REGIONALIZATION: IS IT A VIABLE CONCEPT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT BY YEAR 2000?

JACK B. STORNE
COMMAND COLLEGE III
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
DECEMBER 1986

3-0048

This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in the Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

© 1986 by the
California Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Executive Summary	1
Argument for Consolidation	5
Argument against Consolidation	10
General Information	18
Overview	24
Futures Research	30
Forecasting Trends	32
Forecasting Events	34
Scenarios	46
Strategic Plan	51
Situation	51
Current Environmental Analysis	51
Analysis of Resources	55
Stakeholders/Snaildarters	57
Mission	63
Execution	65
Administration and Logistics	70
Implementation	72
Transition Management Plan	78
Planning-Strategy Development	78
Critical Mass	83
Implementation	86
Conclusion	88
References	89
Appendicies	92

TABLE OF CHARTS AND GRAPHS

	Page
Trend Evaluation Chart	35
Trend Plot Graphs	36
Event Evaluation Chart	44
Cross Impact Evaluation Chart	45
California Cities Contracting for Law Enforcement Services by Year	96
California Cities Contracting Since 1980	97
California Police Departments: Number of Personnel by Category	98
Plotting of Stakeholders	105
Planning Mode Chart	106
Commitment Planning	107

6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report on regionalization was completed for the State of California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Command College. The report is an in-depth analysis into the concept of regionalization-unification of law enforcement services. The purpose of the project is to raise the level of consciousness of the benefits, risks, and potentials of regionalizing law enforcement services. There are three main sections of information in this report.

The first section provides information on different concepts of regionalization-unification from an historical perspective. A thorough review of academic literature is presented providing the arguments and assumptions supporting the concepts of regionalization. The challenges to those assumptions and arguments against regionalization and an overview of the major concerns and considerations of regionalizing services. This section also contains information on regionalization-unification data for the United States and more specifically for the State of California. The major findings and conclusions of the academic research are presented in the close of this section.

The second section contains an explanation of the process and the findings of futuristic analysis of the events and trends which may be major factors in regionalization-consolidation. The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used to forecast 25 trends that should be monitored concerning regionalization-consolidation. There were also 21 events identified which could affect regionalizing an area. These events and trends were examined, refined, and re-defined into five major trends and events that the selected group felt were most likely to play a major role in the unification concepts.

The trends were analyzed as to their level of influence five years ago, their level of influence today, and the level of influence they may have by the year 2000. The events were analyzed as to their probability of occurrence and the expected level of impact on law enforcement. A cross impact analysis of how the occurrence of one event may affect the probability of occurrence of other events is also presented.

The second session concludes with the development of three possible scenarios involving regionalization-consolidation. The scenarios were developed using information obtained from the futuristic research. One of the three scenarios is identified as being the "most

likely" situation to occur and is used as the basis for developing strategic and management plans.

Section three contains a strategic plan for dealing with the most likely scenario and a transition management plan for effecting the desired change. The plans of this section are based on a hypothetical situation so as not to be too specific for a particular agency or setting.

The strategic plan analyzes the hypothetical situation as to the environment, the resources available, and the major players which are identified as "stakeholders" and "snaildarters". The mission of the plan is specified and alternate courses of action suggested. The administration of the plan is discussed along with suggestions for gaining necessary support to ensure the desired change can be accomplished. Points of negotiation, non-negotiation, and dealing with issues of conflict are covered in the strategic plan.

The transition management plan provides a roadmap or strategy for actual implementation of the change. The transition plan discusses obtaining support and commitment from a group identified as the "critical mass" - that group whose support will be necessary to achieve success. Each member of the critical mass is

evaluated as to their readiness for the change and their ability to cause or block the change. Suggestions are given to obtain the necessary commitment from each group member. The necessity of establishing monitoring and feedback systems is briefly covered.

The project ends with a brief discussion of the findings and conclusions of the study.

ARGUMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATION

The arguments in favor of regionalization/consolidation are numerous. Most of these arguments center around economy and efficiency increases. The pro-consolidation arguments usually will be oriented toward cities or jurisdictions which are geographically close to one another. This point is emphasized in an International City Management Association (ICMA) newsletter. The ICMA states that the geographical isolation of many small cities helps make small departments a "tolerable" situation. However, ICMA also goes on to point out that continuing urban sprawl is creating towns in which the larger jurisdictions are essential (ICMA, 1973). The older tradition of the small local departments has been to oppose the consolidation movement, rejecting the movement toward a "police state". But, in spite of the older traditions, Parsonson points out while many jurisdictions insist on local police responsibility and accountability, this insistance has "...greatly favored the criminal". He continues by stating, "...There are wide disparaties between the urban and rural areas in all phases of criminal justice administration and only voluntary cooperation between departments has prevented the criminal situation from getting 'completely out of hand'" (Parsonson, 1971).

The pro-regionalization supporters carry the urban-rural argument to include what some may consider larger cities. Wickum, in a 1986 project report, states that if all things are equal, the cities most likely to contract for law enforcement services are "small cities" and populations up to 100,000 (Wickum, 1986).

Another argument for pro-consolidation is that even though larger departments do not have as close a contact with the citizens, the satisfaction expressed by those receiving law enforcement services is not diminished. Pachon and Loverich state, "Evidence further suggests that 'if all things were equal', larger jurisdictions would produce more satisfying police services". They continue to say that the effect of size of jurisdiction (and consequently the size of a police force) is not a negative one. The differences between the metropolitan, centralized cities and the smaller departments where citizen orientation is concerned is a socioeconomic characteristic rather than a result of size differences (Pachon and Loverich, 1977).

In an article on consolidation presented to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Adams and Vito suggest specific reasons in support of centralizing police services. These authors state that con-

solidation may result in the following benefits:

1. More effective delivery of police services.
2. More efficient police services by elimination of duplication of services by several small departments.
3. Development of specialized units with unique expertise.
4. Better trained personnel.
5. Increased opportunities for officers resulting in a lower turnover rate.
6. Increased opportunity for innovation with resulting improved quality of police service.

(Adams and Vito, 1982)

Other authors support these reasons for consolidation. Pachon and Loverich (1977) claim consolidation, particularly in the public safety field, would lead to more effective and equitable provisions of services. Utilization of modern equipment and better trained and educated personnel are the reasons suggested by the ICMA (1973). Wickum, too, has similar arguments as presented below:

1. Standardization of services.
2. Increased effectiveness and efficiency.
3. Increased crime prevention.
4. Increased traffic enforcement.
5. Adequate financial support
6. Better utilization of manpower.
7. Cohesive planning to meet future needs.

Wickum also makes a strong argument in favor of consolidation where the recent "deep pocket" insurance crisis is concerned. He points out the high cost of insurance and insurance claims as a factor favoring regionalization (Wickum, 1986).

Do these arguments suggest that regionalization is, or should be, increasing? In his article on regional trends, Parsonson states:

> More and more, it is being demonstrated that the increasing number of routine police functions can be performed more efficiently and more economically on a regional basis. ... The soundness of this approach has been demonstrated in a number of areas all over the country.
>
> (Parsonson, 1971)

The concept of consolidation or regionalization is strongly supported by its advocates. However, they also point out it is not an inexpensive undertaking. In an article submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Carson and Brown claim that combining of departments can create one large and under financed department. They further state:

> So do not let anyone sell you on the idea of saving money through law enforcement consolidation. You can promise them a much more efficient operation, but adequate law enforcement is expensive.
>
> (Carson and Brown, 1970)

The point of saving little or no money is illustrated in a study where it was proposed that financing for the

regionalized law enforcement agency be obtained by each of the five California cities contributing "...100 percent of the amount appropriated in the last fiscal year..." (Adams and Vito, 1982).

To summarize the arguments in favor of consolidation or regionalization, Carson and Brown (1970) state, "Consolidation has given us the opportunity for experimentation and innovation". Wickum (1986) claims that contract law enforcement (consolidation and regionalization) is a viable alternative to law enforcement service delivery and that a large number of police departments have started a trend that will be hard to reverse - participation in regionalization. The recommendation of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was that regionalization was one of the most certain ways to improve the delivery of police services. The commission's recommendation specifically was:

> Each metropolitan area and each county should take action directed toward the pooling or consolidation of services, through the particular technique that will provide the most satisfactory law enforcement service and protection at the lowest cost.
>
> (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1968)

ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONSOLIDATION

Although there are numerous arguments in favor of regionalization/consolidation and the proclaimed or expected benefits of centralizing services, that concept is not without challenges. The arguments in favor of regionalization center around economies of scale, more equitable delivery of services and alleged efficiency. These assumptions are strongly challenged by researchers and authors who do not favor regionalization. In a report to the National Science Foundation, Ostrom, et.al., state, "The erroneous, but common, picture of metropolitan police agencies is that they are too numerous and diverse to work together". The authors continue, "Some common assumptions about department size are also erroneous. Small departments are thought to dominate service delivery, to 'waste' resources by duplicating administrative personnel, and to fail to provide complete service to the communities they serve" (Ostrom, et.al., 1977).

In another publication, these same authors point out that the arguments in favor of regionalization/consolidation are based on three assumptions and that these assumptions are "little examined". The assumptions challenged by the authors are as follows:

1. Specialization and professionalization are necessary for effective urban law enforcement.

2. That large size is necessary for specialization and professionalization.

3. Large scale departments are thought to be more efficient.

The conclusion drawn from these assumptions then are that small departments cannot provide the level of services needed and that smaller departments with lower per capita expenditures are assumed to provide inferior services (Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker, 1973).

The arguments supporting regionalization because larger departments are able to specialize, professionalize and deliver a full range of services are not as strong as they appear. In the study Ostrom, et.al., made in preparing their report to the National Science Foundation, they determined that, of the 80 metropolitan departmens studied,:

> Reliance on other agencies for auxiliary services is not limited to small departments. In fact, there is only one department in the 80 metropolitan areas producing <u>all</u> of the services we studied. With few exceptions, all direct police service producers in the 80 metropolitan areas...have arrangements with other agencies to supply them with entry level training, chemical analysis of evidence, pre-trial detention of suspected offenders, and radio communications.
>
> (Ostrom, et.al., 1977)

In the same report, these authors write that, "Duplication of police services delivery is not common. Few police agencies serving the same community act in isolation from each other". A major conclusion of their report is that regionalization/consolidation is not necessarily a "good" or desireable condition. They state, "whether or not departments should decentralize, consolidate, or remain the same will depend upon the service needs and the resources of each particular metropolitan area" (Ostrom, et.al., 1977).

A major issue that always arises when a consolidation is considered is the matter of local control. Most all communities, citizens and elected officials alike are reluctant to give up "local control" of their police forces. Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker (1973) write:

> Where mechanisms exist to insure that the policemen are responsive to citizen requirements for service, then an increase in the availability of police should lead to better service. Alternatively, if police are insulated from the needs of the citizens served, their increased presence may be perceived as a force imposed from the outside.
>
> Community control of governmental officials can be exercised both formally and informally. We postulate that greater informal communication between citizens and police contributes to greater community control of local police in the independant communities.

In a separate article, Ostrom and Whitaker (1973) write:

> Our findings strongly suggest that in the area studied, small police forces under local community control are more effective than a large city-wide controlled police department in meeting citizen demands for police protection.

This point of view is supported by Norton and Cowart (1978) who state that local communities exercised greater control over the smaller police departments. They state, "Their (small departments) small size fostered greater intimacy, community identification, public interaction and civic education". In writing about the political considerations of regionalization/consolidation, they write, "Local communities are reluctant to share control over what they consider to be their police; they fear reorganization (regionalization/consolidation) will be detrimental to service delivery...".

The issue of police responsiveness and sensitivity to the local citizens is emphasized in the service levels and "production strategies" between small and large departments. The larger departments are seen as being "task oriented utilizing specialized units and divisions of labor characteristic of "professional" departments. The small departments are seen as being patrol or service oriented and having little job specialization (Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker, 1973). As Norton and Cowart (1978) point out:

> Larger departments assert that because of their greater professionalization and specialization, they have an edge in performance over small departments. Such claims have yet to be validated scientifically. In contrast, small police units obviously remain viable, and their performance frequently seems superior.

Supporting the "small is better" concept, Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker (1973) conducted a survey of comparative levels of police services. They used citizens' direct experiences with their local police departments as well as their evaluations of police services as indicators of services provided to their neighborhoods. They looked at follow-up investigations, answering calls for assistance, speed of service delivery and relative satisfaction as measures of performance. The authors' general conclusion was, "The citizens living in the independent communities were victims of crime less and received more and better service". They also found that, "...The smaller departments were allocating somewhat more resources than the larger department, while providing higher levels of service".

In further examinations, Ostrom and Whitaker (1973) say findings from over 200 urban areas appear to support the same conclusion. They, too, conclude, "...We are beginning to gain a little more confidence in our affirmative answer to the question: Does local community control of the police make a difference?.

In examining the economic considerations of regionalization/consolidation, Norton and Cowart (1978) point out that freezing services and keeping costs down is not popular with communities if the result is poorer service or increased labor actions. They also point out that "Per capita costs (of services) are much higher in larger police departments than smaller" (Ostrom, 1976). Ostrom adds that larger departments do achieve economies in some areas such as crime lab analysis, training academies, detention facilities, but not necessarily in the bulk of police work. The implication here is that economies of scale can be a factor for certain auxiliary services but not necessarily a factor for blanket justification for regionalization/consolidation.

In a paper prepared for the Urban Affairs annual reviews, a strong challenge was made to those who support consolidation. The paper makes reference to the many task forces, commissions and "scholarly" claims that urban police forces are too many and too small. The authors claim that the consistency of that philosophy would lead one to believe that claim is empirically well documented when, in fact, it is not. They also point out that:

> ...a search of these publications for citations to specific studies establishing a negative relationship between the size of municipality of suburban police departments with service levels reveals a paucity of references.

> The most frequent form of "evidence" is a "list" of the number of police departments serving some particular metropolitan area.
>
> (Ostrom and Parks, 1973)

These authors conclude that two of the major working hypothesis used to justify regionalization/consolidation are not supported by empirical evidence. These hypothesis are:

1. An increase in the size of jurisdiction providing police services to citizens will be positively associated with higher levels of service.

2. For consistant levels of service, an increase in the size of the jurisdiction providing police services will be positively associated with lower per capita expenditures or police services.

> The major conclusion which can be derived from the analysis presented above is that proposals for the elimination of suburban police departments by consolidation are not based on firm empirical evidence.
>
> (Ostrom and Parks, 1973)

From their studies, Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker (1973) state:

1. Small police departments can provide a higher level of service than larger departments.

2. High degrees of specialization are not required for effective police services.

Concerning regionalization/consolidation of police services, Norton and Cowart (1978) caution, "...We advocate a serious rethinking of the underlying assumptions". Ostrom, et.al.

(1977), support this caution stating:

> Conventional wisdom holds that coordination and cooperation of activities can occur only under the direction of a single, overarching hierarchy. This assumption is clearly contraindicated by the experience of many of the police agencies in the 80 metropolitan areas we studied.

Those opponents of the regionalization/consolidation concepts perhaps best summarize their position with the following statement, "...Full consolidation involving the total merger of two or more police departments into one very large agency has not lived up to early expectations" (Marcus, et.al., 1976).

It is interesting to note that except the work by Wickum, 1986, and the references both supporting and challenging regionalization, date back to the late 60's and 70's.

GENERAL INFORMATION

In looking at the overall picture of regionalization/consolidation, there are many aspects to be considered in weighing the pros and cons of "becoming centralized". One must consider who stands to benefit or lose, who is the consumer and what is the market place. "An organization exists and prospers based on its capability to provide quality services that respond to the needs of the user - the citizens" (Bolas, 1981). The basic concept of regionalization/consolidation is to provide a better service to citizens. Recognizing the sensitivity of the local control issue, Morgan (1969) writes that we must accept the idea that local control must be preserved along with increasing quantity and quality of services. Morgan continues that any regionalization/consolidation being considered must benefit all concerned and there must be a commonality of interest. Consolidation of services is not a panacea for overcoming police problems, but it can provide a successful means to attack the criminal element. Consolidation does require "...a structure manned by a team of competent professionals and a community prepared to support the changes..." (Bolas, 1981).

A great deal of preparation must be considered before a regionalization project can be begun. In a final report on a coordination project involving four California Bay Area cities, Higgins and Klump (1977) point out:

> All of these major programs have required many hours of research and planning. If the project staff had not been available, then each of the cities would have been forced to devote many hours to these programs. It is doubtful whether the Chiefs of Police or the City Managers would have permitted that volume of time.

These authors point out in their report several problems encountered in the project. Celebration of holidays on different days, differing personnel rules and regulations, and establishing equitable funding formulas, to name a few. To simplify matters, the authors suggest there should be a lead city or department for control.

The stimulus for the regionalization project was the individual departments' identification of problems of mutual concern which led to a "natural cohesiveness". Another very important factor, according to the study, was each city's "contiguous geographical proximity". Even though all the right conditions seemed to exist to make the project a success, the project staff recommendations were not adopted. The reasons given were a change in the cities' demands and needs, the fact that one city became involved in a law suit with Fair

Employment Practices Commission and one city was said to have had never been "overly excited" by the project. In summary, the "project staff realized that they were 'change agents' and not always accepted by the bureaucrats" (Higgins and Klump, 1977).

Regionalization/consolidation of local government services is not uncommon. However, in a report by the Public Administration Service (1961) the special case of law enforcement is highlighted.

> However, the obstacles to coordination and consolidation of police services tend to be among the most formidable, primarily because police service is generally considered to be one of the most local of governmental services and also because even the smallest local governmental jurisdictions like to believe that they can provide at least minimal needed police services.
>
> Generally, the political and social pressures inherent in the desire for local self-government, rather than legal restrictions, militate against the coordination and consolidation of police services.

The fact that the regionalization/consolidation of law enforcement services is a "sensitive" issue is also pointed out in the regionalization of staff and auxiliary services in Snohomish County, Washington. During the study, one of the first problems encountered was a semantical problem.

> ...The word <u>consolidated</u> was freely used. This caused concern among certain citizens, since they felt there was going to be a

> regional take-over of law enforcement matters in the county. As this problem emerged, the use of the word consolidated was largely abandoned, and it was stressed that the matters under consideration involved a "cooperative effort" and all law enforcement agencies would retain their own identities.
>
> (Eastman and Chapman, 1976)

The Public Administration Service said that law enforcement regionalization/consolidation can be broken down into two major categories. First, is the area involving recruitment, selection, training, and planning which will fit well into joint actions. The second area which consists of public information, internal investigation and staff investigation (control) is better handled by each department.

> Field services are a controversial area for the implementation of coordinated and consolidated police service, primarily because such activities involve the fulfillment of basic police responsibilities that involve direct contact with the public.
>
> (Public Administration Service, 1966)

The conclusion of the Public Administration Service was that comprehensive reorganization offers the best of possibilities but is most difficult to accomplish. This point of view is supported by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which states that law enforcement is "not a very promising area" for regionalization/consolidation. The Commission does point out that

in the law enforcement field, there are certain aspects that are amenable to regionalization (Acir, 1963).

The numerous studies, reports, and attempts involving regionalization have many different values for different groups or individuals. What Eastman and Chapman (1976) say about their work appears to be very appropriate for any of the information available to the subject matter. They state:

> For the student, this work may be just another assignment, or it may provide clues to better understanding of local problems and alternative solutions to them. For the law enforcement official, the ideas may be partially unacceptable, or, conversely, they may provide avenues to resolve vexing questions. For the local government official, the text may be a blueprint to achieving greater efficiency and more effective use of existing resources. For the interested citizen, the program may appear to be just another waste of taxpayers' money or a use of money in the right direction--action toward more logical use of resources.

In reviewing the overall picture concerning regionalization/consolidation, Francis (1981) makes two clear points. First, he says:

> Many cities and towns do not want to consolidate their police departments with others to create one "super" agency. It is for this reason that sharing designated services, buildings, and equipment by more than one department can be a workable alternative to total consolidation by those communities not desiring to lose local control.

Francis' second point is:

> In light of this strong opposition [to total regionalization/consolidation and loss of control] coordination, cooperation, and sharing must be examined as alternatives to total jurisdictional consolidation of police agencies.

These points made by Francis fairly well summarize the considerations that one must look at in dealing with regionalization/consolidation. Regionalization can be beneficial if it provides better delivery of service and/or improves efficiency and economy. However, regionalization/consolidation is not cheap and there are numerous political aspects that would have to be resolved if regionalization/consolidation is to be successful.

OVERVIEW

In an effort to get a current understanding of the present status of regionalization/consolidation, several references were reviewed. In 1976, the U.S. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice conducted a survey of the then recent law enforcement and criminal justice unification, regionalization/consolidation or coordination efforts. The Institute's survey was exploratory in nature and included citations from several sources. In law enforcement, regionalization/consolidation efforts were reported by 26 states and 61 cases of unification were cited. Twenty of those cases involved regionalization/consolidation of general law enforcement services. Two of those twenty cases were planned but were not implemented. The survey gave a very brief abstract of each case but no history as to the factors involved in the success or failure of the particular cases cited (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976).

The International City Management Association reported in its 1983 Municipal Year Book on Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, there was an extensive investigation into alternative approaches including contractors, franchises, grants, vouchers, volunteers,

and self-help. There were 3,130 cities and 1,570 counties surveyed with 1,433 (46%) and 347 (24%) responses respectively. In the general law enforcement category, There were no reported cases of alternative services delivered through franchises, grants, or vouchers. Volunteerism was reported used by 9% of the agencies reporting, self-help by 5% and none reported using contracting. However, a note was made that contracting here referred to contracts with the private sector and that police powers are a power granted to governments (Harty and Valente, 1983). The implication here for regionalization/consolidation is that there is not any apparent trend toward regionalization outside intergovernmental agencies or joint powers agreements.

The author of this report has also researched the most recent data available about current trends in regionalization/consolidation as these concepts pertain to California law enforcement. Using a roster of Chiefs of Police provided by California's Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, it was determined that there are presently 85 cities that have contracted for or consolidated their general law enforcement services. Each of these 85 jurisdictions was contacted to obtain information concerning the date that its particular

jurisdiction entered into a contractural, regionalized, or consolidated agreement. The earliest record found was dated back to 1954 when the City of Lakewood, California, contracted with Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office. The most recent "consolidations" were in 1985 involving the cities of Plymouth, Loomis, and Solvang. A list of these 85 cities and the date they "contracted" is presented in Appendix I. A line graph showing how many jurisdictions unified each year from 1950 and prior through 1985 is presented in Appendix II.

A closer examination of those jurisdictions which have unified between 1980 and 1985 was made. During that five year period of time, there were 19 jurisdictions unified in some manner. Most were "contract" agreements between the city and its associated county. Of those 19 jurisdictions, seven were older cities that disbanded their police departments or went to regional service delivery. The remaining 12 jurisdictions contracted with their respective counties at the time of incorporation. A bar graph representing this information is represented in Appendix III.

In reviewing the data for California, the author did not find either a long term trend or recent trend that would suggest a growth in regionalization/consolida-

tion. With the exception of 1957, 1964 and 1978, which had 9, 7, and 8 unifications respectively, the pattern seems fairly steady over the past 35 years.

The data for ther period of time from 1980 to 1985 show there were 3 or 4 unifications each year, but on close examination, over half (63%) of those unifications occurred simultaneously with incorporation. Unification of jurisdictions between a city and county would be expected at the time of incorporation. A new city would need time to establish its predictable revenues to fund a full service police department and time to recruit, train and develop its law enforcement personnel.

Each year the California Commission on P.O.S.T. publishes information on employment data for California law enforcement. In 1985, for 356 police departments, there were 95 departments which employed between 1 and 24 personnel. Those 95 departments comprise 27% of those departments listed. These same data for 1975 indicate that of the 350 of cities listed, 156 were shown as having 1-24 personnel or 45% of the total. Appendix IV presents a table of these data.

While a decline from 45% to 27% might have indicated a decline in small community police departments, further study showed that the decline was not due to the disbanding of small departments, but was due to

growth. Of the 156 departments which had 1-24 personnel in 1975, 59 were not listed in the same size group for 1985. Fifty-one of those 59 were listed in categories of departments with over 24 personnel, 7 were found to be under contract with counties, and 2 had regionalized. It was also noted that there were 6 new departments listed in the 1-24 personnel size in 1985 that were non-existent in 1975. The net loss of departments in the 1-24 personnel size was three if one does not count those departments that grew in size. These statistics do not indicate any major trend toward regionalization/consolidation or the disbanding of small departments.

One other factor that should be considered when looking into regionalization/consolidation in California is how those cities not providing their own law enforcement services are spread out over the state. It is usual when discussing California to differentiate northern California and southern California using an imaginary dividing line approximately located along the Tehachapi mountain range in Kern County. Using this imaginary and arbitrary line, it was determined that 61 (72%) of the 85 California cities presently regionalized or under contract, were located in southern California in seven counties. The remaining 24 cities

(28%) were located in northern California in 18 counties. Southern California has by far the smallest portion of land and the most cities and highly concentrated population. Los Angeles, San Diego, and Riverside Counties alone have 47 (55%) of the 85 cities under contract. One possible reason for the high concentration in southern California is that unification of police services is very dependant on close proximity and contiguous boundaries of the unifying jurisdictions.

The overall conclusions from the research done for this project concerning the past history of regionalization/consolidation can be stated as follows:

1. The major advantages of regionalization/consolidation are claimed to be an increase in effectiveness and efficiency, savings by utilizing economies of scale, and better overall delivery of police services.

2. The obstacles that hamper regionalization/consolidation/ are primarily political and social issues involving maintaining local control of law enforcement services.

3. Sound empirical data supporting the arguments for the benefits of regionalization/consolidation seem to weak, especially financial ones.

4. The largest push for regionalization/consolidation and the major arguments against such unification of law enforcement services seem to have taken place a decade or more in the past.

5. There does not appear to be a major trend toward regionalization/consolidation at the present time. In California, the unification of services has remained stable over the past 10 years.

FUTURES RESEARCH

Upon completing the research of past and present literature, this project then undertook a study to try to predict those factors which could influence regionalization/consolidation in the future. A time span expanded to the year 2000 was used as a guideline in working with the predictions. To try to gain understanding of the dynamic factors that have a role in the regionalization/consolidation issues, a group consisting of both law enforcement and non-law enforcement members was assembled by the author. The group members were selected using the following criteria:

1. Familiarity with law enforcement and current law enforcement issues.
2. Familiarity with local government and current issues affecting local government operations.
3. Experience in the administrative or semi-professional field of work.
4. Familiarity with regionalization concepts or unification of police services.

There were eight persons selected to participate in the idea generating group. The use of eight persons was chosen following the guidelines set by Boucher (1986) in which he suggests the optimal group consists of between 6 and 10 persons.

The group consisted of the following individuals:

1. A retired Deputy Director of County Planning.

2. The administrative head of a regionalized public transit system.

3. An administrative head of a building inspection department.

4. A director of county finance.

5. A Police Lieutenant in charge of operations.

6. A Deputy Chief of Police.

7. An administrative supervisor of a county District Attorney's office.

8. A supervising county probation officer in charge of a multi-jurisdictional juvenile offender supervising office.

The group was given information obtained from the literary research and instructed to provide answers or generate ideas concerning the regionalization or unification of services.

Information was obtained using a nominal group technique (NGT). This technique involves idea generation of group members on an individual basis, recording of the ideas in a "Round Robin" fashion, then through priority selection by the group of a few main ideas. The goal of this process is to examine ideas, not to determine actuality or "truth".

Forecasting Trends

Using the NGT, the group identified 25 current trends they felt would or could influence regionalization/consolidation. The 25 predicted trends identified were as follows:

1. Computer aided dispatch systems and the availability of high technology equipment will increase.

2. Available manpower (qualified personnel) will not keep pace with increased demands for service and work loads.

3. Urban sprawl will increase.

4. Demands for services will increase.

5. Population will increase without a corresponding increase in manpower resulting in a reduction in levels of service.

6. Funding will be reduced or fail to keep pace with needs for local government services.

7. The need for support services for small agencies will increase.

8. Private sector sources will provide services now provided by local government agencies.

9. Officers' training and skill development will not keep pace with increased demands for more highly skilled service providers.

10. Demand for specialization in skill areas will increase.

11. Federal funding will be reduced.

12. There will be loss of local identity and an increased demand for consolidated services.

13. The ethnic mix in the population will change.

14. The focus of prosecution will be toward major crimes.

15. Movement toward uniformity of testing and pre-employment requirements will increase.

16. There will be loss of "personalization" in policing. Police will not relate to citizens as much on a one to one basis.

17. Local government will increase debt financing.

18. Services will deteriorate due to fiscal reasons.

19. Centralization of criminal justice information will increase.

20. Civilianization of police services will increase.

21. Public transportation systems will decline.

22. The use of federal prosecution will increase.

23. In-house employee assistance programs, i.e., peer counseling type programs will increase.

24. The demand for officers who are skilled understanding different ethnic cultures will increase.

25. The early release of prisoners due to prison overcrowding will increase.

Through the continued process of using NGT, these 25 trends were refined. The group has identified five major trends which they felt were most likely to be

factors involved in having an effect on regionalization/ consolidation. The five identified trends were:

1. There could be a general reduction of monies available to local agencies.

2. An increased demand for the delivery of services and a consequent deteriorization of available services due to population increases is likely to occur.

3. Significant advances in hi-technology equipment will occur.

4. There will be an increase in the use of civilians to perform those tasks not requiring sworn personnel.

5. Education and training of law enforcement personnel will not keep current with the progressive needs of the profession.

Using the collective projections of the individual members of the group, the author evaluated by the group the expected effect of the five trends to the year and the maximum possible effect of each trend to 2000. The relative level of each trend is given below. Each trend has also been plotted graphically.

Trend Evaluation Forms

5 Plot Graphs

Forecasting of Events

Following the forecasting of the trend and the trend analysis, the group then forecasted possible events which may affect the expected trends and which may have

TREND EVALUATION FORM

Subgroup: N=8

TREND STATEMENT	LEVEL OF THE TREND (Ratio: Today = 100)			
	5 Years Ago	Today	"Will be" in 2000	"Could be" in 2000
Continuing trend that results in reduced funding for local agencies.	$\bar{x}$=77	100	Range 125-200 $\bar{x}$=154	Range 150-400 $\bar{x}$=235
Increasing demand for the delivery of services and a consequent deteriorization of available services due to population increases.	$\bar{x}$=66	100	Range 125-200 $\bar{x}$=172	Range 175-400 $\bar{x}$=263
Significant advances in high technology equipment.	$\bar{x}$=52	100	Range 125-10,000 $\bar{x}$=1465	Range 150-10,000 $\bar{x}$=1606
Increase in the use of civilians to perform those tasks not requiring sworn peace officers	$\bar{x}$=48	100	Range 120-300 $\bar{x}$=152	Range 140-500 $\bar{x}$=218
Education and training of law enforcement personnel not keeping current with the progressive needs of the profession.	$\bar{x}$=56	100	Range 125-200 $\bar{x}$=154	Range 100-400 $\bar{x}$=209

CONTINUED TREND THAT RESULTS IN REDUCED
FUNDING FOR LOCAL AGENCIES



INCREASING DEMAND FOR THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES AND A CONSEQUENT DETERIORIZATION OF AVAILABLE SERVICES DUE TO POPULATION INCREASES



SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT



INCREASE IN THE USE OF CIVILIANS TO PERFORM
THOSE TASKS NOT REQUIRING SWORN PEACE OFFICERS



EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
NOT KEEPING CURRENT WITH THE PROGRESSIVE NEEDS OF THE PROFESSION



an effect on regionalization/consolidation rates. The group again used the NGT to identify which events may play a major role in regionalization/consolidation.

There were 21 possible events originally identified by the group. These events were as follows:

1. Federally mandated accreditation of law enforcement officers.
2. Collapse of the U.S. monetary system.
3. Counties consolidation of circuit courts into one central system.
4. Major economic recession - depression.
5. Major physical disaster - earthquake.
6. Development of major industrial areas or sports complexes.
7. Major reform in taxation.
8. Major legislation limiting compensation and benefit packages.
9. County reduction of services to local agencies.
10. Increase in state sales tax.
11. Major political problem in Mexico.
12. Change in California's bond rating.
13. Legislation making regionalization/consolidation a more viable option.
14. Change in federal political power.
15. Federal or military involvement in law enforcement activities.
16. Drastic cut in costs of high-technological equipment.

17. Loss of funding or change of benefit philosophy by welfare programs.

18. Resurgence of organized crime.

19. Major influx of aliens.

20. Increase in terrorist activity.

21. Drastic change in weather patterns.

Using the NGT process, again the group refined, redefined these 21 events, and five major events were identified as being the most likely events to affect regionalization/consolidation. The five major events are:

1. A major recession or depression in the nation's economy. This event is estimated to have a 42% probability of occurring by 2000.

2. A major disaster, natural such as earthquake or man made such as nuclear disaster. The estimated probability of this event is 76% by the year 2000.

3. A major change in political power with a corresponding change in philosophy of dealing with criminal justice matters. Estimated probability of occurrance by 2000 is 77%.

4. Collapse of the United States' monetary system. Estimated probability is 27%.

5. Development of major sports complexes or industrial development such as the Superconducting Supercollider. Estimated probability by the year 2000 is 58%.

These five events, their probability and net impact are presented in summary form in the event evaluation chart below.

Event Evaluation Chart

A cross impact evaluation was done on these events and an effort made by the group to assess the effect that the occurrance of an event may have on the probability of other events. The cross impact evaluations are presented in the following chart:

Cross Impact Evaluation Chart

The author of this project believes that a few comments should be made concerning the trend and event forecasting process and results. The NGT process calls for the soliciting of trends and events from group participants without critical comment. Some of the trends and events as presented in first round of recording seem not to be related to the regionalization/consolidation issue in any significant manner. The "round robin" recording was specifically done to solicit ideas which come from the group and which may have been of value in examining the regionalization/consolidation issue. After the trends and events were reviewed and narrowed to five each, there was still some question in the author's opinion as to the relevance of some of the items as they pertain to regionalization/consolidation. However, the identified trends and events are the product of the group, obtained as specified using the NGT and will be the basis for scenario development.

EVENT EVALUATION FORM

EVENT STATEMENT	PROBABILITY		NET IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCE-MENT (−10 to +10)
	By 1990 (0—100)	By 2000 (0—100)	
Major recession or depression in nation's economy	21%	42%	5.4
Major disaster, natural such as earthquake or man made such as nuclear disaster	52%	76%	3.3
Change in political power and corresponding change in philosophy in dealing with criminal justice matters	45%	77%	1.8
Collapse of United States' monetary system	7%	27%	4.6
Development of major sports complexes or industrial development such as the superconducting supercollider	36%	58%	5.5

CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION FORM

Suppose that this event actually occurred ..... with this probability ..... How would the probability of the events shown below be affected?

		1	2	3	4	5
1	42%		0	86.4	79.3	97.9
2	76%	19.3		27.9	22.1	63.6
3	77%	51.4	5.7		42.1	51.4
4	27%	98.6	2.9	95		98.4
5	58%	30.7	7.1	30	27.1	

SCENARIO

In order to provide an adequate insight into the future of regionalization/consolidation, three scenarios are presented below. These scenarios are descriptions of what future events may be and are not intended as predictions of what actually will be. The scenarios were developed using a combination of information obtained in the literary research and futures research using the idea generation group and NGT process.

Scenario "A"

The year is 1995. Recent trends have indicated that there is a continuing increase in the use of civilians to perform non-critical law enforcement jobs. The delivery of services by the civilians has proven to be at an acceptable level.

In recent elections, two small communities have experienced a change in a majority of their five member City Councils. The cities are located in the southern region of the Imperial Valley. One city has a population of 10,000, the other city has 8,500 residents. The cities are in the same county and separated by 15 miles.

With the new Councils in power, there has been a change in philosophy from an older more conservative position to an innovative more liberal position. The

cities are looking into the possibility of developing a southern Imperial sports complex and are hoping to attract a major league basketball team to the area.

If the complex is successful, there will be continued rapid growth causing increased demands for services from the local law enforcement agencies. The two cities have decided they will unite their two police departments and also would like to form a special "police district" to service the two cities as well as the unincorporated area between the cities. The unincorporated area is where the complex is planned.

Scenario"B"

The year is 2000. In the past decade, there has been a major shift in priorities of the use of federal, state and local funding. The influx of aliens, unemployment and general nature of social welfare programs has resulted in cutbacks of funding for law enforcement, public works and capital improvement services. Local law enforcement agencies have not received increases in funding to permit keeping up with expenses. The education and training funds once available for full service training, are gone. State P.O.S.T. programs have limited reimbursement for funding of basic academies and occasional update training classes. The education,

training level and professional standards expected of police officers in the past have not kept pace with the needs for today's delivery of services.

In the central valley of the State of California, there has been an increase in the number of small cities (population under 7,000). The fiscal base of these cities, which was once agriculture, is now a combination of agriculture, light-to-moderate industry and commerce. In the central San Joaquin valley, there are six cities of similar size (5,000-7,500 population) located in a 25 mile radius. These six cities are also located in three counties.

Late last fall there was a major earthquake along the central valley's San Andreas Fault which caused heavy damage to one of the cities similar to the damage of the Coalinga, California, earthquake. Last winter another city experienced moderate damage along its northwestern border due to severe winter storms and consequent flooding. These naturally occuring, damaging events have severely affected the financial solvency of these cities. In one instance, the entire infrastructure must be replaced or repaired, in the other, the loss of a large commercial area has severely affected tax revenue.

The demands for law enforcement services have been tremendous for these two cities and they have needed to

call on the state and county for mutual aid several times. The other four cities have been strained, too, due to the increased demand for services associated with growth problems.

There had been talk a year ago about moving toward unifying law enforcement services among these cities, and the concept was still being considered when the disasters hit. There was strong opposition to making "one big police department" due to local control issues, yet financing each department is becoming more and more difficult.

Scenario "C"

The year is 1990. There has been a steady decline in funding to local governments from state and federal subventions. The national economy is experiencing a fairly substantial recession, the United States dollar has begun to decline on the international market.

The stress of the changing economy is adversely affecting small cities and the rural counties. Hardest hit are the non-enterprise public services such as recreation programs, fire protection services and law enforcement services.

In the extreme northern counties of California, the small cities and rural counties are very dependant on agriculture and the lumber industries for fiscal

security. The recession has drastically reduced building and agricultural expansion. The import markets, too, have hurt both industries.

The two west coast northern counties and the adjoining counties to the east have met and decided to undertake a feasibility study to regionalize auxiliary services. There is talk of including joint recruitment and training to establish a manpower pool, joint purchasing for economies of scale, and creating a central records center available by access through hi-tech equipment. Communications and detention facilities are not being considered due to the distances involved.

Of these three scenarios, the author believes the most likely scenario or some version similar to Scenario "B" could occur. For the purposes of this project, Scenario "B" will be used to develop a strategic plan and transition management plan.

STRATEGIC PLAN

Situation

1. Current Environmental Analysis

In the central valley of the State of California, there are presently six cities considering some type of unification of their law enforcement services. The cities do not share contiguous boundaries but are located within a 25 mile radius. The six cities are located in three independant counties with contiguous boundaries.

The six cities share similar types of financial base. At one time, they were all supported by their nearby agricultural farms. The picture today has changed in that there has been a large influx of persons coming to the area to find relief from urban-metropolitan living. Along with the population increase, commercial development has increased and light to medium manufacturing has increased. No longer are these six communities isolated rural agriculture dependant cities. They now have a financial base comprised of commercial, agricultural and industrial support.

As is typical of small communities, the cities are all general law cities governed by Mayor/Council legislative bodies and managed by city managers/city adminis-

trators. Also, typical, in these cities there is a strong identification of the "city fathers" and citizens in the communities with each of their respective cities and the individual uniqueness of each city.

One of the usual services that each city would be expected to defend as "their own" is their law enforcement service. The crime rates for these cities are relatively low compared to metropolitan standards and the small cities are perceived by a majority of their residents as "safe". Whether or not it is an accurate assumption, the credit for the communities being safe is given to the individual police departments and their respective Chiefs of Police.

There is also strong identification and association between the local citizens of each community and the members of the police departments. Both the local legislative bodies and the individual citizens believe there is a strong sense of "local control" over their police departments. The Chiefs are readily available to the citizens to discuss problems and/or receive complaints. The officers, for the most part, are residents in their own cities and spend the "off duty" time, leisure time, etc., in local activities. There is a feeling of cohesion between the police and the community.

The general picture of "all is well" where law enforcement services are concerned is well deserved in these small communities; however, the static status quo of peacefulness has been challenged during the past decade. There have been several threats to the peaceful picture. The local funding for the law enforcement services has been threatened due to the trend of federal and state monies being allocated more and more toward social welfare programs, primary and secondary education, and to programs oriented toward benefiting protected classes of people, i.e., aliens, minorities, etc. The funding once realized by law enforcement services has not received increases comparable to inflation rates or the needs of law enforcement as perceived by law enforcement administrators.

As a consequence, education, training, and financial support for law enforcement has not kept pace with the needs as perceived by municipal governments. The need for highly skilled officers trained in legal matters, multi-cultural understanding and the ability to keep up with technological changes has become acute. The ability of small departments to meet that need has been and is being challenged, and their ability to deliver services effectively is threatened.

Added to these challenges and threats have been the occurrences of recent events which adversely affected some of the cities involved. A major earthquake and flooding from an unusually wet winter have caused major damage to infrastructures and abilities to provide non-law enforcement services. Funds have had to be taken from wherever possible to repair and rebuild. Law enforcement funding has been further reduced at the local level during the crisis.

Under consideration has been the unification of law enforcement services. This change, too, has been a threat. The local citizens realize that the effective services they have enjoyed and the local control they have had are threatened. They also realize that in order to continue to receive effective law enforcement service there must be some change in their ability to provide for the services.

Not only are there threats, but opportunities as well. Through unification there is an opportunity for innovation, better financial support (possibly) and an opportunity to strengthen the law enforcement services delivered to the communities. Opportunities and threats are both realities in the present environment. Much of what happens will depend on how unification is approached,

what form it takes and if the idea can be presented to the communities in such a way as to be acceptable. The challenges presented by the environment are declining financial support, increasing demands for professionalism, local control issues, and the need to continue providing safe communities.

2. Analysis of Current Resources

An analysis of current resources must be made to clearly identify the strengths and weaknesses of the agencies, persons (both law enforcement and non-law enforcement) and finances involved in considering unification of services.

In identifying the current resources for the cities and police departments, one must consider the persons involved, their ideas, their concerns and desires. Within the police departments, there are no formal organizations or unions. As such, the major resources there are the individual officers themselves. This includes management and line personnel. Where the police departments are concerned, the officers, while the only source of internal information, provide the best source of information as they are the ones involved in the daily performance of the job.

Outside the police department, the main source of information comes from other departments' personnel,

allowing a "big picture" perspective. These others, especially the finance/purchasing and administrative departments, see the police department not as the epicenter of the cities, but as functioning arms of the government. As well as seeing the police department in its proper perspective, these branches of the city government are a most valuable source of information when it comes to future forecasting of the financial, planning, or operational needs.

Finally, the members of the community, i.e., business, political, social, or service groups, etc., must be sought out for their input to insure that the direction of the departments is consistent with the desires of the communities they protect.

In order to analyze the current status of the agencies involved, a capability analysis: Rating 1, was prepared. This rating indicates the overall rated capability for all agencies involved. Individual agencies may vary from the joint rating on a given item but the rating was prepared with the intent of gaining a general picture of the agencies in the present environment. The Rating I analysis is presented in Appendix V.

In order to assess the departments' abilities to change, a separate capability analysis: Rating 2, was

completed. The rating, as in Rating 1, is on all departments as a whole. If change is possible, there must be flexibility and willingness to change. Rating 2 analysis is presented in Appendix VI.

The ratings indicate that presently the departments involved share a good image, have better than average personnel (both management and line), have a good attitude but low morale due to present problems, and have average skills and flexibility. The departments suffer from lack of technologies, specialization, poor pay and benefits, and may be faced with a feeling of crisis where growth, financing and training are concerned. The departments' ability to change to meet specified strategic needs is seen as good in the areas of increasing professionalism and service delivery but poor in changing local control. There is a perceived strong resistance to the loss of or change in local control where the community and citizens are concerned.

3. Stakeholders/Snaildarters

In evaluating this plan and doing the analysis of the situation, one must carefully examine persons and groups which can be considered as having an influence and exerting some power on the issue. These persons would be identified as those who have a "stake" in the

direction the issue goes and in the outcome of final decision. Therefore, the name "stakeholders" is given to these persons or groups. Another set of persons or groups to be dealt with which is less influential and less powerful but who could have either a positive or negative effect on the issue has been named "snail-darters". When identifying the stakeholders and snail-darters, there are assumptions made as to what extent each may support or oppose unification. The stakeholders and the assumptions about their support/opposition to regionalization/consolidation are as follows:

Stakeholders	Assumptions
Law Enforcement	
1. Police Chiefs	Mixed reactions
2. Police Supervisor	Cautious support
3. Police Officers	Mixed reaction
4. Police Associations	Opposition
Local Government	
1. Mayors and Elected Officials	Mixed reactions
2. City Managers	Cautious support
3. Fiscal Officers	Support
4. Other departments	Mixed reactions
5. County Board of Supervisors	Support
Courts	
1. Local	Support
2. State and Federal	Mixed reactions
Educational Institutions	
1. P.O.S.T.	Support
2. Private Providers (in-service)	Cautious Support
3. Public Providers (academies)	Mixed reactions
4. Local Public Schools/Districts	Oppose

Community Groups	
1. Home Owner's Associations	Oppose
2. Service Clubs	Mixed reactions
3. Political Activist Groups	Mixed reactions
4. Residents	Mixed reactions to opposition

Within each groups of stakeholders identified, one could point out several other stakeholders of a minor nature. The identified stakeholders are grouped above for brevity. The following discussion is intended to provide some insight to the expectations of each group of stakeholders.

1. Law Enforcement

The Chief of Police is the primary stakeholder in this group. The Chiefs are usually long time members of the community and are considered powerful people. The Chief could lose a lot of political power if unification meant disbanding of his/her department. The Chief is assumed to want to protect his/her position and work to insure that police employees would be well cared for regardless of what type of unification occurred.

Police supervisors would maintain a somewhat more secure position and would more likely support unification than strongly oppose. They could expand their span of control and realize more opportunities.

Police officers would vary in their support of unification. More opportunity would be accompanied by

more challenge and responsibility. Police associations are assumed to oppose any change in that some unifications could lead to the dissolution of associations.

The law enforcement group would be a very important group to content with if a change were to take place.

2. Local Government

Mayors and elected officials are assumed to vary in support depending on their perceptions on maintaining or losing local control.

City Managers and fiscal officers would be expected to support a unification, expecting to realize some fairly substantial fiscal relief from economies of scale. The City Managers could also be faced with loss of local control, however, and would have to deal with the issue politically.

County boards of supervisors are assumed to support a unification as it would not reduce their control and could provide services for some county residents or county law enforcement activities. The centralization of courts and district attorneys services could reduce expenses.

3. Courts

Courts are assumed to support unification because it would probably centralize court services.

4. Educational Institutions

P.O.S.T. is assumed to support unification due to centralization of needs and services. Local school districts would be expected to oppose unification due to loss of local intimate contact with police services. In-service agencies and academies are assumed to support if they do not perceive a loss of opportunities to continue to be providers.

5. Community Group

These groups would be expected to have the second largest impact on the issue as stakeholders. Homeowners' associations and residents could strongly oppose unification if they felt there would be a loss of personal contact with their police. If unification meant "one big department" with most officers being unknown to the residents, it is assumed to be seen as a threat.

Service clubs are assumed to be mixed in support of unification. If there were close contact with police, they probably would oppose it. If there were not close contact, there could be some support as long as the clubs did not perceive unification as meaning loss of local control or anonomity.

Political activist groups are assumed also to be mixed in their support of unification. Conservative and traditional groups would probably oppose loss of

"their" police department. The more liberal groups may expect innovation and opportunity from change and thus support unification.

The snaildarters identified with the unification issue and assumptions about their positions are as follows:

Snaildarters	Assumptions
Law Enforcement	
1. Reserves/Volunteers	Oppose
2. Civilian Employees	Mixed reactions
Local Government	
1. Planning Boards/ Commissions	Weak support
2. County Administration	Support
3. Special Districts	Mixed reactions
4. Recreation Groups	Oppose
Community Groups	
1. Neighborhood Watch Groups	Oppose
2. Local Advisory Boards	Mixed
3. Taxpayer's Associations	Cautious support
4. Churches	Mixed
Media	
1. Local	Mixed
2. Regional	Cautious support

A plotting of stakeholders and snaildarters and the assumptions about their support are given in Appendix VII and VIII respectively. The plotting shows the relative importance of each identified stakeholder or snaildarter and the relative certainty of predicting their assumption.

The above situation fairly accurately describes the environment in which this plan must be implemented.

Mission

The first goal of this plan is to examine the mission of unification appropriate to law enforcement agencies at the macrolevel, that is, the entire six-city region. Second, the mission must be examined at the microlevel, or, in light of what must be considered for each city locally.

It is the mission of law enforcement to provide for the protection of lives, and property of the citizens and to provide a safe and healthy community in which to live, work, attend school, and share recreational and leisure activities. This protection is accomplished through enforcement of local ordinances and state laws, and by apprehending violators and assisting in their prosecution in court. In addition to the above general mission of law enforcement, the local departments are afforded special opportunities for community activities due to the size of the cities, the good working relationship with the city's people, and the relatively low crime rates. The departments have become heavily involved in providing public relations programs including child safety programs, community safety programs, firearms and hunter safety courses, etc. These programs

have become built into the departments' mission.

In addition to providing sound, economical and efficient law enforcement services, the departments must orient themselves to a dynamic, changing field of public safety. The reason this orientation becomes important is to prepare the police departments to cope with and adjust to the increasing pressure of a dynamic society. The departments must develop pro-active programs for adequately facing possible future trends and changes. The departments should not allow themselves to be put into a position of reacting to pressure but take a public safety leadership role in dealing with the changes. Such a mission should be viewed as a necessary and positive role.

Where the possibility of unification exists, the mission of the departments will be to review the current resources, roles, programs and determine what exists now and what is needed. Obstacles that need to be overcome must be identified, priorities set, key ideas and determined, possible solutions discussed, goals set, responsibilities identified and assigned, and in general, a tentative "game plan" devised. Once this part of the mission is accomplished, the continued mission will be to monitor the "game plan" for changes and to continue to forecast future changes. The departments must con-

tinue to prepare themselves to deal effectively with the changing times and pressures.

In any unification plan, the special opportunities of these small cities, i.e., public safety programs, maintaining a low crime rate and close contact with local citizens must be a primary concern if the change is to be effectively executed.

Execution

1. Alternate Courses of Action

   A. The six cities and three counties that are geographically involved in the area under study could decide to create a special police district or region that would encompass the cities and unincorporated parts of the county lying within the given 25 mile radius. This alternative would be the creation of the "one big department". It would be necessary to create a governing body and realign the administration of law enforcement portions of the county within the district.

   B. The cities involved could disband their individual police departments and contract for full law enforcement ser-

vices from their respective counties. Contracting would be a more traditional approach to consolidation of services and would have a large volume of research and reference material available.

C. The six cities could decide to regionalize some of the services, usually referred to as auxiliary services and maintain their own individual departments to deliver "front line" or field services. Auxiliary services to be considered for regionalization could include recruitment, training, purchasing, record keeping and communications.

2. Recommended Course of Action

The first consideration to be given toward unification of services in the case of the six cities cited above would be whether or not there is a practical value in savings, delivery of services and political acceptance. One need to consider carefully is that the six cities do not share a contiguous boundary as is usually the case in areas where unification and consolidation are common. If a unified effort is perceived as practical,

considering the geographic location of the cities, the distance separating the cities and the political implications of unification, the recommended courses of action would be alternate number three. This recommended course of action is chosen because it offers the best consistency between the elements identified in the discussion of the environment, the resources available and in keeping with the overall mission of providing local public safety. Alternate A, the "one big department" concept, would threaten police administration and reduce local control. Alternate B would, in fact, disband the small departments and drastically reduce, if not eliminate, local control. Local control is promised and worked toward in contracting; however, any services delivered by the county would have to be provided within the scope and control of county rules and regulations. These first alternatives are seen as possible but not practical for the given circumstances.

To implement alternate number three, the following steps must be taken:

1. Establishment of a governing body that will eventually have policy and direction/control of the regionalized services. This body must believe in and support the concept of regionalization. The governing body should include at least one member from each affected city.
2. Election of a spokesperson or leader of the body from within the members of the group. This individual should have the trust and confidence of other members of the group.
3. Appointment of an administrative or executive leader for the management and day to day operation of the regional agency. This individual would be responsible for staffing the necessary jobs within that agency.
4. Bringing both governing body and staff together, carefully outlining expectations of both, and defining the relationship of each to the other, including specifying powers granted to and limitations placed on each group. The method of functioning, of providing effective communication links and of establishing social-political relationships for both groups would be a very

important step in this process.

5. Establishment of advisory committees for each of the special auxiliary services to be provided by the regional agency. These committees would not have power or authority to dictate policy or control but would serve to provide recommended guidance and direction to staff and the governing board. These groups would be technical in nature and would have to have a working understanding of their areas of advisory responsibility.
6. The governing body and administrative staff would then review present status of the services to be regionalized, identifying what each department was presently doing in the respective areas. The future direction and needs of the regional agency would be established.
7. With a clear picture of needs of the region, the establishing of roles and power or spans of control and a solid analysis of resources available, a Joint Powers Agreement would be drawn up and entered into by all affected parties. The Joint Powers Agreement would

specify the rights and responsibilities of control, function, fiscal support, etc., for each involved city.

8. Selection and training of operational staff for the regional agency.
9. Selection and installation of capital supplies necessary to carry out the regionalized functions.
10. Training and briefing of the "consumers" of the functions who will be using the provided services.
11. Establishment of an implementation calendar for the agency to become operational.
12. Provision of feedback system for all involved cities to insure that complaints, problems, and needed changes are dealt with quickly and efficiently.
13. Throughout this entire process, a public relations program through the media and through various citizen contacts to work at "selling" the regionalization of services to the communities as a whole and to the consumers.

Administrations and logistics

Support for implementating the recommended course

of action would primarily be needed from administrative sources. The governing body and staff would have to believe in and work toward "selling" the regionalized concept to the intended users. To enlist their support, Chiefs of Police and other police administrators would have to be included in the planning and research phases of the project in order for them to share "ownership" of the regional agency.

Proper and effective administrative support is seen as the key to success or failure of the project. The support of the stakeholders who are not directly or administratively involved in regionalizing of the services would have to be won. The winning of their support would be primarily an administrative responsibility.

The logistic support needed to carry out the recommended course of action appears to be fairly routine. Each affected participating city would have to pay its fair share based on use and need. The logistical support where revenues are concerned can be assumed when a given city enters into the Joint Powers Agreement. The Joint Powers Agreement would specity what support is expected from each participant.

One problem concerning logistics that would have to be addressed is insuring economy. Economy is seen as being a major factor for unifying auxiliary services.

The research cited above indicates that increased economy from unification is often questionable. Support for sound fiscal management is a must if unification is to be a success.

Planning System

The author, in an attempt to determine which planning system to utilize in dealing with the implementation of alternative number three, analyzed the present environment for turbulance and visibility. A planning mode chart was utilized to plot measures of these two variables, and a planning system of "issue planning" was determined the most appropriate system. Appendix IX shows the planning mode chart. The issues to be addressed by planning should be forecast to the best of the staff's ability. The important feature of this type of planning system would be the timely and accurate forecasting of emerging issues. Special issues would be dealt with on a demand-need basis, similar to a surprise/signal planning system.

Implementation

In order to implement the strategic plan, there would have to be some decisions made as to the specific value of the points which are negotiable and the points which are not. Since the plan was developed by a governing body, control of the plan should be kept by this body

and not given over to some outside participants.

The major points for implementation of this plan is to initiate the recommended course of action, which is alternative number three, to select an administrative head, and to form advisory groups to monitor futuristic trends, make predictions, and "assist" in planning. The selection of alternative number three should be followed; however, some negotiation could be had with advisory groups as to the scope of their involvement.

There are some points which should not be open to negotiation and a discussion of these points would emphasize their logic. The first point not negotiable is that of major control remaining with the governing body that developed the plan. The plan would have continuity and could best accomplish its intended purpose if controlled by the persons who developed the plan. If control were given to another authority, the direction and effectiveness of the plan might be jeopardized.

A second non-negotiable point would be tied very close to the first: the formal recognition of an appointed administrator. This individual should be associated with law enforcement administration to keep a practical, realistic orientation to regionalization

policies. It must also be an individual who can affect change where needed. No value would be had by having a director who could not affect needed change.

Other non-negotiable points (though not necessarily as important) would be as follows:

1. Certain members of the advisory groups would have to be persons familiar with the service provided for which they are advising. It should also be clearly specified that they were, in fact, members of an advisory group and not policy makers or directors.
2. Very specific training guidance and direction should be provided to the advisory groups. Accurate forecasting, planning and goal definition do not occur naturally but through a concentrated effort and through well directed training.
3. Finally, it should be a non-negotiable aspect that any feature of the plan be viewed as a guideline and not a rule. A plan should be flexible and should be amendable to fit a dynamic environment.

There are also some points on implementing the plan that would be negotiable. The definition of issues the

groups would deal with and the method of their functioning would be negotiable. The expertise of individual members may also be considered in negotiations. Lay people in law enforcement or persons with little previous exposure to law enforcement issues or political processes may be seen as valuable group members.

One of the large stakeholders that would have to be considered would be members of the police associations. Initially, opposition would be expected from this group. The Peace Officers Associations would be expected to see the plan as a deviation from traditional policing. The plan would be, in fact, a non-traditional approach. In negotiating with this stakeholder, it is anticipated that their agendas would deal primarily with new methods or enforcement philosophies. These agendas could include a feeling that the administration may be giving up control of the departments. The Peace Officers Associations would be looking at their Memorandums of Understanding, increased compensation for what they may feel would be more work, more record keeping or documentation and a lessening of their traditional power. It is expected that the police associations would not negotiate on matters of span of control of the departments or administrators, and would not negotiate on

enforcement philosophies which vary from the traditional "way we used to do it".

The police associations can be expected to negotiate for a better deal with their Memorandums of Understanding or compensation plans, their influence, who may be suitable members of the advisory boards and for updated training programs.

Another important and powerful stakeholder to deal with would be the citizens of the community. This group is a vocal group that would probably be a front line group working with the governing body. In negotiating with this group, one could expect them to be sensitive to time lines, a "do it now" approach, a "we needed this a long time ago" approach, or a "we need more" attitude. They might be expected to try to negotiate for influence with the governing body, but they should not negotiate on whether or not they have representation on the advisory groups.

There is expected to be flexibility in this group where selection of a director is concerned, as to which parties might serve on the advisory groups and as to methods and amount of feedback which is received from <u>other</u> stakeholders. Their primary interest here would be insuring their own feedback mechanisms.

To negotiate the acceptance of this plan, a strategy would have to be developed for implementation which would hopefully foster the acceptance of the plan with as little changing as possible. To this end, it would be suggested that negotiations be started from a positive position of strength. The benefit to all involved would have to be clearly emphasized. The governing body would have to show the benefits and make sure to minimize any threat. The administration would have to enter negotiations knowing most of all the potential sources of conflict and prepared to resolve the differences.

Issues of conflict, as they arise, would have to be clarified to insure everyone is considering the same points. The costs of agreement to each party must be fully recognized and minimized or justified. By being fully aware of each of the parties' (stakeholders') agendas and through a process of active listening and accurate reflection, a win-win approach should be sought by all involved. Once there is a basic agreement as to the issues involved, differences resolved or at least negotiated to compromise, and a unity of purpose and direction established, the plan would be ready for implementation and the process begun.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN

If a unification of auxiliary services were to take place and the strategic plan implemented, the changes involved would be both physical and emotional. There would be a centralization of physical facilities for records and communication, and centralization of personnel recruitment and training facilities. Emotionally, many employees of the cities could be working for a new employer - "the regional agency", or could be laid off in a worst case situation. The transition from the present state to the future state should be managed with purposeful direction and planning. In order to accomplish the transition as easily as possible, the following transition management plan would be suggested.

Planning - Strategy Development

Planning is the development of a process or a "roadmap" to enhance the change from the present to the future. In the case of the six cities which would be undertaking the regionalization of their auxiliary services, there would be certain critical events or incidents that must occur to effect the change. Several of these critical events are discussed in the strategic plan under the recommended course of action. In addition to those listed in the strategic plan, there would be

several events that must occur if the transition were to be successfully smooth. These additional events would include the following:

1. Obtaining support from those most closely affected by the change.
2. Obtaining commitment from those involved in operations of the regional agency to make the change work. Participants/workers must be shown how work loads would be equalized, possibly reduced by regionalization and how efficiency in time and money might be realized.
3. Changing the commitment of those who would resist or block the change to a commitment at least to let the change happen or even to help the change occur. These resistive parties would have to be assured that those aspects of the change perceived as threats could at least be low cost and at best be opportunities for gain. This assurance would have to be well documented through careful study and presented as win-win compromises.
4. Gaining commitment of the consumers of the service. Police administrators would

have to be shown the value of pooled resources for recruitment and training. Field officers would have to be assured that the time for records and/or warrant checks would be decreased and, more, that a regionalized service would provide more comprehensive checks than the present state.

5. Obtaining citizen commitment to the plan. A positive media campaign, several community contacts through service clubs, schools and councils/boards should be arranged.

In addition to these critical conditions, an explicit, but realistic time sequence for reaching various milestones should be set. Progress should be predictable and demonstrated. The planning strategy should also be adaptable. Contingency plans should be developed to deal with the unexpected obstacles or enhancements that would always occur during a major transition.

As part of managing transition, a clearly defined governance plan would need to be specified. This need, too, was discussed in the strategic plan. The transi-

tion state would be a unique state unlike the past or future ones requiring close attention and unique management. During the transition state, management of the regional day-to-day operations would have to occur and management of the transition itself would offer challenges. There could be no perceived weakness of the managers during this important time.

The governance plan, as suggested in alternate number three, specifies a policy-making board to establish policies, directions and allocations of resources. A manager, director, or chief executive officer would be responsible for day-to-day operations, staffing and control of resources. Advisory bodies made up of persons with technical and political strengths would help direct the regional agency as far as the individual auxiliary services are concerned. There would have to be a specified hierarchy which clearly defines roles and expectations of those involved. Power struggles during the transition phase would be seen as weakness and could very well damage the chances for the success of the regional agency.

Provisions for obtaining commitment and loyalty of "natural" leaders would be a must. The influence of this informal group would be very powerful. Natural

leaders should be identified as early as possible and where possible given tasks, duties or responsibilities that can influence the positive directions of the regional agency. Natural leaders should be closely monitored for the commitment and loyalty to the regionalization success. If they become disenchanted or frustrated, their natural leadership can be a large obstacle to success. Contingency plans for dealing with the disenchanted natural leader should be developed.

Provisions would also have to be made for dealing with the trusted colleagues and confidents of the regional agency's manager. These individuals, too, would have high organizational influence and this influence could be used to help the agency through its transition phase, or - conversely - could hurt it.

Another very important part of the planning or strategy development phase of the transition management plan would be the development of a commitment plan. It has been mentioned above that commitment of specific individuals or groups would be necessary for success. The commitment plan is a strategy devised to obtain support of key individuals or groups that have been identified as critical to the success of the region. These individuals are referred to as the critical mass.

The critical mass for the success of regionalization of auxiliary services for the six cities would be identified as follows:

1. Police Chiefs
2. Mayors - Council members
3. City Managers
4. Police officers
5. Homeowners' groups
6. County administrators
7. Media - local editors
8. Employee groups

An evaluation of the readiness and capability of each of these individuals or groups to support the change to regionalization of auxiliary services is presented in the readiness/capability chart, Appendix X. Once the readiness/capability of each is determined, their present commitment to the change and the desired commitment of each would have to be evaluated. A commitment planning chart of the present to desired commitment for each is given in Appendix XI.

To achieve the change from the present level of commitment to the desired level of commitment, there are certain action approaches that can be used. The following approaches would be recommended to change the commitment level of each member of the critical mass.

1. Police Chiefs. To raise their level of commitment from "help change" to "make change happen", a combination approach would use educational activities (awareness raising) and would explain their very important function as role models.
2. Mayors/Council Members. No change is needed. However, an action approach would consist of a monitoring - feedback system to pick up any warning signs of loss of commitment.
3. City Managers. Change level of commitment from "help happen" to "make happen" by changing rewards. Point out potential savings, expected success and possibility of additional available resources if the regional agency is success. City Managers should be sold on "ownership" of regionalization - especially the successes of the program.
4. Police Officers. It would be important to change their commitment from "blocking change" to "help change happen". An action plan of educational activities and problem-finding activities (awareness

raising activities) could well be used to move the police officers away from their traditional methods toward the regionalized concept.

5. Homeowners' Groups. Change level of commitment to "help happen" from "let happen" by an approach using educational activities.
6. County Administrators. Change the level of these three individuals' commitment from "let happen" to "help happen" by emphasizing their functions as role models.
7. Media. These individuals would best be moved from a level of commitment of "let change happen" to "help change happen" by an action plan of educational activities, problem-finding activities, and a specific action plan of inclusion. The media should experience no surprises and no secrets.
8. Employee Groups. These groups could be the hardest to deal with. These groups have traditionally stood for employees' rights and maintaining the status quo unless there are liberal benefits to

accompany change. An approach to dealing with these groups might be forced collaboration. Hopefully, the action approach could be moved toward problem-finding and educational activities. These groups should be led from a "block change" commitment toward a "let change happen" commitment.

Implementation

Once the planning and strategy of the above plans were understood, the "getting started" could begin. The work with the critical mass, the obtaining of the necessary commitments, educational activities, and treating of hurting systems should be started as soon as practical. The support of the critical mass would be paramount for success. Trust would become a primary issue. The management of commitment, participation and involvement and the exchange of information and open communications would be critical from the beginning of the program.

Continuous monitoring would be vital to success, also. Periodic monitoring of levels of commitment, assumptions about the regionalization of auxiliary services, perceptions about progress and/or perceived problems and a monitoring of unexpected events or

changes should be a primary concern. Any monitoring, evaluating or feedback plan should be fed with reliable data that would be dependable and trusted.

As with any plan, one should be prepared to adapt to reality. This transition plan does not exist in isolation to an ongoing "real world". Success of the regionalization of auxiliary services would be more assured by following no plan than by following a plan rigidly without flexibility.

CONCLUSION

From the information obtained in the literary research, one can readily see that both the arguments in in favor of regionalization/consolidation and the arguments against regionalization/consolidation have convincing points of merit. The prospects of unification of law enforcement services is an issue that is certainly politically charged and an issue that involves emotion.

The benefits of unification which are claimed to be increased efficiency and economy in the delivery of law enforcement services were not substantially documented in the literature reviewed. The problem areas that must be dealt with are primarily political and social issues. Fear of loss of local control and the strong feelings of "ownership" by citizens of their police forces is challenged by unifying with other jurisdictions.

Research has shown that in California during the past decade, there has been no significant trend toward regionalization/consolidation/unification.

If there is a threat toward regionalization/consolidation, the unification of auxiliary services such as recruitment, training, communications, custody, purchasing, etc., seems most likely. This author would not predict any significant or major regionalization of general law enforcement services by the year 2000.

REFERENCES

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1963). Performing of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide. pp. 9-23.

Bolas, S. M. (1981, November). "Consolidation: To What Extent?" Police Chief. pp. 64-66.

Carson, D. G., Brown, D. K. (1970, October). "Law Enforcement Consolidation for Greater Efficiency." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. pp. 11-15.

Eastman, G. D., Chapman, S. G. (1976). Short of Merger: Countywide Police Resource Pooling. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

Francis, W. J. (1981, May). "Consolidation Alternatives: Coordination, Cooperation and Sharing." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. pp. 9-11.

Green, P. D., Beatie, P. M. (1981). Regionalized Consolidation of Law Enforcment Services. Unpublished Manuscript.

Harty, H. P., Valente, C. F. (1983). Alternative Delivery Approaches Involving Increased Use of the Private Sector. Municipal Year Book (pp. 199-217). Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association.

Higgins, J. P., Klump, L. A. (1977). Select Police Service Coordination Project. Unpublished Manuscript.

Horgan, W. P. (1980). "A Look at Local Control and Efforts Toward Consolidation of Police Services." Journal of Police Science and Administration, 8, 1-4.

International City Management Association (1973). One Police Department for Five Cities. Newsletter of Successful Projects Funded by L.E.A.A., 2.

Kennedy, J. P., Adams, G. B., Vito, G. F. (1982). "Consolidation of Police Services: An Opportunity for Innovation." Journal of Police Science and administration, 10, 466-472.

Marcus, M., Edgan, J. E., Wheaton, R. J., Hicox, R. C. (1976). Police Consolidation - A Selected Bibliography. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, p. 5.

Morgan, J. D. (1969). Feasibility Study of Consolidated Police Services for the Cities of Campbell and Saratoga. Unpublished Manuscript.

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (1976) Recent Criminal Justice Unification, Consolidation, and Coordination Efforts. (Visiting Fellowship Aware No. 75-NI-99-1016). Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice.

Norton, J. J., Cowart, G. G. (1978, February). "Municipal Police Consolidation: Boon or Boondoggie?: Police Chief. pp. 24-26.

Ostrom, E. (1976). Police Consolidation and Economies of Scale: Do They Go Together? (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis), Indiana University. p. 5.

Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B. (1973). The Urbanization of the Suburbs. Urban Affairs Annual Review, 7, 367-399.

Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B., Whitaker, G. P. (1973, September/October). "Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions." Public Administration Review. pp. 423-432.

Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B., Whitaker, G. P. (1977). Policing Metropolitan America. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation.

Ostrom, E., Whitaker, G. (1973). "Does Local Control of Police Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings." American Journal of Political Science, 17, 48-76.

Pachon, H. P., Loverich, N. P. (1977). "Consolidation of Urban Public Services: A Focus on the Police." Public Administration Review. pp. 38-47.

Parsonson, R. T. (1973, August). "The Regional Trend in Law Enforcement." Police Chief. pp. 26-28.

Peace Officer Standards and Training (1976). Jurisdictional Consolidation of Police Services: Legal Aspects. State of California. pp. 3-5.

Peace Officer Standards and Training (1982). Symposium on Professional Issues in Law Enforcement. State of California.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967). Task Force Report: The Police. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Public Administration Service (1966). Coordination and Consolidation of Police Services: Problems and Potentials. Chicago. pp. 9-17.

Shyrock, J. R. (1971, August). "Regionalization of Police Services." Police Chief. pp. 8.

Wickum, T. G. (1986). California City Police Departments - A Dying Tradition. Unpublished Manuscript.

APPENDIX I

California cities contracting for law enforcement services, regionalized or consolidated.

CITY	DATE OF CONSOLIDATION OR CONTRACT
Alameda County Sheriff's Office	
Dublin	July 1, 1982
Amador County Sheriff's Office	
Plymouth	December 1, 1985
Butte County Sheriff's Office	
Biggs	January 1, 1982
Contra Costa Sheriff's Office	
Danville	July 1, 1983
San Ramon	July 1, 1984
Fresno County Sheriff's Office	
Parlier	July 1, 1984
San Joaquin	July, 1978
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office	
Blue Lake	July 1, 1975
Imperial County Sheriff's Office	
Calipatria	April 15, 1983
Kern County Sheriff's Office	
Wasco	July 1, 1981
Kings County Sheriff's Office	
Avenal	December 1, 1979
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office	
Agoura Hills	December, 1982
Artesia	May, 1959
Avalon	September, 1962
Avenal	November 1, 1979
Bell	October 1, 1974
Bellflower	September, 1957
Bradbury Estates	July, 1957
Carson	February, 1968
Cerritos	April, 1956
Commerce	January, 1960

CITY	DATE OF CONSOLIDATION OR CONTRACT
Duarte	August, 1957
Hawaiian Gardens	April, 1964
Hidden Hills	October, 1961
Industry	June, 1957
LaCanada-Flintridge	December, 1976
La Habra Heights	December, 1978
Lakewood	April, 1954
La Mirada	March, 1960
Lancaster	November, 1977
La Puente	August, 1956
Lawndale	December, 1959
Lomita	June, 1964
Lynwood	May, 1977
Norwalk	August, 1957
Palmdale	August, 1962
Paramount	January, 1957
Pico Rivera	January, 1958
Rancho Palos Verdes	September, 1973
Rolling Hills	January, 1957
Rolling Hills Estates	September, 1957
Rosemead	August, 1959
San Dimas	August, 1960
Santa Fe Springs	May, 1957
South El Monte	July, 1958
Temple City	May, 1960
Walnut	January, 1959
West Hollywood	November, 1984
Westlake Village	December, 1981
Napa County Sheriff's Office	
Yountville	June 24, 1975
Orange County Sheriff's Office	
Brea	October 1, 1970
San Juan Capistrano	1961
Villa Park	1962
Placer County Sheriff's Office	
Loomis	July 1, 1985
Plumas County Sheriff's Office	
Portola	July 1, 1970

CITY	DATE OF CONSOLIDATION OR CONTRACT
Riverside County Sheriff's Office	
Indian Wells	July 1, 1968
Lake Elsinore	July 1, 1968
La Quinta	July 1, 1983
Norco	July 1, 1965
Palm Desert	July 1, 1974
Rancho Mirage	July 1, 1974
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Office	
Big Bear City	July, 1978
Grand Terrace City	July, 1978
Rancho Cucamonga	July, 1978
San Diego County Sheriff's Office	
Del Mar	July, 1959
Lemon Grove	July 1, 1978
Powar	December, 1981
San Marcos	1966
Santee	December, 1980
Vista	July 1, 1963
San Mateo County Sheriff's Office	
Portola Valley	July, 1964
Woodside	November, 1956
Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Office	
Solvang	July, 1985
Santa Clara County Sheiff's Office	
Cupertino	1966
Los Altos Hills	20 years +
Monte Sereno	20 years +
Saratoga	20 years +
Sierra County Sheriff's Office	
Loyalton	June 7, 1972
Siskiyou County Sheriff's Office	
Montague	July 1, 1983
Sutter County Sheriff's Office	
Live Oak	January 1, 1980
Tehama County Sheriff's Office	
Tehama	October, 1978

CITY	DATE OF CONSOLIDATION OR CONTRACT
Ventura County Sheriff's Office	
Carmarillo	July, 1964
Moorpark	July, 1984
Ojai	January 2, 1980
Thousand Oaks	July, 1965

APPENDIX II

CALIFORNIA CITIES CONTRACTING OR CONSOLIDATING LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

YEAR OF CONTRACT



YEAR OF CONTRACT

APPENDIX III

CALIFORNIA CITIES UNIFYING OR CONTRACTING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES SINCE 1980



APPENDIX IV

CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL BY CATEGORY
1975 and 1985

1975	Size of Department									
	1000+	500-999	400-499	300-399	200-299	100-199	75-99	50-74	25-49	1-24
No. of Dept.	3	4	0	2	14	37	20	46	67	157
% of Total	(<)1%	1%	0%	(<)1%	4%	11%	6%	13%	19%	45%

1985	Size of Department									
	1000+	500-999	400-499	300-399	200-299	100-199	75-99	50-74	25-49	1-24
No. of Dept.	5	5	1	8	21	48	41	47	85	95
									N=356	
% of Total	1%	1%	(<)1%	2%	6%	13%	12%	13%	24%	27%
									%=100	

Source: Employment Data for California Law Enforcement California Commission on P.O.S.T. 1975 and 1985

APPENDIX V

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING I

Instructions

Evaluate for each item, as appropriate, on the basis of the following criteria:

- I Superior. Better than anyone else. Beyond present need.
- II Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
- III Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition. Not good, not bad.
- IV Problems here. Not as good as it should be. Deteriorating. Must be improved.
- V Real cause for concern. Situation bad. Crisis. Must take action to improve.

Category	I	II	III	IV	V
manpower		X			
technology				X	
equipment			X		
facility			X		
money					X
calls for service		X			
supplies			X		
management skills		X			
P.O. skills			X		
supervisory skills		X			
training					X
attitudes		X			
image	X				
Council support		X			
C.M. support		X			
growth potential					X
specialties				X	
mgmt. flexibility			X		
sworn/non-sworn ratio	X				
pay scale				X	
benefits			X		
turnover				X	
community support		X			
complaints rec'd	X				
enforcement index		X			
traffic index		X			
sick leave rates			X		
morale				X	

APPENDIX VI

STRATEGIC NEED AREA Financial Support Innovative Financing

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item as to what type of activity it encourages:

I Custodial - Rejects Change
II Production - Adapts to Minor Changes
III Marketing - Seeks Familiar Change
IV Strategic - Seeks Related Change
V Flexible - Seeks Novel Change

Category

TOP MANAGERS:	I	II	III	IV	V
Mentality Personality			X		
Skills/Talents				X	
Knowledge/Education				X	
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms		X			
Rewards/Incentives			X		
Power Structure	X				
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure		X			
Resources				X	
Middle Management			X		
Line Personnel	X				

STRATEGIC NEED AREA Provide Safe Communities Service Delivery

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item as to what type of activity it encourages:

I	Custodial	- Rejects Change
II	Production	- Adapts to Minor Changes
III	Marketing	- Seeks Familiar Change
IV	Strategic	- Seeks Related Change
V	Flexible	- Seeks Novel Change

Category

TOP MANAGERS:	I	II	III	IV	V
Mentality Personality					X
Skills/Talents				X	
Knowledge/Education					X
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms				X	
Rewards/Incentives				X	
Power Structure		X			
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure			X		
Resources		X			
Middle Management				X	
Line Personnel					X

STRATEGIC NEED AREA Change in Local Control

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item as to what type of activity it encourages:

I	Custodial	- Rejects Change
II	Production	- Adapts to Minor Changes
III	Marketing	- Seeks Familiar Change
IV	Strategic	- Seeks Related Change
V	Flexible	- Seeks Novel Change

Category

	I	II	III	IV	V
TOP MANAGERS:					
Mentality Personality	X				
Skills/Talents		X			
Knowledge/Education				X	
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms	X				
Rewards/Incentives			X		
Power Structure	X				
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure		X			
Resources			X		
Middle Management	X				
Line Personnel	X				
COMMUNITY/CITIZENS:					
Attitudes/Beliefs			X		
Financial Climate		X			
Power Structure	X				
Perceived Benefits		X			

STRATEGIC NEED AREA Increased Professionalism

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item as to what type of activity it encourages:

I	Custodial	- Rejects Change
II	Production	- Adapts to Minor Changes
III	Marketing	- Seeks Familiar Change
IV	Strategic	- Seeks Related Change
V	Flexible	- Seeks Novel Change

Category

TOP MANAGERS:	I	II	III	IV	V
Mentality Personality					X
Skills/Talents				X	
Knowledge/Education				X	
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms			X		
Rewards/Incentives				X	
Power Structure			X		
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure			X		
Resources		X			
Middle Management				X	
Line Personnel			X		

APPENDIX VII

STAKEHOLDERS

Certainty

*Police Chief *Police Supervisors *Fiscal Officer *Home Owners Assoc. *City Managers	*Police Assoc. *Local Court *Local Public Schools *P.O.S.T. *Police Officers Other Departments* *County Board of Supervisors
Most Important	Least Important
*Mayors/Elected Officials *State and Federal Court *Residents	*Private Providers *Service Clubs *Political Activist Groups

Uncertainty

APPENDIX VIII

SNAILDARTERS



APPENDIX IX

PLANNING MODE CHART



Turbulance
1. No changes
2. Few Changes
3. Change on Regular Basis
4. Many Changes
5. Constant Change

Visibility of Future
1. Recurring
2. Forecastable
3. Predictable
4. Partially Predictable
5. Unpredictable

Operation Management: Planning for routine ongoing operations

Issue Planning: Planning for specific issues important for services of the strategic plan

Periodic Planning: Planning for operations or issues should take place on an intermittant basis

Signal/Surprise Planning: Planning is reactive - in response to "surprise" issues - may be considered sometimes as crisis planning.

COMMITMENT PLANNING

x WHERE DOES "CRITICAL MASS" (INDIVIDUALLY) STAND NOW REGARDING THE CHANGE?

*DESIRED COMMITMENT FROM INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF CRITICAL MASS

TYPE OF COMMITMENT

Actors in Critical Mass	Block Change	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
Police Chiefs			x	*
Mayors/Council Members				x*
City Managers			x	*
Police Officers	x		*	
Home Owners Groups		x	*	
County Administrators		x	*	
Media-Local Editors		x	*	
Employee Groups	x	*		

COMMITMENT PLANNING
HANDOUT NO. 1