WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE PORT OF LOS ANGELES BY THE YEAR 2010?

A project presented to
California Commission on
Peace Officer Standards and Training

By
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This Command College Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so the planner can prepare for a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future: creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. (POST)
This project, written under the guidance and approval of the student’s agency, mentor, and academic advisor, has been presented to and accepted by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, State of California, in fulfillment of the requirements of Command College Class Thirty.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## LIST OF TABLES

### Chapter I
**ISSUE IDENTIFICATION**
- Introduction 7
- Environmental Scan 7
- Threat Assessment 8
- Interviews 11

### Chapter II
**FUTURES STUDY**
- Introduction 14
- Nominal Group Technique 14
  - Trends 15
  - Events 20
  - Cross impact Analysis 25
- Future Scenarios 27
  - Optimistic Scenario 27
  - Surprise Free Scenario 28
  - Pessimistic Scenario 29

### Chapter III
**STRATEGIC PLAN**
- Introduction 32
- Organizational Description 32
- Situational Analysis 33
- Strategy Development 34
- Implementation Plan 35
- Cost Analysis 37

### Chapter IV
**TRANSITION MANAGEMENT**
- Introduction 39
- Commitment Plan 40
- Transition Techniques 41

### Chapter V
**CONCLUSION**
- Project Summary 43
- Recommendations for the Future 43
- Conclusion 44
THE APPENDICIES

Appendix A
  Map of Port 46

Appendix B
  Interviewees 47

Appendix C
  Nominal Group Technique Panel 48

Appendix D
  List of Trends 49

Appendix E
  List of Events 51

REFERENCE 53
LIST OF TABLES

Tables

1  Trend Summary Chart  16
2  Event Evaluation Table  21
3  Cross Impact Analysis Matrix  25
CHAPTER ONE

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

Introduction

This project on the potential impacts of terrorism on the Port of Los Angeles was completed for the State of California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Command College. It is an exploration of the potential futures of terrorist activity that may affect the Port of Los Angeles. The purpose is to raise the level of awareness regarding this issue and identify alternative possible future scenarios.

The current level of terrorist activity is on the rise, particularly in the Middle Eastern countries (United States Department of State, 2000). How significant is the threat of terrorist activity to the Port of Los Angeles? This project identifies potential future emerging trends and events that may affect the Port of Los Angeles and its Police Department’s planning for potential terrorist activity. The question that this paper will answer is: “What will be the impact of terrorism on the Port of Los Angeles by the year 2010?”

Environmental Scan

To adequately address this question, one must first understand the environment, geography and fiscal importance of the port. Founded in 1907, the Port of Los Angeles has long been a dominant gateway for international commerce. With the continual growth in the containerized shipping industry, the Port is poised to maintain this position well into the twenty-first century.
The Port of Los Angeles is ideally located to serve shippers and carriers requiring marine access. Currently, the Port of Los Angeles is the largest port by volume in the United States (Newton, 2000). It encompasses over 7,500 acres, including twenty-eight major shipping facilities along thirty-five miles of waterfront and navigable waterways. The Port includes parts of the communities of San Pedro, Wilmington and a large portion of Terminal Island, all of which are within the city of Los Angeles. The Port area is the termination point of three major freeways and several rail lines (Appendix A).

The daytime population within the Port is in excess of seventy-five thousand. This figure decreases to approximately five thousand during the hours of darkness. This is subject to change with the arrival and trans-loading of a vessel’s cargo. Currently the Port is involved in a major expansion plan that includes the addition of over five hundred acres of land that is being filled into the main channel. When completed, this will be the largest shipping terminal in the United States, generating several million dollars of income to the Port, the local, and national economies.

The Port has a throughput of over 450 thousand twenty-foot containers per month (Zahniser, 2000). This amount of cargo has a major impact on the economy of the western United States. The Port has an impact on 259 thousand jobs and twenty-six billion dollars in industry sales. This generates 1.4 billion in taxes for the local and national economies (Port of Los Angeles, 1998). The majority of the container traffic is generated from the Pacific Rim countries.

Threat Assessment

Although seaports represent an important component of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, there is no indication that they are currently being targeted
by terrorists. Terrorism is defined as the systematic use of terror as a means of coercion (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1986). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) considers the present threat of terrorist activity directed at any U.S. seaport to be low, even though their vulnerability to terrorist attack is high (United States Coast Guard, 1999). This is a view that is not necessarily shared by the maritime community. The Maritime Security Council publishes weekly bulletins on the threats to maritime security that demonstrate that the threat of terrorist activity has the ebb and flow of the tide.

The Port of Los Angeles is the leading Port on the West Coast for cruise ship passenger activity. Seaport passenger volumes have increased steadily over the past decade and this trend does not appear to be headed for change (Port of Los Angeles, 1999). With this increase comes an accompanying rise in non-resident crewmembers that represent a potential threat for terrorist activity. The unlimited access for both the foreign nationals and the goods that are shipped to them is of great concern.

Generally, cruise ships have focused on baggage inspection and passenger segregation. This system has substantially reduced the number of non-passengers having access to a ship. However, there is a major concern that cargo other than passenger baggage is not inspected. Another area of major concern is the lack of security systems that address waterside vessel access to ships. This could permit an incident similar to the situation in the U.S.S. Cole incident of October 12, 2000. This incident reflects the potential for extensive damage to a ship that may be inflicted from a waterside approach and attack.
The Navy has estimated that repairs will take approximately one year and cost an estimated two hundred and forty million dollars to complete (Navy Office of Information, 2001). The loss in human life is not quantifiable, seventeen sailors lost their lives, and an additional thirty-nine were wounded. This damage resulted from two individuals approaching the vessel in an inflatable boat that contained an explosive device. This was a relatively small amount of explosives and not well placed structurally on the ship. The formal board of inquiry found that there were several security measures that were not followed, however, they did not attach blame (CNN, 2001).

The threat to the Port of Los Angeles is magnified by the fact that it is a military mobilization facility for the west coast of the United States. There are several facilities designed for the loading of troops and supplies within the Port. Using a seaport for a military mobilization greatly increases the security stakes (Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, 2000). An act of terrorism or sabotage can certainly harm the national defense capability, in addition to those working in the Port. The presence of military munitions and equipment could be a magnet for such acts.

In recent years there have been several terrorist acts committed in the maritime arena throughout the world as reported by the U.S. Department of State (1999). The incidents of maritime piracy and terrorist activity directed towards seaports have been steadily increasing (Maritime Security Council, 2000). The United States Department of State (2000) reports this type of activity has been most evident in Africa, the Middle East, Indonesia, and the Philippine Islands. The United States mainland has not been the target of any successful maritime terrorist acts with the exception of the World Trade Center bombing. Although not physically located within a seaport this facility is
headquarters to the New York-New Jersey Port Authorities. It is unclear whether this act was directed at this facility due to its ties with the maritime industry. This act was that of an international terrorist faction.

There has also been the recent attack on the Naval vessel U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Yemen. It appears that the attack was at the direction of Usama Bin Ladin. Bin Ladin is currently living in exile in Afghanistan and it is believed he is directing terrorist operations from there (National Commission on Terrorism, 2000). Many fanatic Middle-Eastern terrorist factions have focused their attention on the U.S. and it’s military stationed throughout the world. Bin Laden is believed to be both mastermind and financial backer for these operations.

There have been acts of domestic terrorism such as the Oklahoma Federal building, however; there have been no reported acts of domestic terrorism that focused on the maritime environment. As of this writing, there has been no known terrorist acts directed at the Port of Los Angeles or its Port customers.

Interviews

Individuals in various roles of leadership working in, or in conjunction with port security and port operations were interviewed to glean information regarding the concern for terrorism within the Port of Los Angeles (Appendix B). Of those interviewed there was an overriding concern with the vulnerability of the Port to an attack from the water similar to that of the U.S.S. Cole. All participants repeated the concern. There was an added concern that this area was not easily addressed. Most interviewees were of the belief that this problem was irresolvable without closing the Port. The current practice of free access to the waterway is a Constitutionally guaranteed right (California
Constitution Article X Section 4, 1976) and the interviewees saw little hope of addressing the situation. All were of the opinion that the only way to mitigate this was through increased marine patrols by both the Port Police and the Coast Guard.

Another area of concern that was consistent with those interviewed was the general apathy of the senior management of the Port as it pertains to terrorism prevention and the required training necessary to prevent or manage such an event. The concerns were in the areas of staffing reductions in the Coast Guard and Port Police, a lack of training to address the potential threat, and a lack of adequate funding to properly equip those charged with protecting the Port. The consistent belief was that it would take an incident to awaken the Port’s management to this threat and cause them to take action.

There was also a concern expressed that the Port could be a target for sympathy attacks from the local Serbo-Croatian community. As San Pedro is the largest Serbo-Croatian community in the nation it is only natural that they could be either the target of terrorist acts or a center for a local terrorist cell.

The final concern was that the Port is a major force in the national economy and the ability to protect the public’s investment was at unacceptable levels. Those interviewed expressed concerns that the Los Angeles City Police Department has historically taken the position of “wait until called” and may be unable to respond sufficiently in the event of a terrorist related emergency. Recent internal and political issues raise doubt as to whether these factors are soon resolvable.

There were also concerns that the Coast Guard detachment that is assigned to the Port is responsible for the entire eleventh district. This area is comprised of a large
portion of the state of California. Their mandate is the maintenance of federal standards and regulations specific to U.S. Ports. Their presence in the Port of Los Angeles is merely incidental as their staff must monitor the entire district with equality.
Chapter II
Futures Study

Introduction

This project was prepared utilizing the Nominal Group Technique (NGT) for futures forecasting. A Delphi study was also attempted. A Delphi is a computer based futures study that brings together a group of individuals with significant technical expertise from various geographic locations. This Delphi was established with the assistance of Dr. Murray Turroff of the New Jersey Institute of Technology. This process was unsuccessful due to time constraints and a lack of software compatibility of many of the intended participants’ computers due to firewall problems either on their computer systems or that of the Web Board. There were also a few of the intended participants that were not as familiar with computers as was necessary for the project. Many of the members of the intended Delphi panel were still able to participate by interview and their remarks are included in the interview section of Chapter I. Those interviewed possessed unique expertise in the area of Port security and Port operations.

N.G.T. Process

The NGT panel was composed of nine individuals who were tasked with identifying potential emerging trends and events that may impact the issue (Appendix C). This group included: two Police Chiefs, The President of the Southern California Steamship Association, an Assistant Chief of the Los Angeles City Fire Department, two Police Lieutenants, The Pilot Services Manager for the Port of Los Angeles, Manger of Information Systems for the Port of Los Angeles, and a Lieutenant from the United States Coast Guard representing several areas of expertise.
Two weeks prior to the process all participants received a packet of information containing materials that clarified their roles in the process. Upon their arrival, the group spent time initially getting a thorough understanding of the process, definitions of trends, events, and terrorism. They then had a discussion on how these would apply to the issue presented.

**Trend Identification**

Each of the panel members brought a list of what they saw as potential trends (Appendix D). A trend was defined as a series of incidents taking place that seem to indicate a direction in which a particular issue may be heading. It is based on the past, present and future and can be quantitative or qualitative. After a group discussion and vote, the trends were distilled down to the top ten. The ten selected are listed below:

1. Environmental activism
2. Intelligence sharing/gathering
3. Organizational leadership
4. Hi-Tech weapons availability
5. Level of funding
6. Apathy in government agencies
7. Reliance on foreign goods
8. Economic sabotage
9. Privatization of security
10. Domestic anti-government terrorists
After identification of the top ten trends, each participant ranked them in order of importance on a worksheet provided at the beginning of the session. The order of importance is listed below. The values indicated in columns two through five represent the panel’s forecasted direction of the trend relative to the 100 value. The value 100 in column three represents the impact of the trend today. The value in column six represents the group’s level of concern about the trend as measured on a one to ten scale with ten being the highest level of concern. A discussion followed and the group came to consensus regarding the trends. Each panel member was asked to forecast the trends at the various time periods, the data was then collated.

**Trend Summary Chart**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>&lt;5 yr</th>
<th>Today</th>
<th>&gt; 5 yrs</th>
<th>&gt; 10 yrs</th>
<th>Concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Trend 1  
Environmental Activism | 50 | 100 | 150 | 200 | 10 |
| Trend 2  
Intelligence sharing/gathering | 60 | 100 | 80 | 65 | 10 |
| Trend 3  
Organizational leadership | 110 | 100 | 90 | 75 | 9 |
| Trend 4  
Hi-tech weapons availability | 70 | 100 | 140 | 160 | 8 |
| Trend 5  
Level of funding | 100 | 100 | 85 | 70 | 8 |
| Trend 6  
Apathy in government agencies | 70 | 100 | 100 | 90 | 7 |
| Trend 7  
Reliance on foreign goods | 85 | 100 | 150 | 175 | 10 |
| Trend 8  
Economic sabotage | 85 | 100 | 150 | 175 | 3 |
| Trend 9  
Privatization of security | 80 | 100 | 125 | 150 | 8 |
| Trend 10  
Domestic anti-government terrorists | 90 | 100 | 150 | 200 | 6 |
Trend Analysis

Trend #1: Environmental Activism

The panel believed that there has been, and will continue to be, an increase in activism by environmental groups. They further opined that there might be an act of environmental terrorism such as the taking of oil tankers or petro-chemical facilities and threatening to “open the cargo discharge valves” if their demands were not met.

Trend #2: Intelligence Sharing/Gathering

The panel was of the opinion that there has been a steady decrease in the amount of information gathered and shared between different law enforcement and governmental agencies such as the F.B.I., U.S. Coast Guard, I.N.S., L.A.P.D., etc. The panel also believes that the traditional methods for gathering information are no longer effective with the globalization of the region. This is of major concern with the influx of new cultures and citizens from foreign countries who speak different languages. Many of the new immigrants bring with them beliefs that law enforcement or the government in general is not to be trusted. This makes it difficult, if not impossible to gather information of any type from them.

Trend #3: Organizational Leadership

The participants agreed there was a lack of organizational leadership in governmental entities resulting from downsizing in critical areas. Given the current civilian management structure of the Port and the City as a whole, it is difficult to address security concerns. The policy-making officials lack expertise in Port security principles. This lack of knowledge and lack of communication with those
having knowledge of Port security principles gives the illusion that management is unconcerned with potential terrorism.

The group consistently expressed their opinions that formulas used for downsizing or right sizing were incorrect. The re-tasking portion of any downsizing plan never seems to take place, only the do more with less mentality, resulting in many essential tasks not being performed.

**Trend #4: Availability of Hi-Tech Weapons**

This was a major concern as the participants believed that these weapons could be easily accessed via the Internet and almost any one could get them and cause a major incident. With the availability of high-grade explosives and detonating mechanisms from the eastern block countries the panel believed the Port would be an easy target.

**Trend #5: Changes in Funding**

The continued decrease in funding for anti-terrorist activities was seen as an emerging trend. The panel was of the opinion that it will become more difficult to prepare for potential terrorist activities with shrinking resources. There was the overriding opinion that until there is a direct attack on a Port facility, the problem will be ignored and funding diminished.

**Trend #6: Apathy in Government Agencies**

The panel was of the opinion that there was a major problem with senior governmental administrators taking an apathetic view of this issue, and that this has translated directly into a lack of preparedness. The panel forecasted that the level of preparation might improve as a result of the recent events in the Middle
Trend #7:  Reliance on Foreign Goods

The participants expressed deep concern over this country’s continuing reliance on foreign goods. They were of the opinion that this reliance will only get worse making our nation vulnerable to embargos.

Trend #8:  Economic Sabotage

The panel raised concerns that a major shipping client of the Port could be the victim of economic sabotage. Some possible manifestations could include embargo, Internet activity adversely impacting the company’s economic standing, i.e., generation of a false credit report, which may even affect the stock market.

Trend #9:  Privatization of Security

The panel was of the opinion that the privatization of security forces in the Port would hinder the flow of information. As a general rule, when private security staff is put in place it is at the lowest pay and educational scale. These employees receive minimal training and have limited enforcement capabilities. As a result, the level of enforcement-related activities and professionalism that currently exists within the Port’s facilities would diminish.

Trend #10:  Domestic Anti-Government Terrorists

The panel was concerned with the alliances formed between several anarchist, anti-government groups during the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle and Washington D.C. They believe that this is only a sign of things to come. If these groups continue to form such alliances, they will become a major disruptive force.
Event Forecasts

Events are different from trends in that events are singular occurrences. Events occur at a specific time and date. For example, an earthquake or windstorm on a certain date is an event. The passage of a new law that would mandate a certain action is an event. The panel was provided with a definition of events and it was explained that ultimately these events would be cross-indexed with trends to show the potential impacts. All potential events were posted, then distilled to the ten with most interest as rated on a −5 to +5 scale (Appendix E).

The top ten are listed below:

1. Middle East Conflict
2. Detonation of a nuclear device or weapon of mass destruction (WMD)
3. International labor disruption
4. Major natural disaster
5. "Going postal" incident
6. Alameda Corridor incident
7. Major oil spill
8. Pollution incident
9. Act of environmental piracy
10. Passenger ferry accident
Event Summary Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Yr &gt; 0</th>
<th>&gt; 5 yr</th>
<th>&gt; 10 yr</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event 1</td>
<td>Middle East Conflict</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 2</td>
<td>Detonation of nuclear device or MWD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 3</td>
<td>International labor disruption</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 4</td>
<td>Major natural disaster</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 5</td>
<td>“Going postal” incident</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 6</td>
<td>Alameda Corridor incident</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 7</td>
<td>Major oil spill</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 8</td>
<td>Pollution incident</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 9</td>
<td>Environmental piracy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event 10</td>
<td>Passenger ferry accident</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Event Analysis:

**Event #1:** Middle East Conflict

The panel collectively opined that this is a problem that will escalate into a cross border war. With this escalation in the level of hostilities, the potential for terrorist activity in the Middle East nations will increase exponentially as this area traditionally fosters militant groups. This phenomenon will be particularly significant in Lebanon and Afghanistan (National Commission on Terrorism, 2000). The panel felt that this incident would have a negative impact on the potential for terrorist activity in the Port of Los Angeles as is indicated by the minus sign in the impact column of the table above.

**Event #2:** Detonation of a nuclear device or WMD
The panel was concerned that either intentional or accidental detonation of a nuclear device would have a major global impact and that a chemical WMD could produce similar results. They believed that either event would provide more of an opportunity for terrorist activity, as there would be a time frame when the person or persons causing the detonation would be unidentified. This may give the illusion that a terrorist faction possesses extreme power.

Event #3: International Labor Disruption

Labor organizations’ membership pool has historically been located within the confines of the United States. With the advent of the European common market, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the normalization of relations with China and other Pacific Rim countries, labor organizations are less restricted to the traditional geographic boundaries. The panel believes that globalization would only increase the strength of the various labor organizations. Labor disputes formerly confined to a specific region may now occur worldwide simultaneously, thereby, holding organizations hostage. The panel indicated in the statistical data that there was a high probability that this type of incident would occur. They were also of the opinion that this would have a negative impact on the issue.

Event #4: Major Natural Disaster

All members agreed that a major natural disaster (earthquake, fire) would significantly tax available resources. Through diversion this would allow the opportunistic terrorist easy access to facilities that would most likely be unsecured. Typically, resources would be concentrated on the most critically impacted areas
during such an event.

**Event #5: Going Postal Incident**

The panel was unable to label this type of event in any other meaningful way. The concern was that a lone individual or small group would become fanatical and act out their frustrations in a sudden unanticipated violent manner. There was also a concern that this type of activity could take place in the work environment.

**Event #6: Alameda Corridor Incident**

The Alameda Corridor is a rail link for the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach with downtown Los Angeles. This corridor parallels Alameda Boulevard, a main north/south thoroughfare, and traverses seven municipalities before reaching its ultimate destination of the downtown switching yards. This is the largest public works project undertaken by the Federal Government in United States history (United States Department of Transportation, 1999). Upon completion, it will facilitate dockside rail shipping, thus reducing a substantial amount of commercial truck traffic. This project runs both above and below street surface grade.

The panel expressed serious concerns that this rail corridor is vulnerable to a myriad of problems. With the emergence of trans-rail shipping in the Port, a stoppage in this vital link could back-up cargo and ship movements almost immediately.

This is of particular concern to law enforcement as there has been a lack of planning in this area. There is inadequate access and monitoring capabilities for the entire length of the corridor. There has also been a complete lack of
communication between Alameda Corridor Transit Authority (A.C.T.A.) and the concerned law enforcement agencies to address security concerns.

Event #7: Major Oil Spill

The panel consensus was that the potential for a major oil spill continues to increase with our countries current dependence on foreign oil. Any spill in the shipping lanes between the Pacific rim countries and the Port of Los Angeles would have a direct impact on the Port of Los Angeles’ ability to continue to operate at an acceptable level due to the massive clean-up efforts required. A terrorist may cause this spill or a terrorist may be able to act in another area while resources are diverted to addressing the spill.

Event #8: Major Pollution Incident

While this may be similar to an oil spill, the panel differentiated between pollution and an oil spill. There was more of a concern of an event involving hazardous materials with a higher level of toxicity. This was not restricted to an incident involving a spill in the water. There was a greatest concern of an airborne release of toxic chemicals from one of the Port’s terminals. This could allow the opportunist to act, or it could be the act of the terrorist that would affect a substantial number of people.

Event #9: Environmental Piracy

The panel had major concerns that environmental groups are growing more militant. They believed that one or more of these groups could seize control of a vessel and threaten to blockade the Port or a Port facility if their demands were not met.
**Event #10: Major Passenger Ferry Accident**

The panel discussed the proliferation of small high-speed passenger ferries between Catalina and the mainland. There was concern that a large, deep draft passenger vessel could be involved in a major accident. This problem will be magnified with the increase in tourist travel from the Port of Los Angeles, as it is the largest passenger cruise facility on the West Coast. An incident of this type would tap all resources and could be orchestrated by the terrorist groups.

**Cross Trend Impact Matrix:**

On completion of the NGT the data was collated and a cross trend, event impact matrix was prepared. All NGT participants completed an individual matrix and that data was input into the master matrix. The ratings contained in the table below consist of values ranging from –5 to +5, with +5 having the highest level of impact on the issue presented. The indicated number represents the mean score.
Based on the above listed data the group voiced an overwhelming concern with the activities in the Middle East and the potential for an incident involving weapons of mass destruction. There was also a strong concern in the areas of environmental terrorism and a lack of intelligence gathering/sharing capabilities to identify and address these issues. Additionally, strong concerns were expressed for potential problems in the areas of organizational leadership and funding to address the identified threats to the safety of the Port.
The participants forecasted several areas of concern that were not previously considered by the author. Many of the concerns are not limited to the Port of Los Angeles but are being experienced on a national level. The panel was concerned with the vulnerability of the Port, as it is easily accessible from the water. There does not seem to be any easy way to address this problem and secure the Port. This free access magnifies all of the identified problem areas and the panel was unable to fashion a viable solution.

Another area of major concern is the lack of a mechanism for securing land access to most of the Port facilities. The panel was of the opinion that there should be some method for identifying those workers who are authorized to access Port facilities. This problem has been in existence for quite some time and the participants were aware of the political ramifications of requiring workers to have a Port identification card. This has been a problem area with most of the labor organizations that fail to see the need for employees to undergo a background investigation prior to issuance of an identification card. This problem also exacerbates all others identified by the panel.

**Futures Scenarios:**

Based upon the information obtained during the NGT and the interviews, the author developed a series of three potential future scenarios. The scenarios illustrate the need to prepare a strategic plan that addresses both positive and negative events that may impact the potential for terrorist activity in the Port of Los Angeles. The scenarios are divided into three categories; optimistic or most desirable, surprise free or neutral with no change from current operations and pessimistic, the least desirable or worst case scenario.
Optimistic:

It is the year 2008. There is a greater awareness of the potential for terrorist activity in and around the Port of Los Angeles. Officer Baptista and Officer Hall of the Los Angeles Port Police have received an interactive video call to investigate a potential act of environmental terrorism. The Port of Los Angeles and the Federal government are devoting a substantial amount of financial resources towards the detection and mitigation of potential terrorist activities. Officer Hall and Officer Baptista have received information from the newly integrated, federally funded, Vessel Traffic Information System. This system provides day and night continuous digital video monitoring of the entire Port. A known terrorist faction has entered the Port and is approaching a petrol-chemical terminal. The officers have received additional information from the security staff at the petrol-chemical terminal that individuals believed to be environmental activists have been observed approaching in a hovercraft on the outboard side of a marine oil tanker. The Security staff has based this on information they obtained at the quarterly security briefing held jointly by the United States Coast Guard and the Los Angeles Port Police. This group has been identified as an environmental activist group with anti-governmental sentiments.

On approach Officers of the United States Coast Guard meet the Port Police Officers. The officers stop the hovercraft using an electronic engine-disabling device. The officers board and search the vessel and find several devices that would remotely operate discharge valves on the oil tanker docked at the petrol-chemical terminal. All parties on the hovercraft are arrested and the
craft is impounded as an implement of terrorism under the terrorist prevention act of 2003. This act has been passed as a result of the President’s Commission on Seaport Security report in 2000. The Officers have prevented a potential terrorist act through the early detection of a potential terrorist threat.

**Surprise Free:**

There are no reports of terrorist activity in the Port of Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Port Police and the United States Coast Guard have maintained staffing at a continuous no growth level. The Port’s management continues to use the “hope for the best” style of management and has dedicated no additional resources towards anti-terrorist efforts. The Federal government continues to fund the Coast Guard at the basic levels that do not provide for additional training in the area of terrorist activities. In this scenario luck will play a major role.

Training and equipment for the Port Police and Coast Guard have not changed with the advances in technology. There is no specific emphasis on terrorist activity or prevention. There continues to be the isolationism between the various law enforcement agencies that are capable of addressing potential terrorist related issues. The cruise industry and petro-chemical industry continue to see the potential for terrorist activity as a relatively low priority and have devoted minimal resources towards security and prevention. There is no information sharing between the public and private sector. There continues to be a relatively poorly trained civilian security contingent at most Port terminals. The overriding concern for all who do business in the Port is profit. There is a continuing failure to recognize that the Port also has a responsibility to the community as a whole to be
a good neighbor.

Through luck there have been no actual major acts of terrorism reported. The only concern arises when an environmental activist group arrives in the Port to do fund raising or demonstrate against a particular vessel or company, and this is only from a public relations standpoint.

Pessimistic:

The year is 2007, there is a major terrorist event directed at the Port and a Port customer. There are three Port Police officers on duty at the time of the incident. The United States Coast Guard has one boarding team consisting of three guardsmen available to respond. A Middle Eastern terrorist faction sponsored by Usama Bin Ladin (who is still at large) has made entry into the Port of Los Angeles. They are in possession of a remotely activated explosive device that is capable of attachment to a vessel. This group succeeds in accessing a liquefied petroleum gas vessel, attaching the device, and going undetected. This is due to a lack of terminal security and non-existent police patrol boats.

These shortages are a direct result of the laissez-faire attitude of Port management. Both the Los Angeles Port Police and the U.S. Coast Guard continue to suffer greater staffing shortages as time passes. There has been a total disregard for the recommendations of the President's Commission on Seaport Security as well as those of the International Maritime Organization. It is obvious that this event could have been anticipated, however, apathy resulted in a lack of information gathering/sharing and resources. Major labor organizations have voiced concerns over the lack of security in the Port and are contemplating
refusing to do business, declaring the Port an unsafe working environment.

When the device is detonated the explosion has the force of three hundred rail cars containing liquefied petroleum gas (L.P.G.) exploding simultaneously. The resulting boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (B.L.E.V.E.) is like none seen in this country with the exception of a test of a nuclear device. Many residences in the Wilmington and San Pedro areas are destroyed. The workers in the Port at the time of the explosion are virtually vaporized and there are several out of control fires. It takes over one month to locate all the injured and dead. The Port is unable to function for a year due to the collapse of the Vincent Thomas Bridge in the main channel and the destruction of all of the shipping terminals.

There will be major political repercussions and senior managers will be in the unenviable position of being targets of public ridicule for failure to take preventative measures.

Given these three potential futures a strategic plan is discussed in the following chapter that may assist in realizing the optimistic future. This plan should minimize the impact of terrorism on the Port of Los Angeles by the year 2010.
Chapter III
Strategic Plan

Introduction

If we reflect on the past and consider the potential futures that have appeared during this project, it is apparent that planning is essential. The threat of a terrorist act may have a relatively low potential, but the potential for damage to a major seaport like Los Angeles is catastrophic.

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities lack the ability to prioritize, translate, and understand in a timely fashion all of the information to which they have access (National Commission on Terrorism, 2000). Due to this inability to appropriately translate information many activities that may demonstrate potential threats go unnoticed for long periods, or may never be identified.

Organizational Description

Currently the Port of Los Angeles’ security and anti-terrorist concerns are addressed through many agencies. There are federal, state, and local agencies, all with some state of involvement in the Port. The lead agencies are the U.S. Coast Guard and the Port Police. The Coast Guard is an arm of the Department of Transportation of the Federal Government and their management is far removed from the day-to-day activities of the Port.

The Port Police is controlled by the Los Angeles Harbor Department, which is a proprietary department of the City of Los Angeles (L.A. City Charter sec 657, 2000). The management is concerned mostly with the profitability of the Port, and
views all other activities as secondary. There has been a concerted effort to
downsized the Port’s workforce including the police force. This has proven to be
deleterious to the interests of the Port. There is little, if any, awareness of the
Port’s civilian managers regarding the day-to-day operations of the Port Police.
The view is that security or anti-terrorist measures are a low priority that may be
avoided unless statutorily required to be performed. This view has been constant
for the past fifteen years and can be expected to continue well into the future,
absent a significant change in the top levels of Port and City management.

Situational Analysis

The U.S. Coast Guard and the Los Angeles Port Police are severely under
deployed and under funded to properly address the existing concerns. There is an
existing Port security plan that all terminal operators and law enforcement
agencies in the Port are to use as a guideline. This document is ten years old and
is in desperate need of updating.

Currently the Port Police has been downsized from fifty-seven sworn officers
to fifty. This problem has been further exacerbated by the policy of not allowing
the replacement of an officer prior to the departure of another. The current
average age of officers at the Port Police is forty-five plus. There will be a high
level of attrition due to anticipated retirements in the near future. There has been
a total lack of succession planning on the part of senior management within the
Harbor Department. This has not only damaged response times to calls for
service, it has also impacted morale of the rank and file officers.

The Coast Guard faces a different type of problem, however the results are
the same. The current administration has steadily cut the funding to the Coast
Guard with the exception of pet projects such as narcotics interdiction. This has
resulted in a lack of staff to perform even the most basic patrol function. This,
coupled with the low salary and benefit levels has caused a problem with staffing
stability in the region.

Strategy Development

The Port Police and the U. S. Coast Guard have identified several of the
troubling areas and have submitted them to the Interagency Commission on Crime
and Security in U.S. Seaports. A report of the findings of that Commission has just
been published (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2000). There have also been
requests from several agencies that there be a more open sharing of information
and resources. The law enforcement community is neither fully exploiting the
growing amount of information it collects during the course of terrorism
investigations nor distributing that information effectively to analysts and policy
makers (National Commission on Terrorism, 2000).

The Captain of the Port (U.S.C.G.) has taken an active role in this process
as well as the Chief of the Port Police. They have begun the difficult process of
educating the Port’s customers and management team on the potential for terrorist
activity within the Port.

For this to continue there will have to be an increase in resources for both
agencies. There will be a need to access both federal and state grant funds that
are designated towards fighting terrorist activity. The Federal government will
need to dedicate significant funds towards Port security and give the Coast Guard
significant staff increases. The City of Los Angeles will need to dedicate additional resources to policing its harbor. This will need to include an increase in staff and equipment such as surveillance and explosive detection devices designed for anti-terrorist activity. To achieve this goal the Port will have to embrace the International Maritime Organization guidelines for Port security, declare them to be mandatory, not optional, requiring compliance at all times.

There is a current potential for regionalization of Port Security resources that has yet to be explored. The Ports on the west coast should be sharing not only intelligence but also equipment and training. This can be accomplished by participation in multi-agency task forces and the use of the Internet as a tool for sharing information.

The availability of new and improved technology for vessel tracking is an asset to maritime law enforcement. This can also be expanded globally, as the Ports are partners in trading with many other countries throughout the world. All parties have the common interest in ensuring the continued smooth flow of cargo from one Port to another.

**Implementation Plan**

Currently the Port collects a fee for each passenger that cruises from the Port of Los Angeles. A portion of that fee should be designated for Port security. These funds need to be earmarked exclusively for the purpose of Port security. The Port of Los Angeles is the leading Port in the nation and as such is very profitable. Some of the funds generated need to be re-invested in Port security related functions. This is not the current situation as the annual budget for the
Port Police has held steady for over fifteen years allowing for minimal cost of living adjustments in only some of the budget cycles. There has been no significant budget increase since 1977 after the “Sansinea” oil tanker fire. A budget increase can be achieved with minimal effort, as the Port has a surplus each year. Profits from the Port are required to be expended only on activities that promote the good of the Port, commercial fishing, or the maritime commerce. These funds cannot be diverted into the general municipal fund of the City of Los Angeles (Tidelands Trust Act, CA. 1917).

Given the above facts, the implementation of a Port security plan with sufficient resources would not be that difficult. It merely requires a change in mindset and core values focusing on Port security issues. This change is beginning to occur with the Port customers that are investing funds in the security of their facilities. There is still a substantial disagreement in the area of requiring background investigations and fingerprinting prior to issuing credentials permitting private employees to access Port facilities. For this issue to be resolved it may take State and or Federal legislation similar to that enacted in Florida in 1998 (Miami-Dade County Code, sec 28a).

The private corporations operating within the Port are beginning to bring in a higher caliber of security guard. The utilization of video surveillance in a more effective manner will enhance security measures. In the future it will be incumbent on Port officials to require credentialed security personnel. There will also be a need to establish minimum levels for cargo security to include tracking and video surveillance systems.
For the Port management there will have to be an agreement to share information more readily. This is not only confined to other governmental entities, but must also include major customers that do business within the Port. The Coast Guard and Port Police have established regular meetings to discuss Port Security issues. These meetings should be expanded to include annual terrorist threat assessments. There should also be meetings that involve the major customers of the Port. This is especially true for the Cruise and Petro-chemical industries. There should be a mechanism established to address the identified problems jointly and proactively.

A more committed attitude towards the global sharing of information regarding potential terrorist threats and activities is imperative. This can be done through the Organization of American States, The International Association of Air and Seaport Police, American Association of Port Authorities, and the Maritime Security Council. The above steps can be implemented locally through the Port Security Council and should be taken as soon as reasonably possible.

Cost Analysis

The cost of any new program is difficult to measure. For the Port there is no exception. The major difference here is that the Port is revenue generating and utilizes no taxpayer dollars. All monies generated by the Port are required to be reinvested in activities promoting the Port or Port related activities (Tidelands Trust Act, CA., 1917).

Currently the Port collects a fee from each passenger that embarks or disembarks on a cruise from the Port of Los Angeles. The Port has also recorded record profits in each of the past three years (Port of Los Angeles, 1999). Given these
two factors and the state law requiring re-investment there would be little, if any, difficulty funding the added staff or training and equipment.
Chapter IV

Transition Management

Introduction

As with any organization, the Port will have to begin the process of change. Change is not easily accepted as there is a reluctance to alter methods or procedures in the way things are done. Changing requires one to leave the comfort zone and adapt to a new process or procedure. This process is sometimes painful and can be difficult for an organization to survive. The mere statement that change is going to occur does not make the change happen.

To achieve a successful transition the following steps must be taken:

- The Port and the Coast Guard must jointly commit to a review and re-constitution of the Port’s security plan (1989). This will need to be accomplished as soon as possible. The concerned stakeholders, Port customers, organized labor, and local community members must be identified. All parties must be allowed to submit their ideas for consideration and review for inclusion in any new security plan.

- There must be an indoctrination period for both agencies to acquaint themselves with these changes, this should last approximately six months with bi-monthly meetings scheduled to ensure adequate progress. Upon completion of this first phase, a reasonable evaluation period must follow accompanied by frequent written reports generated gauging compliance with the newly established objectives. This period should last for one year to eighteen months.
with continuance of the bi-monthly meetings of the concerned parties. Once initial compliance is achieved, semi-annual evaluations should be completed to ensure it continues.

**Commitment to Change**

It is imperative that the Port begins the transition period immediately. This requires that the Port’s senior management embrace the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Seaport Security and those of the International Maritime Organization. A sweeping change in the policies of the Port regarding maritime security and the existing Port Security plan are necessary for success.

The following are minimally required:

- The Port must adopt a long-range plan to ensure that real change is achieved and simultaneously commit the necessary resources.
- Senior management must assume participating roles in the process of change, rather than be viewed merely as figureheads. This is paramount if there is to be acceptance by the Port rank and file.
- The Port and the United States Coast Guard must co-sponsor training seminars for their respective staffs as well as major customers utilizing Port facilities.
- There must be an aggressive compliance-monitoring program for compliance with the newly established objectives.
- The Port’s management team will have to re-organize and centralize the Port Police contingent and increase basic staffing levels. This will require a concerted effort due to the aging of the Police force and
the current shortage of qualified applicants.

- Successorship planning is imperative as the Port is in danger of loosing its expertise due to attractive incentives in retirement programs.

- The Port will have to reallocate resources and assign additional staff to address the potential terrorist threat. Substantial funding must be earmarked for training and equipment related to terrorism prevention activities.

- The Port Police will need to enhance their intelligence gathering capabilities and also increase their participation in multi-agency task forces.

**Transition Techniques**

The Port Police management team will have to seek buy in from all concerned parties, then move into a transition period with a timeline for accomplishment of specific objectives. The Port Police will have to prepare a written mission statement for this program of change. Port management will need to meet with the appropriate agencies, (Coast Guard, I.N.S., F.B.I. etc.) and solicit their input and support for the proposed changes in Port operations.

Audit programs must be established to measure the level of compliance with new policies and to identify any areas requiring additional training or resources to achieve the desired results. Management must anticipate some reluctance by employees of the Port Police and other concerned agencies to accept change and constantly reinforce
the need and rationale for the changes. There can be no backing away from the established objectives no matter what degree of resistance is encountered.

In the past, many attempts to implement change have come and gone. The mentality has consistently been to say that change is taking place and because management has said this it must have happened. Nothing could be further from the truth; there must be a serious commitment to change and an ongoing evaluation of the process for change to truly occur.

Change is one of the most painful phenomenons that human beings must endure. It is also inevitable if mankind is to survive. We live in a dynamic world were we must adapt to a myriad of forces acting upon us, some good, and some evil. Change is painful because it requires a departure from routine and is accompanied by a fear of the unknown. Many cling to old methodology because it is comfortable and risk free.

With terrorism, one truth is abundantly clear. Those who would inflict it are constantly changing to identify new targets, new delivery systems, new technologies, and training new personnel to carry out their master plan in furtherance of their beliefs. To resist change in defense of these acts is to be defeated by those who are all too willing to change.
Chapter V

Conclusion

Project Summary

This project has provided a glimpse into some potential futures for the Port of Los Angeles. The recommendations made here are focused on potential problem areas to ensure the optimum or best-case scenario is the outcome.

While the current threat level for terrorist activity in the Port is rated as low, the potential damage that could result from a terrorist act is substantial. Since this is the reality, there must be a strong stand taken to encourage and support anti-terrorist efforts. The laissez-faire method of management will only leave the Port of Los Angeles, and other seaports, vulnerable to both domestic and international acts of terrorism.

Recommendations for the Future

It is recommended that the funds designated for Port Security actually be spent for that purpose without diversion. It is also recommended that the Chief of the Port Police establish quarterly meetings with the Coast Guard, F.B.I., and other concerned agencies to provide ongoing intelligence sharing and current threat assessments. The Port Police must take advantage of available anti-terrorist training and support the efforts of the international maritime community in providing this training to the entire spectrum of maritime security personnel. Finally, it is recommended that the Port expand its efforts to include commercial customers of the Port in some of the training activities that may be of benefit to their respective staffs.
Conclusion

Even though written in 1962, Thomas Schelling’s words as written in the forward to Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decisions by Roberta Wholstetter still ring true:

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he’ll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes someone else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government’s failure to anticipate effectively.

The City of Los Angeles has the busiest Port in the nation. There is a responsibility to ensure that it continues to operate at its highest potential. This responsibility flows not only to the citizens of Los Angeles but also to the nation as a whole as the Port’s activities have a significant impact on the economy of our country. If the Port is to live up to these responsibilities they must dedicate adequate resources to ensure the continued safety and security of all their customers and facilities. Should the Port fail to address the potential for terrorist activity, there is a substantial risk of a
terrorist incident being focused upon the Port by a vessel approaching through the open harbor.

This project has identified several areas that are potentially vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The most significant risk will come from vessels having unlimited access to the Port. The impact of terrorism on the Port of Los Angeles by the year 2010 will correlate directly to the amount of resources dedicated to addressing and preventing maritime terrorist acts.
Appendix B

Interviewees:

1. Noel Cunningham, Chief, Los Angeles Port Police
2. Michael Godward, Captain, Los Angeles Port Police
3. Ronald J. Boyd, Captain, Los Angeles Airport Police
4. Dave Hall, Chief, San Diego Harbor Police
6. Herman Gomez, Captain, Port of Miami, Chairman Security Committee

American Association of Port Authorities
Appendix C:

Nominal Group Technique Panel:

1. Dave Badget, Division Chief, L.A.F.D.
2. Rob Coller, Lieutenant, U.S.C.G
3. Noel Cunningham, Chief, Los Angeles Port Police
4. Louis Garcia, Information Systems Manager, Port of Los Angeles
5. Gordon Galligan, Lieutenant, San Diego Harbor Police
6. Dave Hall, Chief, San Diego Harbor Police
7. Jim Morgan, Pilot Manager, Port of Los Angeles
8. Jay Winter, President, Steamship Association of Southern California
9. Ralph Tracy, Lieutenant, Los Angeles Port Police
Appendix D

List of Trends:

1. Increase in trade and shipping.
2. Increase in union activity.
3. Increase/acceptance of violence.
4. Increase in environmental activism.
7. Anti-government groups joining together.
8. Individual terrorist “nut”.
10. Shipment of weapons/hazardous materials.
11. Apathy of government agencies.
12. Reliance on foreign goods.
13. Demand for personal freedom affecting access.
14. Increased private security.
15. Decreased intelligence sharing/gathering.
16. Decreased organizational leadership.
17. Government unilateral quick fix.
18. Regionalization of operations.
19. Increased civilian population.
20. Hi-Tech weapons availability.
22. Cultural issues.

23. Increased international o/c groups.


26. Decrease in funding.
Appendix E

List of Events:

2. Middle East conflict.
3. Detonation of nuclear device/WMD.
5. Civil unrest.
6. Passenger ship hi-jacking.
7. Gerald Desmond Bridge.
8. Major fire.
9. Major natural disaster.
10. Major oil spill.
11. International labor disruption.
12. Alameda Corridor incident.
14. Terrorist act in other port.
15. Pollution incident.
17. Mutiny on vessel.
18. Environmental piracy.
19. Passenger Ferry accident.
20. Infestation of foreign insect.
21. Court decision impacting police efforts.
22. Federal intervention to port security issue.
23. Hostage situation.
24. Shipping company economic sabotage.
25. Going postal incident.
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