

HOW WILL THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AS AN URBAN
TERRORIST TACTIC IMPACT THE LEVEL OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
PREPAREDNESS BY THE YEAR 2005?

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by

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This Command College Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future; creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The view and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training.
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California Peace Officer Standards and Training

Table of Contents

Chapter I	Introduction	1
Chapter II	Forecasting the Future	9
Chapter III	Strategic Plan/Transition Management	19
Chapter IV	Implications, Recommendations and Conclusions	34
	List of Tables	37
	Endnotes	38
	Bibliography	40

Chapter I The Threat from Terrorism

Introduction

The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists poses a grave threat to the United States. Combating the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery systems is of paramount importance and will involve all levels of government. Traditional terrorist organizations with distinct military type command structures have been replaced with a fragmented, leaderless type of terrorist organization. This poses an even greater threat as individual terrorists become more difficult to track, less predictable in their actions, and have access to weapons of mass destruction. A successful attack on the United States would have a devastating impact. Even a credible threat will have a significant impact on the nation's sense of security and wellbeing.

A number of events over the last 20 years have shown that terrorism is a legitimate concern for law enforcement. Since the Oklahoma City bombing, investigations into subversive groups have increased tenfold from about 100 per year to 1,000 per year.¹ Possible threats now not only include bombings, shootings and kidnappings, but also the threat of chemical, biological and nuclear attacks. At least twelve known terrorist groups have an interest in or have actively sought chemical, nuclear or biological weapons.²

A review of terrorist activities in the 20th century reveals that terrorists can acquire and use lethal chemical, biological, and radiological agents if they wish to do so. To date, however, such attacks have rarely produced significant casualties. In the last four decades, only a handful of cases have occurred where terrorist groups have threatened to use such lethal agents and materials (collectively referred to as Weapons of Mass Destruction or WMD) in a mass casualty causing act or one involving super-violence.

Nevertheless, the potential for even one successful terrorist related WMD attack would have such devastating consequences that we cannot easily shrug off this threat, even in light of statistics which suggests bombings, kidnappings, and assassination will continue to be the terrorist's tactics of choice.

The likelihood of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction on American soil has increased exponentially in the last few years. Anthrax threats have begun to take the place of bomb threats in many of our large metropolitan areas. The availability of weapons of mass destruction has proliferated. The likelihood of local terrorist actions involving the response of local law enforcement has increased. The federal government has begun to provide significant funding to local agencies specifically for equipment and preparation in response to terrorist acts. Local law enforcement agencies must be prepared to respond to such incidents and take appropriate action.

Historical Development

Organized societies have existed for several thousand years. Changes in government, or attempts to change governments, often result in destabilization and terrorism. Traditionally, destabilization has been accomplished through agitation propaganda, street disorder, and intimidation. Guerrilla and civil wars are an escalation of isolated terrorist actions. Terrorist organizations have taken advantage of these fears to achieve their goals. Terrorism is, in essence, a violent and often lethal form of intimidation. The intent of terrorism is to make laws unworkable and create a climate of collapse.

Politically motivated domestic violence has long been characteristic of American Society. For example, some of the 19th century Victorian roots of the modern British Secret Intelligence Service are found in the establishment within Scotland Yard during the early 1880's of a Special

Branch to counter the Irish rebel bombings of British cities. This still continues today with the unsettled relationship between Ireland and Britain.

Early on, terror was typically a way of doing political business. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century Russia and Eastern Europe had well-established traditions regarding the use of systematic tactical terror for the accomplishment of political ends. These patterns continued into modern times.

Within the United States, a number of terrorist groups have operated in recent times. Those include the Black Liberation Army, the Weather Underground, the Cuban Nationalist Movement and the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide.³ Most recently, militia groups, who also use terrorist tactics, have formed and currently pose a significant threat to United States security.

On a global scale, multinational terrorist organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, the African National Congress and various death squads in Latin America have formed and become politically violent.⁴ A number of groups now operate as loose confederations of groups that manage to operate even without centralized control.

Terrorism has struck the United States from a number of directions. International terrorists have struck the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. This date is considered the day that international terrorism came to United States soil. Militia groups have spawned a number of isolated attacks, the most significant being the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. Individual hate-based attacks were the basis for the shootings at the Jewish community center in Los Angeles. Attacks have also occurred elsewhere against the Jewish faith with burnings of the three synagogues in Sacramento and shootings in

Chicago. Table 1.1 on page 5 outlines the chronological summary of incidents in the United States between 1990 and 1997.

The most frightening aspect of the evolution of terrorism is the use of weapons of mass destruction as the tactic of choice for terrorist acts. Recently, President Clinton stated that it is highly likely that a terrorist group will launch or threaten a germ or chemical attack on U.S. soil within the next few years.⁵

Most state-sponsored terrorism comes from seven countries; Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Most of these seven states either have or are seeking weapons of mass destruction. More than a dozen states have offensive chemical and/or biological weapons. Despite a number of years of intrusive inspections by the United States Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there still is no certainty that Iraq's WMD programs have been eliminated.

A number of factors have contributed to the proliferation and availability of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The collapse of the USSR has resulted in a lapse of security and accountability of nuclear, chemical and biological materials in Russia, making them prone to theft. China has carried out extensive transfers of nuclear weaponry to Iran and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan have successfully tested nuclear weapons. Neither have any real surveillance capability or reliable command and control to prevent such transfers. The propagation of WMD and delivery systems manufacturing capabilities may further stimulate the diffusion of these dangerous and destabilizing technologies.

These examples demonstrate the danger to U.S. national security, as clearly stated by President Clinton. The greatest threat comes from planned efforts of states and sub-national groups to acquire WMD capability. These weapons present unique challenges in terms of

Table 1.1
Chronological Summary of Incidents in the United States
Between 1990 and 1997⁶

Date	Location	Incident Type	Group
1-12-90	Santurce, P.R.	Pipe Bombing	Brigada Internacionalista Eugenio Maria de Hostos de las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Pedro Albizu Campos (Eugenio Maria de Hostos International Brigade of the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces)
1-12-90	Carolina, P.R.	Pipe Bombing	Brigada Internacionalista Eugenio Maria de Hostos de las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Pedro Albizu Campos (Eugenio Maria de Hostos International Brigade of the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces)
2-22-90	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	Up the IRS, Inc.
4-22-90	Santa Cruz County, CA	Malicious Destruction of Property	Earth Night Action Group
5-27-90	Mayaguez, P.R.	Arson	Unknown Puerto Rican Group
9-17-90	Arecibo, P.R.	Bombing	Pedro Albizu Group Revolutionary Forces
9-17-90	Vega Baja, P.R.	Bombing	Pedro Albizu Group Revolutionary Forces
2-3-91	Mayaguez, P.R.	Arson	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
2-18-91	Sabana Grande, P.R.	Arson	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
3-17-91	Carolina, P.R.	Arson	Unknown Puerto Rican Group
4-1-91	Fresno, CA	Bombing	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
7-6-91	Punta Borinquen, P.R.	Bombing	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
4-5-92	New York, NY	Hostile Takeover	Mujahedin-E-Khaig (MEK)
11-19-92	Urbana, IL	Attempted Firebombing	Mexican Revolutionary Movement
12-10-92	Chicago, IL	Car Fire and Attempted Firebombing	Boricua Revolutionary Front (two incidents)
2-26-93	New York, NY	Car Bombing	International Radical Terrorists
7-20-93	Tacoma, WA	Pipe Bombing	American Front Skinheads
7-22-93	Tacoma, WA	Bombing	American Front Skinheads
11-27/28-93	Chicago, IL	Firebombing	Animal Liberation Front (nine incidents)
THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM IN 1994			
4-19-95	Oklahoma City, OK	Truck Bombing	Pending Investigation
4-1-96	Spokane, WA	Pipe Bomb/Bank Robbery	Phineas Priesthood
7-12-96	Spokane, WA	Pipe Bomb/Bank Robbery	Phineas Priesthood
7-27-96	Atlanta, GA	Pipe Bomb	Pending Investigation
1-2-97	Washington, DC	Letter Bomb	Pending Investigation
1-2-97	Leavenworth, KA	Letter Bomb	Pending Investigation

control, detection and response. With the ever-growing threat of the use of WMD on American soil, local law enforcement agencies can no longer ignore these types of weapons as only a military problem. In the event of an attack with WMD on American soil, local public safety employees will be the first to respond. First responders must be properly equipped and trained to respond, assess and take action in the event of such an attack.

The Threat from Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons

Non-conventional weapons have actually been in use throughout history. The Athenian army poisoned the water supply to the city of Kirrha in 600 BC using toxin derived from the hellebore plant.⁷ The Greeks also used biological warfare as long ago as 300 BC when they intentionally polluted enemy wells with animal carcasses. World War I saw the use of both biological and chemical warfare. The Germans used anthrax, cholera and glanders against human and animal targets and the use of chemical weapons was also widespread.⁸

Biological weapons have been used recently within the United States. In 1984, 750 people became sick in Dalles, Oregon after eating in restaurants. A member of a religious group, the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, spread salmonella bacteria on salad bars in 4 local restaurants in an attempt to disrupt elections in eastern Oregon. In 1993, Canadian customs apprehended a man from Arkansas who had 4 guns, 20,000 rounds of ammunition and enough ricin, which is castor bean toxin, to kill 30 million people. There have been other arrests in the United States for possession of botulism and ricin toxins. Larry Harris, a laboratory worker in Ohio and member of a white supremacist organization, was able to mail order *Yersinia pestis*, the agent responsible for bubonic plague, from a biomedical supply house in May of 1995.⁹

Two terms are used when comparing the effectiveness of weapons: lethality and casualty generation.¹⁰ Lethality is the fraction that dies of the total number in the target population.

Casualty generation is defined as the number of individuals in the target population who are injured by a single use of a weapon.¹¹ As an example, bullets have a high index of lethality but a low index of casualty generation. Fragmentation munitions, on the other hand, have high rates of casualty generation while relatively low lethality rates. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are variable in their casualty generation and lethality rates but often generate high numbers of minimally injured casualties. As an example, 1000 kilograms of sarin gas released from an airplane would kill 8,000 people. One hundred kilograms of anthrax bacillus would result in the death of 3 million people if optimally distributed.¹²

Chemical weapons have 5 classifications: nerve agents, blister agents, blood agents, choking agents, and incapacitating agents. Some of the more common agents are tabun, sarin, and soman. One of the most recent examples of the use of sarin gas occurred in Japan. In June of 1994 the Aum Shinrikyo cult either accidentally or intentionally released sarin gas in the community of Matsamuto. This caused several deaths and 200 casualties. This was followed by a March 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system. Sarin gas was placed in 5 subway cars on 3 separate lines. The attack was planned for the early morning rush hour and it was coordinated to occur beneath Japanese national government office buildings. During this one attack, twelve people were killed and there were 5,500 casualties. The cult had also purchased a Russian helicopter with the intent of the aerial spraying of nerve gas.

The terrorist use of nuclear weapons is one of the most frightening and serious threats facing the United States. This threat is predicated not only on the availability of plutonium and enriched uranium, but also on the lack of security in many areas of the world that have these products.¹³ Currently there is almost 1,100 tons of plutonium in the world. This is predicted to reach 1,600 tons within one year. The smuggling of both plutonium and enriched uranium is a

major security problem. In November of 1993 a thief climbed through a hole in a fence and entered a supposedly secure area in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk, Russia. He was able to use a hacksaw to enter storage compartments on a submarine that held nuclear fuel. He stole 3 fuel assemblies, each containing 4.5 kg of enriched uranium. In October of 1993 in Istanbul, Turkey, police seized 2.5 kg of uranium 238 and detained 4 Turkish businessmen along with 4 suspected agents of the Iranian secret service. The number of nuclear smugglings has increased during the past few years. For example, German authorities have reported 41 incidents in 1991, 158 in 1992, 241 in 1993, and 267 in 1994.¹⁴

Summary

In 1997 the Federal Bureau of Investigation recorded two terrorist incidents and 21 potential acts of terrorism were prevented in the United States.¹⁵ This is the highest number of prevented acts of terrorism since 1985, at which time 23 planned acts of terrorism were prevented. How agencies are prepared to respond to these incidents will have a direct impact on the outcome of a terrorist event. The next chapter outlines three future scenarios involving a law enforcement agency's response to a WMD incident. One will be optimistic, in which the agency will be well prepared, equipped and trained for such an event. The second will be pessimistic, in which an agency will not be prepared and incur a significantly different outcome. The third scenario outlines the total disintegration of society and the advent of military rule. The nominal group technique was used to assist in forecasting trends and possible events. From this information, a strategic plan will be outlined in Chapter III and findings and recommendations are provided in Chapter IV.

Chapter 2 Forecasting the Future

Utilization of the Nominal Group

In order to assist in the formation of a strategic plan, the Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used to develop pertinent information relative to local law enforcement preparedness for the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. A group of six local experts representing a variety of agencies from the Sacramento area met on July 26, 1999 to discuss trends and events related to the topic. The following is a list of the agencies represented.

- Sacramento Sheriff's Department - Emergency Operations
- Sacramento Municipal Utility District – Emergency Preparedness
- Kaiser Permanente – Environmental Health and Safety
- Sacramento County HAZMAT
- Sacramento County Fire Department

Prior to the group meeting, participants were mailed a letter describing the project and the purpose of the NGT. Specifically, they were advised that brainstorming would be used to identify specific trends and events that impact the topic. They were asked to determine trends by looking at the past, the present and then make assumptions about the future.

On the day of the meeting, panel members were first asked to identify trends that they believed would or could impact the use of WMD by terrorists. They were led through an open discussion allowing each of the members to state his/her thoughts and opinions. Thirty-two (32) trends were identified using the brainstorming and round robin techniques. From those, the top ten were derived for the purposes of this project. Twenty-three (23) possible events related to the topic were identified using the brainstorming and round robin techniques. From those, the

top ten were derived for the purposes of this project using a voting and ranking process. The selected trends are shown below:

TRENDS

- T1 The proliferation of weapons making and terrorist information available to a broader range of people due to the Internet and periodicals.
- T2 Rage and anger are affecting more people and having a greater impact on their lives.
- T3 Terrorists are working alone or in smaller groups.
- T4 Global communications capability is becoming commonplace.
- T5 Escalation of media exposure and coverage of terrorist activities.
- T6 Availability to weapons of mass destruction that allow a single person to perform a devastating act.
- T7 Economics – Cost of terrorism escalating.
- T8 The USA as a primary target of terrorism – “The Great Satan”
- T9 Technology-based terrorism.
- T10 Ease of world travel becoming more difficult.

Trend Summary Table 2.1 was completed which indicates the panel’s valuation of the trend over time as it relates to the topic. The value 100 is given to represent today.

Table 2.1
Trend Summary

Trend	-5 Years	Today	+5 Years	+10 Years	Concern
T1	30	100	300	600	3
T2	50	100	300	400	5
T3	40	100	250	400	3
T4	50	100	400	1000	7
T5	70	100	300	800	5
T6	50	100	300	600	2
T7	65	100	500	800	2
T8	80	100	300	500	5
T9	60	100	350	700	3
T10	150	100	95	80	7

EVENTS

- E1 Poisoning of the public water system
- E2 Assassination of key political leaders/judges
- E3 Terrorist attack on a key public event such as the Olympics
- E4 Hate crimes using weapons of mass destruction carried out on recognized groups
- E5 Terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction on transportation systems
- E6 Terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction on hospitals
- E7 Terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction on communications systems
- E8 Terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction to disrupt the flow of petroleum products
- E9 Terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction on waterways/dams
- E10 Terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction on energy supply

Event Summary Table 2.2 outlines the forecasted probability of a WMD terrorist event occurring. Column 2 represents the panel's value determination of the first year the possibility of events occurring exceed 0. Columns 3 and 4 represent the panel's value determination of the event possibility of occurring within 5 years and 10 years. Column 5 represents the positive or negative impact on the issue.

Table 2.2
Event Summary

Event	Y _t >0	+5 Years	+10 Years	Impact	+ or -
E1	10	12	15	1	-
E2	15	25	40	8	-
E3	40	45	50	3	-
E4	40	50	60	5	-
E5	25	40	50	5	-
E6	15	20	30	5	-
E7	30	30	40	3	-
E8	30	30	30	2	-
E9	10	10	10	3	-
E10	15	20	25	2	-

Cross Impact Analysis Table 2.3 identifies the positive or negative impact of an event occurring. In viewing the table, it is apparent that trends 4 through 7 are all impacted by each of the events identified. Those trends and events will be used as a basis for the following three scenarios.

Table 2.3
Cross Impact Analysis

Event	Trends									
	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7	T8	T9	T10
E1				-2	-5	-3	-5		-2	
E2	-1			-2	-4	-3	-5		-3	
E3	-2			-2	-5	-3	-5	-5	-1	
E4	-2	-3		-4	-4	-3	-5		-2	
E5	-2			-2	-5	-4	-5		-3	-5
E6	-2			-2	-5	-3	-5			
E7	-2			-2	-5	-5	-5		-5	-2
E8	-2			-2	-5	-3	-5	-5	-1	-3
E9	-2			-2	-5	-5	-5	-3	-1	
E10	-1			-2	-5	-5	-5	-5		-1

Futures Scenarios

Optimistic Scenario

In 2005, the focus on local urban terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction are a priority concern for government officials. The number of threats implicating the use of WMD has skyrocketed. Politicians declare that preparation for such events shall be the number one national security priority. Sheriff Doorite, Sheriff of Sacramento County, makes the preparation of such events a priority in his department as well.

America continues to be viewed as the Great Satan. The collapse of the Soviet block has reduced the threat posed by communism, but increased the threat posed by smaller countries as the United States takes on a more active and prolific role in world peace. In 2002, the United

States invaded Iraq and now occupies it as a last alternative to controlling Saddam Hussein.

Many Arab countries vehemently opposed the occupation, creating more hatred against the U.S.

Millions of dollars are made available to local law enforcement agencies to train and prepare for a local terrorist event using WMD. The proliferation of information on the manufacture and use of such weapons, coupled with the increase in domestic terrorists and foreign terrorists acting out on U.S. soil, has heightened the concern about the reality of a local attack. The Sacramento Sheriff's Department has responded to 10 false threats of anthrax and nuclear weapons dispersal last year alone (2004). As the State Capitol, it is anticipated that Sacramento would be a likely California target.

The Sacramento Sheriff's Department began its training and preparation in the area of terrorism and the use of WMD six years ago, in 1999. The establishment of a special unit charged with equipping and training the department has proven quite successful. The department was successful in obtaining a \$1 million dollar grant to fund their emergency preparedness in the area of WMD. Patrol officers, as first responders, have received extensive WMD training and carry equipment that provides them with necessary protection for a variety of encounters. They have received inoculations against biological agents as part of their standard requirement for duty.

On July 28, 2005, the Sacramento Sheriff's Department received a call of a suspicious object at the Sacramento International Airport. Upon arrival, Officer Jones locates the object. It is a metal cylindrical shaped container. Recognizing it as a possible dispersal device for anthrax, the officer begins to take immediate evacuation steps and calls out the Sheriff's BNICE (Biological, Nuclear, Incendiary, Chemical and Explosives) Response Team. Officer Jones, being a 20-year veteran, remembers the days when the department only had the Explosives

Ordinance Detail, whose expertise was limited to explosives. He immediately realizes the importance of all of the training and program development in the area of WMD and terrorism that the department began in 1999. The BNICE Response Team arrives and takes control of the tactical operations. A full-scale incident command system is established and the incident is mitigated with no injuries to officers or citizens. Examination of the object resulted in the determination that it did contain anthrax. Officer Jones later receives a special commendation for his quick and proper decision-making that resulted in thwarting what could have been a major disaster.

Pessimistic Scenario

The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) locally by terrorists has done little to encourage local government officials in Sacramento to take action to prepare for a localized event. Politicians generally have taken the position that terrorism and the use of such extravagant weapons is not going to happen in their communities. To support such an idea would be tantamount to branding their community as unsafe and vulnerable. It would also risk their political futures. While they play lip service to the community and the media as to how they support making their communities safe, they have not taken any action. Sheriff Doorite has gone to the Board of Supervisors repeatedly to obtain funding for training and equipment to no avail.

The cost of terrorism has escalated and single events can now cost millions of dollars due to the use of WMD. Due to a nationwide recession that began in 2001, little money is available for new programs or training for law enforcement. The federal government has drastically reduced its financial commitment to local governments in the area of training and support in

preparation for terrorist acts. This burden has shifted to local governments and the cost of such programs and training are not possible without federal funds.

The world has become a more violent place. Communication systems and the Internet have contributed significantly to the proliferation of terrorism and the use of WMD. What was once difficult to obtain is now easy. Technology now provides for instantaneous communication around the world. Terrorists have decentralized their activities and are becoming harder to track and identify.

Despite Sheriff Doorite's efforts, the Sacramento Sheriff's Department is not prepared to handle a terrorist act using WMD. A small group of terrorists associated with white supremacy groups plan to release anthrax in a shopping mall located in a predominantly minority community in the south area of the county. Officers receive a report of a suspicious object. Upon arrival, they enter and immediately locate the object, which appears to be some type of cylindrical object. Absent training and equipment, one officer picks up the device thinking it to be some type of plumber's tool. The device explodes and releases anthrax spores. They are overcome and are unable to provide any assistance. Additional officers respond and more casualties are incurred as a result. Eventually, federal and state experts are brought in to handle the incident. As a result, eight officers and 54 citizens lose their lives. Another 5 officers and 100 citizens are seriously injured. Many of those who were injured and killed were exposed after law enforcement arrived.

Due to the lack of training, equipment and preparedness by the Sheriff's Department, numerous lawsuits are filed against the county. As part of the settlement, the county agrees to train all emergency response personnel in regard to the hazards faced with the use of WMD and they settle for millions of dollars in personal loss and pain and suffering claims.

The Breakdown of Law and Order and the advent of Military Order – A Scenario

It is the year 2005. The threat of urban terrorist actions by white supremacists has become a serious concern after the incidence of threats and violence against minority and religious groups have become commonplace and increasingly violent. Weapons of mass destruction have been used by terrorists in other parts of the world and there have already been three incidents of the use of WMD on U.S. soil by both domestic and foreign terrorist groups, resulting in the deaths of 50,000 people. Many believe this carnage could have been prevented had local law enforcement been better prepared to counteract and prevent such occurrences.

People live in fear. Society has become closed with personal freedoms being restricted. A fortress mentality has taken over. Some feel that terrorists have won the war, as their primary objective was to instill fear. Some say it was a self-fulfilling prophecy. People are restricted in their travels. Identification is required for almost every movement a person makes, whether it is at their work or just shopping at the local grocery store.

The role of local law enforcement has changed dramatically. The Sacramento Sheriff's Department was not prepared to deal with such radical changes and demands on their services. Calls for service, particularly in regard to suspicious persons and objects, have increased 2000 percent. The State Legislature, as a result of federal law, has mandated a response time of 5 minutes or less to any suspicious objects in public areas. Special strike units had to be created by the Sheriff to address these types of calls. Gun sales increased 500 percent in 2004 alone. Calls for service involving violence have quadrupled in just two years. Homicides alone have increased 400 percent as paranoia and stress abound. People are generally taking the law into their own hands and self-protection has become the number one priority of most Americans.

Government has become increasingly more militaristic. The Sheriff's Department has become an occupational army with specialized units trained in not only the handling of WMD but also in their limited use. The federal government is on the verge of eliminating local law enforcement and establishing military control across the nation. Community policing is dead. Anarchy is on the horizon. Local government failed to realize the extreme and real threat posed by WMD and its impact on the communities they serve. They are all paying the price and local control is lost.

Summary

These scenarios paint a future that ranges from the preservation of peace and the world as we know it to the end of the world as we know it. The following is a list of threats that have been specifically identified as those of greatest concern:

- Terrorist acquisition or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
- Possession of, and the manufacturing capability for, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or other unfriendly states.
- Diversion of WMD-related weapons, technology, materials, and expertise from Russia.
- China's role as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and enabling technologies.
- Destabilizing consequences of WMD programs in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia.
- Militia groups becoming more active and more violent.

Combating these threats and preventing potential crises requires that government be organized to develop and carry out a coherent, coordinated, and sustained response, using all available tools and appropriate level of resources. This can only be accomplished through a

planning process. The next chapter will provide a basis from which to develop a strategic plan that an agency can use to prepare itself as a first-responder to a WMD incident.

Chapter III Strategic Plan

By utilizing strategic planning, an organization can create and manage a desirable future based on the identification of trends and events that may impact an issue. The purpose of this chapter is to present a strategic planning model that will prepare an agency to respond to a terrorist event in which weapons of mass destruction are utilized. Specifically, identifying what steps agencies must complete to help create a response plan that will minimize casualties and effectively protect the public.

In developing this strategic plan, the optimistic scenario was used as a guide. It is anticipated that an agency would want a favorable outcome when responding to such a catastrophic event. This scenario represents a successful response to a biological threat. Its success hinges on training, equipment and sound policy. Many organizations today would not be prepared to respond to such a threat. Absent sound strategic planning, many local law enforcement agencies and communities face an uncertain and dangerous future.

Strategic planning is a process by which guiding members of an organization envision its future and develop the necessary procedures and operations to achieve the desired result. An organization must anticipate the future and then prepare accordingly.¹⁶ The organization must also hold the belief that the future can be influenced and changed by what we do now.

Planning to Plan

Organizations engaging in planning for a response to the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists must consider a number of issues before starting. These include:

- What level of commitment is there to the planning process from key members of the organization and outside the organization (stakeholders)?
- Who should be involved in the planning process?

- How long will it take?
- What information do we need in order to plan successfully?
- Who will get the information we need?
- What resources/support do we need?
- How will we evaluate our effectiveness?

The organization must consider where it is in relation to its environment, and what it may face in the future. The development of trends and events outlined in Chapter II can assist a law enforcement organization in identifying things we cannot change but will continue to occur and things that may or may not occur. Analyzing these trends and events provides an agency with choices that can ultimately impact its success or failure.

Situational Analysis

In order to fully assess the level of risk an agency and a community face from a terrorist attack utilizing weapons of mass destruction, an analysis of the external environment must be completed. This will allow an agency to identify specific challenges and vulnerabilities to a terrorist incident. This can be accomplished through a scanning process called STEEP. It allows for the analysis of the external environment across five domains: Social, Technological, Environmental, Economic, and Political. Accurate risk assessments based on valid threat data and an understanding of a community's vulnerability is critical to the successful planning for a response to a WMD event. The following are examples of issues an agency should consider if they are to fully understand their key components of their own external environment and how they can contribute to their level of risk:

Social

- Rage and anger are affecting people and having a greater impact on their lives.

- Escalation of media exposure and coverage of terrorist activities.
- Terrorists are working alone or in smaller groups.
- More violence in the media and in entertainment.

Technological

- Global communications capability is becoming commonplace.
- The proliferation of weapons making and terrorist information is available to a broader range of people.
- Technology-based terrorism is becoming a greater threat as technology improves.

Environmental

- Availability of weapons of mass destruction that allow a single person to perform a devastating act.
- The potential for the destruction of crops using both biological and chemical weapons.
- Availability of targets.

Economic

- The cost of terrorism is escalating.
- Countries continue to generate revenue through the sale of nuclear, chemical and biological agents and technology.

Political

- The USA is a primary target of terrorism – The Great Satan.
- Growth in far right militia type organizations.
- The break-up of the Soviet Union.
- Religious-based terrorism.

S.W.O.T. Analysis

Doing an environmental scan and recognizing the potential threat for a community is the first step in the process. A thorough risk and threat assessment based on valid threat data must also be undertaken by the agency. This will provide direction to the agency as to the level of training and equipment that will be necessary to adequately address the threat posed. This must be constantly updated and revised as the threat of a WMD terrorist attack could shift from low probability to high probability over a period of time.

An agency must then analyze itself internally by assessing its readiness to meet an identified challenge. An internal scanning method that focuses on the agency's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (S.W.O.T.) is often an effective tool for such an assessment. The following are examples of questions and statements to consider during the S.W.O.T. analysis which will help guide the development of a preparedness plan for the use of WMD by terrorists.

Strengths

- There is strong public support due to the desire to feel safe from WMD attack.
- Collaboration with federal and state governments.
- Professionalism of staff.
- Economic support from other government agencies.
- Preparation will dispel fears by personnel.
- Many agencies have staff trained in HAZMAT response. HAZMAT protocol can be used for chemical or biological response to terrorism also.
- Large quantity of information available about WMD and preparedness.

Weaknesses

- Lack of equipment.
- Staff that do not have the expertise to respond to chemical, biological or nuclear events.
- Lack of funding to support training and equipment needs.
- Lack of expertise to provide training.
- Lack of community preparedness for catastrophic events.
- Fear by officers of responding to WMD events.
- Resource availability outside of law enforcement (shelter, food, medical etc.).
- Ability to conduct ongoing training and maintain readiness.
- Is the agency SEMS/ICS trained?

Opportunities

- Federal dollars available for equipment and training.
- Allow officers to be psychologically and physically prepared for a WMD event.
- Officers are better educated and understand what they are confronting.
- Share preparedness with the community to help ease their discomfort and fears.

Threats

- Lack of support from elected officials.
- Inability to maintain readiness after initial training and equipment acquisition.
- Given low priority by management due to low likelihood of occurrence.
- Will funding continue after initial federal dollars are used?

Formulating a Mission

Law enforcement administrators pursuing a response plan to a terrorist WMD event should formulate a mission statement that reflects the agency's vision and values. This statement will provide the direction and clarity needed in any planning process. It will:

- Define areas of operation
- Express values and beliefs
- Provide for both internal and external communication
- Be the foundation for the development of strategies, decisions and operational protocol
- It will build commitment and consistency

Implementation and Transition Management

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 or Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY97, advocated the training of first responders to deal with a WMD terrorist incident. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program began in FY97 to train first responders -- fire, police, and emergency medical technicians in 120 of the largest cities in the country.¹⁷ By the end of 1998, forty cities had received training, with the remaining cities scheduled to complete training in 2001. Each city receives \$300,000 from the Department of Defense for personal protection, decontamination, and detection equipment. The Public Health Service will also set up Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams in each of the 120 cities, as well, with each city receiving \$350,000 of equipment and pharmaceuticals for the teams. The federal government is spending an average of seven billion dollars annually to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

NLD program agencies provided the first 27 cities information and a set of questions intended to prompt city officials to examine their city's ability to respond to a WMD incident. The information included a generic list of possible terrorist targets that, if attacked, could generate mass casualties, including government facilities; commercial/industrial facilities (including financial centers, factories, shopping malls, hotels, and water supply and wastewater plants); transportation centers; recreational facilities; hospitals; and universities. The information emphasized that emergency response personnel must have the equipment necessary to protect themselves and the victims and instructed cities to determine whether their equipment was adequate in quality and quantity to perform the emergency response mission. The set of questions led the cities to identify additional equipment needs. After receiving the information and questions from federal program agencies, several of the NLD cities generated lists of sites they considered vulnerable on the basis of very general threat information or local law enforcement data. From the data reviewed on 11 cities, it was unclear whether individual WMD threats were categorized in terms of the likelihood of a successful attack on a given asset, such as a water supply system or a subway, or the severity of the consequences of an attack. Cities also established lists of equipment they believed would be needed to deal with a WMD terrorist incident without the benefit of valid threat information from the intelligence community or a formal risk assessment process using accepted analytical standards.

The agencies implementing the NLD program and other appropriate agencies should work collaboratively with NLD city officials to do formal threat and risk assessments that use validated threat data and consider the likelihood of a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack. The FBI is in the best position to take the federal lead in facilitating city-specific threat and risk assessments. The FBI, through the Attorney General, is the lead agency

for domestic terrorism crisis management. The FBI also collects, analyzes, and reports threat information on domestic origin threats and targets.

An implementation plan, or action plan, completes the overall strategic plan. Based on the recommendations of the NLD and basic disaster response protocols, the following components should be included in any agency's implementation plan. This is presented as a broad set of guidelines, as each agency's needs and scope will be unique to that agency.

- Policy
- Intelligence and Threat Assessment
- Role and Responsibilities/Collaboration
- Psychological Preparedness
- Physical Preparedness
- Community Preparedness
- Training
- Equipment
- Funding

Policy

Any strategic plan must include basic policy direction relative to response and operational procedures and protocol for first responders. Examples of critical policy areas are command structure, evacuation protocol, declaration of emergency, mutual aid, finance, sheltering and deployment. Additionally, protocols should be in place to address hoaxes, which have occurred recently and most frequently include anthrax threats. Response protocols must also address the issue of secondary devices that are designed to inflict casualties on first responders. It should be noted that first responders might be reluctant to initiate response

mechanisms to a WMD event due to the magnitude of the response. Prudence and caution represent the most appropriate response to incidents involving suspected WMD devices.

Most agencies already have operational policies in place to respond to HAZMAT incidents and bomb threats. Much of these same protocols can be used when responding to a WMD event. Wherever possible agencies should mirror existing response protocols to alleviate confusion, keeping in mind that some changes are necessary based on the weapon used.

Intelligence and Threat Assessment

Although not mandated by the NLD Act, local agencies should devise their own method of assessing risk and gathering intelligence relative to vulnerability to a WMD attack and work closely with the FBI. This will allow agencies to make informed decisions in regard to equipment needs and purchases and training. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 outline probability and severity level designations that can be used when assessing threats and vulnerability.¹⁸

Table 3.1
Probability Levels of an Undesired Event

Probability Level	Specific Event
A Frequent	Likely to occur frequently
B Probable	Will occur several times
C Occasional	Likely to occur sometime
D Remote	Unlikely but possible to occur
E Improbable	So unlikely it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced

Table 3.2
Severity Levels of Undesired Event Consequences

Severity level	Characteristics
I Catastrophic	Death, system loss, or severe environmental damage
II Critical	Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system or environmental damage
III Marginal	Minor injury, minor occupational illness, or minor system or environmental damage
IV Negligible	Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or less than minor system or environmental damage

Role and Responsibilities/Collaboration

It is critical that roles and responsibilities are delineated for all of the participants and stakeholders involved. The use of the Standard Emergency Management System (SEMS) is statutorily mandated by the State of California. This would include the use of the Incident Command System (ICS). Agencies must train and implement ICS for emergency response according to California Peace Officers Standards and Training. SEMS regulations must be used in all situations that require multiple agency or multiple jurisdictional involvement. All agencies must incorporate the use of SEMS/ICS in their strategic plans. This system provides for incident command, multi/inter-agency coordination, mutual aid systems and an operational area concept for the management and application of resources.

SEMS also provides for five levels of response; Field Response, Local Government, Operational Area, Regional and State. Planning and response to a WMD incident must include the participation of agencies at all levels of government. This would include federal agencies such as the Department of Defense Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the U.S. Army Technical Transport Unit, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Another integral partner in the planning and response to a WMD event is the medical community. Extensive research and preparation has been done to prepare medical professionals to respond and treat victims of WMD. The medical community is a valuable partner and will play a vital role in response to a WMD event.

All of the participants' roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined in any implementation plan.

Psychological Preparedness

Many times law enforcement agencies overlook training officers to be psychologically prepared to handle traumatic incidents. While law enforcement is good at following up a traumatic incident with counseling for personnel, typically officers encounter traumatic incidents without benefit of knowing what they may see and feel.

Needless to say, the use of WMD will result in numerous casualties and have the capability of causing horrific injuries and symptoms. Also, there is a high likelihood that there will be some first responder casualties among those injured or killed and law enforcement personnel must be trained and have a clear understanding that they may encounter such a scenario. There may also be a threat to family members of responding personnel depending on the location and magnitude of the weapon used. It is imperative that any implementation plans include psychological preparedness in their training.

Physical Preparedness

Physical preparedness to a response to a WMD event may require the inoculation of first responders. The military has required their personnel to receive various vaccines for chemical and biological threats. Anthrax vaccines have been given to all 2.4 million active duty and reserve troops. This was recently brought to light when a Marine refused to take the vaccine.

Agencies need to explore whether a vaccination program is necessary, or at least be prepared to provide such protection should it become necessary. This should be tied in with the risk and threat assessment performed on an ongoing basis. President Clinton is currently weighing a proposal to give anthrax vaccinations to police, fire, public health and other emergency officials in cities throughout the country.¹⁹ This would be in addition to the military.

Community Preparedness

Agencies should include, as part of their response plan, community awareness programs that will enhance the public's ability to respond to a WMD event. Law enforcement agencies do an excellent job at working with the community to fight crime and reduce victimization. A number of agencies also involve themselves in providing the public with disaster preparation information and training. The response to a WMD event could be included in natural disaster response materials and training.

Training

The key to the success of response to any disaster is training. This includes SEMS/ICS training at a multiple agency level, tabletop exercises and scenario exercises. Larger communities in particular should stage multiple casualty and WMD training at least once a year.

Individual officer training is also critical to the successful response to a WMD event. Officers must be trained in how to recognize WMD devices as a first responder and what steps to take to ensure both officer and public safety. What may appear to be a harmless device may in fact be a dispersion device. Officers also need to have a clear understanding of the physical effects of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons can create. Officers responding to chemical and biological incidents can follow many of the HAZMAT protocols currently in place.

Equipment

The United States General Accounting Office has identified over 200 equipment items that federal, state, and local officials believed would enhance their capability to respond to a WMD event.²⁰ The items are categorized by capability; basic and modest, moderate, and high. It is imperative that local agencies assess their risk before embarking on the purchase of

equipment. Federal agencies, particularly the FBI, can be of great assistance in assessing necessary levels of preparedness based on risk.

Agencies should inventory their own equipment prior to purchasing new equipment. Much of the equipment used to respond to a WMD attack is currently used for HAZMAT response. The federal government estimates that for an average city of 500,000 people, equipment costs could range from \$4.6 million for basic capability to \$43 million for high capability.²¹

While no set of equipment requirements has been defined or established for equipping local law enforcement agencies to respond to a WMD event, the InterAgency Board to the National Domestic Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of Investigation has developed a list of standardized equipment which is available to local agencies. This list can be used as a guideline when acquiring equipment to respond to chemical, biological or nuclear events. The reason for standardization is to promote interoperability between federal, state and local levels.

Funding

To adequately prepare and train for a WMD event will require the expenditure of significant funds. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 or Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY97 will provide 120 of the largest cities in the country with \$300,000 from the Department of Defense for personal protection, decontamination, and detection equipment.²² The Public Health Service will also set up Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams in each of the 120 cities, as well, with each city receiving \$350,000 of equipment and pharmaceuticals for the teams. The federal government is spending an average of seven billion dollars annually to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

There is a great deal of federal money available for agencies that pursue first responder preparedness for a WMD attack. Agencies may also look to military surplus as a means to acquire some equipment with little or no cost. Table 3.3 outlines possible equipment costs for a city of 500,000 people to respond to a WMD type event beginning with basic readiness to high readiness. This table represents a baseline and does not include some costs, such as those associated with equipment maintained as a stockpile, equipment training and certification, or some hospital and emergency medical response services.

As is clearly indicated by this table, preparation for response to a WMD terrorist event can be economically staggering. It is imperative that an agency's plan address funding issues. Such extreme costs cannot be locally funded in its entirety. Agencies must look to the state and federal level for assistance. As mentioned previously, it is also essential that agencies complete

Table 3.3
Possible costs (In Millions) to Respond to a WMD Event for a city of 500,000 Residents²³

Equipment Level	Initial Procurement Cost	Sustainment Cost Over 10 Years	Total Cost
Basic HAZMAT	\$1.3	\$3.3	\$4.6
Modest	\$5.2	\$13.1	\$18.3
Moderate	\$8.3	\$20.9	\$29.2
High	\$12.2	\$30.7	\$42.9

a sound threat and risk assessment using valid inputs from the intelligence community and other agencies. This has proven to be a successful decision making tool for prioritizing investments and will help local agencies select equipment that would provide the greatest benefit whether purchased with federal, state, or local funds.

Transition Management

As agencies begin to prepare to plan for a WMD event in their community must gain full commitment from key stakeholders in the community they serve. While there may be some

naysayers regarding the need for such extensive preparation, an organized informative approach to all stakeholders should yield a cooperative supportive response. Again, good intelligence and threat assessments will go a long way to convincing key decision-makers to choose to plan and prepare.

Law enforcement is typically looked to for leadership on issues facing a community. Law enforcement must take the lead in regard to first responder preparedness for a WMD event. This leadership role would include bringing key stakeholders and agencies together. These include, but are not limited to, hospitals, medical professionals, fire agencies, elected officials, key government agencies, and public utilities. A regional authority could be established that would link all of the key agencies and stakeholders. This authority could be charged with planning, training and equipping first responders.

Chapter IV Implications, Recommendations and Conclusions

Leadership Implications

Law enforcement leaders are charged with protecting the public and enforcing the laws of the land. They have an inherent duty to forecast potential threats and take action to mitigate those threats. Terrorism has occurred on U.S. soil. We can no longer take the position that terrorism is something that happens in foreign lands. With the advent of weapons of mass destruction and the increasing ease of access to these weapons, the threat has become real. The public places a strong trust in its law enforcement leaders. The expectation is that should a WMD event occur, law enforcement would be ready. Steps must be taken now to ensure that readiness.

Recommendations

The following general recommendations are made for law enforcement leaders wanting to plan and prepare for a WMD terrorist attack in their communities. This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, but rather a guide to getting started:

- The leader should familiarize himself/herself with information relative to the threat of WMD and terrorism in America.
- A lead department member should be appointed to begin the process of coordinating key partnerships with other local public safety agencies such as fire, medical, public works, utility companies, and other identified stakeholders.
- A risk and threat assessment should be completed with assistance from state and federal agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- A strategic plan should be developed that encompasses a unified approach, with the application of SEMS/ICS components.

- The risk and threat assessment analysis should be used to determine what level of response is required for the community (basic, modest, moderate, or high).
- Funding should be secured to meet the training and equipment needs of the risk assessment designation.
- Ongoing evaluation and assessment should be conducted to maintain a proper sense of readiness.

Conclusion

Law enforcement leaders and the American public must understand that weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, pose a serious and grave threat to the United States. These threats define a new age and reality for our country. Because of their magnitude, new strategies must be formulated to be prepared to respond and to protect the public. Successful planning and training in preparation of a WMD event will result in:

- Greater efficiency, accountability and capability for defense against and response to a WMD incident.
- Better intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of terrorists.
- Enhanced capabilities by local law enforcement to take timely and effective operational actions that could deter or prevent the use of WMD.
- A more coordinated and systematic application of resources for their intended purposes, coordinating agency efforts, and evaluating progress.

The time is now to prepare. The threat is too serious and the consequences too grave for inaction. Agencies must assess the risk to their communities and prepare. The task is monumental, requiring a great deal of resources and time. By the year 2005, law enforcement

agencies must be equipped and trained to successfully address a WMD event, or face cataclysmic results.

List of Tables

Table		Page
1.1	Chronological Summary of Incidents in the United States Between 1990-1997	5
2.1	NGT future trends summary affecting the preparedness of local law enforcement for a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction.	10
2.2	NGT future events summary affecting the preparedness of local law enforcement for a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction.	11
2.3	NGT cross impact analysis of trends and events affecting the preparedness of local law enforcement for a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction.	12
3.1	Probability Levels of an Undesirable Event	27
3.2	Severity Levels of Undesired Event Consequences	27
3.3	Possible Costs (In Millions) to Respond to a WMD Event for a City of 500,000 Residents	32

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