

**WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT  
OF COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES  
ON CALLS FOR SERVICE RESPONSE  
AT THE OCEANSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
BY THE YEAR 2009?**

**A project presented to  
California Commission on  
Peace Officer Standards and Training**

**by**

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This Command College Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future, creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The view and conclusions expressed in the Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

## CONTENTS

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Nominal Group Results</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>CFS versus COPPS</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Scenarios</b>	
<b>The Chief's Tale</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>The Consultant Sings the Blues</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>The Gold Star</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Strategic Objectives</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Transition Management</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Implications of Issue on Leadership</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Budgetary Implications</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Follow Up and Evaluation</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Sources Consulted</b>	<b>62</b>

## INTRODUCTION

This project considers the question, **what will be the impact of community policing strategies on calls for service response at the Oceanside Police Department by the year 2009?** It considers that there is, or at least ought to be, a relationship between the two models of policing. It postulates that the two models compete for the same resources.

Because there are inadequate resources for people to do all they want to do, scarcity exists. Even governments must compete for limited resources, and many municipalities struggle to do more with less. Of government, citizens are expecting more service but are less willing to fund the additional services. Elected officials, pressured by constituent demands, in turn pressure professional government workers to keep them in office by the delivery of timely, efficient and cost effective services. Municipal law enforcement professionals have felt this pressure as much or more than other local government service providers. In the aftermath of this increasing pressure, the calls for service model of policing, the 9-1-1 system and the related expensive computerized information management and communications systems, have been criticized for failure to deliver a perception of safety in the minds of citizens.

Nonetheless, in the midst of this criticism, citizens continue to call police, demanding rapid response and effective police action. At the same time, other models of policing have been enacted to answer citizen and political demands. These other models are incongruent with the calls for service model. As an example, municipal police agencies struggle to field neighborhood policing teams

designed to solve long term community policing issues. Yet rarely are there adequate resources for these more innovative deployments. Instead, officers are diverted from answering calls for service, to deal with the more complicated policing issues.

Traditional police managers are keenly aware of the demands of the calls for service model, and the impatience of the citizenry to await long-term solutions in the face of short-term crises. These short-term crises include domestic violence, burglaries, robberies, and neighbors who play their music too loudly. The result is a tug-of-war over the use of resources.

This project is a futures study. It looks at what might happen to calls for service if certain community policing strategies are pursued over the next ten years. It postulates that potential impacts are strongly influenced by the kind of leadership provided by the department and on the working environment leaders create. In addition, it considers the extent to which potential outcomes to calls for service by the use of proactive policing strategies will be molded to varying degrees by the presence of trends and events that could have an impact on how the two models interact over the next ten years.

The calls-for-service model is simply conceived and operated. Police managers assign officers to beats or service areas. When citizens need assistance, they call the emergency number 9-1-1. There is a kind of social contract that expects that the citizen's need constitutes an emergency and that the nearest police officer will be dispatched with the quickest arrival time safety will allow.

On the other hand, the community-policing model is as complicated as imaginative innovation will permit. Community policing is Officer Friendly, the neighborhood cop, cops on bicycles, cops on foot, and cops at community meetings. It is cops in partnership with other service providers, cops in schools, cops in sports, cops at youth centers, and cops in dialogue with gang youth. It is cops conducting surveys, cops on pagers, cops on cellular phones, cops on skateboards, cops on horseback, and cops in resource centers and store fronts. It is cops living in the neighborhoods with federal subsistence in the purchase of housing, cops and code enforcement, cops and homeless task forces, and cops and mental health clinicians, and other partnerships yet to be conceived. Community policing involves the use of civil abatement procedures and restraining orders against gang members. In it the police officer is the ombudsman for community improvement (1).

During the preparation phases of the project, two nominal group technique panels separately arrived at ten trends and ten events. The panel results have been combined into ten of each and their ramifications are discussed in depth. In addition, the project contains three scenarios of possible futures.

Of the three scenarios, one represents a desirable future for the City of Oceanside. Portions of a strategic and transition management plan are included with the project. These detail specific steps to achieve the desired future.

## NOMINAL GROUP RESULTS

The nominal group technique (NGT) is a method of future forecasting. It involves the use of persons who are knowledgeable in a given subject area to predict trends and events. They need not be experts, however. While group size varies, too fewer than seven limits input and too greater than twelve makes group management cumbersome.

A trend is a general movement in society over time. It begins in the past and continues into the future. For purposes of the NGT, the group only identifies trends that relate to the issue. Trends indicate change, but the group does not specify direction.

Events are single time occurrences. The group identifies events that are likely to occur during the coming five to ten years. The group gauges the time when the event may first happen and the probable impact of the event on the trends. An event may be significant, noteworthy or newsworthy, and still have little or no impact on the trend. Or it may have a great impact on the trends affecting the issue.

There were two nominal group panels. One was comprised of individuals either from law enforcement or connected to law enforcement. There were no law enforcement people in the second panel. There were seven members in the first panel and eleven in the second. In the first panel was a lieutenant, a sergeant, a police public information officer, a senior volunteer patrol program coordinator, a neighborhood watch block captain, the chair of an Oceanside business owners

association, and a case worker for a women's advocacy organization. In the second group was a retired nurse, a retail security specialist, an aspiring writer, two high school students, a young homemaker, an elementary school teacher, an interior decorator, two representatives of the copying industry, and a fiber optics salesperson. Each panel distilled their input to ten trends and ten events. Their work products were then combined to a total of ten trends and ten events. Trends are provided below with commentary.

**1. The mainstreaming of political extremism** - Panel members expressed a sense that lawlessness and apathy permeated the general population. This indifference ranged from the proliferation of motorists running red lights and who disregard speeding laws, to general discourtesy on the highways, to the blatant disregard for litter laws. They noted that in spite of the fact of more and more behaviors being made illegal, the willingness of the general population to be obedient seems to be dwindling. They believed that many people are increasing in dissatisfaction with services provided by the government and that more people will likely choose to use vigilante tactics as a way to get what they want. They believed that there was also a lessening of satisfaction with the main political parties and/or philosophies operating within our country and that those who held views on the fringes of mainstream political thought were going to gain in adherents in the future. They believed that there would be an increase in involvement in private militias, and that as a final product of the "me generation" there would be an increase in small group involvement in domestic terrorist activities.

**2. The complexity of technology** - Panel members believed that advances in technology would change the way that citizens contact police. Technology would allow that officers could be contacted directly through cellular telephones or through email. Wireless communication of the future would enable citizens to send messages directly to officers in patrol cars or even into miniaturized computers carried by officers. At the same time, panelists saw technology as further dividing communities, as those with the money for such technology had ready access to police response while those without those funds would not.

**3. The presence of racial strife** - Panel members did not see any ready solutions to racial tensions in communities. They believed that notwithstanding advances in communication and emphasis on diversity and mutual understanding and mutual respect that tension between and among races would continue. Some panel members felt that there was little police could do to stem this tension. Others felt that police efforts to foster good relations with various racial groups were of importance and could reduce community racial tension. These persons tended to see police as representative of community feelings about racial issues.

**4. The volume of vehicular traffic on roadways** - Panelists saw Oceanside population as continuing to increase. They saw the volume of traffic as impacting the delivery of police services both as to timely response due to traffic congestion and as to citizen dissatisfaction with delays caused by crowded roadways and unsafe driving occurring on residential streets.

**5. The impact of the senior population on services** - Panelists saw an increasing population of older citizens with unique concerns and issues. Panel members

expressed particular concern about the potential for an increase in crimes against the elderly and the inability of police investigative services to respond to these crimes.

**6. Police officers knowing "regular" citizens** - Panel members believed that one of the keys to a successful community policing strategy was the degree to which street police officers knew and interacted with citizens. They felt that the degree to which officers were on familiar terms with residents (particularly teenagers) would reflect the success of policing efforts. They were concerned that while the Oceanside Police Department espouses the tenets of community policing, internally such involvement is not actually rewarded by the police culture. More likely to be rewarded were numbers and types of arrests, and the time spent on these activities as opposed to rewards for positive interaction with citizens.

**7. The functionality of governmental systems other than law enforcement** - Panelists held that municipal law enforcement does not operate in a vacuum. They opined that the level to which schools, the district attorney, courts, the prisons, and the ability of social service agencies to service clients; that all of these impacted the success of community policing strategies and impacted the need for citizens to call police for service.

**8. The impact of welfare reform on homelessness** - Panelists acknowledged the positive intention behind recent welfare reform wherein there is a limit to the time citizens might remain on welfare. In general they saw this action as increasing homelessness. Even though the desired impact of the reform is to move a non-working, non-productive population into productivity, panelists believed that many

people would opt for homelessness instead and/or engage in criminal activity to support a lifestyle no longer supported by government dole.

**9. The empowerment provided to criminals by three strikes conviction** - Some panelists saw penal institutions as schools of higher learning for criminals. Especially as criminal behavior supports gang involvement, some panelists believed that the stiffer penalties would enhance the stature of criminals among their peers. Others saw the three strikes laws as contributing to lawlessness. They believed that one impact of these laws has been the adoption of zero tolerance policies in Oceanside schools. Zero tolerance policies have raised the severity of behaviors that were once tolerated. At one time, society considered these behaviors as growing experiences. With zero tolerance even children in lower primary grades can be suspended (and gain a "record") for activities that every child engages in at one time or another, such as pushing and shoving on the playground.

**10. Gangs in schools** - Panelists believed that schools hold the key to allowing or disallowing gangs in schools. In contrast to concerns about the negative impacts of zero tolerance policies in schools, other panelists believed that zero tolerance ought to be expanded when behavior indicates gang involvement. These panelists expressed that what schools allow in its venues, is only reflected in the neighborhoods of the community at large.

Common to both panels was the difficulty of event prediction over trends identification. Here follows events and panelist input.

**1. Local government experiences severe revenue shortfall** - This means that Oceanside would not have the money it needs to provide the services citizens

want. Panel members believed that this was a very likely event. They believed that it would happen. It was a matter of when. Oceanside has gone without sufficient revenues in the past. Panelists believed it would again.

**2. The federal government makes funds available to support widespread youth recreation facilities** - Some panel members thought this was more of a trend, but the majority believed it to be an event. This event was more something they wanted to happen than something they believed would happen. Of course, part of futures planning is to identify these kinds of good events and dream up ways to make them happen.

**3. Citizens possess the technology to contact neighborhood officers directly** - Some believed this to be a trend, but the majority believed that if it happened, it would happen all at once. For instance, they believed that at some point each officer would be issued a cellular phone and that the numbers would be published. Since the officers would be working in the same neighborhoods for long periods of time, panelists believed that many citizens would get used to calling them directly when they needed help.

**4. An earthquake damages Oceanside** - Although panel members believed that there was a good chance of a serious earthquake to strike Oceanside, they only saw it as having short-term impacts on the city. They concluded that police services would be strained for a time but that life would return to normal.

**5. The opening of the Manchester Resorts and Downtown Theatre Complex**  
Up through the early 1980's, downtown Oceanside had a lot of bars and dilapidated buildings. It was an area of high crime. Law abiding citizens avoided

the area. Through redevelopment the city closed the bars and tore down the buildings, but until recently nothing was built in their place. At present, however, new construction is underway for a large theater complex downtown. A resort hotel is being planned for the nearby beach area. Panelists believed that the event of opening these new businesses would greatly impact both calls for service and community policing. The new businesses would bring more people and generate more calls for service. But the success of the business was tied to how safe people felt downtown. If the police department did not do a good job keeping downtown crime free, these businesses would not flourish. If they didn't flourish then more bad people would go downtown than good people. Poor community policing efforts would cause calls for service to go up.

**6. Race riot or severe racial unrest** - Many communities have had problems with race relations in the past. Panelist believed that problems with race relations would continue. The believed that racial tension in Oceanside would increase to a point where there was fighting. This event is an example of something we don't want to happen. It may be that Oceanside can prevent race riots. The idea is to insure that there are good race relations in Oceanside. It is important that potential racial problems are worked out while they are still small. If people who are different communicate and learn to respect their differences and celebrate their similarities, then strained race relations can be avoided. One purpose of futures study is to make sure that negative events, like a race riot, don't happen.

**7. Social service agencies close due to recession** - Panelists saw this event as arising from similar causes as the event where local government doesn't have

enough money. Panelists believed that social service agencies help hold the fabric of the community together. They help people who might otherwise become homeless, or become victims of crime, or even criminals. Without these agencies, panelists believed that there would be more problems for police, and more calls for service. Conversely they believed that social service agencies are one of the resources available to community policing efforts.

**8. Due to a foreign war the draft is re-instituted** - Panelists saw this event impacting community policing and call for service two ways. First, they assumed that the draft would involve young men between the ages of 18 to 25. They believed that young men in this age group caused most crime. They believed that the draft could reduce the number of young men who are permanent residents of Oceanside. This action would reduce calls for service and crime. On the other hand, they recognized that the Camp Pendleton Marine Base is next to Oceanside. A war and a draft would increase the number of young men at the base. Many of these would spend their liberties in Oceanside. Panelists considered that these Marines might cause crime or become the victims of crime as happened during the Viet Nam conflict.

**9. The police department absorbs the Harbor Patrol** – The Oceanside Harbor Patrol is a small law enforcement agency employed by the Oceanside Harbor District. The Harbor District is a separate governmental agency from the City of Oceanside. Members of the Oceanside City Council also sit as the Oceanside Harbor Commission. Panelists saw this event as likely. They did not see it as having extensive community impact.

10. **The Supreme Court rules that injunctions against gang members are unconstitutional** - Panelists saw this as a significant event. In the late 1990's injunctions against gang members became a powerful tool to control gang violence and the behavior of gang members. Panelists believed that the loss of this tool would cause an increase in violence. Some panelists believed that this event would not happen. Others saw it as a remote possibility. More cynical panel members believed it a certainty.

#### **CALLS-FOR-SERVICE VERSUS COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING AND PROBLEM SOLVING (COPPS)**

There is relationship between police response to calls for service and police efforts to make those calls unnecessary in the first place. The latter is a significant effort, one touching the very fabric of societal and individual lives. There is a tug over resources between responding to calls, often-abbreviated CFS, and actions often dubbed community policing. These actions also go by the acronym COPPS (community oriented policing and problem solving). Because of the scarcity of police resources, CFS and COPPS are at odds with each other.

There is an inherent conflict between the policing model that supports calls for service response and the policing model that supports COPPS. The CFS model demands that officers be available for calls. Thus officers cannot be deployed at the same time for special projects or problems and remain in service and available at the same time. This model requires the purchase of electronic systems to support CFS. These often extremely expensive systems include the 9-1-1-response system and

sophisticated radio systems to include 800 MHz trunking systems. It includes computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems, often themselves costing millions of dollars even for smaller agencies. The CFS model deals with citizen expectation of police response time. In the CFS model, a good police department comes when called and comes quickly.

Thus the CFS model is citizen driven. Officer time is not their own nor that of their superiors. Their time belongs to the citizen who may call. Because officers are under pressure to remain in service for potential CFS need, their solutions to citizen needs are short-term and limited. Such solutions may offer advice, the taking of a report, or the making of an arrest.

The Neighborhood Watch program has been the chief sales forum for the CFS model. Neighborhood Watch trains citizens to be the eyes and ears of the police department. It teaches, "you look and when you see something, you call us and we'll come. But don't get involved yourself. We wouldn't want you to get hurt." In the CFS model, the police are the experts and the citizens are to rely on those experts to solve citizen problems. The citizen sees several components in the CFS model. First, the citizen believes that the police will save them. Second, the citizen concludes that the crisis is not his responsibility but that of the police. Third, the citizen also concludes that he is frustrated with the police. This frustration occurs because the citizen realizes that the solution to his crisis rests with the police officer and there aren't enough of them to go around.

The CFS model values rapid response times, the idea of the police having the solution, and the realization that problems must get to a crisis stage before the

police can be summoned. Because police must be ever available, officers are relegated to remaining in their patrol cars near the radio in order to be prepared for rapid response to citizen crisis. (2)

Today, citizen requests for service are changing. They are demanding more in depth solutions to problems. They are doing more than just calling dispatch for a police officer. They are writing chiefs of police. They are writing their elected officials. They are using email. And they are calling back if they don't hear what the police have done.

They want police intervention to have longer lasting effects. Consequently, it has become apparent that community-policing problems cannot be solved using only the traditional tools of policing, such as reports and arrests. Citizens now are beginning to demand that the problem go away. After years of pushing for more rapid police response, they have realized the awful truth: there are not enough police to go around, nor can police always solve my problem.

Unfortunately, these changes in the kinds of demands being placed on police are not congruent with the CFS system. Dispatch systems are not equipped to handle long term interventions (even with CAD histories). Also since police and citizen emphasis remains on the officer being available to respond, dispatch systems cannot commit officers to long term solutions (going to meetings, or meeting with individual citizens or other efforts at getting acquainted with the local citizenry – the officer getting to 'know' his/her beat).

With limited police staffing resources it is doubtful there will ever be sufficient officers for both the CFS model and the COPPS model. Therefore the

COPPS model must be designed to reduce the CFS thus maximizing available resources.

## **THE CHIEF'S TALE SCENARIO**

My name is Ken Middletown and I was born in England but my parents immigrated to the United States when I was six years old and I became a naturalized citizen when I was ten. I am now fifty-seven and consider myself fully an American. In my life I have served this country in the military, having served just at the end of the Viet Nam conflict and I have been a law enforcement officer for 35 years. I have served at four different police departments, two for which I have been the chief of police. The last has been for the City of Oceanside for which I have been police chief for six years.

It is the year 2009. I am looking back over the achievements our department has made over the last ten years, specifically as it relates to the question, What is the impact of Oceanside Police community policing strategies on calls for service workload at the Oceanside Police Department by the year 2009? I will be candid in my appraisal. I can afford to be candid because I have announced my retirement. I am not concerned about burning bridges I will need to cross sometime in the future.

The position of police chief is a highly political one. One in which, as the chief executive of a municipal law enforcement agency, I have struggled to find a balance between competing priorities: I have struggled to balance what the citizens want with what the politicians want and with what the employees want.

A police chief is playing a game. You cannot win this game. You will never win. Rather the purpose of the game is to see how long you get to play. Adept chiefs of police play longer than inept chiefs. Less adept chiefs of police may find themselves looking for new employment within a matter of months after taking office. Since I have lasted awhile, I consider myself possessed of some ability.

Ten years ago in 1999, the population of our city was about 150,000 people. Today it is about 220,000. And many city planners consider the city at build out; that is, based on the designed density of the city, it is not designed nor zoned to hold more persons. Basically the population of Oceanside is now stable and has been such for the last two years.

Different zoning strategies and laws could have achieved a higher density rate. Because of the city's master plan, which was adopted back in the 1970's and modified in the 1980's and 1990's, the zoning laws only allowed sufficient construction that would project the city to have a build out of about 200,000. That build out target has now been surpassed.

One vision contained in the master plan was to achieve a healthy balance between residential and light, hi-tech commercial activity. This vision has met with limited success. The plan also prescribes a solid retail base. This solid retail base was somewhat corrupted in the late 1990's by the construction and opening of two large Wal-Mart stores that were installed at opposite ends of the city. These stores eventually undercut other retailers to a sufficient degree that overall retail commercial space within the city actually declined or diminished over time.

As a result, over the last ten years there has been a decrease in city revenues, with a relative decrease in revenues from retail commercial sources. In addition, the city has been not nearly as successful in attracting light industry, as has its neighbor to the south, Carlsbad. Carlsbad, on the other hand, had looked like a hi-tech industrial jewel in North San Diego County in the late 1990's, and was proud of its hi-tech golfing industry. Carlsbad, however, actually lost some economic ground because of the rather lengthy, enduring recession occurring in Southeast Asia and other Eastern Pacific rim countries.

My tenure has been a mixed bag. Some things have gone as I had hoped. Some issues I considered significant faded away. The reason things didn't happen as I thought was due to a complex array of political and social pressures that were brought to bear on the availability of resources within the police department. Of consequence, was the unwillingness of employees to make the kinds of sacrifices needed to better the community? Some employee actions contributed to the erosion of public trust in the police department. One event that stands out was an expensive lawsuit over the abuse of a member of the minority community that occurred just prior to my arrival. This incident and its legal and social aftermath had a long lasting impact on the trust relationship between the department and the minority communities.

Labor-management relations suffered when police officers lost parity with officers from other agencies in the county. In the beginning of this decade, there was an effort by the city council then seated to link officer salary and benefit levels be among the top third within the county. This approach was part of an effort to

extend existing contracts and achieve a multi-year labor peace. Unfortunately, this intention never materialized. The effort was rejected by police union leaders of the time.

I found my efforts frustrated by what I can only term as a backlash in the mid-management structure of the department. This group became suspicious and disdainful of the department emphasis on community policing strategies (3). They felt that the pursuit of these strategies occurred at the expense of police response to calls for service. This backlash arose, in part I think, because the long-term decline in the crime rate that had manifested itself during much of the 1990's both locally and nationally, began edging up after the beginning of the new millenium. There are a variety of reasons for fluctuations in rates of crime. These vary from socioeconomic conditions that change with time to attitudes of the populace (4). They include currently popular political philosophies and the confidence the American people have that they will achieve their dreams. They include conditions in the world and may even reflect the chaos theory: the system is too complex to accurately predict or explain fluctuations.

Nonetheless, the crime rate did go back up. In spite of some of the strategies that were present in community policing, it became more and more difficult to have sufficient resources to deploy personnel from the calls for service contingent to community policing efforts. Mid managers were the ones who felt they were being tasked with responding to citizen concerns and to the activity in the street. They believed that they didn't have sufficient officers to allow extended

time away from calls for service duties to devote time to environmental upgrades and neighborhood renewal.

I'll enumerate some of the strategies I used. One strategy was the use of neighborhood officers. I did not think this up but I did continue it. Another strategy was the use of a youth public safety council. This was to be set up in conjunction with the schools district. It received initial support from administrators, but police mid managers complained that officers were spending too much time with the council while calls for service went unanswered. I suppose I should have insisted more on participation, but I had to acknowledge that during that time we were severely understaffed with officers. I also developed a Comprehensive Community Traffic Safety Plan. Again, mid managers didn't support the plan consistently due to calls for service workload. Or at least so they claimed. I also instituted a family violence response team. This team was to handle domestic violence calls and look for lasting solutions. The efforts of the team were diluted by calls for service demands. I allowed it to disband after 18 months (5).

As the crime rate continued upward, there continued to be pressure from citizen groups, and individuals, and ultimately the media, the local paper, about police response times. There was extensive questioning whether or not police officers of our community were being responsive to the citizenry. These concerns were not helped by the attitudes expressed by some of the officers who felt that they were underpaid and under supported. These disgruntled officers were more than willing to share their dissatisfaction with citizens. I found this condition very disheartening and at times I became discouraged. No doubt some of my

discouragement was apparent to those I led and contributed to the malaise I experienced in the department.

More likely, as crime went up, the attitude prevailed which held, I've got to leave this call and get to the next one. Police mid managers pressured officers to remain in service, and supervisors did the same. Self-initiated activity dropped as more officers remained in service more often so that they could take those calls. As the result, the organization faltered in its commitment to look for longer-term solutions to calls for service.

On the other hand, of course, there were a series of events that had begun in the 1990's that we have continued emphasizing over the last decade that have been very helpful. Civil abatements, where premises were cleaned up because they had become public nuisances, were used more and more. The city invested greater dollars in this process, some of which was taken away from my department. The city invested dollars in new employment in the city attorney's office and the building department to pursue civil remedies against places that created crime. The court injunction against gang members was tested through the highest levels of judicial review and prevailed. Potential gang members were discouraged from joining the gang because gang activities were severely limited. New problems didn't arise because of limitations.

After a time gang members engaged in illegal activities outside their old "turf" neighborhoods. The original injunctions recognized that the street gangs were often concerned with "turf" and that the violence they engaged in often surrounded "turf." One consequence of the injunctions was that the leadership of

the Posole gang (the oldest and most violent in Oceanside) became more sophisticated in its criminal interests, and more creative in finding ways to operate that did not violate the injunction. Gang crime took on a wider scope. But when it was brought before the court's attention that the gang was now operating on a wider scale or in new neighborhoods, civil action was taken to enjoin them. Normally this would have severely tested the limits of constraining the civil rights of gang members. But because it could be shown that previously enjoined gang members were engaging in an ever widening circle of criminal activity, the courts were amenable to enjoining their association in other places in the city. The impact of pursuing these civil remedies was that we were able to keep the gang violence and gang crime at a minimum in the community. We've maintained the pressure in many neighborhoods that could classically be labeled as "at risk" neighborhoods. I think that as a result, many residents in those neighborhoods have taken charge of their own destinies within their own cultural identities to prevent gangs.

One difficulty that we encountered repeatedly was the unwillingness of the city to make the jump to 800 MHz radio trucking system. Oceanside remains the only city in San Diego County that is not on an 800 MHz countywide system. It has been more difficult to partner with surrounding agencies, especially dealing with crime on the borders of the city. The department has kept pace with advances in computer technology, but we have not had the funding to purchase voice recognition word procession systems, like those used throughout the country. With these systems, officers are able to dictate their reports and also have witnesses speak directly into the system so that witness statements are

immediately both voice recorded and transcribed for report purposes. Those agencies on this system are linked with the district attorney's office, where attorneys are able to review witness statements not only by reading them in printed reports, but may also listen to the tone of testimony of the witnesses themselves. This technology has enabled prosecutors to better gauge the suitability of witnesses for courtroom testimony. Our department did take several runs at this technology, believing that it would be cost effective, but because of the initial expense, we did not make this change.

I would like to say a little bit about the impact of politics on the ability of the police department to deliver its service. I would surmise that the average citizen in Oceanside is not aware, doesn't watch, hasn't watched, nor has a high level of interest or participation in local government activities. Notwithstanding, the city council and local government decisions have had major impacts on life within Oceanside. Most people show concern for the actions of national government, but they ought to be concerned about local government. Unfortunately many people feel they are too busy with their own lives. They don't have extensive involvement nor do they feel the necessity for that involvement. As a result, there are ups and downs and battles among elected officials, the differences between elected officials. There are different prevailing philosophies that may be pursued by one council majority and then another. These include ideological differences that occur within city councils that cause 2/3 vote splits, or whatever, and arguments – even though some of these make it into the local media, they are not of great concern to citizens at large in the community. You do have your gadflies, those that frequent

council meetings as a hobby, but these individuals are neither impacted by government decisions nor respected in political circles. Citizens at large do not equate difference in city councils and attitudes with having impact on the delivery of police and other city services.

Actually there is a great impact. Different city councils distribute funding differently. Some have different pet issues or individual council members have specific agendas. I'll give an example of what I feel was an unhealthy council action. At the end of my second year as chief, the city council was split two-two over retention of the city manager. The council member with the swing vote exerted tremendous power over the manager because he held the deciding vote. Each day he threatened to fire the manager unless specific constituent concerns were addressed. Often these concerns revolved around policing issues. The council member complained that too much enforcement was being applied to a minority who police alleged was a gang member. The gangster alleged he had retired from the gang. My officers didn't believe these claims, but to satisfy the councilman, I had to require them to conduct more in-depth investigations than even the district attorney required. Immediately after police contacted the gangster, he called his councilman who called the city manager who called me. I had to gather facts to support the contact, etc. etc. It was a waste of precious time, one I came to resent.

Differences in councils create instability within city departments and in the minds of city department directors, city management, and employees. I experienced uncertainty in city leadership. Some department directors were fearful

of losing their jobs. They scrambled to adopt new positions consistent with the new political leadership. Some attempted to take on a more pleasing attitude toward those in power and against those who are no longer politically favored. I've seen the emergence of private agendas and backroom deals. While they were not illegal, they have not been conducive to open government. As a police chief I experienced city government leadership that behaved like a Pulsar. I could not readily identify the political focus. First, we applied community-policing strategies to certain neighborhoods. As political emphasis shifted, we had to divert service and resources to other neighborhoods, even though there remained work to do in the first neighborhood. Some who complained loudly got attention. Others, who were just as loud, received no action. But who was favored and who was not changed from day to day.

The previous council caused this instability. They had an initial split over growth. This dispute over growth differed from one that occurred in the city in the 1980's. In that instance a slow growth initiative was passed by the voters and the city expended large sums defending it, until ultimately it was declared unconstitutional. Rather this split was over the idea of changing the master plan to allow for continued population growth in the city. The proponents wanted to increase allowable population density so that 100,000 more people could be crowded into the city. This council faction was led by real estate developers who had gotten the support of a sufficient number of business owners. This council faction was willing to have one-time terms if necessary in order to force through the changes in city government they believed were in the best long-term interest of

the city economically. To me they were pursuing self-interest not the public good. The impact was that disagreement over one serious issue led to disagreements over all issues. Eventually, council meetings reflected a contest between personalities. Finally two years ago, a fed up minority electorate obtained a plurality of votes and elected more public-spirited candidates. This change did not occur until the momentum to increase population density was well under way.

Another product of this prior city council was its unwillingness to participate regionally. Not only was there a 3/2 split within the city council, but also the council members who represented the city in regional boards focused on their personal agendas and disregarded the needs of Oceanside as well as the needs of surrounding communities. In the past Oceanside had been viewed as having a very narrow focus. In the 1990's this focus had begun to broaden. It appeared to many that the city was entering an age reflective of more progressive policies. This tendency actually began to reverse with this city council. Old and worn metaphors of what the city had been like in the 1950's 60's 70' and 80's began to reemerge. These were quoted in newspaper articles declaring that the façade of Oceanside had slipped away revealing its true image, that the Oceanside that was still remained; that is, a community with a provincial outlook and a narrow focus. This attitude was a contributing factor to a less than stellar performance by police officers in terms of servicing the needs of citizens. The confusion in leadership effected city workers and the community itself began to see itself more negatively.

The lawsuit over an abuse of police powers damaged the city financially. It came to trial the middle of this aberrant council's tenure. It was very expensive and

drew funds away from progressive city projects. It opened old wounds reflecting poor police-community relationships of the past. Our department worked to overcome the incident, but the simple length of the litigation had a deleterious effect on us as a department. A new mistrust of the police by the minority community arose. This lack of trust made it more difficult to implement community-policing strategies because the success of these efforts relied on the cooperation and partnership of community members.

There is no doubt in my mind that solving community-policing issues reduces calls for service. Still, it is difficult to maintain focus on these issues when confusion reigns in municipal government. It is difficult to think progressively when you face survival each day of your working life. Like so many enterprises, police action is only one part of an entire effort. If local politicians are truly interested in the public good, then they must work to create professional harmony in local government.

As chief of police, I had good ideas. I am familiar with crime reduction strategy (6). But I also know that without enduring and progressive support, law enforcement efforts will not succeed. Government will continue to invest millions into rapid response communications systems. Through advanced technology, our officers already have reduced their response times to calls for service. So what! Calls for service response at its best is a Band-Aid approach to serious and complex social ills. They offer little more than the mentality of the quick-fix (7). Calls for service cries the loudest for police resources, but as is often the case, the loudest is not the most significant.

## CONSULTANT SINGS THE BLUES SCENARIO

I'm Ahmad Mohammed and I am an organizational consultant hired to report on the status of the Oceanside Police Department as of 2009, and department efforts to promote community-policing strategies. What my staff and I have found is an ailing organization, one without consistent leadership or focus. It is an organization that through self-selection is being acted upon by the trends and events that surround it instead of acting to make the most of positive trends and events and to minimize the impact of the negative ones. In essence this department has abandoned futures thinking and planning. It is reactive in nature. It is having difficulty both retaining current employees as well as attracting quality new ones.

The department is using a system of policing that almost works by itself. It is the calls for service model. I use that word works advisedly because the system is simple, and can be carried out simply, almost without thinking. It claims to deliver to the populace that which is needed to create a better community. It is the traditional approach to policing, the calls for service model. It is easy to operate on the surface because it is easy to fulfill citizen expectations. The citizen calls and the officer responds. Or the officer sees a traffic violation and acts but there is no plan behind the action. Or the officer may operate according to personal prejudices and biases. I observed that officers have favorite violations to enforce, the enforcement of which does not reflect community priorities. Some officers state that community policing is conducive to interaction with citizens but doubt its

impact on crime (8). Some officers consider that a particular segment of the population does not merit the same level of service as others.

There is haphazard enforcement. The difficulty with this model comes with maintaining quality control. The department lacks adequate controls and the right attitudes behind those controls. Without these controls they have been unable to achieve any long lasting solutions to citizen concerns. The officer shows up and acts or shows up and talks his or her way out of taking any action. Officers hide behind the bureaucracy of the police department or the failure of the criminal justice system as a whole. Many officers demonstrate an unwillingness to look for solutions to community problems beyond the moment, beyond the attitude, "This is all I can do. And I cannot do any more. We're both victims of the same inefficient criminal justice system."

To use the model of Stephen Covey in *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, this department has a small circle of concern and a small circle of influence. One closes in upon the other. Officers do not address citizen needs because they see themselves as professionally impotent. Some officers have concluded that systems surrounding policing provide no support. They see themselves operating in a vacuum that doesn't support them. The ability to address the needs of citizens shrinks because the officers who would deliver the service have pronounced themselves to be impotent. Some officers merely take reports. Others talk their way out of reports. There is little officer energy expended to search for more information, because they believe nothing will come of it anyway.

The following is from an interview I had with a lieutenant. Said he,

I've been around here a long time. I've been through the ups and the downs of this place and I've seen what works and I've seen what didn't work. And I'll tell you what didn't work. What didn't work are these strange new approaches to police work, all this so-called innovation that some professor in some college dreamed up who has never had a moment on the street. These academicians have no idea what real police work is about; they have never been there. Of course, they claim their expertise from having interviewed real cops, just like you're doing. But that is not the same. I'll grant he may have been on a ride along, but the truth is he has no concept of reality and comes up with some academic model that is supposed to save the day. And all that just to get his Ph.D. or to publish a book filled with other unworkable theories, or to look important in front of his colleagues. These ideas are sent out and we are supposed to jump for joy, place our hands to our cheeks, and gasp, "This guy's a genius, no wonder I've been having so much trouble for so long. I'm just stupid. I don't know anything. Thank the good Lord for the experts." Hardly!

I'm telling you that I've been through so many of these programs that I have learned this much: they are the same wasted efforts only with new titles. They are the same tired ideas wrapped in different colored paper, this one with balloons and this one with small horses, but inside they're the same unworkable nonsense. The truth is you've got to stay with basic police work. You've got to have command and control, you've got to know what your officers are doing (because if you give them too much rope they'll hang themselves and pretty soon you'll have a corrupt department). We've got these young police officers out here, we've got these young people; they've never had any real life experience; they've never been in the military. They don't understand police work. They think they are glorified social workers, but they're not. This is a hard business and we deal with unsavory people and we've got to remember that. Because as soon as we don't, some cop will get him or herself killed. And who's fault will it be? It will be our fault, because we haven't taken the time to train them right.

Another lieutenant said this.

Well, this is all kind of confusing to me. I think that we should simplify things and just get back to the basics so that the decisions can be made at the officer level. We just have to do things the way we've always done them. Time has shown traditional approaches to be the best. Frankly, I'm confused by the need for innovation. We already have the answers. Let's just follow them. I'm not sure really which way to go. I don't know what management wants. So I'm not sure what to do."

One elderly lady we interviewed had this to say,

I'm a long term resident of Oceanside. I raised my family here, although all my children have moved away now, not that I blame them. I buried my husband here. I do know that we've not had a lot of crime where I live. We're mostly a

bunch of old ladies in whom no one has an interest. Now someone has broken into my home. I called the police and the dispatch acted like my call wasn't important. I felt like I was wasting her time. The officer didn't show up and I waited. He didn't show up and I waited. I waited so long that I missed my computer class. When he did show up he said, "Well we probably can't catch anyone anyway. There's probably not much we can do. I'll take a report just to have a record of your call." I showed him some fingerprints left on the glass where the robber had broken in. He said, 'Well there are some prints, although they look smudged. We probably can't match them, but I'll have one of our evidence people come by and lift them.' Well, no one ever came by. The whole impression I had was that they just didn't care, my call was just not important to them.

We interviewed a member of the City Council. This council member is concerned about leadership in the department. She said,

I just hope we can find a new chief who will make a better place and who will work for the community and for the employees. I had hoped that we would be able to, or the city manager would be able to appoint someone within the department because I favor using local people. But there is no evidence of leadership, of anyone who can or will step up to take charge. It's like the department is floundering. There is no care and no concern for the community. I believe that we should re-institute the law that requires that police management live in the city. None of the current leadership and most of the officers don't live in the city. How can they truly care about the town if they don't live in it? Because none of these people live in the city of Oceanside, I don't think they have any loyalty to the community. They are like mercenaries; they work for who pays them. Unfortunately, the civil service protections they have keep many here. There are many that don't deserve to work here and should be fired, but so far we've not been able to pull this off. We've lost some cases over the last few years trying to cleanse ourselves of some employees who are marginal. The civil service commission keeps putting them back to work. I can tell you I'm using my influence at the state level to change this. Civil service protections have gone way to far. We just stuck with some of these people. They have been here a long time and they are entrenched. They have very old-fashioned attitudes. If it were up to me, I'd disband the department and contract with the sheriff's department.

Of course, we found citizens who criticized elected officials. They claimed the elected officials don't show leadership. Of course, criticism of elected officials is a national pastime in America.

One citizen expressed the following.

You know, one of the problems in our community is that the city council will not maintain stable leaders in the government. We have been through three city managers in practically as many years. We've been through two police chiefs and we're looking for a third right now. And we've got other department directors, like community services or building or engineering, and even the librarian who are coming and going. It is almost like a revolving door in government. There is no stability. There is confusion in the ranks. And we wonder that not much is getting done?

We found the department to be in the midst of leadership change. Old views of management are waning. But the new ones have not come forward yet. The change has produced dissonance within the department and dissidents who are expressing critical attitudes. Some dissidents are bright and intelligent but misdirected.

The presence of dissonance and dissidents at the Oceanside Police Department is not new. Five years ago, under the previous chief of police, these conditions existed. That chief endeavored to placate the outspoken few by giving them a stake in the success of the department. He empowered them. He hoped they would rise to the occasion and again become loyal employees. He hoped that things would improve and that there will be labor peace.

Some dissidents were promoted to supervisory and management positions. Instead of buying their loyalty, however, they possessed a broader base from which to expound their negative outlooks and predictions. This chief was foolish for attempting to buy loyalty. We interviewed one of these individuals, the communications manager. This is what she said,

They just won't leave me alone in this organization. I've been here many, many years; I've seen what works and what didn't work. I know my job and I know it better than they do. They could not come in here and do my job, yet they are constantly trying to tell me how I should do the work. They could not come in

here and run these systems. They just don't understand that the people they are hiring are not qualified. I can tell within two weeks whether or not someone is going to be able to do this job, to be a good dispatcher, or doesn't have the skill to even learn the job. They keep hiring these substandard people; it is no wonder the new employees only stay here a month or two and we have to let them go or they decide to leave on their own. They can't meet my standards. I wish management would leave me alone and let me do my job. Things would work out a lot better if they would.

We also did an interview with the leader of the police officer's association.

In some organizations we've observed that the police association can be a training ground for future leaders in the department. Or it can also be a hotbed of dissent. Police union leadership in Oceanside has a long-standing reputation of militancy. For a time, in the late 1990's early 2000's, there was labor peace in the department. It seems that this peace gradually dissipated and adversarial relationships arose. He said,

The problem with this organization is that they don't know what they're doing. They don't know the laws. Management is constantly trying to take advantage of the employees. They do this repeatedly. It is obvious this occurs out of either stupidity, which I suspect at times, or vindictiveness, which I am certain of. Someone has to be a watchdog. That's where I come in. Now, I know that I long ago burned my bridges with the management of this department. I'll never be anything other than a police officer. I accept that. That's the price of protecting the employees and insisting that management follow the law.

We assessed the use of technology in the department. Over the last twenty years, the Oceanside Police Department has endeavored to become cutting edge. The department did experience city support in its effort to stay current with technology. They city purchased new computer aided dispatch systems in 1990 and again in 2000. But the city seemed to fall prey to Beta testing many so-called cutting edge systems. The city went through a series of contractual arrangements with some well-known and some not so well known manufacturers. But these

arrangements did not work out. In several instances the vendors were unable to deliver the goods as promised. Essentially what happened was that the vendors made promises about their products that they could not deliver. The products looked good, but often, half way through the installation of hardware and software, either the vendor backed out of the contract and cut its losses or the software didn't perform exactly like employees thought it was going to perform. These failures created bad feelings among employees about innovative technologies. Department management and city leadership was viewed as technically incompetent and incapable of bringing employees the kinds of products that would really have made their work lives easier. Employees became less willing to stretch themselves for the department because many felt that the department could not support their efforts.

On one occasion, the city spent a lot of money on the purchase and installation of hardware and software to support voice activated word processing. The system did not live up to its advertising. It was too slow and incapable of recognizing legal terms often used in law enforcement. Within a year of acquisition the system was scrapped and city leaders had to admit they had wasted a million dollars on the effort. The city administrative services director and the director of automated services for the city lost their jobs over this snafu. Police employees fully lost confidence in city leadership to produce. This failure impacted the willingness of police officers to partnership with other city departments. It became an obstacle to communications and contributed to mistrust among employees and between city departments.

From our analysis we recommend a change in the department organizational structure. Before the current decade, the department had removed officers from most administrative positions and deployed them in the community. Management has placed more and more officers in administrative positions. Contrary to what had occurred in the late 1990's under the COPS and COPS MORE grants, police officers gravitated back to administrative duties. This was partly a natural process, because as financial resources became scarcer, jobs that had been performed by support personnel returned to police officers.

The city decided to find permanent slots for restricted duty police officers, those that had been injured in the line of duty. This action came about because in 2004, the State of California repealed Government Code 4850. This legislation made industrial related disability retirements virtually things of the past. Some industrial retirements remained, such as for officers who had lost limbs or been shot in the head, but mostly this benefit was no longer available to police officers. In a humanitarian effort, the city sought to find permanent limited duty police officer employment.

By 2008 there were fifteen police officer positions occupied by limited duty personnel. Since none of these officers were able to work in the field, they were also generally unable to participate in community policing activities, beyond the occasional support of the neighborhood watch program. As a management approach this decision was a self-defeating even if noble in its intention. It was fiscally foolhardy.

During the recession of 2005 there was a cutback in monies available for police services similar to what had occurred in 1990. The department experienced a severe mid-year budget reduction. This cutback nearly resulted in the layoffs of officers as it had done in 1990. Again, no officers were laid off although many support personnel lost their jobs. The size of the department was reduced by 1/3 in a seven-month period. Because of the attitudes of managers and the reliance on the calls for service model, the department quickly disbanded community-policing programs. This action had a negative impact on the ability of the department to meet its objectives and to continue outreach into the community and to solve community problems through that outreach.

In the media, these cutbacks were portrayed as a necessity, given that the rest of the businesses and other workers were also experiencing the impacts of the recession. There was little sympathy in the community for what was happening in the department, because many community members had it worse. Police officers were not getting salary increases and lost some benefits. In contrast members of the public lost their jobs. Partly because police officers and the police union lamented the cutbacks so vehemently, the confidence in the department was eroded. Since the public saw its own plight as worse, police complaints garnered little public sympathy. Many thought the police officers crybabies and criticized them for complaining when they had things much better in many cases than the people they served.

The twelve-year crime drop bottomed out in 2001. A single-term and overly zealous district attorney aggressively pursued restraining orders against gangs. His

actions produced adverse case law. This action made injunctions against gang members virtually impossible. Once again, gangs began to flourish. There was renewed intimidation of citizens in neighborhoods where gangs claimed supremacy. The perception of the fear of crime increased dramatically. Basically, the community suffered from too much of good legal action. Since the loss of control over gangs, crime has seemed more out of control in Oceanside and this perception has continued to the time of this study, 2009.

The department's narrowing focus and loss of fiscal resources was also reflected in the turnover of leadership and of employees. Some long standing progressive leaders retired or sought other employment, leaving less talented management behind.

Community conditions outside the department have contributed to poor conditions inside the department. Oceanside has been unable to build or sustain a light industrial base as had been called for in the master plans of the last millennia. It had been projected ten years ago that the city would increase its industrial base. In addition, the effort to revitalize downtown pivoted on two points, a thirteen-screen theatre complex and the construction of the Manchester Resort Hotel. The Theatre project was completed on schedule and made a fine addition to downtown. In the last few years, however, theatre attendance has fallen off dramatically and this for two reasons. First, home theaters have become more affordable. Many people have purchased Advanced Flat Panel Viewing Screens (AFP) and High Definition Digital Television (HDTV). Second, Cable companies allow subscribers to request the movie of their choice, even current run movies, at the time of their

choice and at a rate cheaper than theater attendance. All theater attendance fell dramatically. The Manchester project declared bankruptcy halfway to completion. Manchester Resorts filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001 as foreign investments pulled out of the project. All that remains to date is the boarded up shell of a hotel. Even though there were guards, transients broke into the structure repeatedly. The shell turned the whole beach into an eyesore. The city has been unsuccessful in having the project completed by another developer. Disposition of the structure remained in litigation for a number of years as the bankruptcy proceedings moved slowly through the courts. As of today, the aging structure is scheduled for demolition.

Beach services gradually suffered through the years. In the late 1990's and the early 2000's families frequented the beach area around the pier. As the war in the Middle East heated up, and more and more young men were recruited into the military and the draft was re-instituted, the beach was gradually taken over by a different clientele, particularly on weekends. Families and teenaged girls were frightened away from the beach because of the presence numbers of young men who were going off to war. There was a serious increase in the incidence of rape and sexual assault on the beach, especially during evening hours. The department was unable to stem the rise in these kinds of offenses. There was also an increase in robberies. The beach returned to the kind of condition it was in the 1970's wherein residents and tourists were unwilling to use the beach because of concerns for safety.

The Beach Train, which was first used in 1999, only lasted until 2002. The Beach Train brought tourists from inland cities to the coast. The route to Oceanside was terminated because of the absence of riders.

The storms of 2006 destroyed the end of the pier. It was just a shell. The pier foundation had been weakened because of the 6.0 earthquake that had occurred in 2002 along the Rose Canyon fault. This earthquake caused extensive damage in San Diego but lesser damage in the North San Diego County area.

One of the things we were also asked to do as part of our analysis of the department was to look at a series of trends and events that had been decided upon and projected in 1999 as part of a couple of nominal group technique panels. We were to gauge whether or not these trends and events had had any impact on the department especially as it relates to community policing and calls for service.

The first trend was identified as the mainstreaming of political extremism. There were concerns that militias and others on the extremes of the political spectrum would increase Oceanside in the future. Actually, this did not materialize. In fact Oceanside continues to be politically conservative, especially with the increased use of Camp Pendleton Marine Base, as the draft was re-instituted in the early part of this decade and more and more military people. Actually the feeling of patriotism increased in Oceanside. This may have partly been due to the popularity of the war itself inasmuch as Iran had exploded a nuclear device on Israel.

The second trend was the complexity of technology. This did have an impact on the department, a negative one because as the city tried to keep pace with growing innovations in technology it got to a point that change was coming

so rapidly, there were insufficient funds to support the purchase and maintenance of the technology. Still, in the first part of the decade there was strong preference for cutting edge technology in the delivery of government service to the citizens. Many of these projects left behind cyber-skeletons of the products that had been taunted as advances

The third trend concerns the presence of racial strife. There continues to be racial strife cropping up occasionally in Oceanside. At present the population of minorities in the aggregate exceeds that of the population of whites. As the department cut back on innovative services to the community and focused more on calls for service response, there has been a loss of rapport with minority leaders. This was compounded about 2005 when a prominent member of a minority community was shot and killed by a white police officer. Ultimately the City lost the wrongful death suit and the officer was prosecuted for manslaughter. This case and its aftermath strained relations between minorities and the department. This was probably compounded by the department's lack of ability to hire officers reflective of city demographics.

Fourth, the volume of vehicular traffic has continued to be a problem throughout the decade. There was a community concern over available affordable housing for a growing homeless population and those in a lower socioeconomic status; the availability of low cost housing became of paramount interest to the community. There was a shift to create low cost housing. This view had in part arisen out of a program undertaken by the Women's Resource Center late in the year 1999 to secure low cost long term housing for single mothers and their

children, especially mothers who had been battered by spouses or boyfriends. Early in the decade extensive amounts of federal dollars were made available for low cost housing. Coupled with the high community interest in such housing, developers rushed to Oceanside to take advantage of the boom. Still, the federal dollars were for construction not subsidy. Developers petitioned and won changes in Oceanside zoning regulations that increased the density of housing. This construction solved the immediate housing shortage for low income and homeless people but it raised the density of Oceanside significantly beyond the levels for which it had been programmed. As a result by the year 2009, the city had increased in population to just fewer than 250,000.

This increase in population resulted in more vehicles on the roadway and the streets were inadequate to support the increases in traffic. It was an occasion of poor planning. Nor was enforcement able to keep pace. The crime that often attends persons living in the lower socioeconomic strata of society arose in these newer neighborhoods as well. There were poor controls on the structure of the environment of the new housing, and this contributed to the crime problems in those neighborhoods. The structure of housing projects had created an environment wherein crime could flourish. Tragically, there were insufficient city resources to support its suppression.

The new population increased the number of unlicensed drivers. There was an increase in traffic congestion and more hit and run collisions. There was an increase in the incidence of collisions involving drinking drivers. The low cost housing had a very negative impact on the community as a whole.

Fifth, the trend of the senior population impact on services. The senior population did increase slightly due to the aging baby boomers but not significantly. Because of the development of the low cost housing and the rapid influx of people, the percentage of the senior population to the community at large was relatively minor and there was as just as great an impact on services to seniors as had been foreseen ten years ago.

Sixth, concerned the trend of officers "knowing" the community. Because of the rapid growth and changes in the police department positive citizen contact was not paramount. Officers did not have time to know citizens. Officers showed up for calls. The department grew for a time. It tried to keep pace with the rapid influx of population. Overall, there were fewer and fewer officers who knew the community. Community trust eroded. There was a rapid influx of immigrants who had had a different experience with police officers from those who had grown up in the United States. Many refugees from the revolution in Mexico came to Oceanside. Some were victims. Others were criminals. Not only is there a language barrier with the people but there was more mistrust of the police.

Seventh, concerned the functionality of other systems. These systems included schools and prisons. Under the three strikes laws prisons reached their maximum allowable inmate populations. This resulted that prisons housed more serious violators. Many who had three strikes were released because of prison overcrowding. Three strikers who were gang members bragged of invulnerability.

There was a backlash in the schools due to overly stringent zero tolerance standards enacted to combat unruly behavior. The standard of zero tolerance was

implemented in the late 1990's. Even children in the lower primary grades were being expelled under the ruling. The ruling was challenged in the courts. There was erosion of discipline throughout the system as it was demonstrated that school rules could not be effectively enforced. Because the plaintiffs prevailed, the school district was forced to severely relax its standing on zero tolerance.

As school control relaxed, gangs flourished in the schools. The schools were not in a position to provide much support in maintaining peace among the youth of the community. This occurred in spite of the fact that this age group is responsible for most crime that occurs in the city.

Eight, the issue of civil rights versus property rights: this has not been an issue in terms of the police to any great extent (in spite of the one aberration in which a white officer illegally killed a prominent member of the minority community). The police continue to be constrained to abide by court rulings protecting civil rights. There has been no change at the national level in the concept of the exclusionary rule as it pertains to admissibility of evidence. For the most part police do not engage in targeted or biased enforcement that would violate those rights. Lawyers still abound who are willing to take cases in support of indigent persons against municipalities with deep pockets. Some lawsuits have contributed to racial strife in Oceanside. For the most part city government has lost those lawsuits.

One lawsuit in particular in 2004 that did not come to trial until 2007 cost several million dollars. A prominent member of a minority group was abused by a police officer and killed.

In non-English speaking neighborhoods, vigilantism has become the law enforcement method of choice for residents. Of course there has been a price. Gangs have become the enforcers. Trust and use of the police has declined. From this perspective, there are fewer calls for service, but the decrease is not indicative of reduced crime. It was through our bilingual surveys conducted as part of this study that we discovered this information.

Nine, the empowering aspects to criminals under three strikes. Only gang members see facing the third strike as a badge of courage; they see it as a mark of pedigree. Other criminals are more discreet and less willing to face apprehension.

Gangs in schools have flourished. The trend of gangs in schools has impacted police service. Fiscal cutbacks removed officers from schools. Gang violence has increased in schools.

Of the ten events predicted ten years ago, some have been discussed already. These include the loss of revenue to local government, the earthquake, the race riot, the Manchester Resort, the re-institution of the draft, and the gang injunctions. It was predicted that the federal government would make funds available to youth programs. This event did not materialize. It was predicted that the police department would absorb the Harbor patrol. This event did not materialize. It was predicted that citizens would have the technology to call officers directly. This event did materialize. However, officers stopped answering their cellular phones and pagers. This action increased citizen frustration. It was predicted that social service agencies would close due to a recession. As discussed, there was a recession but social service agencies survived it intact.

In summary, our findings show that the police department is need of a leadership overhaul. Through lack of leadership the department has abandoned community-policing strategies; it has also shrunk from adequate response to calls for service.

## **THE GOLD STARR SCENARIO**

My name is Naaman Starr and I represent the Law Enforcement Analysis Foundation (LEAF) headquartered in Washington D. C. It is my privilege today to award to the City of Oceanside Police Department the LEAF Citation of Merit for the year 2009. The citation recognizes the presence of a superior law enforcement organization that has achieved crime control through the application of modern policing principles. The Oceanside Police Department has an excellent reputation for innovative problem solving and community improvement.

What is the essence of an outstanding policing organization? The answer to the question is the standards and practices of the Oceanside Police Department. It takes time to build an outstanding organization. It takes time to build a responsive organization. Over the last ten to fifteen years, this department has invested the time and effort to merit this recognition.

The Oceanside organizational culture, its outlook on the world, reflects the department's mission statement and core values (Appendix). Every department action is grounded in these core values. LEAF representatives have visited organizational meetings and reviewed the minutes of others. Consistently the decisions made in these meetings reflect organizational values. Of each decision

the question is asked, how will this action move our mission forward? It is evident that meeting participants take this question seriously.

Police members thrive on building solid relationships with the community (9). These relationships aid the department in its drive to fulfill its mission. Relationships are both internal and external to the department. Both are important. A conscious, daily activity at the department is the nurturing of partnerships. The building of these relationships is a key activity. Members are concerned about the impressions they make on clients, customers, and stakeholders. Wherever possible, members take the time to explain policing actions. The objective is to provide service that meets the needs of the recipient, or at least, members explain the purpose behind actions. There is even a saying among criminals, "if you have to get busted, do it in Oceanside; they treat you right."

As an organization, the Oceanside Police Department has an optimistic view of human potential. Its enforcement actions are professional and non-judgmental. Members do not use enforcement opportunities as punishment. For this organization, a job well done is not the apprehension of the violator; it is prevention of the violation. The Oceanside organizational culture believes that humans have the capacity to overcome their own problems through innovative social engineering. It sees itself as an agent of community self-improvement. It disdains any policing action that tends to perpetuate the status quo of illegal anti-social behavior. Intervention is aimed at improvement not just interruption of criminal behavior.

Department leadership teaches that there are factors that contribute to the presence of crime and there are factors that contribute to the absence of crime.

Department planning seek to isolate in the community environment factors that support a safer and more productive citizenry. Consequently, department members concern themselves with neighborhood upkeep, the condition of community buildings and homes, the viability of families and family relationships, the support of youth and other productive community activities, and solutions to the problems of alcohol and drug abuse (10). At the same time, department leadership assertively supports the enforcement aspects of policing. It is in tune with the community consciousness and emphasizes laws that support community values. Since members regularly interact with a cross-section of the community, these values support the wide-ranging cultures and lifestyles possible in a democratic society.

The Oceanside Police Department actively engages in the enforcement of laws surrounding disorderly behavior (11). While traditional departments discover that many statutes outlawing disorderly behavior are unconstitutional, Oceanside seeks to rewrite statutes so that they meet court standards. Oceanside repairs "broken windows," actual or metaphorical.

A key activity of Oceanside leadership is futures planning. Oceanside is a contingency organization. As an enforcement organization, Oceanside reacts according to what happened yesterday. But as a prevention organization, it considers what may happen tomorrow. Of each undesirable event from yesterday, the question that is asked of tomorrow, what can we do that prevents a reoccurrence? In addition to traditional police reports filed on calls for service, every member who responds to the call completes a Statement of Future

Preventability. These statements are a significant part of police management futures planning.

Oceanside leadership constantly looks for ways to streamline internal administrative procedures. Their actions minimize paperwork and allow members to focus on problem solving and community interaction. Management supports systems that enable reports to be more quickly transcribed and documented. They solicit employee input to make the work environment simpler.

The Oceanside Police Department is flexible (12). Police management realizes that community concerns and priorities change. Through ongoing relationships with the community, department leadership endeavors to be cognizant of change as it is occurring. The success of this effort is the acceptance by police members that they are part of the community not separate from it. Members are taught that police actions are not taken in a vacuum. Every police action has a ramification, a rippling throughout the community. Actions by one officer today will impact community receptiveness to actions by another officer tomorrow.

The department culture encompasses an expanded world-view. Members strive to meet a variety of community needs. Sometimes needs conflict. Members are trained in conflict resolution. They have been taught the same techniques that apply to peace keeping in foreign nations. For example, police intervention in Oceanside in neighborhood disputes often takes more time than similar interventions in other communities. Police members endeavor to achieve understanding between people as well as resolution of the dispute. It is a method for avoiding future problems.

Police members acknowledge that people act like they are treated. Patience with disgruntled citizens takes more time in the short run. It saves time in the long run. Likewise, the use of courtesy is important in the department. It is believed that graciousness and respect given today produce improved compliance tomorrow. Department actions that support the maxim voluntary compliance are the best kind of enforcement.

Police leaders believe that employees act as they are treated. While the department is still has some internal conflicts, employees feel respected even when they disagree with management decisions. Such conflicts rarely arise, however, because police management is viewed as a partnership. Managers are open with employees and professional in their conduct. They maintain a friendly yet professional relationship. It is one that promotes mutual respect with emphasis on mutual. Managers acknowledge that to gain respect from subordinates, it is first necessary to give it. Of greater importance, to leaders subordinates are co-workers. They have respect for co-worker expertise and provide training and educational support to enhance this expertise.

Police leaders emphasize service. While traditional police departments target apprehension, Oceanside also advocates for victims. Victims of crime are provided regular updates on the progress of the investigation. While traditional departments emphasize rapid response, Oceanside also conducts thorough preliminary investigations. In this sense, responding officers are investigators in uniform. Supervisors allow the time need for this kind of value-added service.

Police leaders have built strong yet appropriate political relationships. Politics is power in practice and contributes to public safety. Rightly harnessed, political leaders support the mission of the organization. Oceanside police leadership has achieved this level of political support.

Police leaders are consistent. This consistency is not accidental. Leaders regularly review their own decisions and practices for consistency. The ability to be consistent is a measurement of manager performance. Consistency is measured in support of the mission and core values and on levels of communication with co-workers. Poor communication is acknowledged as a management failing.

Police leaders are attentive to detail. As frustrating as attention to detail may be, Oceanside managers know that organizations, communities, and indeed the nations of the world are made and unmade in the details. Attentiveness to subtle community changes has enabled managers to understand that the world does not change by leaps and bounds. It changes minutely. Where historically it has appeared that there has been radical change, it is because minute actions have gone unnoticed under the surface to set the stage for major change.

Police leaders have been willing to sacrifice their time and energies to build an excellent organization. Over the last ten years these leaders, to varying degrees, have remained committed to the single goal of community improvement through excellence of service. The culture at the department communicates extra mile involvement. It is recognized that promotion means more not less work. A leadership tenet at the department states that without deep commitment, the result is mediocrity; or in other words, the traditional police department.

Police leaders are constantly educating themselves. All are college graduates, many with advanced degrees. They prize reading and research. They are innovators. They are not content to have deficiencies. They look for their own weaknesses and seek to strengthen them. They are open to criticism positive or negative. In that criticism, they look for the seeds of change that will improve the service they provide and the service provided by the department. They are forever open to input. Their doors remain open and their minds also.

A requisite to promotion at the Oceanside Police Department is a willingness to participate in the POST Command College and to actively engage in futures research and planning. These leaders know that technology and social innovations are changing rapidly. It is as important for them to keep up with societal progress as with technological progress. They constantly search for new ideas.

To foster creative thinking police leaders have formed community think tanks to consider community-policing issues. These groups are comprised of police leaders and members acting as co-workers. In addition, various community leaders and other interested stakeholders are included. The group emphasizes innovation and long-term problem solving. Police leadership values the creative efforts of others, but they are not bound by traditional thinking. Nor does the thinking of the majority blind them to new possibilities. A coveted prize among managers is called the *Outrageous Idea* award. The police chief gives it for the most unlikely idea each year that produces the most community improvement.

Accompanying an emphasis on innovation is a willingness to look at what techniques and programs used by other agencies. Still, Oceanside police leaders

exercise caution in this activity. A bar to innovation is the adage, "Let's not re-invent the wheel." Police leaders understand that often the wheel needs re-invention. They have confidence in their own capacities to be creative and solve community issues. Often, their unique approach has led to new standards of community policing.

The Oceanside Police Department has excellent leaders. Excellent leaders are key to impacting calls for service. Community members trust the responsiveness of excellent leaders. Excellent leaders seek longer-term solutions and push their co-workers to engage in longer-term and strategic thinking. Strategic objectives promote community safety, community harmony, community trust, and community peace. Excellent leaders emphasize the term "peace officer" over the term "law enforcement officer." They emphasize the term "police officer" in terms of being a community officer (*polis*), someone representing the community.

The Oceanside Police Department actively promotes citizen empowerment. The department has built upon the idea of community partnerships to promote citizen based problem solving. In this way the agency has moved beyond the concepts of community oriented policing and problems solving (COPPS). The department has become an educational institution communicating successful strategies for peaceful living in modern society. In Oceanside, more and more, the people themselves are the police.

Based on all of the above, I, Naaman Starr, am honored to present this citation of merit to the members of the Oceanside Police Department this ninth day of September 2009.

## **STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

An objective is a goal, something to be accomplished. An overall organizational goal is often called its mission. A strategy is a plan for meeting objectives, or it is a plan for achieving a mission. For example, if my goal is to be elected to public office, my strategy may be to concentrate my campaigning in precincts with the highest voter turnout. Or, if my goal is to train a relay team to swim from San Clemente to Catalina Island, my strategy may be to have members of the team practice in the ocean instead of a swimming pool.

A strategy includes activities necessary to reach the goal and excludes activities that are not. For example, if my goal is the office of mayor in one city, it is of little value to campaign in another; or, if to swim, I would avoid wasting time in a bowling tournament. A strategy is holistic. It considers not only what is to be accomplished, but also the environment in which the accomplishment is to take place.

A strategy can be simple or complex. A simple strategy may be an approach to problem solving held in the mind. Complex strategies are often written in the form of strategic objectives. Strategic objectives support the strategy. The strategy supports the overall objective or the mission. Taken together strategic objectives form the strategy.

The issue in this project questions the impact of community policing strategies on calls for service workload. It concludes that given the correct leadership, community-policing strategies reduce the need for citizens to call police. The strategic objectives contained in the project are guides for leadership. Following these guidelines will assist leadership in resolving community concerns before they arise. They will enable leadership to develop a citywide organizational culture in which community problem solving can flourish.

1. Continue to emphasize the department mission and core values throughout organizational activities. Insure that deployment reflects mission.
2. Determine internal and external relationships that need strengthening. Make specific assignments to build rapport. Analyze progress at Department manger meetings. Emphasize relationships that support the department mission.
3. Where feasible have dispatchers or officers provide citizens update on action taken on calls for service. If the service was unsatisfactory, analyze what the department could have done to produce a different outcome.
4. Inculcate an optimistic view of human potential into organizational culture through fostering positive police-citizen interaction.
5. Investigate social engineering concepts to ascertain placement potential of policing.
6. Conduct an analysis of the community from an environmental perspective. Identify physical arrangements of buildings, homes, businesses, streets, lighting, etc. that could contribute to crime.
7. Involve community members in the identification in the unsafe aspects of the community environment.
8. Modify domestic violence response to include consideration of methods for strengthening families at the same time as upholding the law. Consider forming a specially trained domestic violence response team (where like the psychiatric emergency response team a family therapist is partnered with a police officer).

9. Continue the use of diversion for public drunkenness.
10. Identify different demographic groupings in city. Determine if different groups desire different policing services. Compare with actual deployment and adjust as necessary.
11. Analyze local statutes dealing with disorderly behavior for constitutionality. Adjust as necessary to retain or enhance as policing tool.
12. Actively engage in "fixing broken windows" from graffiti to truancy to poor streets to broken streetlights to abandoned homes, etc.
13. Use the nominal group technique as a planning tool in the department. Require environmental scanning by department managers in the areas of social, technological, environmental, economic, and political issues. As a management team, discuss the results of these activities.
14. Conduct an analysis of calls for service. Identify patterns and/or environmental issues. Propose strategies to prevent reoccurrence of call.
15. Establish a form, Statement of Future Preventability. Have the form completed on select calls for service. Conduct analysis of findings as means to reduce future calls for service through proactive intervention.
16. Create a focus group to review internal administrative procedures for streamlining or elimination. Seek to simplify procedures.
17. Continue annual and other citizen surveys to ascertain community policing priorities and interests.
18. Through the community affairs unit increase employee involvement in community events to support the concept as police as part of the community.
19. Conduct specialized training in conflict resolution. Seek training that will support lasting solutions to community disputes.
20. Re-evaluate management duties to flatten the organization. Convert from the idea of subordinates to that of co-workers. Build co-worker expertise in problem solving skills.
21. Analyze department support of victims of crime. Determine if department leaves victims in or out of its efforts in the criminal justice process.

22. Analyze the department culture. Determine if the performance behaviors that are rewarded are also supportive the department mission. If there is incongruity, repair.
23. Through training and the adherence to performance standards improve the capability of officers to conduct preliminary investigations. Insist that supervisors allow officers time to thoroughly investigate reports of crime.
24. Analyze management decision practices across the organization. Determine where there is resolvable inconsistency. Repair.
25. Analyze the department's relationship to the political base. Determine if the relationship can be improved in support of the department mission.
26. Consider consistent leadership as a measure of management performance.
27. Continue to insist on attention to detail in the work products of the department. Hold up perfection as an ideal of excellent performance and pursue.
28. Continue to involve managers in a community organization outside the department, especially those that support the department mission.
29. Define extra mile service as a department practice. Reward employees who exhibit this level of service.
30. Continue to encourage management learning. Among other actions, assign contemporary books to be read and have reports given on new ideas to managers.
31. Conduct organizational brainstorming to come up with new ideas for resolving community-policing issues.
32. Assign personnel to search the Internet for innovative policing strategies. Showcase a strategy at each management meeting. Recognize employees who suggest new ways of problem solving. Reward well thought out ideas even if not implemented.
33. Strongly encourage manager participation in POST Command College.
34. Promote citizen oriented problem solving. Educate citizens how to solve their own problems (appropriately) without calling police. Consider that a well-informed citizenry is the best defense against tyranny.
35. Develop an annual operational calendar to anticipate seasonal policing needs.

36. Develop and implement a community traffic safety plan.
37. Modify CAD to track community policing efforts.
38. Divide the city into reporting districts. Develop a neighborhood or crime watch in each. Actively liaison with groups over public safety issues and police deployment.
39. Outfit neighborhood officers so citizens may call them directly.
40. Establish an officer share program where officers work in the planning and building departments to facilitate a wider perspective on community problem solving.
41. Create a community panel of youth to gain input on community and policing issues.
42. Enable dispatch to handle calls for service that come via email.
43. Advertise traffic enforcement priorities.
44. Create a citywide effort to reduce the need for police calls for service.
45. Continue to use volunteers to assist police in service delivery.
46. Adopt a squad concept for uniformed officer deployment and enact increased first line supervisor accountability.
47. Continue to conduct a department wide meeting to consider coordinated operational deployment.
48. Create a financial plan to keep department current with technology that will support mission.

The creation of a strategic plan cannot be accomplished without the hard work, dedication, and assistance of a great many people. Successful strategic planning is a group not an individual effort. Successful strategies that promote change embody the viewpoints and experience of a wide variety of people who are

stakeholders in its outcome. Any meaningful change in the way calls for service is handled will come from this perspective.

## **TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN**

While a strategy is a plan for meeting objectives, a transition management plan is a set of objectives to ready the organization to undertake a new strategy. The Oceanside Police Department is in the midst of using community-policing strategies on an ongoing basis.

The department undertakes many activities to resolve community concerns as or before they arise. Nonetheless, the department can be more proactive. It can improve its flexibility to respond to the community. It can engage in future forecasting. It can build better partnerships with the community.

The emphasis of the transition management plan is to create a future focus for department management. Within the context of a future focus the strategic guides for leadership will enable the department to develop the citywide culture in which community problem solving will flourish.

1. By June 30, 2000 at a meeting of department staff review project findings and recommendations. Gain input and commitment to add project recommendations to the department's strategic plan.
2. By June 30, 2000 institute a procedure to tabulate calls for service by type. Create a workgroup to review categories of calls and to recommend alternate solutions to prevent reoccurrence.
3. By June 30, 2000 create a focus group to review proposed strategies in the project and to add or subtract objectives; and to attach action steps and timetables to objectives.
4. By June 30, 2000 create a focus group to redefine calls for service in terms of both short-term response and long term intervention. Redefine policing

strategies in terms of calls for service reduction. After staff review, implement group findings.

5. By December 31, 2000 install future forecasting as a planning tool within the department. As part of the process utilize nominal groups and environmental scanning (STEEP).
6. By December 31, 2000 research grant or other funding for a domestic violence response time.
7. By December 31, 1999 create an operational calendar which projects crime patterns and other anticipated policing events. Based on the calendar plan for potential future events.
8. By December 31, 1999 redefine role of lieutenants (as watch commanders) to more fully embrace the management of community policing strategies.
9. By December 31, 1999 identify police service areas (based on currently existing reporting districts) and form or identify neighborhood groups to deal with policing issues.
10. By May 31, 2000 create training for citizens on self-government and problem solving.
11. By May 31, 2000 create a methodology (template) for field officers to submit ideas for reduction of calls for service based on analysis of calls.

To achieve a desirable future an organization must manage two critical areas.

The first area is the management of the implementation of the strategies needed to bring about the desired change. The second area is the management of the change itself. While change is a natural process in life, directed organizational change can be disruptive to cherished traditions. To avoid removal from positions of comfort, some employees will oppose change. Transition management readies the organization for change in an effort to reduce opposition to the desired future.

## **IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP**

The Oceanside Police Department is an organization structured along traditional grounds. The main focus of its uniformed division is calls for service response accompanied by sprinklings of proactive enforcement and directed patrol. Some department components, such as its neighborhood officer efforts, tend to look toward the long term. But long term problem solution is not a main organizational focus. It is given a lesser weight in the organizational structure than are calls for service.

To effectively prepare for the future, police management will have to more aggressively seek out community needs. Management will have to embrace futures research and the creation of scenarios as a significant method of doing business. Managers must adjust to inquire of each policing event, what can my agency do to prevent a reoccurrence? And managers must never accept "Nothing" as an acceptable response. Managers must change to believe that there are always alternatives and there is no end to the potential for innovation.

More than at present managers must come to see the world as a resource and partnerships and relationships as the means to attach/attract the world's resources. Managers must examine the existing definition of policing as reflected by organizational culture and formulate a definition that supports community problem solving.

Oceanside Police Managers have the ability to embrace the needed change in perspective. They will change their typical day from reacting to what has been to anticipating what may be.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations are provided to Oceanside Police management as a means to achieve the desirable future described in the Gold Star Scenario.

1. Staff should review, discuss, and consider the objectives contained in the strategic and implementation portions of this project. In particular the objectives in the strategic plan should be adopted into the department's multi-year strategic plan.
2. Each manager should be given an assignment to engage in environmental scanning with reference to trends and events that may impact the department. Staff time should be allocated to consider possible futures for the organization and the community.
3. Staff should adopt the transition management plan as a means to bring about the most desirable future.
4. Staff should consider changes in the way the organization is structured that would support the futures orientation.

## **BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS**

As stated in the introduction to this project, the relationship between the two models of policing is a struggle between the use of resources. Additional resources cost money and there are no surprise new funding sources for the City of Oceanside. Therefore the success of community policing strategies rests with organizational leadership and its management of scarcity.

There will need to be modest increases in police staffing levels over the next five to ten years. Some that have already occurred through grant monies will have to be funded through the city general fund or lost from department policing efforts. Within five years, the retention of grant funded positions and new positions will increase the police budget by approximately \$630,000. These increased include five police officers, five community service officers, and a report review specialist.

## **FOLLOW UP AND EVALUATION**

Currently department staff meets monthly to review progress on the five-year strategic plan. With the inclusion of the strategic objectives from this project into the department's strategic plan, progress on those objectives will be regularly monitored. A specific manager will be assigned responsibility for the transition management portion of the project and to also report on progress on transition at the monthly meetings. Uniformed division staff will compare calls for service workload with efforts to reduce those calls. Division staff will report to department staff on a quarterly basis the progress on efforts to reduce calls for service through community policing strategies.

Calls for service are at the heart of policing. Technology has brought police officers to anyone's doorstep at the push of a couple of buttons. It is wonderful technology and has produced a system of emergency response unequalled in the world.

Unfortunately, the solution to community policing problems is not in response at the emergency level. Emergencies are symptoms. Yet the analysis of these symptoms will reveal the underlying causes. Then, as causes are addressed, emergencies will occur less frequently. Ultimately, the aim of policing is to reduce human suffering. Community policing strategies tied to calls-for-service analysis will support this aim.

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