff work. The training strategy should provide all five agencies with certification for those functions the regional team is qualified to perform and assure that they will not be called to perform a function that they have not qualified for.

Completing those tasks and having the team ready to perform all of the functions normally associated with SWAT/HNT will take an extended period of time, which is outlined in the transition management of this study.

During this time, arrangements should be made with the Sheriff's Departments to provide services that the regional team is not prepared to provide. A bi-county

tactical commanders association should be formed and regular meetings should be held. This group should discuss philosophy and concepts of managing high risk unusual incidents. They should assist each other with training and make their tactics consistent.

When the regional team is in place and functional, a mutual aid agreement should be reached that would allow for the management of lengthy and or multiple incidents in both counties.

As technology begins to solve the tactical problems associated with high risk unusual incidents, these agencies should pool their resources to make sure that their equipment is state of the art.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

The purpose of transition management is to actualize the strategic plan from the present to the projected future. It is a plan for the management of change. Change has risks and most are threatened by it. Transition requires early analysis, planning and continuous assessment. A great deal of time was spent identifying those persons who will be critical in making the change happen. Their roles, their readiness, what is needed to make them ready and techniques that can be used to make them ready, are key elements of making change happen.

A commitment chart identifies the current position and the desired position for each of the key people in this study. Four categories; Block Change, Let Happen, Help Happen and Make Happen, were used to assist the reader in following what movement objectives were desired for the particular group or individual to reach in achieving this plan. "X" indicates the current position and "O" indicates the desired position.

COMMITMENT CHART

Actors in Critical Mass	Block Change	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
Alta View Chief of Police		X →	→ C	
Evergreen Chief of Police		X →	→ C	
Evergreen Tactical Commander			X →	→ O
Evergreen HNT Coordinator	X →	→ C		
Evergreen SWAT Team		X →	→ C	
City Managers		X →	→ C	
City Councils		X →	→ C	

Alta View Chief of Police

A progressive Chief of Police who has extensive experience in coordinating a SWAT/HNT program. While his experience is dated, he understands the uses of tactical/negotiations teams and will understand the need for training and equipment to be state of the art. His department does not have its own program and currently relies on the County Sheriff's Department. He is not comfortable with this arrangement.

This Chief was selected as part of the critical mass because he has the best knowledge of tactics and negotiations of the five Chiefs of Police. He also has an excellent relationship with all of the other Chiefs. He is the key person to gain the support of the Chiefs of Police from the other agencies.

He is currently in the Let Happen category, but needs to be moved into the Help Happen area. He is generally supportive of innovation and favors regionalism as a concept. A skeletal plan that answers basic questions regarding budget, training and local control of incidents should move him to the Help Happen category. The Evergreen Tactical commander will be the ideal person to answer questions for and gain the support of the involved Chiefs.

Evergreen Chief of Police

He is also a progressive Chief of Police. His department is well know for having tremendous resources and for providing excellent service to its community. This is the only department with an existing Special Weapons & Tactics Team (SWAT) and a Hostage Negotiations Team. This Chief has already been significantly involved in regional enforcement programs that have crossed county boundaries and he is interested in reducing the expenses of his SWAT/HNT program. He is in the Let Happen category and needs move to the Help Happen category because of the work he must do with his City Manager and City Council. Since his existing program will be at the core of the change, he could block the change. The risk to the strategy is that members of his staff may try to move him to the Block Change category.

Evergreen Tactical Commander

A lieutenant with many years of experience with SWAT. He is well known and respected regionally for his leadership skills and his knowledge. He has been an instructor in the areas of officer survival and arrest & control for over 10 years. He

is the logical person to become the project manager for this strategy. He has participated as a member of the Nominal Group Technique and the panel that helped select the critical mass for this Independent Study Project.

He is currently in the Help Happen category. He will be easily moved to the Make Happen category if the predicted support from the rest of the critical mass is confirmed.

Evergreen Hostage Negotiations Team Coordinator

A Captain and the most likely to be in the Block Change category in the critical mass. He has been a member of the Hostage Negotiations Team, in a variety of capacities, for many years as he has come through the ranks. This unit was the responsibility of Lieutenants from 1972 to 1992. When he was promoted to Captain in 1992 he refused to pass the Hostage Negotiations Team Coordinator position to a Lieutenant.

This person has a reputation for being controlling and interfering in all areas of the department. He has always been anti SWAT and has tried to pit the negotiators against the tactical people from the time he became a negotiator. He feels that tactical resolutions to high risk unusual incidents are never appropriate and that tactical teams are unnecessary. He believes that whoever happens to be on duty can handle perimeters around high risk unusual incidents while the negotiators resolve the problem.

He is never in favor of a change unless convinced it is his idea. He has the potential to convince the Evergreen Chief of Police to block the change. He is in the Block Change category and must be moved to the Let Happen area. This will be best accomplished by convincing him that regionalizing the negotiations portion of the strategy will broaden his sphere of influence and enhance his professional image. A belief that he will be able to influence the tactical side of the strategy would also enhance the chances of gaining his support. This will be best accomplished by the Evergreen Tactical Commander and some supporters from the Evergreen Hostage Negotiations Team.

This person is disliked by many at the supervisory and line levels. If he moved to the Help Happen category he might cause problems for the strategy. If he moved to the Make Happen category, the strategy would probably be doomed.

Evergreen SWAT Team Members

Some of the best officers in an agency that actively encourages risk taking, innovation and providing excellent service. They will have concerns about retaining the quality of their existing program. They will be troubled by the possibility of reducing the size of their team in order to save money.

This group is placed in the critical mass because they have tremendous influence with the staff of their department and could convince them to block the plan. If the plan is given conceptual approval, they could prevent the transition from occurring successfully. With their support, they can influence staff to approve the plan and they will be instrumental in making the transition successful.

A meeting with this group, set up by the Evergreen Tactical Commander and other supporting managers, will be one of the first things that happens. The concept will be presented to them and they will be asked to help work out the details to their satisfaction. This group is in the Let Happen mode now, but will need to be in the Help Happen category. They must actively support the plan and be willing to act as the core group during the transition. They will be the role models, trainers and mentors for the outside agencies entering the regional program.

City Managers

A scaled down version of the strategy could occur with the participation of Evergreen and Alta View only. For that reason, there was some debate amongst the panel about whether to include only the two City Manager's from those cities as part of the critical mass. The final decision was to include them all. This decision was based on the fact that they all consult with each other on a routine basis. The panel felt that if one of them decided to block the strategy, that decision would have significant influence on the others.

This group will be concerned with issues of liability and finance. They have veto power and their support will be mandatory when it is time to approach the City Councils for final approval and financial resources. The panel feels that they are in the Let Happen category, but must be moved to the Help Happen category before the City Councils are approached. The Chiefs of Police will provide the primary influence when it is time to gain the support of the City Managers.

City Councils

The plan requires increased financial commitment from four of the cities. It

requires approval of Joint Powers Agreement from all five agencies. The City Councils have the authority to grant both. A scaled down version of the strategy could proceed without the three smallest cities, but a blockage by one of the City Councils would have great influence on the others.

The City Councils have experience with regional programs on a smaller scale. The panel believes that they are in the Let Happen area now, but they must be moved to the Help Happen category to get the final approvals necessary.

Each of these Councils has a Public Safety Committee. Three Council Members are on each of the Public Safety Committees. Presentations to the Public Safety Committees by the City Managers and the Chiefs of Police from the respective cities, with assistance from the project manager, will be used to gain their support. Questions and concerns can be addressed early in the process at this level. The Public Safety Committees make recommendations to the Councils and approval or denial is usually in place before issues go to a vote.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

A variety of management structures could potentially work the chosen strategy through its transition state. The researcher believes that combining two change-management structure options will be most likely to achieve success.

The Evergreen Tactical Commander is well known regionally for his technical skill, his leadership and his interpersonal skills. Much of the work required to take the plan through the transition state will require in depth knowledge of budget requirements, training needs, current methods of managing high risk unusual incidents and a future oriented outlook. He will make an ideal project manager.

Because this strategy involves multiple agencies with stakeholders and members of the critical mass in all of the agencies, there will also need to be a group of representatives of the constituencies formed. While the project manager can provide focus and expertise, input and approvals will have to come from all of the agencies. A management person from each of the other four agencies can assist the project manager and receive input and approvals from their respective agencies.

It is expected that the project manager and the representatives of the constituencies will work on this project, part time, in addition to their normal work assignments. Hence, "job enrichment" is also part of the management structure to be employed.

TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION

To be successful, the chosen strategy will involve many people at many levels of government and organizational structure. Because it involves many groups and individuals with divergent interests and concerns, it will require a variety of technologies to support its implementation.

Commitment Planning/Commitment Chart

The development of a commitment plan in which critical mass players are identified, their commitment is evaluated and the support required from them is identified is an example of a technology or method used to support implementation of the strategy. Designing action steps to gain the needed support is also part of this process. Some of those action steps are described below.

Problem Finding

This is a process in which critical mass players meet to discuss, identify and clarify the problem. This is a non public non binding discussion and brain storming session that allows the group to work through concerns, anxiety and uncertainty. As mentioned in the discussion of the critical mass Evergreen SWAT Team members, they will have concerns about retaining the quality of their existing program. They will be troubled by the possibility of reducing the size of their team in order to save money.

They are also a knowledgeable innovative group that will recognize the benefits of having additional personnel, more equipment, new technology and other additional resources. Problem finding will be an excellent technique for them to use to clarify the issues and to encourage commitment.

Variations of this technology could be useful for all of the groups listed in the critical mass.

Educational Intervention

Educational activities help people understand a problem, the need for change and they help induce the needed commitment. An educational exercise for those members of the critical mass who are not members of the law enforcement profession will help them understand the problems of managing high risk unusual incidents. A description of the process and the number of trained personnel needed to establishing inner and outer perimeter teams, movement teams, command posts,

emergency medical posts and hostage negotiations teams is an impressive way to establish a need for a regional program.

The logistics of communications, press liaison, feeding personnel and replacing them when they are fatigued communicates the massive resources needed to manage a high risk unusual incident. Especially if it lasts longer than eight hours. The tremendous resources required combined with the liability associated with these incidents will have impressive impact on the City Manager and City Council critical mass groups.

Confrontation/Goal Setting Meeting

At some point, the Evergreen Hostage Negotiations Team Coordinator must be moved from the Block Change to the Let Happen category. If the project manager, the representatives of the constituencies and the members of the Evergreen SWAT Team were united in a commitment to the concept of the strategy, a confrontation/goal setting meeting might be effective.

In these meetings, the total group meets and a general purpose and procedure is outlined. Mixed subgroups meet and prepare lists of desired changes. The total group reconvenes and broad categories of change are drafted. Action plans are framed, recommended priorities are set and plans for communicating are put in place. Decisions are made and follow up meetings are scheduled.

Placing the Evergreen Hostage Negotiations Team Coordinator in the position of being the only naysayer would be very uncomfortable for him. His desire to have some control over everything would likely put him in a position of supporting the strategy so that he can be involved in its implementation.

Responsibility Charting

Responsibility charting is a tool that will be used throughout the period of transition management in accomplishing the main strategy and the collateral strategies chosen by the Modified Policy Delphi group. This tool involves two or more people going through a process that combines individual and group work.

The final outcome is a list of actions, decisions or activities recorded on a chart. A list of "actors" who have a role concerning each action or decision is included on the form. The required behavior of each actor is decided upon and broken down into 1) R - Responsibility to see that decisions or actions occur, 2) A - Approval of actions or decisions with right to veto, 3) S - Support of actions or decision by

provision of resources , but with no right to veto 4) I - Informed of action or decisions, but with no right to veto and 5) -- Irrelevant to this item.

When this process is complete, the group should have agreed on each item by consensus decision and only one R should exist for each activity. This results in an agreed upon chart, an understanding of peoples roles and, due to the discussion that occurs, an understanding of their attitude toward their roles.

This is a tool that can be used starting with the first meeting of the project manager and the representatives of the constituencies. It will be effective throughout the process of gaining the necessary approvals for the strategy and for doing the work of implementing the strategy.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT (Outline of Major Events)

PHASE ONE

M=Month W=Week

PLAN AND ORGANIZE

- A. Initial approach/presentation to existing Evergreen SWAT members *M I , W I*
 - 1. Problem finding session to gain support for concept
- B. Initial approach/presentation to Chiefs of Police *M I , W 2*
 - 1. Discuss concept only
 - 2. Receive approval for recommended management structure
 - 3. Have Chiefs make commitment to appoint representatives of the constituencies
- C. First meeting of project manager and representatives of the constituencies (management team) *M 2 , W I*
 - 1. Team building and problem finding session
 - 2. Define roles
 - 3. Initial responsibility chart
 - 4. Rough draft of scope of project (Numbers of personnel, costs, etc.)
- D. Presentation of draft manual, mission statement and general order to management team *M 3 , W 2*
 - 1. Number of personnel to be committed by each agency
 - 2. Selection and deselection process of team members

3. Individual and team equipment needs
 4. Outline of functions team will perform
 5. Call out procedures
 6. Training requirements (Start up and maintenance)
 7. Command and control during incidents
- E. Presentation of draft budget to management team (start up and maintenance) *M 3, W 3*
1. Team equipment
 2. Individual equipment
 3. Schools
 4. Travel and per diem
 5. Overtime
 6. Back fill when team members are away
- F. First rewrite of manual and budget to Chiefs for review *M 3, W 2*
- G. Second meeting with Chiefs to discuss details *M 4, W 2*
1. Rewrites and adjustments as necessary
- H. First formal meeting with City Managers *M 6, W 1*
1. Individually or as a group?
 2. Primarily an educational intervention process
 3. Rewrites and adjustments as necessary or
 4. Support and authorization to meet with Council Public Safety Committees
- I. Meet with each of the five Council Public Safety Committees *M 7 & 8*
1. Five separate meetings
 2. Primarily educational intervention process
 3. Rewrites and adjustments as necessary or
 4. Support and authorization to present to City Councils for approval and budget
- J. Presentations to City Councils *M 9 & 10*
1. Five separate presentations
 2. Rewrites and adjustments as necessary or
 3. Authorization to begin implementation

PHASE TWO

IMPLEMENTATION

- A. Make adjustments as/if needed in make up of management team *M II , W I*
 - 1. Establish a new responsibility chart

- B. Meet with members of existing Evergreen team *M II, W 3*
 - 1. Update
 - 2. Gain support and assistance
 - 3. Responsibility charting

- C. Selection of personnel *M 12 - 15*
 - 1. Physical agility testing
 - 2. Psychological testing
 - 3. Interview
 - 4. Select command level, supervisory and team member personnel

- D. First meeting of new personnel *M 16 , W I*
 - 1. Team building exercise
 - 2. Responsibility chart for work to make team functional

- E. Purchase budgeted equipment *M 12 - 18*

- F. Arrange initial training session(s) *M 16 - 24*

- G. Monitor and test for readiness of team to perform job tasks *M 16 - 24*
 - 1. Firearms qualification
 - 2. Tactical qualification
 - 3. Command structure qualification

PHASE THREE

FORMALIZE

- A. Formalize new structure *M 24 - 26*
 - 1. Public announcements of program readiness
 - 2. Organizational announcements of program readiness

- 3. Organizational educational intervention
- 4. Mock incident trial run in each city
- B. Fine tuning organization and interface relationships *Ongoing*
- C. Establish technology/equipment committee to continuously evaluate technology and its potential uses for SWAT/HNT *Ongoing*
- D. Establish training committee to continuously evaluate new tactics for use by SWAT/HNT *Ongoing*

PHASE FOUR

EVALUATE

- A. Evaluation of the transition *M 26 - 32*
- B. Monitor new organization *Ongoing*
 - 1. Make adjustments as necessary

Similar outlines could be written for the collateral strategies involving 1) support from both Sheriff's Departments during the transition period and formal mutual aid agreements when the regional team is functional, 2) formation of the bi-county tactical commanders association and 3) formation of the technology task force.

CONCLUSION

This study indicates the need for most small to medium size law enforcement agencies to evaluate what the desired future will be in the area of managing high risk incidents. Each agency's needs are somewhat unique. Crime levels, geography, growth, funding and a myriad of other factors will effect how each agency reacts to this issue in the future. Some considerations and conclusions can be drawn from this study that should be considered by all law enforcement agencies and particularly those with limited resources.

Some conclusions reached with regards to the sub-issues are as follows:

How will local control of incidents be maintained?

The two most likely ways appear to be 1) maintaining the status quo and continuing to handle high risk incidents exclusively at the local level with local resources or 2) organizing a regional approach and involving management personnel from each participating jurisdiction.

The risks of managing these incidents with the limited resources available to smaller agencies is clear. This is especially true in light of the increasing resources being applied to these situations by law enforcement agencies with large resource pools.

How will law enforcement use regionalization or consolidation?

One of the fictional scenarios, the strategic plan and the transition management sections of this study focus on a plan for regionalization. This plan involves five jurisdictions in two counties. The advantages in terms of staffing, resources, cost sharing, improved communication and the increased ability to keep up with the "state of the art" are clear. The difficulties involved in sharing resources, establishing command structure, scheduling, liability and the political environment are also clear. For small to medium sized law enforcement agencies to provide excellent service to their communities, at times of crisis, they must work through the hurdles and pool their resources.

Will contracting or another form of collective effort be used to deploy high risk management?

The study indicates that contracting will only be used by those agencies who have no resources to apply to this issue and/or little need for high risk management. Protection of life is at the core of the law enforcement purpose. Few, if any law enforcement agencies favor abdicating that responsibility to another organization, during high risk incidents.

How will technology affect high risk incident tactics?

Microwave projectiles, flash blinding bombs, chemical laser rifles, sticky or electrified nets, and super slippery fluids exist in prototype forms today.¹³ Robots, listening devices, audio devices, probing radar devices and a myriad of other high technology devices are on the horizon.

The day the researcher was writing this conclusion, the Fall 1994 issue of the Tactical Edge arrived. It featured an article about Mesa, Arizona's new \$50,000 robot. The robot has "X-ray capabilities, a dual mounted water cannon, three separate angle mounted viewing cameras, a VCR tape recording system, a public address system, a front end gripper that has a grip strength range from 20 pounds of pressure to crushing capacity, front arm extensions that will enable the robot to reach the second

¹³ Langreth, Robert: "Soft Kill: The Picture of Warfare," Popular Science. Vol. 245, No 4, pg. 69

story of a structure, the robot can drag up to 600 pounds, a mounted shotgun with laser sighting system, front and rear mounted spotlights, a television monitor, a replaceable 8-hour power source."¹⁴

This study indicates that technology will have a dramatic impact on high risk management. Much of that impact will occur near the end of the 10 year study period or even later. All indications are that technology will greatly alter today's tactics and possibly make them obsolete.

This is an area that underwent exciting developments during the time of this study. It will be an interesting area for further research.

The research information was targeted to the issue: **"What methods will medium and small size law enforcement agencies use for high risk incidents by the year 2004?"**

The ability to manage high risk incidents is important to the vast majority, if not all, of California law enforcement agencies. These incidents tax agency resources and carry tremendous liability with them. Being prepared in advance, to the extent possible, to manage these incidents while harnessing all available resources is the key to success.

This study gives the reader a basic, generic plan that can be modified to meet the needs of medium and small size law enforcement agencies. The time to act for success in the future is now.

¹⁴ Shields, Tom: "Robotic Technology Joins the Mesa (AZ) P.D.'s Tactical Team," The Tactical Edge. Vol 12, No 4, pg. 65

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