

Providing Cooperative Police Services in Northwest

Orange County in 2009.

Command College-

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INTRODUCTION

Years ago, Orange County, California consisting of orange groves and dairies in a suburb south of Los Angeles. Today it is a thriving upper middle class megalopolis that in 1998 claimed 2,721,701 residents.¹ The County is made up of a over 20 incorporated cities and a number of other communities. While several of these cities claim more than 100,000 residents each, there are four smaller unique communities in the northwest corner of Orange County, along the Los Angeles County border, that are the subject of this paper. These are the cities of La Palma, Cypress, Los Alamitos and Seal Beach.

The majority of these areas were incorporated into cities in the 1950's and are built out as far as population and density. Over the course of time these communities developed their own unique community cultures and, intentionally or accidentally, cast their economic futures. Each of the four cities also started police departments, which like their respective communities, developed a policing strategy, a unique role in their community and their own organizational cultures. Specific details of these communities and their police departments are described in chapter 3.

Like many police departments doing business in the 1990's, these four departments, that for the purpose of this paper will be referred to as northwest Orange County, were continually called upon to do more, and do it better than they had done it before. Over these same years the demand curve continued to climb with new mandates for crime reporting, new training expectations, changes in policing strategies, increased public scrutiny, automation demands and expensive support technology. Over this same period of time, the available pool of general fund revenue available to pay for the aforementioned demands and rising personnel costs began to shrink. This shrinkage can

be traced to a number of factors, all the subject of a great political debate, but the result to law enforcement was the same: "Do more with less." In fact the "more with less" mantra has become so loud that one Orange County Police Chief went on the record to say, "that based on the track we have been on, we will ultimately be called upon to do everything with nothing."²

While there has recently been COPPS (Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving) and LLEBG (Local Law Enforcement Block Grant) money made available to assist police with some of these efforts, there is no indication that this trend of recent years will change. Demands on law enforcement will continue to increase at a rate far above available funding. The responses to this trend in Northwest Orange County have been varied. One response to the increased demands and reduced resources has been downsizing and the reduction or elimination of some services. Another, more positive result, has been an increase in cooperation between the four agencies. Initially this cooperation was informal and sporadic, typically along the order of working an occasional drug deal with a neighboring agency, or working together on a drunk driving checkpoint. This cooperation evolved to a point that three of the agencies that worked out of the same court facility began to share the services of a civilian Court Liaison. This arrangement involved Cypress, Los Alamitos and Seal Beach, and required Los Alamitos and Seal Beach to contract with Cypress for the services. The cost of these services was, and still is, split based on the percentage of the total number of cases filed in a year. Subsequent to this the concept of a regional communications center was agreed upon, developed and implemented. West-Comm is now is fully operational and providing regional communications for the cities of Cypress, Los Alamitos and Seal Beach. This

trend of cooperation seems to have been very effective in reducing costs and improving the ability of the involved departments to provide police services.

As there seems to be no end in sight for the inverse trend between demand for services and decreased funds, law enforcement will have to continue to find creative yet affordable ways to meet this demand. Cooperative efforts, of a much broader scope than those currently in existence in northwest Orange County, may in fact prove a very viable solution to the continuing problems likely to be faced by the four smaller agencies in Northwest Orange County between now and the year 2009.

The goal of this paper is to explore how these departments will cooperate to provide police service in the year 2009.

THE CASE FOR COOPERATION

The concept of law enforcement cooperation is by no means a new concept. Since law enforcement began in Orange County there have been mutual aid agreements. Cooperation, however, can take a number of forms beyond emergency mutual aid. These can include resource sharing and contracting, and extend to complete consolidation or regionalization.

The United Kingdom began an effort to consolidate the hundreds of small police departments across England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales shortly after World War II. Today there are only 43 constabularies serving the United Kingdom and the ultimate goal is to shrink that to 28.³

The concept of regionalization is also not new to northwest Orange County. In 1969/70 a study was undertaken to evaluate the feasibility of consolidating the La Palma, Cypress, Los Alamitos and Seal Beach Police Departments.⁴ While political issues and concerns over varied policing styles derailed this effort, it planted a seed that has remained alive some 30 years later. The reasons for the continued interest in expanded law enforcement cooperation, up to and including complete consolidation, are varied. Some of the justifications for exploring expanded cooperation or possible consolidation include:

To reduce costs. It is generally believed that a great deal of redundancy could be reduced if law enforcement efforts in the region were consolidated. Some examples of these reductions could be in upper management positions, such as chiefs or captains, and in certain support positions, such as property or parking enforcement. Additional cost savings could also be recognized by the reduction of certain soft costs currently borne by

each of the four jurisdictions that make up the region. This could include the costs for recruiting, personnel management, risk management, payroll, etcetera.

Technology. In many ways this argument could be listed as part of the effort to reduce costs. As we enter the 21st century, law enforcement will be forced to purchase and use a number of new technologies. The research required to identify the required technology (computers, software, equipment), the costs of that technology, and the training required to become proficient in its use are quite expensive. A consolidated approach to the technology issue would not only reduce a great deal of repetitious effort, but would also likely make law enforcement a much better consumer and user of technology.

Improved service. If the goal of law enforcement is service, and if that service is safety related, then law enforcement could much more effectively serve the community on a regional basis than in a piece-meal approach. One of the more obvious applications of this concept includes the pursuit of criminals over a broader area, versus believing or working like we believe that criminals contain their illegal activity within each respective city limits. Another way service could be improved on a regional basis is by a unified approach to public safety issues that cross city borders.

One example of this is the region's current concern over traffic along Seal Beach/Los Alamitos Boulevard. Would this issue be more effectively addressed by three or four independent jurisdictions, or would it be better addressed by a unified agency with a single strategic approach? Another example of this same thinking pertains to the school districts in the region. Not one of the four cities in the region has a school district which shares the same exact borders as the incorporated city, and the impact of school

aged children on law enforcement is a well documented fact. The Cypress School District crosses over into Buena Park, and La Palma. La Palma is in a school district that also exceeds its city boundaries, and both Cypress and La Palma have junior and senior high schools that are part of the much larger Anaheim Union High School District. Only Los Alamitos and Seal Beach share a common unified school district.

These types of situations are just a few examples of how law enforcement currently provides a fragmented response that could very likely be improved through a cooperative approach.

Optimization of Resources. The current configuration of four smaller police departments in the region requires each police department to maintain certain minimum levels of staff and equipment that could likely be reduced by consolidation. The two most visible examples of this optimization would be police officers and police cars.

These four cities serve a population of about 100,000, yet on any given day there are about 15 patrol officers patrolling the cities and 4 sergeants supervising. If one of the four jurisdictions has a vacancy for whatever reason, they will likely divert some other resource, such as traffic or reserve officers, or spend overtime funds to fill the position. These steps are necessary to fill a legitimate minimum staffing standard. However, if the cities' police services were consolidated, one or two vacancies from a total compliment of 15 would not necessitate such steps. Subsequently, service would not be compromised and additional costs would not be incurred.

Another very real illustration of this benefit is police cars. If one looks in the parking lot of any of these four stations on a given day they will see a number of a parked police cars. These cars are in fact necessary to accommodate overlaps and repairs.

However, if one took two, three or four of the jurisdictions in the region and consolidated them, the number of spare cars could be reduced, again eliminating an unnecessary expense and at the same time not compromising service.

In addition to the costs savings, this type of resource optimization could be used to equip officers (with mobile data systems, less lethal weapons and training) in a manner that would allow them to serve and protect the citizens more efficiently through cooperation than they could through their current independent efforts.

POLICE DEPARTMENT AND COMMUNITY PROFILES

As previously mentioned, this paper looks at regionalization only in northwest Orange County, specifically involving the cities of La Palma, Cypress, Los Alamitos and Seal Beach. A map has been included in the addendum to provide the reader with a geographic perspective of the area. The following brief descriptions of each of the four communities and police departments is provided as a foundation for subsequent discussion.

The City of **La Palma**, the northern-most city in the northwest region (see map), was incorporated in 1955. It is approximately 2 square miles in area. The City of La Palma contains elementary schools from two different school districts and is home to a junior and senior high school that make up part of the much larger Anaheim Unified School District. According to the 1990 Federal Census, La Palma has approximately 15,392 residents with the two largest segments of that population being Caucasians (59.9%) and Asians (31.1%). The median household income in La Palma is \$54,364. While La Palma has a business park, it is small and is comprised primarily of offices with some light manufacturing. The city has no significant sales tax base. This city is managed by a city manager who reports to five city council members who are elected at large to represent the city.

The La Palma Police Department is authorized 25 officers and approximately 18 civilian positions. They have 14 reserves and a very active senior volunteer program that contributes over 5,000 hours a year to the Police Department. The police budget for fiscal year 1998/99 is about \$3.2 million a year.⁵

In 1997 there were 483 Part 1 crimes in La Palma, making their 1997 Part 1 crime rate 2,939 crimes per 100,000 residents.⁶ In the years since, the City has continued to experience a decrease in crime. Because of this relatively low crime rate, and a generally safe environment, the La Palma Police Department has had the opportunity to excel in a number of other areas, as demonstrated by awards it has received for its internal ethics program and its very active volunteer program. The La Palma Police Department is very involved in its community and very well thought of.

The City of Cypress is the largest of the cities in the northwest region (see map). It was incorporated in 1956 and approximately 7 square miles in area. The City of Cypress contains a number of public elementary schools, all in the Cypress Elementary School District, as well as two junior highs and one senior high that are part of the much larger Anaheim Unified School District. Cypress College (a two year community college) is also located in the City of Cypress. Cypress has approximately 47,938 residents with the three largest segments of that population being Caucasians (79.2%), Asians (13.7%) and Hispanics (13.5%). The median household income in Cypress is \$50,981. In addition to the Los Alamitos Race Course (a quarter horse, sulky and satellite racing facility), the City of Cypress has a thriving business park in the southern portion of the city that supplements its predominantly residential community with a healthy sales tax base. This revenue stream and an aggressive strategy to control costs have provided Cypress a healthy and dependable economic condition. This city is managed by a city manager who reports to five city council members who are elected at large to represent the city.

The Cypress Police Department is authorized 55 officers and approximately 18 full time civilian positions. They have 1 reserve officer and a senior volunteer program that contributes over 4,000 hours a year to the Police Department. The police budget for fiscal year 1998/99 is about \$8.2 million a year.⁷

In 1997 there were 1,448 Part 1 crimes in Cypress, making their 1997 Part 1 crime rate 3,039 crimes per 100,000 residents.⁸ In the years since the City has continued to experience a decrease in crime. Cypress is generally agreed to be the busiest city in the northwest Orange County region (calls for service, arrests, crimes, reports). Because of this it is generally viewed as having a more aggressive style of policing than the surrounding communities. The Cypress Police Department is well thought of in the community.

The City of Los Alamitos is located almost in the middle of the northwest region, (see map) was incorporated in 1960. It is approximately 4 square miles in area, one half of which is occupied by an Armed Forces Reserve Center. The City of Los Alamitos has two elementary schools, two junior high schools, one senior high school and the Orange County High School of the Arts, all part of the Los Alamitos Unified School District which services Los Alamitos, Rossmoor and Seal Beach. The City of Los Alamitos also has a large hospital with a number of adjacent medical facilities in its city. Los Alamitos has approximately 11,676 residents with the two largest segments of that population being Caucasians (84.9%) and Hispanic (12.5%). The median household income in Los Alamitos is \$45,171. Los Alamitos has a small commercial area which is primarily light manufacturing. The City has no significant sales tax base. This City is managed by a

city manager who reports to five city council members who are elected at large to represent the city.

The Los Alamitos Police Department is authorized 24 officers, 3 full time civilian positions, 7 reserves and 6 part time civilian aides. The police budget is about \$3.1 million a year for fiscal year 1998/99.⁹

In 1997 there were 436 Part 1 crimes in Los Alamitos, making their 1997 Part 1 crime rate 3,536 crimes per 100,000 residents.¹⁰ In the years since, the City has continued to experience a decrease in crime. The Los Alamitos Police Department is well thought of in the community.

The City of Seal Beach is the southern-most city in the northwest region (see map). Incorporated on October 27, 1915 (84 years ago), the city border encompasses 10.72 miles of land and 7.48 miles of water, for a total area of just slightly more than 18 square miles. There is only one school in City of Seal Beach, an elementary school that is part of the Los Alamitos Unified School District. As the name implies, Seal Beach has a beach with a connected downtown district that attracts typical beach-related activities. Seal Beach has approximately 25,098 residents, of which almost 8,000 are seniors living in a gated community. The two largest ethnic groups making up the Seal Beach population are Caucasians (93.7%) and Hispanics (5%). The median household income in Seal Beach is \$32,834. Seal Beach does not have a business park, and is currently working to develop a commercial project to supplement its limited tax base, with a goal to reduce or eliminate its 11% utility tax. This City is managed by a city manager who reports to five city council members who are elected to represent five different geographic sections of the city.

The Seal Beach Police Department is authorized 34 officers and 11 full time civilian positions. They have 7 reserves and a very active senior volunteer program of 40 volunteers that contributes over 10,000 hours a year to the Police Department. The police budget is currently about \$4.978 million a year.

In 1997 there were 614 Part 1 crimes in Seal Beach, making their 1997 Part 1 crime rate 2,399 crimes per 100,000 residents.¹¹ In the years since, the City has continued to experience a decrease in crime. Because of this relatively low crime rate, and a generally safe environment, the Seal Beach Police Department is viewed by the community as an outstanding organization.

TRENDS, EVENTS, AND CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

In Chapter 2, a case for law enforcement cooperation in northwest Orange County was provided. This chapter will address possible trends and events that could impact cooperation, and will present a cross-impact analysis correlating the potential impact of both the trends and events.

The method used to conduct this analysis was the Nominal Group Technique (commonly known as the N.G.T.). This technique is a facilitated group discussion designed to solicit input from knowledgeable individuals in the field, or in related fields. The goal of this discussion was to get specific input on the issue question ("Will communities in Northwest Orange County cooperate to provide police services in the year 2009?") and specifically to generate ideas that would aid in better predicting possible future outcomes. The N.G.T. also identifies possible trends and events that might impact the stated issue. The process evaluates to what degree those trends, or events, may impact the stated issue.

For this N.G.T., twelve individuals participated in the process. The twelve panelists consisted of three police chiefs (two from adjacent agencies in northwest Orange County and one from an agency that contracts law enforcement services to another city in Orange County); two officers who serve as presidents of police officer bargaining units; two city managers from communities in northwest Orange County; a former city councilman from northwest Orange County; a finance director from a city in northwest Orange County; a property and business owner from the area; a high-level hospital administrator from the area; and the dispatch administrator from the regional

communications center. The names and specific job assignments of all the panelists are listed in the Addendum of this report.

In addition to these panelists, a captain from an agency in south Orange County and a civilian manager from a northwest Orange County police department assisted with the facilitation of the N.G.T.

Trends:

A trend is defined as an inclination, a general course or direction. For the purposes of this project, a trend is an issue with a past, present and future. It can be qualitative as well as quantitative and its past is not necessarily a predictor of the future. Finally, a trend is something we have the ability to exert a degree of control or influence over.

The aforementioned panelists were first provided with a working definition of a trend and then asked to brainstorm a number of possible non directional trends that might impact the stated issue. The panel then clarified each of the listed trends and selected the nine trends that they believed would have the greatest impact on the issue of law enforcement cooperation. Once these nine trends were identified, the panel weighed numerically the past and future direction of the trend and the degree of impact the trend could have on the issue of law enforcement cooperation.


The Trend Summary Table and Trend Chart completed through this process can be found on page 17.

Trend Average Summary

	-5 Years	Today	+5 Years	+10 Years	Concern (1-10)
Trend 1	72	100	199	315	5.5
Trend 2	73	100	151	206	4.3
Trend 3	75	100	140	193	6.3
Trend 4	104	100	176	252	7.1
Trend 5	78	100	168	220	6.4
Trend 6	79	100	183	255	8.1
Trend 7	97	100	138	188	7.1
Trend 8	88	100	192	258	6.9
Trend 9	79	100	169	244	7.5

- Trend 1 – Changes in technology will change policing.
- Trend 2 – Communities perceptions of policing needs will change.
- Trend 3 – Skills, technology and methods of training will change.
- Trend 4 – Maintain service levels with changes in funding.
- Trend 5 – Modifying of public infrastructure including the need for detention Facilities.
- Trend 6 – Recruitment and retention of law enforcement personnel with Competitive pay.
- Trend 7 – Local and regional economic changes.
- Trend 8 – Ethnic/cultural changes.
- Trend 9 – Agency size, jurisdiction and sharing of resources.

Trend Average Analysis



Events:


Events are described as singular incidents that will have a significant impact on the pertinent issue (law enforcement cooperation in northwest Orange County). Events may or may not occur. A probability of occurrence can be established or estimated within a possible time frame. As with a trend, we have the ability to have some degree of impact upon the effects of the event. The panel listed all the possible events the panelists could think of and reduced that list to nine. Again the panel members prioritized the list to determine the events most likely to occur and which events would most likely have a significant impact on the issue of cooperation. The twelve panelists then determined the time when the probability of the event occurring was first greater than zero and what the probability of occurrence would be at five (5) years from now, and then ten (10) years from now. The event Summary Table and Event Chart can be found on page 19.

Event Average Summary

	Year >0	+5 Years	+10 Years	Impact (+ or -)	Impact (1-10)
Event 1	3	40	67	+	3.5
Event 2	3	44	73	+	3.4
Event 3	1	35	59	+	6.7
Event 4	6	13	23	-	-0.8
Event 5	3	37	54	+	8.5
Event 6	3	39	55	-	-0.8
Event 7	7	10	23	+	2.7
Event 8	3	37	65	+	7.4
Event 9	3	30	70	+	8.0

- Event 1 – Downsizing or funding cuts.
- Event 2 – Demographic change.
- Event 3 – Major earthquake.
- Event 4 – Legalization of gambling.
- Event 5 – Two cities merge police departments.
- Event 6 – Significant gain of new income source.
- Event 7 – Closure of Los Alamitos Armed Forces Reserve Center or Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station.
- Event 8 – Recession.
- Event 9 – Significant loss of existing income source.

Event Probability Chart



Cross-Impact Analysis:

The events and trends identified by the panel will not likely occur independently of each other. As we see daily, virtually nothing occurs in a vacuum. Every action has an interrelationship with a number of other events or trends. So it is with the previously identified trends and events. While it is possible that some trends or events may indeed occur independently of each other, the likelihood that one of these nine (9) events or nine (9) trends could occur and not impact one of the other events or trends is highly unlikely. Subsequently, the occurrence of an event could very well effect the slope of another trend curve, and that effect could be either positive or negative (and alter the slope of the trend curve accordingly). Similarly, different events will result in different modifications to the nine trend lines.

Therefore, conducting a cross-impact analyses, using different event occurrences and trend lines will produce different scenarios. In fact, causing or creating an event may be one way to affect a trend in a manner that will result in a desired outcome. The Cross-Impact Analysis Chart on the following page reflects the author's assessment of how the various trends and events identified by the twelve N.G.T. panelists might impact each other.

This cross-impact analyses reveals some interesting possible futures. For example, according to this analysis an event such as major downsizing or funding cuts for one or more of the cities in northwest Orange County could positively impact the trend of how communities use technology to do policing. The thinking here is that financial hardship could impact personnel costs and force police departments to look to technology to replace some of the more costly personnel-intensive elements of the law enforcement

function. The chart also reflects a very positive movement toward cooperation brought about by an event such as the merger of two police departments. While such a merger in and of itself would represent increased cooperation, it could also have a very positive impact on modifications of public infrastructure, such as a regional detention facility or the additional sharing of resources. (For example, if two cities merged their police departments, additional cost savings and cooperation could be achieved in the finance department, or with payroll or fleet maintenance. Other more costly and cumbersome cooperative structures could also be eliminated.)

The cross-impact analysis also revealed some relationships that might negatively impact law enforcement cooperation within the region. Most notable among these was the possible closure of one of the two military facilities in the area. While the panel rated this as not very likely, such an event would clearly have the potential for a significant improvement to the involved cities' financial picture (since facilities occupy more than half of the area in the city in which they are located). This potential for new income would very likely hinder most needs for mutual cooperation with other cities for police services.

In addition to factors that had a positive or a negative impact on trends that would move us toward cooperation, a number of events were identified as insignificantly impacting law enforcement cooperation.

Cross-Impact Analysis Chart

		Trend 1	Trend 2	Trend 3	Trend 4	Trend 5	Trend 6	Trend 7	Trend 8	Trend 9
Event 1	Impact	Yes								
	+ or -	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	No	+
	1-5	2	1	2	4	2	2	2		2
Event 2	Impact		Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	
	+ or -	No	-	-	+	No	No	No	+	No
	1-5		3	1	1				1	
Event 3	Impact		Yes		Yes					
	+ or -	No	+	No	-	No	No	No	No	No
	1-5		2		1					
Event 4	Impact	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes
	+ or -	+	-	+	-	+	No	No	No	-
	1-5	3	2	2	2	2				2
Event 5	Impact			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes
	+ or -	No	No	+	+	+	+	No	No	+
	1-5			1	1	4	4			5
Event 6	Impact	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
	+ or -	+	-	+	No	+	-	-	No	-
	1-5	3	1	3		3	2	1		3
Event 7	Impact		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	+ or -	No	-	No	+	+	-	-	+	-
	1-5		1		4	4	3	4	1	3
Event 8	Impact	Yes		Yes						
	+ or -	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	No	+
	1-5	2	2	2	1	3	2	3		3
Event 9	Impact	Yes		Yes						
	+ or -	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	No	+
	1-5	2	3	2	1	3	1	2		3

- Trend 1 Changes in technology will change how policing is done
- Trend 2 Communities perceptions of what they need will change
- Trend 3 Skills required, technology used by law enforcement and methods of training will change
- Trend 4 Maintenance of service levels with changes in funding levels
- Trend 5 Modifications of public infrastructure, including the need for a regional detention facility
- Trend 6 Recruitment and retention of law enforcement personnel with competitive pay
- Trend 7 Local and regional economic changes
- Trend 8 Ethnic and cultural changes
- Trend 9 Agency size, jurisdiction area and sharing of resources

- Event 1 Downsizing and funding cuts
- Event 2 Demographic change
- Event 3 Major earthquake
- Event 4 Legalization of gambling
- Event 5 Two cities merge police departments
- Event 6 Significant gain of income for one or more cities
- Event 7 Closure of the Los Alamitos Armed Forces Reserve Center or Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station
- Event 8 Recession
- Event 9 Significant loss of income source for one or more cities

SCENARIO GENERATION Scenario 1 – An Optimistic Future

Captain Mioki Palacio unplugged his 2008 GMC Franklin from the charging station in the garage of his rented condominium and headed off for the Northwest Orange County Public Safety Department. As was his usual practice, he drove through the Daily Grind coffee stand, and paid for his café mocha using his new dash mounted VISA tele-sponder. As he settled into the quiet drive south, he switched on his integrated office system and began downloading his video and voice messages, e-mails, and electronic correspondence.

First up was a message from the chief's secretary. In her typical cheery way she was reminding him that tonight he was to attend the south area city council meeting. Chief Piroth would be attending the city council meeting for the northern jurisdiction.

Palacio remembered how great it was five years ago when he was a sergeant and he didn't have to attend council meetings. Back then the police officers' associations for both the participating cities were locked in a protracted wage dispute. The battle had been ongoing for so long in one jurisdiction that a large percentage of their officers were looking to leave. The now-unified cities, being some of the smaller in the county, were having a difficult time paying a competitive wage to recruit and keep qualified people. Unfortunately, this problem was not unique to the smaller cities. In fact everyone seemed to be having a difficult time finding educated, technically qualified personnel. Many of the larger cities were continually struggling to fill vacant positions and offer a competitive wage. It was not easy to find qualified people who would work shifts, and deal with the growing demands placed on law enforcement.

Things seemed to have reached an all-time low. The decision to cross train police officers to supplement fire services and control contract costs had not been received well by many of the senior officers, including Palacio.

These changes, coupled with the Campbell Act, had been especially hard on the smaller police departments. The Campbell Act took discretionary spending of most law enforcement grant funds away from individual agencies and mandated their expenditure for the newly created "Badge Cam System (BCS)." The financial impact of the Campbell Act was significant, but the resistance to BCS almost seemed to hurt as bad.

BCS required every officer to continuously record all of his or her daily activities and then daily download the electronically stored images to a central county repository. BCS not only discouraged many good candidates from pursuing a career in law enforcement, but it also did nothing to stem the tide of service and medical retirements that were already draining departments of their limited human resources. It was these mass departures that provided Palacio the quick opportunities for promotion from sergeant to lieutenant, and then one year later to captain. While many of his peers felt he had promoted too early, the truth was that he was better qualified than most. And while the first couple years had been rocky, things were starting to level out. In fact, he had thought that he would be chief when the recession of 2001 hit.

The recession in and of itself was not terrible; in fact it seemed like everyone knew it was coming. It was the state's effort to respond that hurt the cities most. First there was the loss of additional vehicle licensing fees, then the diversion of fines from the Commission on Police Officers Standards and Training. Finally, a plan to redistribute sales tax dollars on a regional basis was implemented, which in fact only seemed to help

the county and hurt the cities. It seemed like the chief was about to give up and pull the pin on the "Do more with less" and "Faster, Better, Cheaper Show." It was then that the management teams and police associations of a number of the smaller cities, with similar policing philosophies and organizational cultures began to meet to discuss how they could expand their current cooperative efforts for the mutual benefits of their respective departments and communities.

When Palacio first heard the idea, he thought it would never happen. It had been talked about for years and nothing had ever come of it. For some reason, this time was different. Despite the typical conflicts cities go through, the city councils and city managers in northwest Orange County seemed to understand that it was in their mutual best interest to work out a cooperative consolidation. This cooperative effort would have to allow for sufficient local control by each of the participating agencies, and at the same time reduce redundant costs that are associated with running multiple departments. The plan had to be developed in a way that minimized the bureaucracy of other complicated cooperative efforts. It was this cooperative effort that ultimately lead to the merger of the police departments in northwest Orange County that are today known as the Northwest Orange County Public Safety Department.

Scenario 2 – A Pessimistic Future

Lieutenant Mike McDreary is nervous about returning to work. This most recent suspension was clearly unjust, and if his ex-wife had not made such a big deal about the little tussle they got in at the Do Drop Inn, Acting Chief Dona Wannabe would have never found out, much less suspended him. The one thing he had going for him was that the Department was so short staffed that they couldn't really afford to suspend him longer or fire him.

The last five years have not been good for McDreary. The small police department in northwest Orange County that he has worked for the past twenty-three years has seen better times, as has he. Five years ago things were looking good. The economy was strong and the city was recovering from previous years of financial hardship. Most encouraging was the development of a commercial tax base which promised to significantly increase the city's revenue stream.

The small police department had made some significant progress on cooperative efforts of various sorts, and seemed to be moving cautiously in the direction of a complete merger.

As the commercial development in McDreary's town began to generate taxes, and as the economy stayed strong, there seemed less reason to seek cost saving consolidation efforts. At this same time, the conflicts began to arise within the regional arrangements the Department had previously entered into with its near-by neighbors. The administration of the cooperative efforts also became cumbersome for the managers charged with making them work.

In addition to this, changes in administrations and litigation between the cities over development on their common borders generated suspicion and eroded their willingness to cooperate.

To the more senior officers who saw the cooperative changes as a threat to their personal security, this was fine, and most officers never even noticed the slow erosion of trust between the involved jurisdictions.

As the need for cooperative relationships seemed to lessen because of apparent financial independence, each of the smaller agencies in the northwest portion of the county moved off in totally independent directions.

One agency attempted to keep pace with increasing salaries by giving its personnel sizeable raises. Another agency, which could not afford this same approach, became deadlocked in a protracted salary negotiation with its police association. The jurisdiction McDreary worked for initially did well with its newfound tax source. However, as soon as the economy took the slightest downturn, the new businesses, struggling to get established, attempted to negotiate with the city some form of relief from its heavy utility tax obligation. When the city would not negotiate, the business went into default and ultimately abandoned its almost-new building.

Struggling with a dwindling revenue stream, McDreary's department had been forced to deal with downsizing and reorganizing. Training had fallen woefully behind, and there was virtually no available money to replace the department's aging equipment and technology.

Finally, in desperation, McDreary and the acting chief were assigned by the newly elected "Overhaul Government Candidate," via the City Manager, to investigate policing

options. They had attempted to meet with two near-by smaller departments; however, each of them had previously worked out a cooperative arrangement with another jurisdiction. In both cases the smaller departments, which originally had so much in common with McDreary's organization, had been taken over by a larger, less compatible organization.

When Wannabe and McDreary met with a larger agency nearby, the response to something cooperative was cool at best. The chief of that department told Wannabe that neither he or his council saw any benefit for their city in pursuing a "cooperative" relationship with McDreary's department. The only option this Chief was open to discussing with Wannabe and McDreary was a take over contract that clearly benefited his department.

The report Wannabe and McDreary are to submit to the city manager this week only has two recommendations. 1) Make additional cuts and attempt to again reorganize the department, or 2) seek a contract with either the larger department to the north or with the Sheriff.

Scenario 3 – A Surprise Free Future

Monday, January 5, 2009, Commander Shelly Jackson, Director of the Northwest Orange County Police Support Services Joint Powers Authority (N.O. Co.P.S.S. J.P.A.) leaves her comfortable Huntington Beach Condo for the Seal Beach Police Department. The majority of her unit will be returning to work after their first 80-hour winter holiday, a benefit they were finally granted in binding arbitration.

Jackson's usual Monday morning stop is in Seal Beach where she checks in on the Dispatch Administrator and gets the weekend update on the regional communications center. While there she will also pick up and approve payroll for the twenty-three (23) full and part-time Com Center employees.

Once this is done Jackson will go on line with her six managers for their weekly teleconference staff meeting. Previous efforts to regularly get the Dispatch Administrator, the Records Administrator, the Court Liaison, the Regional Animal Control Chief and the Property Administrator together for a meeting proved nearly impossible. And while teleconferencing with this many people did create some personal interaction obstacles, it was better than never getting together. This meeting format also provided Jackson more time to meet with the various division commanders, chiefs and city managers that she worked with to address their respective issues.

As this was the start of a new calendar year, Jackson knew she needed all her people to get a jump on their budget proposals for fiscal year 2010/11. This was going to be an especially difficult year. The Com Center would continue to function as a Joint Powers Authority with costs distributed on a per capita basis. The court liaisons, however, worked on a contract calculated on the number of cases handled in a year, so

the costs of that program changed year to year. This was a fact that none of the chiefs liked and they never stopped reminding Jackson of how much they disliked like this arrangement.

The animal control numbers were also going to be difficult this year because one of the current accounts was asking for an increased level of service and another was weighing the possibility of contracting with a different jurisdiction to the north. In addition to this, the Animal Control Chief was still getting bids from private firms on the cost of contracting out animal licensing. Privatizing licensing could save a great deal of money if N.O. Co.P.S.S. could get all the participating agencies to modify their municipal codes and agree to let the N.O. Co.P.S.S. vendor collect their animal licensing fees.

Jackson knew this would be a fight. She had gone through a similar struggle in 03 when the J.P.A. took over regional alarm administration. To do so required each of the participating agencies to modify their municipal codes so that all the alarms could be administered in a like manner. The process turned out to be a bureaucratic and political nightmare. Between the competing interests of the various councils, the four city attorneys, and three business associations, and the objections of Blue Shield Security who took up the issue to battle for the impropriety of government competing with private business, Jackson thought the idea would never come to fruition. If she had only known how prophetic those issues had been.

Today, her biggest problems were struggling with the seven different configurations of partnership that the four cities in northwest Orange County shared. While the partnerships seemed to provide better service to the community and the

officers in the field by reducing costs and redundancy, the management of the partnerships seemed to be a time-consuming hindrance that continually detracted from the benefits. The one exception was the Regional Property Operation. Unlike the other joint efforts this one had been forged after an interest based problem-solving model. The initial input provided by each of the participating agencies, and the mutual trust each of the agencies had in the Property Administrator (a medically retired detective), allowed property to run in a very independent and satisfactory manner. In fact, the operation was such a success that the Property Administrator was currently in the process of talking with a near-by Los Angeles County agency to see if N.O. Co.P.S.S. could provide them with services.

Yes, there was indeed a lot of work associated with regionalization. Jackson knew that when she took the job eight years ago. A lot had changed in that eight years. Her hope was that the next eight years would be more of the same. She hoped that in the years to come the various law enforcement agencies in northwest Orange County would continue to cooperate, and would continue to refine and improve their cooperative efforts toward the end of providing even better support to the officers and better service to the community.

THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS

Strategic planning is a formal process whereby people, typically leaders, of organizations do not just manage day-to-day activities, but rather, using a number of tools and techniques, identify a (series of) goal(s) 5-7 years in the future and then work toward those goals. The process should include identification of the organization's short and long term goals as well as the internal and external factors that may impact the organization's efforts to reach its goals.

In the context of this paper, strategic planning would include clear identification of what cooperative law enforcement goals the Seal Beach Police Department wished to pursue and the formulation of specific steps to move us toward those goals. Successful attainment of those goals would then require a disciplined pursuit of them with the flexibility to adjust as needed along the way.

This kind of strategic planning cannot be accomplished by one or two individuals. It is a process that takes time, evaluation, communication and consensus building. Once a written strategic plan is developed, it is critical that this plan be regularly reviewed and "tuned up" to adjust for environmental factors not known or anticipated when the plan was first conceived.

In order for a strategic plan to gain the support needed to be successful, and to gain the required consensus, it is vital that there be a common understanding of the organization's philosophy, its mission and its core values and beliefs. One way this can be accomplished is through the development of a mission statement, or a value statement. However, for the strategic plan to be successful, these statements must be truly supported by not only police management, but by all the other involved stakeholders.

There are a long list of possible stakeholders in an issue like law enforcement cooperation. As the level of cooperation grows, the number of stakeholders will likewise grow, and if the desired level of cooperation is department-wide consolidation, the number of stakeholders, or individuals from whom input should be sought, is likely large. For example, a merger of the Los Alamitos and the Seal Beach Police Department would involve not only citizens and business people from each community, but also the officers and management of both departments, the school district, the city hall staff of both cities and the city councils in both the cities. For the strategic planning process to work, input should be sought from all these stakeholders.

While strategic plans will vary, depending on the issue they address and their goal(s), strategies and objectives, the following is a strategic plan for a possible consolidation of the Seal Beach and Los Alamitos Police Departments:

GOAL – To consolidate the Seal Beach and Los Alamitos Police Departments.

Strategy 1: Identify a team of key individuals, representing the key stakeholders (citizens, participating police associations, city staffs, city managers, city councils), and involve them in a process of identifying the benefits and obstacles to consolidation.

Objectives:

- ✘ Identify the 15 most important stakeholders whose support is needed to pursue consolidation.
- ✘ Work with that team to identify benefits of consolidation.
- ✘ Work with that team to identify potential risks of not pursuing consolidation.

Strategy 2: Involve this team in communicating the benefits of consolidation to the group they represent.

Objectives:

- ✘ Develop lines of communication that allow all effected¹² to have input into the process.
- ✘ Maintain an attitude that is open to alternate solutions to build a consensus that is viewed as the best possible solution.

Strategy 3: Improve the Department's ability to initiate and manage change.¹³

Objectives:

- ✘ Reduce delays in adopting and implementing new policies, procedures or goals.
- ✘ Cultivate a proactive approach to change within all Bureaus of the Department.
- ✘ Improve responsiveness to suggestions for change from all levels of the organization and the community.

In preparation for this process, the twelve individuals who participated in the Nominal Group Technique panel were asked what factors they would incorporate into a strategic plan. Their suggestions included the following:

- Successful consolidation should include jurisdictional autonomy and be cheaper and better.
- Consolidation should be pursued before a less favorable cost reduction plan (contract with the Sheriff) is forced upon the agencies.
- Staff has to take an active role in keeping elected officials cooperating. Communication is key and they must be involved in the process.
- Consolidation should be promoted to maximize technology as a tool inside the organization and as a tool for the public to oversee the police.
- Benefits of consolidation, in good times or bad, need to be demonstrated.
- Consolidation strategy needs an element that allows respective departments not to lose their community identity.
- Value of synergy to accomplish police mission needs to be demonstrated. (We can accomplish things together that we can't do individually.)
- Need to continually strive for improved service, and remain customer focused.
- Consolidation study should consider unincorporated county areas which might also benefit from consolidation.
- Consolidation should strive to improve the quality of our community policing and public relations training.

As previously stated, for the strategic planning to work, it must involve all the key stakeholders, those who support the goal as well as those who are opposed. While the Nominal Group Technique did provide some opportunity for input on this issue, a much broader base of input is be critical to the pursuit of this effort. A wide breadth of input

similar to that utilized in 1996 when Los Alamitos, Seal Beach and Cypress investigated
(and ultimately adopted) a regional communications center would be highly beneficial.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on information learned through the Nominal Group Exercise, scanning and assessments of successful and unsuccessful cooperative law enforcement efforts, the following recommendations are provided. Consideration of these recommendation will hopefully promote the cause of law enforcement cooperation in northwest Orange County. The order in which these items are listed is in no way an indication of their importance or weight. For the successful future of cooperation each of these recommendations should be considered.

Police Organizations Must Anticipate Change

A popular quote states that "Change is inevitable. Growth is optional." Law enforcement, by the nature of what it does, has not distinguished itself as a champion for change, and in many ways, this is good. However, for an organization or a profession, or a person to live, they must change. This will especially be true in the 21st century when the environment in which we operate continues to change so rapidly. Law enforcement organizations must incorporate into their core values the concept that things change. If those in leadership (formal or informal) do not begin to nurture in the respective cultures an environment that expects or accepts change, those organizations will ultimately be run over and passed by.

Departments cannot afford managers or line level officers who can only see doing police work the way we did it ten, fifteen or twenty years ago. As leaders we need to recognize the value of those past methods and contributions. We need to retain the parts of the past that were and still are good. We also need to find ways to make those methods work in a present that is very different from the past. This can be accomplished

in several ways. First, we can work to make change a regular part of our daily operation. Second, we can anticipate change so that we can manage it instead of merely responding to it. Third, we can work to involve people (especially those resistant to change) in the change process.

Change will happen, and various forms of cooperation will be part of that change, be it contracting out for services that were previously performed by police employees (jail, background investigations, citation administration, parking enforcement or crossing guard service) or merging services (court liaison, communications, SWAT). As leaders, it is our responsibility to prepare our organizations and our communities to accept this change and work to make it successful.

Cooperative Relationships Tailored to the Participants

No two police departments or communities are exactly alike. It would seem therefore apparent that no two cooperative arrangements for law enforcement services should be exactly alike. Communities and police departments should definitely evaluate how other communities and police departments have tailored cooperative agreements. However, that does not mean that because the Sheriff in a particular county contracts police service by a particular formula using a certain shopping list of services, that every such arrangement should be so constructed. This type of thinking is great for the mass production of hamburgers, but it will not work well with organisms as complex or as unique as the communities in northwest Orange County.

Time needs to be given to assessing participating communities unique law enforcement needs, and how a cooperative relationship can best meet those needs.

Cooperative Agreements Must be Effective and Efficient

One classic definition of effective is doing the right thing. The corresponding definition of efficient is doing the right thing well. In order for a cooperative arrangement between two or more communities for law enforcement services to work well, it needs to be both effective and efficient. The arrangement needs to be tailored in a fashion that provides a satisfactory level of control for the providing agency, yet also allows input from the community receiving the service. This needs to be accomplished in a manner that is timely, cost effective and personal.

While arrangements such as Joint Powers Authorities seem to provide a formal platform for input from all participants, this process also seems cumbersome. A traditional contract seems to create a very hierarchical relationship. An optimum model would be a streamlined, faster model that would provide a better degree of service to both/all of the participating agencies. This model would not only provide better results, but would also do so at a reduced cost. However, this model would require a foundation of trust and a demonstrated interest in the mutual benefit of all the participants.

Economic Considerations Need to be Evaluated on a Long Term Basis

Funding of law enforcement services should not be evaluated on a short term basis. Just as cities plan for infrastructure (streets, sewers, etc.) maintenance, they need to consider and plan for the long-term funding of law enforcement. This could include the future costs of cars, computer systems, support technology, and a competitive wage and benefits package for police personnel. These costs will surely continue to rise, and if the trends of the last years remain the same, revenues to the cities will not likely increase proportionately. City leaders, be they council members, city managers, police chiefs or

police associations, need to acknowledge this fact and plan accordingly. Our failure to plan for the long term, and expect that our tomorrows will be just like today, is a plan for failure.

Financial Hardship Should Not be the Cooperation Engine

As previously stated, and as we have seen in the past, the question is not if the economic situation will worsen, it is when will it worsen. Government has always managed to survive these cyclic downturns, and law enforcement is typically an expert at dealing with such disasters. However, this does not mean that this is the model we should adopt for the future (“We’ll cross that bridge when we come to it,” but the bridge may be gone.). A cooperative agreement crafted now, versus under the heat of fire, will surely produce a much better, well thought out product.

There is also an ethical question attached to this recommendation. If we are aware of a potential method of providing improved service at a reduced cost, but choose not to pursue it because financially we don’t need to, are we being good stewards of the public trust granted us?

Cultural Matches

It has been previously said that cooperative relationships should be tailored to the participants. It seems equally important that the participants be “culturally” similar. In this situation, the participants would be both the communities, and the involved police departments. If, for example, two participating communities were very different (one a high crime area and another an upper class residential area), cooperation might prove impossible. Similarly, if the two participating police departments are dissimilar integration and cooperation might prove much more difficult. An effective assessment of

how a cooperative effort between two or more law enforcement agencies might work should include an evaluation of their similarities and differences.

Improving Service to Community

While financial considerations will typically be a driving force in evaluating cooperative law enforcement or merger arrangements, consideration should obviously be given to how such an arrangement can improve service. An effective evaluation should include some mechanism through which community perceptions about needed or desired police service can be evaluated. This evaluation should then be given serious consideration in the detailed construction of a merger of police services.

Improving Working Conditions for Law Enforcement Personnel

Just as consideration should be given to how public funds are managed and how service is provided to the community, consideration needs to be given to how a cooperative arrangement or merger will effect employees of the participating agencies. While this can mean changes in wages and benefits, it can also mean changes in working environment – in the station and in the community. Will the officers and civilian employees be treated well in the other agency? Will their policing philosophy be accepted? Will their opportunities for special assignments or shift selection be compromised or improved? While some of these may seem minor, they are issues that must be addressed if the various participants are to support the cooperative effort and make it succeed.

Stakeholders Need to be Involved in Crafting Cooperative Arrangements

To successfully implement a cooperative law enforcement arrangement police employees must play a visible leadership role, and city officials need to take a proactive

role in supporting cooperative arrangements. Stakeholders who have a real or perceived interest in the cooperative effort must be identified and involved. If the concerns of these parties are not identified, and if an effort is not made to address them, these unresolved concerns will develop into landmines that will derail the best intended cooperative effort. This is especially true concerning elected officials, whose support is critical to any such effort.¹⁴ In the northwest Orange County region, the support or lack of support by elected officials, was a key factor in the success of West-Comm and the failure of the 1969 consolidation effort. Elected officials need to be provided with information with which they can objectively make decisions that will effect the community and its police department in a long term positive or negative way. Elected officials also need to be involved so that cooperative arrangements are structured in a way that does not lessen their ability to direct police service, or give up authority that the public will ultimately hold them responsible for.

Clearly this is not an exhaustive list of all the possible recommendations for successful cooperative law enforcement arrangements. This paper also does not detail all the negatives that might be associated with failures to pursue consolidation efforts, such as unbalanced distributions of power within existing arrangements, or the weakening of a city's ability to participate in cooperative efforts because of a late "buy in."

These recommendations are offered to provide the reader with some tools to consider cooperation and consolidation before they are forced to consider takeover or contract.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

The world is continually changing. As we enter the 21st century the rate of that change has accelerated to a seemingly out of control pace. Local government and law enforcement have, and will also continue to change. We have the choice of having that change forced on us without our input, or we can look to the future and chart a course that will give us the opportunity to be involved in directing the course of government and law enforcement.

The future of law enforcement will include greater cooperation, likely in the form of consolidations or regionalization of law enforcement.¹⁵ Visionary governmental and law enforcement leaders will hopefully lead this effort. They will do this because of the need to provide quality service. They will do it because of a shrinking pool of resources. They will do it because public scrutiny of government efficiency will mandate it. They will do it because it can be the best solution to a variety of very difficult law enforcement problems, and they will do it because they are looking to provide quality police service, locally controlled at a reasonable cost to the communities they have taken an oath to serve.

Transition management is the actual process by which strategies developed in the strategic plan can be implemented and managed successfully. This process involves the identification of key stakeholders. Stakeholders are individuals, groups or organizations that have an interest (real or perceived) in the desired cooperative arrangement (whatever form it may be).

Stakeholders are individuals, groups or organizations that have the ability, through various methods, of either cooperating toward our desired goal, or of being

obstacles to the attainment of our desired future. In the case of consolidation, these would be individuals or groups who have the ability to influence others to help facilitate a positive outcome, or they could be individuals or groups whose opposition would prevent such an effort as consolidation from occurring. Because of the influence these individuals or groups have, they comprise what is called "critical mass." Identification of these individuals or groups is necessary in any process promoting change. Concerning the consolidation of police services involving the Seal Beach, Cypress and Los Alamitos Police Departments, the individuals, groups or organizations making up the critical mass have been identified as follows:

INTERNAL

- ◆ The City Council
- ◆ The City Manager
- ◆ The Finance Department
- ◆ The Chief of Police
- ◆ The Seal Beach P.M.A.
- ◆ The Seal Beach P.O.A.
- ◆ The Seal Beach P.O.A. vocal minority

EXTERNAL

- ◆ Citizens of 5 Seal Beach Districts
- ◆ Los Alamitos & Cypress City Council
- ◆ Los Alamitos & Cypress P.O.A.
- ◆ Citizens of Los Alamitos & Cypress
- ◆ Los Alamitos Unified School District
- ◆ Rossmoor Board of Directors
- ◆ Los Alamitos City Manager
- ◆ Citizens of Rossmoor
- ◆ West Comm
- ◆ Seal Beach, Cypress & Los Alamitos Chambers of Commerce
- ◆ O.C. Sheriff's Department
- ◆ P.O.S.T.
- ◆ Cypress City Manager

Identification of the stakeholders is the first step in assessing the issues and the support or opposition that may be offered by the respective individual or groups. It also provides a vehicle by which their current level of commitment can be charted. This chart can then be used as a tool to identify individuals who might seek to block change (snaildarters). Ideally, all of these detractors could be identified and addressed on a list

similar to that above. However, this is not always possible, and some individuals or groups may emerge later to stir up opposition. While some of these individuals may seem to have no real or current connection with the issue at hand, the fact that they can generate that critical mass of support or opposition makes them a factor that must be dealt with.

The table on the following page is one way to illustrate the current and desired commitment of various stakeholders. The author's assessment of each party's current level of commitment is represented by an "O" and the desired level of commitment is represented by an "X."

Commitment Levels

Stakeholders For Critical Mass	Block Change	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
The City Council	O-----			----->X
The City Manager		O-----		----->X
The Chief of Police			O-----	----->X
The Finance Department		O-----	----->X	
The Seal Beach P.M.A.		O-----	----->X	
The Seal Beach P.O.A.	O-----		----->X	
The Seal Beach P.O.A. vocal minority	O-----	----->X		
Citizens of Seal Beach's 5 Districts		O-----	----->X	
Los Alamitos & Cypress City Council	O-----		----->X	
Los Alamitos City Manager		O-----		----->X
Los Alamitos & Cypress P.O.A.		O-----	----->X	
Citizens of Los Alamitos & Cypress		O-----	----->X	
Los Alamitos Unified School District		O-----	----->X	
Rossmoor Board of Directors		O-----	----->X	
Citizens of Rossmoor		O-----	----->X	
West Comm		O-----	----->X	
3 Chambers of Commerce	O-----		----->X	
P.O.S.T.		O-----	----->X	
O.C. Sheriff's Department	O-----	----->X		
Cypress City Manager	O-----		----->X	

LEADERSHIP IMPLICATIONS

Once all the stakeholders have been identified, a strategy should be developed as to how and when various stakeholders should be involved and what must be done to gain their support or overcome their resistances. For this process to be effective, the goal should be to get the stakeholders to cooperate and form a collaborative partnership that will utilize the skills, expertise and collective synergy of the group to identify the interests and needs of each of the stakeholders and then pursue the best possible cooperative law enforcement arrangement for all those involved.

In the case of cooperative police efforts, such as consolidation, the chiefs of police and their command staffs certainly play a key role. It is up to the chiefs to lay a groundwork that prepares their organizations for this type of change. They must then help those involved to forge an arrangement that best addresses the concerns of all involved. Likewise, the involved police association leadership must be willing to investigate and support the exploration of such an arrangement, not just in the interest of his or her respective members, but also for the good of the community and the other officers involved.

While these police leaders are key, they will not be successful if the involved city councils and city managers of the involved cities are not supportive of making this type of cooperation happen. The best efforts of the chiefs of police and police associations will be for naught. It is the responsibility of the chiefs of police to see that the city manager has the information required to see the benefits of these types of cooperative law enforcement arrangements. It is the role of the city manager to see that this information is passed on to the elected policy makers so that they can understand the benefit of such

arrangements, and also insure that the arrangement is crafted in a manner that properly represents and serves the constituents they represent.

Change in any organization is not easy. In government it is even harder, and in law enforcement it is sometimes nearly impossible. Some of the keys to successful change include a vision, good communication, participation of the involved stakeholders and leaders who are willing to take risks. These risks cannot be reckless or poorly planned. When a leader considers taking a risk to pursue a change for the better, he or she should ask themselves the following questions:

- ◆ Honestly and objectively, what is the situation now, and what are the obstacles to what we would like to accomplish?
- ◆ Who are all the stakeholders and what are their respective interests (good and bad)?
- ◆ How much power do they have to aid or block our efforts?
- ◆ What do I and the other stakeholders want, and what are the interests driving those desires (good or bad)?
- ◆ Have I objectively evaluated all the pros and cons of my position?
- ◆ Have I provided all the information possible to the various stakeholders to help them make the best possible decision?
- ◆ Have I shared information (good and bad) that will enable the stakeholders to see the value of the change, as well as the risks associated with not changing?

Pressing for change is not easy, and typically the results we end up with are not the ones we initially envisioned. As leaders we will repeatedly be

called upon to champion change. This being the case, it is critical that we not compromise our integrity in the pursuit of a worthy goal. Cooperative efforts, built on trust, similar to those promoted by Interest Based Problem Solving,¹⁶ will be the lasting solutions that will carry us into the 21st century.

CONCLUSION

When I was learning to drive in high school, my driver's education teacher taught me to look down the road, and not just out past the hood of the car. The same principle applies in law enforcement, as it does on the highway. If we as a profession want to avoid crashes and the calamity that accompanies them, we need to look down the road. For over 30 years there has been a flashing sign in northwest Orange County directing us to cooperation and consolidation.

The choice is now ours, the drivers of local government and law enforcement. Will we make the right turn and steer onto a course that will best protect our cities and our citizens, or will we continue on down the road we know, content with the way we have always gone or distracted by the matters of the day that cloud our vision any further than our next court date.

Some excellent ground work has been laid, the regional communications center (West-Comm) being the most notable example. However, the strides we have made toward cooperation were never intended to be the end of that effort.¹⁷

If we want to continue to build on our successes, and maintain a relationship that is in each of our best interests, we must strategically work to build cooperative relationships that reduce costs, provide improved service, maintain equitable balances of power and build a sound platform for future cooperation. Such an effort will be hard work and will, like all change, meet with resistance. However, if we want to be remembered as leaders who drove the winning race, versus those who didn't finish, or crashed and burned, we have no choice but to heed the signs and steer onto the course so clearly laid out for us.

ADDENDUM

Participant List for NGT Panel

Mr. George Brown	Former City Councilman, City of Seal Beach
Mr. Bob Dominguez	City Manager, City of Los Alamitos
Ms. Kay Koford	Administrator, Los Alamitos General Hospital
Ms. Rita Fraser	Dispatch Administrator, West Cities Regional Communications Center
Mr. Bill Lentini	Chief of Police, City of Brea
Mr. Joe Miller	Corporal, Seal Beach P.D. & President SBPOA
Mr. Mike Sellers	Chief of Police, City of Seal Beach
Mr. Mike Skogh	Chief of Police, City of Los Alamitos
Mr. Richard Storey	Director of Administrative Services, City of Cypress
Mr. Keith Till	City Manager, City of Seal Beach
Mr. Jeff Travis	Sergeant, Los Alamitos P.D. & President LAPOA
Mr. Jim Watson	Seal Beach Business and Property Owner Watson and Associates

Assistant Facilitators

Mr. Paul Henisey	Captain, Newport Beach P.D.
Ms. Cassandra Frye	Support Services Manager, Los Alamitos P.D.

ADDENDUM



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- ¹ U.S. Census Bureau – Population Web Page. www.census.gov/population/.
- ² Ronald E. Lowenberg, Chief of Police, Huntington Beach P.D., POST Video on Police Image, 1997.
- ³ Edward J. Tully, “Conversations over Coffee,” Beretta USA Leadership Bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 8 (July 1998).
- ⁴ Daryl M. Wicker, Retired Police Chief, City of Cypress, May 17, 1999, interview.
- ⁵ Jeff Kirkpatrick, Police Captain, City of La Palma, June 10, 1999, interview.
- ⁶ U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Crime in the United States 1997. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 121.
- ⁷ Ann Stadlman, Secretary to City Manager, City of Cypress, June 10, 1999, interview.
- ⁸ U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Crime in the United States 1997. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 120.
- ⁹ Cassandra Frye, Support Services Manager, City of Los Alamitos, June 10, 1999, interview.
- ¹⁰ U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Crime in the United States 1997. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 121.
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- ¹² Moshe Rubenstein, Command College Lecture, July 21, 1998.
- ¹³ Paul Henisey, Don Pedersen, Meeting the Personnel Demands of Law Enforcement in the Next Millenium, Post Command College paper for Class 25, February 1, 1998, p. 36.
- ¹⁴ Communications Operational Study Committee, West-Comm support by council
- ¹⁵ ¹⁵ Edward J. Tully, “Conversations over Coffee,” Beretta USA Leadership Bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 8 (July 1998).
- ¹⁶ Suzanne Foucault and Bill Haney, POST Labor-Management Partnership Workshop, March 23-26, 1999.
- ¹⁷ Communications Operational Study Committee Memorandum to Chiefs Skogh, Stearns and Wicker, May 14, 1996.

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