

HOW WILL TERRORISM IMPACT THE FORMATION OF A CONSOLIDATED
REGIONAL POLICE FORCE IN A LARGE METROPOLITAN AREA BY 2010?

A project presented to
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This Command College project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning considerations.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future; creating it constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1:	Issue Identification	
	Introduction	1
	The Decentralized Policing Model	3
	History of Consolidation	5
	The Changing Landscape	10
Chapter 2:	Researching the Future	
	Introduction	14
	Nominal Group Technique Results	16
	Trends	16
	Events	21
	Cross Impact Analysis	28
	Alternative Future Scenarios	33
	Normative Scenario	33
	Pessimistic Scenario	37
	Optimistic Scenario	40
Chapter 3:	Strategic Planning and Implementation	
	Introduction	45
	A Strategic Plan	47
	Transition Management	54
Chapter 4:	The Tri-City Police Authority	
	Introduction	65

	Proposed Deployment of Resources	66
	Chief's Office	67
	Administrative Services Division	68
	Support Services Division	69
	Special Operations Division	71
	Patrol Operations Division	75
Chapter 5:	Conclusion	
	Summary	77
	Implications for Leadership	78
	Conclusion	81
Appendices		
	Appendix A: Nominal Group Technique Panel	84
	Appendix B: Trend List	85
	Appendix C: Event List	87
	Appendix D: Sample Responsibility Chart	88
	Appendix E: Sample Joint Powers Agreement	89
References		107

CHAPTER 1: Issue Identification

Introduction

Wells Fargo Bank and First Interstate Bank did it; Exxon Oil and Mobil Oil did it; and Hewlett Packard and Compaq did it. Big companies pull off mergers all the time, consolidating to form one larger entity. They build on the individual strengths of the other while eliminating the weaknesses, fat, and overlap that each would produce as an individual company.

A long list of banks, manufacturers, retailers, and telecommunications companies have followed a simple line of thinking: two companies with the same focus join forces to form one entity, ideally saving money, cutting overhead, trimming expenses, and producing a better product through synergy. Would it be possible for police departments to successfully do the same thing in order to fight terrorism?

As residents become more aware of the possibility of future terrorist attacks, the demand for greater protection in the form of security services from their local police department has increased. With the federal government and the State of California facing budget deficits resulting from an economic slow down, local municipalities will be forced to tighten their belts. In the very near future, municipal governments will be faced with the dilemma of how to deliver augmented police services in such a climate. This project studies the impact of terrorism on the implementation of a consolidated regional police force in a large metropolitan area by 2010.

For each city, police department costs are becoming responsible for the majority of the municipality's budget. It makes sense that during times of economic hardship, city leaders would look for ways to reduce the cost to provide police services. Contrary

to the idea of finding ways to reduce police costs, is the public demand for greater security from terrorism. Simultaneously, community members and police leadership have devoured the philosophies of community-based policing. Each of these groups has developed an expectation that police officers will initiate closer relationships with their communities, coordinate more social programs, and participate in more non-enforcement police services. With a perceived need to fight terrorism and a desire to maintain the services that community policing requires, financial restrictions may cause communities to choose one or the other. Financial restrictions that limit or reduce police resources strike at the very heart of the regionalization debate (Oppal, 1995) as such police mergers may make it possible for cities to actually increase services as a result of the savings incurred by consolidating.

The idea of regionalizing municipal police departments to form one larger law enforcement agency is not new. In fact, the movements toward the concept of consolidation seem to come and go with economic cycles, changing social ideologies, and outgrowths of divergence in governmental leadership (Halter, 1993). For many law enforcement executives, the idea of combining municipal police departments is inevitable. Underscoring this sentiment, then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge told a group of municipal leaders in 1996 that they could no longer bury their heads in the sand and function as though the rest of the state, nation, and world did not exist. He explained to his reluctant audience that they must rid themselves of the mentality that supports the because-we-have-always-done-it-this-way ideology and urged them to lead through innovation and courage. Ridge suggested that the geographical borders that current municipal leaders hold sacred are undeniably artificial in the face of today's

technological advances and global economy. At this summit, Ridge called for the restructuring of government into a regionalized format (Flannery, 1996). Because of progressive thinking like this, the State of Pennsylvania currently has nearly 30 municipal police departments that have successfully consolidated services over the past 25 years.

The Decentralized Policing Model

The industrial revolution and wealthy Americans interested in protecting their business interests were the catalysts for the creation of modern police departments (Senna, 2002) in the mid-nineteenth century. Mob violence during this era became commonplace and existing law enforcement mechanisms were unable to suppress frequent riots, demonstrations, and strikes. As a result of this social disorder, large municipalities began to form police departments in order to maintain the status quo. Recognizing the potential power that these police departments would possess, many corrupt politicians seized the opportunity to control these organizations. The empowered officials quickly turned most of the initial police departments into a breeding ground for graft, brutality, and ineffective policing.

Almost simultaneously, an expansion to the West Coast was occurring with many settlers establishing small towns in vast land areas. The need for law enforcement in the sparse regions of the new frontier forced such settlers to rely on individual town sheriffs who managed most of the local criminals with a might makes right mentality. In many instances, the town sheriff constituted all aspects of the local criminal justice system.

As small towns grew in size and stature, larger law enforcement needs were recognized and each town developed its own policing effort to fit its individual need. As

the cry for police reforms from angry citizens mounted, the International Association of Chiefs of Police was formed and became the leading voice for the removal of political influence and control of police agencies (Senna, 2002). However, the movement toward police reform took over 50 years. During this time span, most cities across the nation had formed their own police department, and a decentralized American police system was born.

In 1933, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement was formed to study policing in the United States. Within its research and final report, the Wickersham Report, as it was known, noted considerable problems consistent in urban police forces that seriously affected the police in their fight against crime:

The multitude of police forces in any state and the varying standards of organization and services have contributed immeasurably to the general low grade of police performance in this country. The independence which police forces display toward each other in the absence of any central force which requires either a uniform or minimum standard of service leaves the way open for the profitable operation of criminals in an area where protection is often ineffectual at the best, generally only partial, and too frequently wholly absent (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1934, p. 124).

In 1967, thirty-four years after the Wickersham report was published, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice issued a report that studied the decentralized American police model. The commission described American policing as "fragmented, complicated, and frequently overlapping," creating a country that has small police forces, each operating independently within the limits and jurisdiction of their imposed boundaries (Skoler, 1980). It was the opinion of this commission the system of law enforcement was structured in such a way that it was

detrimental to producing effective law enforcement. The commission recommended greater coordination, the sharing of resources, consolidating specialized units and even the merging of entire police services (Skoler, 1980) into one larger body or entity.

In 2002, thirty-five years later, President George W. Bush's State of the Union address identified similar problems with the decentralized policing model. He proclaimed the need for federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to work together to gather intelligence and share information in order to fight terrorism and bolster homeland security. Much like the Wickersham report of 1933 and the 1967 report from the presidential commission, President Bush identified a greater need for law enforcement to enhance agency-to-agency law enforcement coordination, communication, trust, and even consolidation of duties. President Bush's speech was highlighted by revelations the terrorist plot of September 11, 2001 may have been prevented.

The History of Consolidation

There are numerous successful police consolidations that have taken place that are worthy of review. On a somewhat smaller scale, the State of California saw the cities of Larkspur and Corte Madera consolidate their individual police departments into the Twin Cities Police Authority in January of 1980. The merger of these city police departments was the first in the state's history (<http://www.ci.corte-madera.ca.us/police>). The Twin Cities Police Authority serves a citizenry of 21,000 with 44 full time employees who provide full service policing to a geographic area of 8 square miles. Larkspur and Corte Madera are located just 11 miles north of the Golden Gate Bridge (<http://www.ci.corte-madera.ca.us/police>).

The City of Larkspur and the Town of Corte Madera each provide two members of its elected council to form a four-member group that is responsible for policy development for the police authority. This group is known as the Twin Cities Police Council. The police department is managed by the city manager and town manager from each municipality, while a singular chief of police is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the agency (<http://www.ci.corte-madera.ca.us/police>). The police authority was established through a joint powers agreement. According to current Chief of Police Phillip D. Green, the initial consolidation was difficult, but the benefits have greatly outweighed the problems that have arisen. Chief Green proclaims that the consolidation of the two police departments allowed the police authority to form a professional traffic bureau to address problems that each city was experiencing. Without the merger, Chief Green believes a specialized traffic unit would not have been possible (<http://www.ci.corte-madera.ca.us/police>).

The Las Vegas Nevada Metropolitan Police Department was formed through combining the Clark County Sheriff's Department with the municipal police department of Las Vegas on July 1, 1973. Today, this police department serves the City of Las Vegas, the fastest growing city in the United States boasting a population well over 1 million that encompasses 53 square miles. This agency has over 3,000 full time police officers (<http://www.lvmpd.com>).

An elected sheriff leads the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, serving a term of four years. While an appointed Police Commission approves this police department's budget, the sheriff is only answerable to the people through the election process.

The consolidation of these two entities was conducted by the Nevada State Legislature resulting from an outgrowth of the county and city governments (<http://www.lvmpd.com>) squabbling over which of them was to provide services to a small geographic area that was historically rural, but was evolving to an urban environment with municipal needs. The legislature did not make this decision quickly. In fact, it appointed the Local Government Study Committee to review the issue in 1969. It was not until 1972 that this committee was able to make recommendations to form additional committees from all of the impacted local governments with the mission of identifying those services that may be sensibly merged. After this study was completed, the merger of the police departments occurred (<http://www.lvmpd.com>).

One of the most significant and successful consolidation of police services occurred in Canada (Tomovich & Loree, 1989). In 1974, the Peel Regional Police were formed after the incorporation of the former police departments of Mississauga, Port Credit, Streetsville, Brampton, and Chinguacousy. Today, this police force is the second largest municipal agency in the Province of Ontario with over 2,000 full time employees, serving a population of over 950,000. The formation of this regional police department occurred as a result of the creation of the Regional Municipality of Peel, thus bringing all of the different city and county entities under one governmental structure (<http://www.peelpolice.on.ca>). At the time this occurred, the idea of merging services and entire governments was an accepted mainstream solution to providing better services at reduced costs within Canada.

The Peel Regional Police were named after the father of modern policing, Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850). This regional police department has lived up to the reputation

of its historical namesake by earning a world-class reputation for its progressive police services. In 1994, the department was accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), the first police agency in Ontario to achieve this status and only the fifth in Canada. The Peel Regional Police have received many acclaimed awards, including the prestigious Webber-Seavey Award for Quality in Law Enforcement sponsored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Motorola Corporation in 1995 (<http://www.peelpolice.on.ca>).

Beyond the rhetoric of an individual politician, or the transformation made by a single state or the provided examples of consolidated police services that have been successful, there have been many suggested police studies that overtly state or imply the current decentralized American police system is outdated and does not meet the needs of today's citizens.

In 1980, a consolidated police feasibility study was undertaken for the cities of Bell, Bell Gardens, Commerce, Cudahy, and Vernon. These cities are located in the Los Angeles basin, approximately 10 miles from the City of Los Angeles. At the time of this review, the Cities of Bell, Bell Gardens, and Vernon operated their own police departments, while the Cities of Commerce and Cudahy contracted with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. The conclusion of the study recommended that these cities consolidate to form a singular regional police department (Kenney, Adams, Vito, 1980). The authors of this report declared that the newly-formed police department would possess more patrol officers and more detective personnel, develop new specialized units, and save enough money to hire additional civilian employees to support more effective and economical police services (Kenney et al., 1980). This study

proclaimed that the departments would be able to eliminate overlapping assignments (i.e., K-9, crime prevention and background officers) by centralizing such units into one department. The report studied the service demands in all of the cities and found that they did not support the need for each city to have one police officer in each example assignment listed (Kenney et al., 1980). The additional officers would be sent to the patrol or detective sections to increase personnel and service demands. With additional officers, a specialized crime prevention unit was theorized to provide greater community contact and educational programs in the area of home and building security, drug intervention, and driver safety. Several administrative positions such as chiefs, commanders, and captains would be consolidated in this theorized merger of the five cities. The reduction of personnel costs at the top of the organization would theoretically provide funding for the hiring of civilian support personnel. The study projected that the increase in civilian support personnel would allow police officers to spend more time on the street (Kenney et al., 1980) and, thus, become more adept in fighting crime.

In 1996, the Sonoma County Law Enforcement Chiefs' Association of California, which consists of the police chiefs from the cities of Cloverdale, Healdsburg, Rohnert Park, Sebastopol, Cotati, Petaluma, Santa Rosa, Sonoma, and the sheriff from the County of Sonoma, submitted a concept paper to the federal Department of Justice for funding of a comprehensive study that would recommend the most effective manner to structure police services. The association's proposal did not incorporate any preconceived ideas on the appropriate structure of the police department. In fact, the chiefs theorized that all options should be considered, including joint powers agreement,

contractual arrangement, or even a regional consolidated police department. Within this proposal, the association identified the need for each community to retain local identity with its police department, regardless of the manner in which the police organization was formed. The idea of local identity was theorized to be the key element to strive for if a new type of police agency was organized (Sonoma County Law Enforcement Chiefs' Association, 1996). The request for funding for this research was not granted and a formal plan was never established or implemented. However, the concept plan submitted for consideration was extraordinary as it had the support of the executives from each of the police agencies, city managers and other local politicians. Today, law enforcement leaders in this county continue to have a strong interest in the creation of a new policing model to improve police service delivery.

In 2000, a San Francisco Civil Grand Jury Report to study a San Francisco County and City of San Francisco police services merger was concluded. The results of this study recommended the formation of an advisory commission to perform a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of a possible merger between these two police agencies. Preliminarily, the grand jury reported that it could not find any evidence of a police merger that did not ultimately realize financial savings or any merger that was reversed as a result of failure. The investigation into this issue found that police services to the public were increased, specialization was augmented, and expenditures for police services were lowered (San Francisco Civil Grand Jury, 2000).

The Changing Landscape

Terrorism is real and it has caused death and destruction on American soil. The

attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, have caused society to look hard at what is important in life. Many media sources have reported that Americans have been forever changed, as they are less inclined to chase the almighty dollar and seem to be more likely to seek out family members, old friends and a simple, less hectic life. In a recent press conference, Vice-President Dick Cheney told reporters that it was almost a certainty the United States would be attacked again by terrorists (Fournier, 2002). How will law enforcement maintain its critical role of keeping the peace in society under such a changing and seemingly chaotic environment?

For the federal government, the answer to this question is unfolding. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has reorganized itself and established a new mission. The FBI will become less of an investigative agency and more of a proactive organization that will concentrate on defending Americans from terrorism. The FBI will seek out intelligence information on American citizens, persons visiting America, and identify those persons who are from other countries that are bent on the destruction of the United States (Fournier, 2002). The FBI's new mission marks the beginning of a new era for an organization that has not set new goals and objectives for itself in over 50 years. The new Office of Homeland Security (OHS) will focus on centralizing information as it creates a clearinghouse for intelligence information from the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Secret Service. The OHS is defining its role in the shadow of revelations the FBI and CIA that may have been able to stop the terrorists on September 11, 2001 with greater information sharing. The OHS will provide management of intelligence information in order to ensure appropriate action is

taken on areas of concern. President Bush has recently recommended a budget to Congress that would expand the OHS and add a director to the new agency.

For state, county, and local law enforcement the answer is not so simple. Police departments are currently attempting to find ways to fight terrorism as expectations rise from local citizens and budgets shrink. With limited resources and little expertise, most local police agencies do not have the abilities to provide citizens greater security against terrorists' organizations such as Hezbollah, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda.

In the book, The Minding Organization, authors Moshe F. Rubinstein and Iris R. Firstenberg (1999) describe the future in the following manner:

. . . more change is coming, and it is unfolding at a rate more rapid than ever before. To keep up with the complexity and uncertainty of an unconventional and largely unpredictable global world, organizations must embrace a new metaphor that will transform an organization into a minding organization. The minding organization behaves like a living organism, in which adapting is central to vitality and survival.

As described by these two authors, organizations must embrace change and see themselves as constantly evolving. The authors suggest that survival in the future may coincide with an organization's ability to alter itself when necessary in order to sustain attacks on its vitality. Such change, they suggest, will not only allow the organization to survive, but it will become stronger than it was in the past. The organization that makes this transformation will be proactive in its change, anticipating what is needed to survive instead of reacting as a victim of change.

The future calls for extraordinary innovation, the creation of new policing ideas, careful management and planning, and strong leadership in order to survive the great changes that are coming to society.

For many law enforcement agencies, surviving in a future that may bring terrorist attacks each day may mean the need to increase personnel and infrastructure in order to provide the services and expertise that communities of the future will need and expect. For these police departments, they may find what they are looking for in a regional consolidation with other police departments and the creation of a more centralized policing model.

The next chapter identifies possible trends and events that may have a great impact on the implementation of law enforcement mergers and consolidations. The chapter is utilized as a futures research tool as it provides a discussion and analysis of what may occur if the identified trend or event occurs.

CHAPTER 2: Researching the Future

Introduction

A nominal group technique (NGT) is a structured workshop that brings together panelists with diversified experiences, backgrounds and professions, in order to identify and rank trends and events that would affect them as it relates to the topic of discussion. A facilitator, or third party, ushers the group through this process, assists in the clarification of any information, lends insight to discussion, and ensures that the group does not stray from its intended purpose. As a part of the NGT, each participant is asked to provide information, from his or her perspective, on the topic and is asked not to be judgmental or provide commentary when others are providing input. After a brainstorming of ideas, the group is then allowed to discuss each and provide clarifying information if necessary. A ranking of the trends and events follows and an order of importance and magnitude of each is established. The NGT is a meeting that brings about creative decision-making.

A trend is defined as something that has social, technological, economic, environmental, and/or political characteristics and may be measured or estimated over a period of time. Trends should be thought of as occurrences that are gradual and long term. An event occurs at a specific time and date. They are unambiguous, confirmable and make the future different. Events are different than trends, as events are singular incidents (T. Esenten, lecture, November 2001) and do not reoccur.

The implementation of a consolidated regional police force would impact local law enforcement in varying ways and degrees. In order to determine the trends and events that may affect the development of a regional police department and cause

possible futures and have specific impacts, a nominal group technique was conducted with seven participants (see Appendix A).

One month before this meeting, each panelist was provided with the following:

1. A description of the issue.
2. The definitions for a trend and an event.
3. Three articles that provided information about police consolidations.
4. An explanation of the NGT process and its purpose.

During the meeting, the panelists performed the following functions:

1. Brainstorming sessions were initiated to generate trends and events (see Appendices B and C).
2. Panelists responsible for each trend or event provided the group with clarifying information when it was needed.
3. Panelists ranked the most significant trends and events.

For each trend that was identified, the panelists were asked to:

- a. Assign an arbitrary number (100), which was utilized as a baseline to indicate where the individual trend was today, in relationship to the issue being studied.
- b. Evaluate the direction of each trend five years from today and ten years from today by assigning a number that was either higher or lower than the baseline. For example, if a panelist believed that a trend would increase in five years, a number higher than 100 would be assigned at the five-year mark. Likewise, if the trend was

perceived as decreasing at the five year timeline, a number lower than 100 would be assigned.

- c. Provide their individual concern level for each trend, as it related to the issue being researched by utilizing numbers between 1-10 (1 for a low concern level and 10 for a high concern level) to describe their individual perspective.

Nominal Group Technique Results

Trends

The panel's trends and events were tabulated and calculated to reflect the average values associated with each. This accumulated information allowed for the easy identification of differing thoughts among the participants, and those ideas that were found to be unanimous or at least consistent.

During the brainstorming period, the panel identified twenty-five trends (see Appendix B). The panel ranked six of these as being the most significant of the group. In the table below, these six trends are designated beginning with T-1 and ending with T-6. The trend table summarizes the panel's most significant trends. A synopsis of the panel discussion surrounding each of these trends is provided after the table.

Trend Table:

T-1: Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs.

T-2: Liability exposure for law enforcement.

T-3: Desire to have local control of police.

T-4: Cost of police personnel.

T-5: Level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry.

T-6: Number of citizen oversight committees in law enforcement.

Trend	-5 years	Today	+5 years	+10 years	Concern (1-10)
T-1	71	100	157	255	9
T-2	85	100	120	122	5
T-3	95	100	102	91	9
T-4	111	100	85	81	8
T-5	90	100	138	175	5
T-6	90	100	116	115	5

The first trend (T-1) that was identified by the panel was “resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs.” The panel believed that cities have increased their awareness to the benefits of joining forces. The panel of participants believed that by working in unison, cities have the potential to gain greater political clout, reduce cost with less duplication of services, and increase purchasing power in the market place with their ability to gain price reduction with significantly larger unit purchases. In fact, the panel felt that over the next ten years, municipalities would increase the trend of resource sharing from today’s baseline of 100 to 255. The participants rated the concern level of this trend very high (9) and observed that resource sharing would have a direct impact on the development of a consolidated municipal police department in the future. One of the panelist used a recent example of his city joining with three other cities to purchase a power production facility out of state to ensure a consistent flow of electricity for citizens in these energy-troubled times. Another panelist suggested that resource-sharing would happen incrementally and often. This person explained how politicians, city managers, and citizens will use this strategy, become familiar with its successes and, as he stated, “After traveling down this road, the city will turn around and look what has been accomplished with such

cooperative efforts and realize that there is no way to go back". This panelist suggested that this would eventually lead to the acceptance of the idea that great gains may be made through the consolidation of municipal police departments. One of the private sector panelists explained how consumers would drive the phenomenon of merged police departments. This panelist believed that resource-sharing will increase as consumers will want "one stop shopping", so to speak, and will have a desire to cut back on the duplication of government services and overall bureaucracy.

The second trend (T-2) identified by the panel was "liability exposure for law enforcement". The participants all observed this issue as increasing, slightly, for municipal governments, issuing this trend an increase from 100 to 120. The concern level of this trend and its impact on a regional consolidated police force was only ranked as moderate (5). However, the panel was clearly split on this issue. One group supported the idea that a consolidated police force would create greater consistency in the areas of training, policy implementation, and operations along with an effective tool to communicate information. The group thought that these advantages would create an agency that decreased its exposure to liability. The other group argued that the creation of a larger police entity makes it more difficult to implement accountability, leadership, vision, and establishing proper day-to-day procedures. This group thought that the larger agency would increase police liability due to these difficulties.

The third trend (T-3) identified by the group was "the desire to have local control of police." The panel believed that there would be a very small increase in this trend over a five-year period, increasing from the baseline of 100 to a mere 102. However, they believed that this trend would eventually decrease in a ten-year period to 91.

During the discussion, the participants agreed that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, along with greater acceptance and successes of the sharing of resources (T-1) by municipalities would cause a shift in thinking for politicians and the public. The group theorized that a larger police department with more resources would offer greater prevention against terrorism and bring greater services to the public. One of the participants disagreed. This panelist is a local politician and his perspective was much different than the members of the group. This participant said that it was his belief that community members would want their own police department and not merely become a member of a larger consolidated effort. It was his opinion that such citizens would place great pressure on elected officials to oppose any mergers in order to retain the city's individual police department and the citizens' power to be involved in the community policing effort. It was the opinion of this participant that the merger of a group of police departments was contrary to the ideals of community policing and the goals of increasing citizen-police relationships. This trend was clearly controversial and all of the participants rated their individual concern level very high (7 or above) with the average being 9.

The fourth trend (T-4) identified by this panel was "the cost of police personnel." The group was cohesive as it described this trend as the increasing personnel costs in the law enforcement profession and a decreasing ability for a city to increase its revenue. The panelists described the slowing economy, reduced desire of citizens to pay greater taxes, and a city's inability to generate revenue through business growth initiatives. The panel's concern level for this trend was very high (8), as it believed that the drive to form a consolidated municipal police department would come directly from

the need to reduce costs for police services. Each of the panelist agreed that approximately 90% of the expense to provide police services involved personnel costs.

The fifth trend (T-5) identified by the participants was “the level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry.” The panelists specifically noted the increased number of citizens who speak multiple languages and live by different cultures, a continuance of an increasing Hispanic population, and the need to provide specialized services to an exploding population of elderly. The participants believed that community members have become less homogeneous than in the past and will continue to get more complex and diverse. The panel calculated that demands on police services would increase from a baseline of 100, increasing to 138 in 5 years and the participants concluded an increase from 138 to 175 in 10 years. The panel suggested the growing diversity of the citizens that are serviced would place greater demands on law enforcement as police personnel would have to become familiar with a variety of languages, customs, and other special needs. All but one of the panelists rated the concern level of this trend as moderate (5) to the impact of a consolidated municipal police force. The individual panelist who perceived this trend differently was a professional in the private sector who had experience dealing with many entities with his company’s service. This company provided its service on a regional basis. This panelist believed that a regional police department allowed for greater resources in the area of language and cultural diversification along with increased abilities to provide more innovative ideas to deal with a change in the age demographic. The idea from this panelist centered on synergy and the philosophy that more input, from more people, brings greater ideas.

The sixth trend (T-6) that was identified by the panel was “the number of citizen oversight committees in law enforcement.” The panel believed that many police departments currently perform community-policing functions, which include some sort of citizen involvement and even citizen oversight committees. It was the opinion of the panel that community-policing philosophies would exist well into the future and would ultimately involve citizens more and more. With this premise in mind, the participants concluded that the number of police departments implementing community-policing would grow with time, and it would only make sense that citizen oversight committees would grow as a result of such practices. The panel members believed that these oversight committees would initially increase but eventually level off. This sentiment is reflected in the trend table with the baseline score beginning at 100, increasing to 115 for the five year period and then slightly decreasing to 114 over ten years. The group believed that citizens would become involved as a fad and later remove themselves as their individual commitment waned.

Events

For each event that was identified, the panelists were asked to:

- a. Identify the first year when they felt the event had a 1% possibility of occurrence.
- b. Identify the event’s possibility of occurrence as a percentage, ranging from 0 to 100% in five years.
- c. Identify the event’s possibility of occurrence as a percentage, ranging from 0 to 100% in ten years.

- d. Identify the impact of the event by the issuance of a number between –10 and +10, assigned to each event, with the higher number having the greatest impact to the issue being researched.

During an initial brainstorming period, the panel identified twenty-five events (see Appendix C) they felt would change the future and possibly lead to the development of a consolidated municipal police force. Of these events, the panel ranked six of these as being the most significant. In the table below, these six events are designated beginning with E-1 and ending with E-6. The event table summarizes the panel’s most significant events. A synopsis of the panel discussion surrounding each event is provided after the table.

Event Table:

E-1: A second large terrorist attack on the United States.

E-2: A catastrophic natural disaster.

E-3: A catastrophic communication failure between police departments.

E-4: An open border with Mexico.

E-5: The mainstream use of video technology by citizens and police.

E-6: Police officers forming a statewide union.

Event	Year(s) > 0	+5 years	+10 years	Impact –10 to +10
E-1	1	100%	100%	7.5
E-2	12	0%	14%	5
E-3	2	24%	47%	7
E-4	4	13%	33%	3
E-5	1	49%	91%	1
E-6	9	0%	4%	8.5

The first event (E-1) that was identified by the group was “a second large-scale terrorist attack on the United States.” The participants felt that the United States would be subjected to more terrorist attacks in the future. During the discussion, the panelists described the environment of Israel and the way individual suicide bombers infiltrate public areas and kill themselves and Israeli citizens. The entire group believed that America would be subjected to daily attacks and eventually a very large plot, much like the one that occurred on September 11th, 2001. It was the consensus of the participants that the adversarial ideals of freedom and security would be the greatest weakness the country would face in its fight against future terrorist acts. The panel members believed that E-1 had at least a 1% probability of occurring within the next one or two years and a 100% chance of occurring within the next five years. Additionally, the group explained that such an event as E-1 might have a great impact on the initiation of creating a more centralized policing model to combat the tide of terrorism. The participants explained that individual law enforcement agencies would struggle to be less successful in responding to or preventing a major terrorist attack. The group decided that the occurrence of another large terrorist attack would force law enforcement agencies to collaborate and join forces in order to overcome the numerous effects of such an event. It was theorized that police collaboration over this event would demonstrate the effectiveness of such a centralized police model, creating a desire to join forces on a permanent basis. The panel rated impact of this event to be significant to the development of a regional police force. The panel demonstrated their strong feelings of this event’s impact by its issuance of a 7.5 average score.

The second event (E-2) that the panel identified was “a catastrophic natural disaster.” Members of the panel described this natural disaster as the type of earthquake that causes long-term electricity scarcity, water and food shortages, transportation stoppages, with the most common types of communication eliminated. The participants displayed a great amount of difference in their anticipated timeline for such a natural disaster to occur. The first year of probability ranged from 1, 3, 5, 5, 10, 10, and 50 years among the panelists. Each of them described a situation where nature is unpredictable and such an event could occur at any time. This type of differing timeline remained consistent 5 and 10 years from now. The panel thought that the range of scores was easily explained as each of them considered the difficulty in predicting such an event. As a result of the wide range of scores, the panel’s average first year for probability of occurrence for this event equaled 14-years, resulting in a zero probability within the five-year time span. An interesting discussion took place regarding the impact of such a disaster on the formation of a consolidated regional police force. The two police chiefs on the panel believed that the occurrence of E-2 would cause such great strain on local citizens that municipal police departments would be forever left as a decentralized police model since citizens would fear not having their own exclusive police department. The other panel members believed the opposite, and identified E-2 much like E-1, as a galvanizing force for the initiation of a regional policing effort. The impact of E-1 was considered moderate, as the group was split on this topic.

The third event (E-3) identified by the group was “a catastrophic communication failure between police departments.” On a day-to-day basis, the panel felt that law enforcement did not communicate effectively with each other. Some examples were

noted where a crime occurred across jurisdictional boundaries and the several police agencies working together on a case had not received all of, or only gained bits of, information from each other. With this, the participants felt that a very important incident (i.e., a criminal investigation, terrorist action, or localized emergency) would occur where it would be imperative for several law enforcement agencies to communicate information, share intelligence, and routinely organize themselves to be effective to complete the task at hand. The panel felt such an incident would present itself, and based on a sordid history of poor communication between agencies, the involved police departments would fail miserably and cause the loss of life and destruction of property, causing public confidence in the decentralized model of policing to become wanting. The panel was fairly consistent in its timeline of occurrence, indicating that such an event had a 24% possibility of occurrence within two years and a probability of 47% chance of occurrence over the next ten years. The panel rated the overall impact of E-3 as very high (7). However, one of the panelists, a local politician, did not feel that the impact of E-3 would be quite as daunting. His rationale for this thought was his understanding of technological advances and current efforts that will make communication failures less and less common. He noted the initiatives of federal government, along with state and local, to fund efforts of interoperability among municipalities to increase interagency communications. He explained that the concept of radio interoperability would connect groups of police agencies together on one digital radio channel. This panelist scored the impact for this event very low, resulting in a lower average for the overall impact score.

The fourth event (E-4) that was identified by the group was “an open border with Mexico.” The panel was very diverse in its time measurement of when such an event had an initial chance of occurrence. From a high of 10 years to a low of 1 year, the panel produced an average of approximately 4 years when E-4 would have its first probability of occurrence. The discussion from the group was centered on free trade, terrorism, and the need of California’s migrant work force. At the end of the conversation, the panel came to realize that the diversity in the numbers they assigned to this event was a direct result of understanding that E-4 may be very possible or very impossible depending upon the political environment. The panel had varying opinions of when this would happen based upon how they currently view the political landscape. The impact assessment of E-4 by the group was low. They explained this low assessment by sharing the belief that the circumstances with which the decision to open the border with Mexico would be as meaningful as the act itself. In other words, the group would be inclined to raise their assessment of the impact of E-4 if it occurred as a result of a terrorist act or other incident. But, the group would lower its assessment score of E-4 if it occurred as a result of economics or politics.

The fifth event (E-5) identified by the participants was “the mainstream use of video technology by citizens and police.” The panel agreed that citizens and police departments, to some degree, are currently utilizing video technology. However, the participants conveyed this event as a technological break-through that made video technology as common as a telephone in a household. The vision of the panelists was that such advanced technology would link citizens and police with real time streaming video. This type of video technology immediately transmits from one location to another

with little or no time delay. The panel believed the technology would allow contact with the police from anywhere at anytime. The group felt that technology is very close to having something of this nature and assessed that such an event could occur within one or two years. Accordingly, the panel believed that such video equipment would be in use with a 49% chance of probability over the next five years and a 91% chance of probability within the next ten years. Linking this assessment with the issue being discussed, the group had varying opinions on the impact of E-5. Four members of the group argued that such technology might defeat the idea of a consolidated municipal police department. These four members explained that police departments offer minimal public access and limited opportunities to communicate with their communities. They believed the use of video would increase public access and ease communication between police and citizens. This portion of the group believed that the issues of communication and access were valid and increasingly frustrating for the public. They identified video technology as a possible solution to these problems. The four panel members thought that this technology would make citizens more supportive of their local police departments, defeating a movement not to merge police agencies. The other half of the panel maintained that video technology would not be a determining factor in the development of a consolidated police department. This portion of the group only saw this technology as another tool to be used for law enforcement and did not attach the success or failure of the overall issue to it. With the panel split on the issue of impact, the score in this area was very low (1).

The sixth event (E-6) identified was “police officers forming a statewide union.” As the panel discussed this event, they displayed a great understanding of union issues

and the great impact that police unions would have on the success or failure on a merger of police departments. However, the panel pinpointed that what is important to a member from one department may not be important to a member from a different department. As this was discussed, the panel found agreement on the idea that a singular police union would be very difficult to form and such a formation had a very low probability of occurrence. In fact, the group only identified an approximate 4% probability of E-6 occurring within the next ten years. This low probability of occurrence did not affect the group's thinking of the impact of such an event if it did occur. The panel termed E-6 as one of those events that are "low probability, but high impact". The participants established E-6 with having great impact on the issue at hand by attaching to it the highest average score in the category of impact. The group believed that the coming together of all police officers in the state under the umbrella of one union would significantly increase the opportunity to create a merger of police departments or even one singular state police agency.

Cross Impact Analysis

The table below lists each of the trends and events and graphically illustrates how each event may affect each of the trends. Two members of the panel were asked to assist in providing input for this analysis through discussion and by eventually assigning a numeric value to the cross impact of each event on each trend. If the panelists provided a number of 0, it meant that they perceived that the event had no impact on the trend. If they believed that the event had a positive impact on the trend, a number of 1 to 5 was assigned with the higher number indicating the more positive

impact of the event on the trend. If the panelists believed that the event had a negative impact on the trend, a number of -1 to -5 was assigned with the higher number indicating the more negative impact of the event on the trend. An average number was calculated after the assisting panelists submitted their scores.

This analysis is an attempt to derive what is good and bad relative to the issue being reviewed. This portion of the analysis is very subjective and may be viewed differently depending upon point of view. The greater the positive number means that the effect of the event on the trend is good. The greater the negative number means that the effect of the event on the trend is bad. The terms good and bad are simply a judgment of what is desired (good) and what is not desired (bad) to happen.

The table below depicts the cross impact analysis of each event on every trend. The score for each may be found by locating the area where the two intersect. Following the table, an analysis is provided for the events that had the most significant effect on the trends.

Cross Impact Analysis Table:

T-1: Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs.

T-2: Liability exposure for law enforcement.

T-3: Desire to have local control of police.

T-4: Cost of police personnel.

T-5: Level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry.

T-6: Number of citizen oversight committees in law enforcement.

E-1: A second large terrorist attack on the United States.

E-2: A catastrophic natural disaster.

E-3: A catastrophic communication failure between police departments.

E-4: An open border with Mexico.

E-5: The mainstream use of video technology by citizens and police.

E-6: Police officers forming a statewide union.

	T-1	T-2	T-3	T-4	T-5	T-6
E-1	+5	+3	+4	+3	0	+1
E-2	+4	0	-4	0	0	0
E-3	+4	-2	+4	0	0	-1
E-4	0	0	0	0	-5	-1
E-5	+1	+1	+1	+2	+2	+1
E-6	-2	0	0	-2	0	+1

Event 1:

The occurrence of a second terrorist attack against the United States, (E-1) had the greatest impact on the most trends. It is interesting to see that such a horrific, negative event may provide more positive or good impact to most of the listed trends. For example, the sharing of other city's resources was displayed in New York City after the attacks on the World Trade Center. Municipal leaders all over the country offered to share personnel and equipment (T-1) in the rescue and recovery efforts after the incident occurred. Such an event galvanized city governments to resource share to enhance effectiveness and lower costs for New York City under one of the most basic and heralded human traits: empathy. This event was rated to have the highest, most positive effect (+5) on the trend.

A discussion of the liability exposure for law enforcement (T-2) has an interestingly positive outcome when measured against a second large terrorist attack (E-1). The attack of September 11, 2001, has allowed law enforcement to perform functions that abridge individual freedoms in the endeavor of achieving national security

that would not have been tolerated by the public, the court system and prosecutors in the past. While this research paper does not condone actions that reduce a person's civil liberties, it would be a grave oversight not to point out the increased public tolerance for police intrusiveness that has occurred in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, in exchange for an attempt at greater security. It may be that such a phenomenon translates into less liability exposure to law enforcement (T-2). It is theorized that the occurrence of E-1 would only increase the public's tolerance and inversely affect liability to police agencies. On the issue of liability exposure alone, this may be seen as a positive or good outcome as long as officers understand that they are still bound to uphold the public trust and not become abusive in the process.

E-1 might have a profound positive effect on the desire to give up local control of a police department (T-3). The need to rally personnel resources, specialized expertise, and equipment in the aftermath of a large terrorist attack may be the impetus to consolidate smaller police departments. The pressure of providing citizens with proper police services may cause city leaders to change their stance on the issue of local control for the enhanced resources that would occur under a consolidation. The desire to control or have control over one's own police department might evaporate as the needs of the many overcome the needs of the few.

A second terrorist attack (E-1) has the potential to drive down personnel cost (T-4). It may be that such an attack is seen by Generation X and Y as a call to arms to join law enforcement in order to fight terrorism. Much like the Great Generation flooded the armed services to participate in World War II, the nation's youngest generations may see this as an opportunity to make their mark in history. With a flooded police candidate

market, the rule of supply and demand would allow police agencies to reduce benefit packages and salary, as the pool of candidates would be increased. This would be possible as a candidate's motivation for joining law enforcement would not come from money, but something intangible: patriotism.

Event 2:

It was theorized that the occurrence of a catastrophic natural disaster (E-2) might have significant positive effects that would increase resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower cost (T-1). In a natural disaster setting, local municipalities commonly assist each other to restore order and preserve human life. However, the effect of this event on this trend is a forced relationship as a result of a devastating incident and not seen as initiated for the perpetual good of law enforcement. Because this was seen as something that communities did not seek out on their own in order to survive, the sharing of such resources was seen as short-term with no lasting effect.

Most citizens view the local police department as belonging to them. It is possible that a desire to give up local control of a police department (T-3) would be negatively affected by a catastrophic natural disaster (E-2). Such an event would have residents needing and wanting their local police departments more than ever and looking to this agency for leadership. The panel felt citizens would not want to give this control up for the betterment of a regional effort.

Event 4:

An open border with Mexico (E-4) produced a powerful negative impact on the demands placed on law enforcement by the changing area demographics (T-5). It was

theorized that many Southern California communities would greatly increase their bilingual Mexican population and provide law enforcement officers with a magnitude of language and cultural challenges that are already out of proportion today. Also, with a greater influx of Mexican citizens into the United States, local law enforcement would find itself a precarious situation. Factions of citizens support illegal migration to this country and other factions adamantly oppose it. Many times, local authorities are left in a very volatile political situation when enforcing laws, receiving criticism from both sides: one group expressing the opinion that police officers are racist due to their actions and the other group wanting greater enforcement efforts and complaining that officers are too lenient.

Alternative Future Scenarios

Ultimately, the NGT exercise provides possible futures through the cross impact analysis and suggested impacts when events affect trends. To provide greater clarity to the possible futures that these events and trends may create, three scenarios have been depicted to develop and focus the subject matter. The three scenarios create futures that are normative, pessimistic, and optimistic.

Normative Scenario:

September 11, 2010

It is a hot September day in the Los Angeles basin. At 7:00 a.m., the city-bound commuters on the 10 and 210 freeways are using their air conditioners to soothe the sun's pounding rays. Already, it is eighty degrees and by the lunch hour the heat will drive thermometers up to triple digits. Traffic is snarled and the occupants of each car

tune into their favorite radio talk show to hear the latest garbage that is being portrayed as news. A large yellow truck eases off of the 210 freeway and maneuvers itself through the downtown area of Burbank and parks in front of an elementary school where 700 students attend each day. Two young men wait inside the cab of the truck nervous that they will be detected; each looks from side to side in an effort to locate any passersby. Each of the men is somber, serious, and dedicated to their mission. They have waited patiently for nearly 10 years. They have planned the mission with precision and will die for its cause.

In the suburban cities of Glendale and Pasadena (approximately 10 miles from Los Angeles), the same plot is unfolding. Young men working in pairs, driving large trucks containing tons of explosives are positioning themselves in public areas where children and young adults are present.

It has been nine long years since the United States felt the hate of the holy war and watched hundreds of New Yorkers jump from the burning World Trade Center to their ultimate death. The buildings that eventually came down symbolized the end of the safety and security that Americans unwittingly took for granted.

During the years after the World Trade Center attack, the nation went to war, attacking terrorist cells in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Iran, and Korea. President George W. Bush took exhaustive measures to complete the demise and eventual assassination of Saddam Hussein in the name of world security. For nine years, the United States government tightened its security, increased its intelligence, and sifted through endless pieces of gathered information that included terrorist threats of nuclear

attacks, hi-jacked airplanes, biological warfare, and other diatribes of projected horrific death and destruction of Americans. None of these occurred.

In nine years, the American public grew weary of the threats, increased taxes, and extraordinary security that inconvenienced even a trip to the grocery store. As a result, most of its citizens believed the terrorists were gone and they longed for the days of a bustling economy, low taxes, and an end to the daily color-coded terror warnings from the Director of Homeland Security. With no other attacks occurring on American soil, the public had become desensitized to the possibility of such an attack ever occurring again. As a result of this public sentiment, small local police departments ended their focus on terrorism by lessening security details, awareness, and overall philosophy to a pre-terrorism era disposition.

At 7:05 a.m., all of the trucks are in place. Like a well-oiled machine, cellular telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams. The orders are given to detonate after assuring each team leader that God is pleased with their mission. Trucks explode in Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena, tearing through the buildings and killing many of its occupants. In total, this attack kills 2,018 Americans in three cities. As the victims are identified, it is found that nearly two-thirds of them are under the age of twenty.

During the initial hours, and extending to many days and weeks following this multi-city terrorist attack, affected municipalities called upon mutual aid agreements so they could share police services in an extensive fashion.

The response and cooperativeness of the cities and their neighbors is courageous and generous, but it is also uncoordinated and slow. Each city lacks the

ability to communicate with each other as radio systems are decentralized and fragmented due to their individuality and lack of mutual vision of what the future held.

Patrol officers and detective personnel are pooled together to perform their respective duties. Patrol personnel resources are used to provide the basic law enforcement functions, as the local officers are needed for rescue and eventually recovery efforts. Detective personnel are utilized to provide follow up investigations to ensure those cases that concerned threats of public safety are adequately brought to completion. Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT) are consolidated and used as regional response teams as there are fears that additional terrorist attacks are eminent. Police officers with canines are reduced in number and sent to locations that require more rescue personnel. Two canine units are utilized to cover any requests that involve the use of a police dog throughout the tri-city area. Helicopter patrols from the Pasadena Police Department extend their regular patrol services beyond their city boundaries to provide air support to the other affected cities.

The city councils of the three besieged cities release local control of their police departments for the time being and allow a complete sharing of resources to cope with the disaster at hand. The politicians view this occurrence as an attack on the United States, and not an attack on the individual cities. Thus, the leadership is united to fight against a mutual enemy and trust one another to share each other's resources. Territorial boundaries and any local squabbles that exist are wiped out in the name of patriotism.

Within six months of this terrible disaster, each municipality returns its resources home and begins assessing the hometown's need. Cooperation among the three cities,

and those throughout the valley exist, but the configuration of police services that is put into place to respond to the disaster dissolves.

Pessimistic Scenario:

September 11, 2010

It is a hot September day in the Los Angeles basin. At 7:00 a.m., the city bound commuters on the 10 and 210 freeways are using their air conditioners to soothe the sun's pounding rays. Already, it is eighty degrees and by the lunch hour the heat will drive thermometers up to triple digits. Traffic is snarled and the occupants of each car tune into their favorite radio talk show to hear the latest garbage that is being portrayed as news. A large yellow truck eases off of the 210 freeway and maneuvers itself through the downtown area of Burbank and parks in front of an elementary school where 700 students attend each day. Two young men wait inside the cab of the truck, nervous that they will be detected; each looks from side to side in an effort to locate any passersby. Each of the men is somber, serious, and dedicated to their mission. They have waited patiently for nearly 10 years. They have planned the mission with precision and will die for its cause.

In the suburban cities of Alhambra and Pasadena (approximately 10 miles from Los Angeles), the same plot is unfolding. Young men working in pairs, driving large trucks containing tons of explosives are positioning themselves in public areas where children and young adults are present.

It has been nine long years since the United States felt the hate of the holy war and watched hundreds of New Yorkers jump from the burning World Trade Center to

their ultimate death. The buildings that eventually came down symbolized the end of the safety and security that Americans unwittingly took for granted.

During the years after the World Trade Center attack, the nation went to war, attacking terrorist cells in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Iran, and Korea. President George W. Bush took exhaustive measures to complete the demise and eventual assassination of Saddam Hussein in the name of world security. For nine years, the United States government tightened its security, increased its intelligence, and sifted through endless pieces of gathered information that included terrorist threats of nuclear attacks, hi-jacked airplanes, biological warfare, and other diatribes of projected horrific death and destruction of Americans. None of these occurred.

In nine years, the American public grew weary of the threats, increased taxes, and extraordinary security that inconvenienced even a trip to the grocery store. As a result, most of its citizens believed the terrorists were gone and they longed for the days of a bustling economy, low taxes, and an end to the daily color-coded terror warnings from the Director of Homeland Security. With no other attacks occurring on American soil, the public had become desensitized to the possibility of such an attack ever occurring again. As a result of this public sentiment, small local police departments ended their focus on terrorism by lessening security details, awareness, and overall philosophy to a pre-terrorism era disposition.

At 7:05 a.m., all of the trucks are in place. Like a well-oiled machine, cellular telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams. The orders are given to detonate after assuring each team leader that God is pleased with their mission. Each of the trucks explodes, tearing through the buildings and killing many of

its occupants. In total, this attack kills 4,018 Americans in three cities. As the victims are identified, it is found that nearly two-thirds of them are under the age of twenty.

Each of the cities is in chaos. There are not enough police resources to properly respond to such an incident and mutual aid agreements are not in place. Nearly eight years ago, the desire for local control of police departments from community members and powerful politicians caused the local chiefs to withdraw from any agreement that did not allow direct control to come from within their own departments. With this sentiment, any type of structured mutual response to such a terrorist attack was found to be impossible. As a result, it is estimated that an additional 1,001 lives were lost when emergency personnel responded and lacked proper training, equipment, communications, and the ability to call upon neighboring municipalities for assistance. The death toll increased to 5,019 due to these circumstances.

In the weeks, months, and years that followed this horrific event, criticism of law enforcement's response to this attack was fast and furious. Community leaders spoke out against the police department's leadership and each of the police departments were blamed for the loss of life that many considered a result of the slow and inadequate response to each of the scenes, along with the failure to possess a vision of the future. Many of the police officers in each of the agencies experienced a loss of morale and experienced posttraumatic stress disorder. A high number of officers retired from law enforcement due to psychological problems associated with the terrorist attack while others optioned to lateral to other police agencies outside of the three cities.

Like a group of dominos falling, the exiting police personnel created historically high rates of vacancies. Most of the three police departments attempted to recruit new

hires with bonuses, better retirement plans, lifetime medical plans, and other costly incentives that doubled the cost of personnel when compared to the benefit packages before the attacks on the cities. The gap between increasing personnel costs and decreasing opportunities for each of the cities to generate revenue in the era of terrorism was continuing to expand with no easy solution identified.

Optimistic Scenario

September 11, 2010

It is a hot September day in the Los Angeles basin. At 7:00 a.m., the city bound commuters on the 10 and 210 freeways are using their air conditioners to soothe the sun's pounding rays. Already, it is eighty degrees and by the lunch hour the heat will drive thermometers up to triple digits. Traffic is snarled and the occupants of each car tune into their favorite radio talk show to hear the latest garbage that is being portrayed as news. A large yellow truck eases off of the 210 freeway and maneuvers itself through the downtown area of Burbank and parks in front of an elementary school where 700 students attend each day. Two young men wait inside the cab of the truck, nervous that they will be detected; each looks from side to side in an effort to locate any passersby. Each of the men is somber, serious, and dedicated to their mission. They have waited patiently for nearly 10 years. They have planned the mission with precision and will die for its cause.

In the suburban cities of Glendale and Pasadena (approximately 10 miles from Los Angeles), the same plot is unfolding. Young men working in pairs, driving large

trucks containing tons of explosives are positioning themselves in public areas where children and young adults are present.

It has been nine long years since the United States felt the hate of the holy war and watched hundreds of New Yorkers jump from the burning World Trade Center to their ultimate death. The buildings that eventually came down symbolized the end of the safety and security that Americans unwittingly took for granted.

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In nine years, the American public grew weary of the threats, increased taxes, and extraordinary security that inconvenienced even a trip to the grocery store. As a result, most of its citizens believed the terrorists were gone and they longed for the days of a bustling economy, low taxes, and an end to the daily color-coded terror warnings from the Director of Homeland Security. With no other attacks occurring on American soil, the public had become desensitized to the possibility of such an attack ever occurring again. As a result of this public sentiment, some small local police departments ended their focus on terrorism by lessening security details, awareness, and overall philosophy to a pre-terrorism era disposition.

At 7:05 a.m., all of the trucks are in place. Like a well-oiled machine, cellular telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams. The orders are given to detonate after assuring each team leader that God is pleased with their mission. Each of the teams' attempt to detonate their bombs, but nothing happens.

Meanwhile, the Anti-Terrorist Section (ATS) of the Tri-Cities Police Authority has three different units in place to watch each of the terrorists' trucks carefully, while members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team are also deployed at each of the locations in case an immediate assault is necessary. The ATS command intercepts and listens to the incoming cellular telephone calls that order the terrorists to carry out their plans. As the orders come to the terrorists telephonically, the ATS leadership instructs the SWAT officers to arrest the occupants of the trucks. The tactical teams swarm the trucks, removing the terrorists and placing them under arrest.

The ATS had infiltrated the terrorist cell nearly two years ago, managing to identify the locations where their explosives would be purchased. The ATS arranged for each of the sales to the terrorist to be non-explosive material that would cause no public safety hazard. The public and the police officers making the arrest were never in danger.

The Tri-Cities Police Authority was formed in 2005 after the terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center and several successful regional programs proved the idea of police consolidation worthy of a try. Within this small suburban area, the police departments of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena created a regional atmosphere of sharing resources by introducing new programs in small increments. Beginning in 1998, the police departments funded helicopter patrols of all the cities; set up a singular

SWAT team; and a three-city canine unit. All of these programs allowed many personnel resources to transfer from their old assignments to other areas that required more personnel, including seven police officers, one sergeant and one lieutenant to a tri-city Anti-Terrorist Task Force.

With great success in these regional programs, the three police departments began theorizing a merger. With two of the three police chiefs available for retirement in 2003, a plan was put forward to study the issue of consolidation and make recommendations. In 2005, a plan was initiated and the Tri-Cities Police Authority was born. This new department was under the leadership of one police chief and a police Board of Governors that represented each of the cities equally.

This chapter's future forecasting identified the most significant events that would greatly impact already occurring trends in law enforcement. The panel was comprised of a varied group of persons with a distinguished background and expertise ranging from the fields of politics, education, private business, and law enforcement. At the end of the panel discussion, each of the panel members were asked if a regional consolidated police force would be an effective way to approach the future of policing in order to provide some of the needed solutions to many of these trends and potential events. Without exception, the members of the group agreed that such a police model would be effective, but most agreed that it would take a great deal of time and influence to have such a merger occur. When the group answered this last question, they discussed the possibilities of this large police consolidation and the specific types of positive impact such a police model would bring to the three cities and the San Gabriel Valley. The

information that they discussed was utilized to write the normative, pessimistic, and optimistic scenarios.

The optimistic scenario demonstrates, without providing great details, the elimination of overlapping resources, the potential creation of much-needed specialized police units, along with the implied ideas of saving money and diverting it to greater policing needs when the hierarchy from all of the police departments are reduced.

The next chapter focuses on a strategic plan and transition management to implement the possible optimistic future that is described in the future scenarios.

CHAPTER 3: Strategic Planning and Implementation

Introduction

Strategic planning may be defined as a structured, rational approach of bringing anticipations of the future to bear on today's decisions (T. Esenten, lecture, March, 2001). Without trying to anticipate the future, attempting to make appropriate decisions becomes a game of chance. In order for law enforcement to better prepare itself in a changing world, it must have the ability to look forward and anticipate what is occurring on the horizon. Such forward thinking should not be limited to a singular profession, but an understanding of how such changes affect the world as a whole. To gain such insight, scanning may be employed to identify trends or signals that have social, technological, environmental, economic, or political (STEEP) characteristics. Once identified, a vision, mission, and set of goals may be established in order to properly deal with any possible future.

Looking forward and identifying possible trends and subtle signals of coming change may assist organizations to predict possible futures and their impacts. This planning allows organizations to design outcomes instead of waiting for them to occur. Within the concept of strategic planning, organizations will be able to:

1. Direct the future by developing organizational direction and purpose
2. Identify issues and set priorities
3. Build a culture of inclusion by seeking input from employees and customers
4. Focus resources on target areas
5. Create a framework for budgets and operations in order to accomplish goals
6. Enhance internal coordination through an agreed upon mission

7. Establish accountability by assigning specific duties

Police departments have gained a reputation for accepting the status quo and not having the ability to identify those trends and signals of things that may point to future criminal occurrences, general public disorder, or community discontent. For decades, law enforcement has been evaluated by their response to occurrences instead of their ability to be proactive.

Perhaps this is best exemplified with the investigative probes that the United States Congress has initiated to ascertain the failure of law enforcement to stop the attacks of September 11, 2001. The information that Congress has unveiled to the public underscores the problem of law enforcement's inability to read the signposts of what was coming, even when numerous individual law enforcement persons saw many faint signals. This example of failing to connect the dots to a future outcome, sustains the perception that law enforcement officials failed to act on information that they possessed in order to stop Osama bin Laden's horrific plot.

The federal government is predicting, through its gathering of intelligence information, that more terrorist attacks will occur on American soil. As a result of such dire projections, federal authorities have proclaimed that American deaths will be unavoidable (Fournier, 2002). Many of the so-called experts see an American future society that parallels that of present day Israel, including suicide and homicide bombers, attacks on American youth and young adults, and the need for Americans to forfeit some of their freedoms for greater security. The federal government is quickly reorganizing the mission and duties of its law enforcement branches to focus on fighting

terrorism. How should local law enforcement change in order to cope with the trend of projected future terrorism?

A Strategic Plan

Without a specific plan to address the problems associated with an organizational change, personnel will flounder in the absence of direction. Every employee and customer of any organization needs to understand and know the direction of the group, or in this case, the police department. For any newly created plan, it seems a good idea to begin with the end in mind (Covey, 1999). What does the organization want to achieve? What future does the organization want to create for itself? And, why is it in business? The answers to such questions will assist in setting the direction of the organization toward its desired change and future.

Preserving life and protecting property is the basic goal of any police department. With the threat of terrorism projected for the future, a new policing model may be desired. A different infrastructure may be necessary to address the complex issues that will face law enforcement in this era of terrorism.

The current decentralized policing model that exists throughout the nation has produced small police departments that have become less effective. The independence of these agencies has caused the following problems:

1. Operation of competing communication systems that do not connect.
2. Lack of standards in police service delivery
3. Countless jurisdictional overlapping duties and responsibilities
4. Unnecessary taxpayer expenditures for services that are duplicated

5. Turf wars between police organizations that clearly denote the feeling of superiority of one agency over the other.

In order to develop a strategic plan that will overcome the shortcomings of the nation's current policing model, great change will need to occur. Any change that an organization wants to implement must have buy in from those who will be most affected by this change. The most successful way to assure buy in is to have those who are impacted by the proposed changes participate in deciding what changes need to be made (T. Esenten, lecture, March, 2001). Stakeholders are those persons affected by such changes.

Identification of an organization's stakeholders is a key element of strategic planning. An organization will not be able to institute change if its stakeholders will not, at the very least, accept the change. For any strategic planning process to be successful, that is, to create a plan that is valued, embraced and later achieved by its stakeholders, it must have input from them (Rubenstein & Firstenberg, 1999). This does not mean that a number of stakeholders are assigned to peripheral planning committees as window dressing to give the appearance of participation. The strategic planning process must allow such persons to provide input that is acted upon by the leadership of the organization. As Rubenstein and Firstenberg (1999) suggest, the strategic planning process must include valued internal and external input or stakeholders will reject any plan that is forthcoming and the goals of the leadership will not be completed. The strategic planning process, above all else, must be looked upon as inclusive.

The identified stakeholders for this research project are as follows:

1. Governor of the State of California
2. California assembly and senate members who represent the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena.
3. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
4. Mayors from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
5. City council members from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
6. City managers from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
7. Chiefs of police from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
8. Police officers from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
9. Civilian employees from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
10. Citizens from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
11. California Association of Tactical Officers
12. California Association of Canine Officers
13. Police officer association representatives from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
14. Police civilian union representatives from the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
15. Special interest groups from the San Gabriel Valley
16. District Attorney's office
17. Public Defender's office and private defense attorneys
18. Representatives from schools in the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena
19. California Department of Transportation

20. Public Works Departments from the surrounding area
21. Fire Departments from the surrounding area
22. Local telephone companies
23. Local natural gas companies
24. Local electricity providers
25. Local hospital personnel

Each of the listed stakeholders would be intertwined into the strategic planning process and asked to give input on the issue of devising a consolidated municipal police department in order to overcome the obstacles the older model of policing has created. In this process, the stakeholders would be used to identify trends, issues, and solutions to problems.

Once input is gained from the associated stakeholders, specific strategic initiatives may be devised to properly direct resources to obtain the vision that has already been identified. For the purposes of this paper, information from the nominal group technique (NGT) exercise will be utilized to create a list of focused initiatives that lend themselves to the development of a regional police model.

Increase Resource Sharing by Municipalities

There are hundreds of examples of sharing resources among cities in the Los Angeles County area. Some of these ventures are police-related and some are not. In each project where cities join forces, they are usually doing so to conquer a social, technological, economical, environmental, or political obstacle that they would not successfully overcome as a singular entity. The sharing of resources builds trust,

familiarity, and teamwork. Cities that join forces increase their political clout by becoming united on a focused issue. Politicians tend to listen to larger groups, as they will give greater consideration to those forces that affect their political constituents. Great emphasis should be given to setting goals that develop city-to-city partnerships and the sharing of resources. One of the problems or obstacles to such collaboration by cities is the time it takes for decisions to be made. The age-old problem of bureaucratic red tape created by layers of governmental processes proliferates delays in the normal stages of information-gathering and critical-issue analysis. Any initiative that stresses the increase of resource sharing by cities must include a system that quickly gathers, reviews, and disseminates information to decision-making bodies in order to accelerate the time it takes to enter into such mutual agreements.

Reduce Overlapping Police Services

Great advocacy should be given to reducing the number of specialized units that perform overlapping functions. For example, most cities in the Los Angeles County area possess a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, yet each of these same cities rarely have the need to deploy such a unit more than 2 or 3 times each year. A full-time unit assigned to the tri-city area would be able to serve the needs of the three cities mentioned in the scenarios of chapter 2. By reducing these units to a consolidated SWAT team, each department would be able to free valuable resources to perform functions that are more necessary and are focused on the mission of proactively fighting terrorism. Helicopter patrols, canine responses, and background investigations are other examples of police units that could be reduced to a singular

entity and return resources to the individual police departments for redeployment to areas of responsibility that further the mission of dissuading or investigating acts of terrorism. Downsizing these special units does reduce the number of officers exposed to specialized tactical assignments, and, thus, decreases the number of officers who gain expertise in tactical deployments and other enforcement-related areas.

Local Control Issues

Many cities have political bodies that review police procedure and operations within their own jurisdictional boundaries. However, crime and police action are not bound by these same invisible boundaries. There are times when police investigate, pursue, and arrest citizens beyond their own municipality and into another. While these actions are usually governed by individual department regulations and procedures, a regional oversight committee should be advocated to set proactive policies for instances where confusion as to the jurisdictional assignment and responsibilities occurs. Such a committee would begin to break down the political ownership of individual police departments and lessen the idea of local control as political leaders learn to work with each other to establish policies and procedures for the entire tri-city area instead of individual police departments. With time, a big picture mentality would appear from such a committee and the good for the many may be put aside for the good of the few. Most city police departments try to provide services to their community in such a way that it is individualized and personal. For the most part, police departments have differing philosophies and expectations on how employees interact with individual citizens. The idea of having a regional police department provide services may give the

perception of a cookie cutter approach that is less individualized and not desirable. A great effort by a regional oversight committee to merge department philosophies in order to reflect only the best practices when it comes to police/citizen contacts will be a crucial piece of this initiative. The oversight committee must be able to ensure community members that they would receive the same quality service as they did with the former police service provider.

Technology

Projects that rely upon the use of elusive technology and are common among police department personnel should be combined into a tri-city effort. For example, communication centers for each of the three police departments should be unified so interoperability is achieved and the ability to communicate among three police departments is achieved. Computer Aided Dispatch/Records Management Systems (CAD/RMS) should be combined in one location to lessen the burden of maintenance and to increase the ease of shared regional information such as crime analysis, criminal records, and other pertinent crime-fighting information. Likewise, computer hardware and software in police cars should be linked among cities. This technology would offer car-to-car capabilities so an officer in one city may transmit information to another officer between mobile data computers. Such information sharing would allow criminal information to get in the hands of the patrol officer, reducing delays in the regional crime fighting effort.

Transition Management

Providing a transition management overview creates an understanding of how this issue is moved from the present to the future. Such a plan mitigates or eliminates the potential negative impact that possible changes would have on the organization and its services through specific research and planning. Transition management may be viewed as the initial implementation of the strategic plan. With transition management, the following is necessary (Jick, 1991):

- a. A review of the organization and its need for change.
- b. The creation of a shared vision and common direction.
- c. A distinct separation from the past.
- d. The creation of a sense of urgency to make the change.
- e. Support of a strong leader.
- f. Foster political sponsorship of the change.
- g. Create an implementation plan.
- h. Develop systems to support the necessary changes.
- i. The involvement of a wide array of stakeholders in the change process.
- j. Continued reinforcement and institutionalization of change.

For a regional police force to be formed from the existing three police departments, the current police chiefs would be the persons leading the change. Leadership and direction from the top would be essential for the regional program to have a chance at success. The chiefs would create the vision and common direction necessary, foster the political sponsorship for the change to occur, and with their

leadership, reinforce and institutionalize the change. The three chiefs would not only have the power to assign resources to the transitional management plan, but they would have the ability to influence employee commitment to such a venture. In this transitional plan, the chiefs would also be responsible for creating a sense of urgency, importance and necessity for the cities to complete the conversion to a regional police force. As part of the plan to complete the necessary changes, the chiefs would identify a regional policing committee to manage the day-to-day tasks required.

Regional Policing Committee

A committee that combines a portion of stakeholders from each of the identified groups would study the overall concept of a regional police force. Two police managers from each of the three cities would be assigned to this committee. These managers would be selected by their individual chief of police and would have been identified as an employee with great enthusiasm and commitment to the regional project.

The assigned managers would be responsible for implementing the mechanism of responsibility charting in order to clarify role relationships as a means of reducing ambiguity, wasted energy, and adverse emotional reactions. Responsibility charting is an example of one tool for implementing and managing change

Responsibility charting utilizes a specific form (see Appendix D) to record a list of actions, decisions, or activities that assigned individuals would eventually complete. The items may be thought of as job assignments. Such items would be listed on the form's vertical axis. For each of the noted items on the list, each committee member would identify the actor or person who would have some behavioral role concerning

each action or decision and list these actors or persons on the horizontal axis of the form. The actors may include:

- a. Those persons directly involved.
- b. The bosses of those involved.
- c. Groups and individuals.
- d. People inside or outside the organization.

Each committee member would then identify the necessary behavior of the actor(s) toward a particular activity or decision by utilizing the following classifications:

- a. Responsibility (R): The actor is responsible for seeing that decision(s) or action(s) occur.
- b. Approval (A): The actor is responsible for approving or disapproving of decision(s) or action(s).
- c. Support (S): The actor is responsible for providing the resources necessary for decision(s) or action(s) to occur.
- d. Informed (I): The actor is responsible for knowing of the decision(s) or action(s) but cannot approve or disapprove of them.

The six designated police managers assigned to implement this process would tabulate the individual committee member forms after each was completed. A meeting to review areas of disagreement between committee members as to the proper classifications for each actor would be conducted. The purpose of the meeting is to produce an agreed upon version of the responsibility chart. A simple majority vote would not create the necessary stakeholder unification that would be required for such a

large change of the organization. To be successful, the group would seek consensus to increase overall organizational buy-in and acceptance. If change would be pushed forward without such unanimity, it would be faced with great resistance and reluctance.

After the responsibility chart is completed, the committee would seek to identify areas the tri-city municipalities may improve police service delivery through a possible merger of police departments. A specific action plan for this committee would be developed to ensure that each of the ideas would be researched and analyzed to extract the best practices possible. An action plan provides accountability as an idea is developed from the drawing board to actual implementation. With the responsibility chart completed, and an action plan outlined, personnel may be matched with tasks to complete. The following is an example of an action plan for the transitional management steps that such a committee would undertake:

1. Analyze and evaluate all three police departments for their need to change.
 - a. Evaluation of possible areas of resource sharing by tri-city municipalities
 - b. Number of current projects
 - A complete audit and inspection process would be completed to determine the need to make changes. Documentation will be prepared on the historical collaborative efforts the cities have achieved. This information will be used to evaluate successes and determine the cause of failures as they relate to the sharing of resources. Also, it would demonstrate the municipalities experience working together and establish the rate of success. An example of such a project is the

Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena airport purchase that occurred nearly 25 years ago.

- Research and identify other municipal resource sharing and collaboration that has occurred outside of the tri-cities. This information would be used to compare and contrast the historical sharing that has occurred among the cities. It would assist in the identification of new ways the three cities may be able to develop any new collaborative. A matrix would be built to easily identify those ventures that were successful and unsuccessful.
- A cost/benefit analysis of the current projects would be completed.

c. Number of current police related projects

- Research and identify current police resources being shared by the cities. A review of the shared resources would be prepared explaining the purpose and goals that have been established as part of the partnership. Such examples would be a tri-city narcotics unit that exists to increase the number of undercover operatives available to each city for drug investigations.
- A cost/benefit analysis of the current police related projects would be completed.

d. Number of potential police resources that may be combined

- A list of other potential collaborative efforts among the three police departments that appear to be operationally feasible would be compiled. Such job assignments as canine officer, background

investigator, and any other job responsibilities the three police departments duplicate would be explored for consolidation.

- A cost/benefit analysis of combining potential police resources would be completed.

e. Evaluation of current police performance

- Before a police merger is implemented, it would be important for the new organization to understand how effective it has been providing its services. A survey that focused on all three of the police department's services would need to be constructed and distributed to several groups of stakeholders.
- A survey would be provided to a varied group of stakeholders.
- A survey would be provided to a varied group of citizens.
- A survey would be provided to each of the three police departments' employees.

2. Evaluation of police department use of highly specialized units

- a. Gather data on the use and deployment of special police units to establish a baseline need for such services. Such operations as SWAT, canine officers, and helicopter patrols would be examined to determine the feasibility of merging such units together without loss of service to each city.
 - The number and specific use of units for each city.
 - The typical usage per month for each city.
 - Determine comparable usage of such specialized units for other cities

- A cost/benefit analysis of specialized police services would be completed.
 - A survey of performance for the three city's specialized police service would be completed.
 - A survey would be provided to a varied group of stakeholders.
 - A survey would be provided to a varied group of citizens.
 - A survey would be provided to a varied group of employees.
 - A report would be completed documenting the findings of the survey.
3. Schedule interviews to determine the level of local control desired
- a. Community meetings would be conducted.
 - b. Employee meetings would be conducted.
 - c. Other stakeholder meetings would be conducted.
 - A report would be completed documenting the findings of the interviews.
4. Evaluate each department's technology
- a. Complete a CAD/RMS needs assessment and determine if the three police departments would have compatible data they may share.
 - b. Conduct a mobile data computer needs assessment.
 - c. Determine the three police departments' crime analysis capability.
 - d. Conduct an employee survey relating to the overall satisfaction of departmental technology.
 - e. A cost/benefit analysis of necessary technology would be completed.
5. Provide an overview of the numerous police department labor associations

- a. Identify the number of associations and personnel represented
- b. Identify the elected leadership of each association
- c. Identify each association's labor issues
- d. Compare and contrast benefit packages and salaries for each category of employee from the three police departments
- e. Provide a plan to combine members of similar working assignments to one association instead of three independent associations
- f. A cost/benefit analysis of the combining of associations

Joint Powers Agreement

As part of the transition plan, a legal mechanism must be identified for a consolidation of police resources to occur. A simple memorandum of understanding does not create a new organization, as it would only become a binding agreement for services and not initiate a new police agency recognized by law (T. Halford, personal communication, May 7, 2002). A joint powers agreement (JPA) is a legal agreement, which would grant the involved municipalities the power to form a singular entity while retaining their current status as cities. The creation of a JPA is a long and tedious process that would involve the combined efforts of each of the municipality's legal teams. Such a JPA would have to take into account the needs of all three cities, require the unanimous approval of the assigned legal teams, along with support from the affected city managers and elected officials. It would not be inconceivable for the JPA research, development, and approval process to last at least 18 months. To lessen the impact of such a long time delay, a JPA should be conceived in anticipation for the

desired future. Legal teams should be assembled with the assistance from a small, diverse group of stakeholders for the purpose of preparing a JPA. For the purposes of this project, a sample JPA has been attached in Appendix E.

Pilot Program

Utilizing a short pilot program as a test would assist in identifying problems and determining strengths of the idea under review. A pilot program of regional policing would incrementally expose the concept to each of the stakeholder groups and reduce the amount of risk that each of the police departments would have to endure as it would be possible to end the trial and revert back to the old policing model. The three cities police chiefs would be the leaders who would be able to make such a commitment and implement this pilot.

A trial period allows each city to track the program without a long-term commitment. A set of goals and criteria would be established before the trial is started to assist in the determination of the pilot program's success or failure. Such a test should not begin without the three police agencies agreeing on the measuring levels that determine the project to be successful or unsuccessful.

A tri-city helicopter service, canine team, or specialized investigative unit may be implemented as a trial program along with an administrative initiative such as background investigations. A simultaneous testing period of an enforcement and non-enforcement field will allow for greater experimentation and a diverse gathering of information about what may be gained or lost from such a centralized police model. In order for the participants of this trial period to properly acclimate, it is suggested that a 6

to 12 month trial be conducted. The formation of a regional SWAT team or mutual aid group for the purposes of a pilot program is not suggested. These specialized units are only deployed sporadically and would not accumulate the same data for the purposes of evaluation that day-to-day operational teams would be able to provide.

Finalizing the transition management process includes feedback from the participants, along with a review of the action plan assignments and agreed-upon future meetings to facilitate accountability and ensure completion. Each of the prescribed changes will be slow. The leadership of the organization must drive the needed change, and utilize patience to allow for such changes to permeate the organization.

The great American philosopher and historian Eric Hoffer stated, "Every new adjustment is a crisis in self-esteem." This statement epitomizes the strategic planning process and transition management process. When an organization completes such a plan, it creates changes that make stakeholders feel uneasy. The unknown, how an individual will fit into the new plans of the organization, generally cause discomfort. A leader must understand that the creation of such a plan will cause the organization to shift its thinking and either recreate itself or revolt against the change. To the stakeholder, this may cause a decrease in self-esteem as many items that the person valued and the service that he or she provided might be gone upon plan implementation. Leaders must seek out those persons who do not fear such changes and allow them to carry the plan. These change agents exist in every organization and they are the people who will make the changes reality.

The next chapter provides an outline for the deployment of personnel resources merging the police departments of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena. It has been

completed in an effort to create greater discussion and a vision of what the future may have in store as plans are made to combat terrorism on a local level. With this next chapter, it is more imaginable to perceive the Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena police departments converted into the Tri-City Police Department.

CHAPTER 4: The Tri-City Police Authority

Introduction

The last chapter reviewed the necessary components to effectively create or lessen the impact of a possible future through strategic planning and transition management. Many initiatives were described, along with action steps, with reference to the use of a joint powers agreement to legalize the police merger. A conceptual plan should be developed in order to establish a proposed police organization that reflects potential resources of the three police departments and how a future consolidated police force would more effectively deploy these same resources in order to provide greater security against terrorism. Such a concept plan may be used as a starting point to facilitate discussion, assist in the development of a more specific plan, and provide a more vivid description regarding the merger of three police departments.

This chapter represents only one option from the multitude of possible deployment options if a merger of police departments occurred in the future. It is meant to provoke debate of the issue. It is a descriptive aid to give more detail to predicted outcomes if the optimistic future scenario occurred.

The cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena are all nestled against the foothills in northern Los Angeles County. The three cities are situated in linear fashion, each with a portion of their boundaries adjacent to the City of Los Angeles. The City of Burbank is the furthest west with the City of Pasadena the furthest east, and the City of Glendale between them. The three cities span approximately 72 square miles, with a combined population of about 475,000. Each of the cities is rich in diversity, culture, and history.

The cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena have a history of collaboration. In 1977, the three municipalities signed a joint powers agreement for the purpose of purchasing and operating the Burbank Airport from the Lockheed Corporation. City council members from each of the cities preside over the airport, as part of its policy-making airport commission. In the mid-1980s, the three cities combined fire department communications into a single entity and several years later united fire department resources again, to form a tri-city hazardous materials response team. The police departments of these cities signed a memorandum of understanding in 1998 so that they could consolidate resources for the purposes of mutual aid and emergency responses. Under the terms and conditions of this mutual aid agreement, the three police departments train together on a continual basis. The training creates teamwork and communication as a by-product. Currently, the three police departments are engaged in discussions to share computer aided dispatch/records management systems, for the purpose of regional crime analysis. As they seek to provide greater field communications in any given emergency, the three police departments are working to define a future path of radio interoperability to provide Los Angeles County police agencies the ability to speak to each other on a single radio frequency.

Proposed Deployment of Resources

The police departments of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena currently employ 168, 243, and 240 sworn police officers respectively. Combining these police officers, the Tri-City Police Authority (TCPA) would have an authorized strength of 651. In addition, the three police departments utilize the assistance and expertise of 362 civilian

employees. With the combination of sworn and civilian employees, the TCPA would possess 1,013 full time employees collectively.

A simple configuration of four police divisions, along with the chief's office, would be utilized for this future based proposed deployment of personnel resources of the TCPA. The divisions would be the following: administrative services, support services, special operations and patrol operations. The decrease in necessary funding that is outlined in the following paragraphs has been calculated utilizing an approximate average of the current salary and benefit information provided by the three police departments of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena.

The Chief's Office

Each of the three police departments employs a police chief. With the consolidation of the TCPA, only one person is necessary for this position. As described in the futures optimistic scenario in chapter 2, the reduction of these positions occur only as the result of normal attrition via retirement. The reduction of personnel at this executive level would provide a monetary savings estimated at \$350,000 per year.

There are a total of thirteen command staff positions for each of the three police departments. They range from the rank of captain, commander, or deputy chief and each report directly to the chief of police. A deputy chief would be appointed as the chief of police designee in case the chief of police is not available or to assist him or her. The deputy chief would be the second in command of the TCPA. Because of the geographical size of the TCPA, it is theorized that one person titled area commander would be charged with the day-to-day operations of the police authority. This person

would report directly to the deputy chief. A captain would be assigned to each city police station, as its commanding officer, responsible for that station's operations. The station captains would report directly to the area commander. The command staff for the TCPA would theoretically total five positions, reducing the number necessary from the original three independent police departments by 8 full-time employees. The anticipated savings resulting from this deployment of command staff would be 1.2 million dollars annually.

Currently, the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena provide at least one staff support person to each chief of police and each command staff member. The reduction of police chiefs and command staff personnel that would result from the consolidation of the police departments would reduce the number of needed support personnel by the same number. With one chief of police and five command staff members, only six support persons would be necessary for the TCPA. This is in contrast to the sixteen support positions configured for the three independent police departments as they currently operate. There would be a reduction of ten full-time positions if the merger of the police departments occurred. Reducing personnel in these positions would bring an estimated savings of \$500,000 each year.

The Administrative Services Division

The merged police department would be able to centralize the following special assignments within the Administrative Services Division:

1. Training
2. Background investigations

3. Internal affairs investigations
4. Research and development
5. Finance and payroll

Currently, each of the three police departments employs units that have similar responsibilities within the above categories. Each has supervisors and administrators assigned to provide oversight and direction. For the TCPA, each of these special units would be assigned to work from a centralized headquarters facility. This would allow the TCPA to reduce the number of administrators and supervisors currently work in these assignments and still retain a high degree of command and control. Currently, the three cities have a combined total of fifteen supervisors and three administrators to oversee the listed units. The TCPA would need only five supervisors and one administrator for the same duties. This change would result in a decrease of ten supervisor and two administrator positions. The total number of line workers that hold positions in these units would remain the same. These are generally small personnel deployments and the ratio of supervisor to line worker would remain manageable. To ensure the steady flow of work product, the support staff would remain the same until it was determined the TCPA would not need these assistants. The estimated savings due to the reduction of supervisors and administrators would be \$950,000 annually.

The Support Services Division

Through the consolidation of the three police departments, the TCPA would be able to greatly reduce the following current overlapping areas of responsibility and enhance its services:

1. Records
2. Communications
3. Jail
4. Property and evidence
5. Fleet purchase and maintenance
6. Information and technology

The current configuration of sergeants and lieutenants assigned to the listed functions for the three independent police departments are twelve lieutenants and twenty-seven sergeants. It would be possible to reduce the number of lieutenants to six under the proposed TCPA. This deployment of lieutenants would assign one person to each of these six sections, yet it would yield a 50% reduction from the deployment of the three independent police departments.

Since the duties of a sergeant, front line supervision, requires a 24-hour, 7-day a week staffing schedule, the reduction in such supervisory positions would only decrease by approximately 30%. The TCPA would staff the records, communications and the jail sections with five supervisors each and assign the property and evidence unit, fleet purchases and maintenance unit, and the information and technology unit, with one supervisor each. Much like that of the Administrative Division described in the previous paragraph, the units in the Support Services Division would be traditionally small in size and the ratio of supervisor to line worker would not be out of balance. The suggested overall reduction eliminates six administrators and nine supervisors for an annual savings of approximately 1.5 million dollars.

Contained within the Support Operations Division of the TCPA would be an

important portion of the police authority's infrastructure: the Computer Aided Dispatch/Records Management System (CAD/RMS) and radio system. Each of these components may be said to be mission-critical and fundamental to the basic function of providing police services.

As related in the nominal group technique exercise in Chapter 2, along with the issues described in the pessimistic scenario, communication between police departments is problematic. The formation of the TCPA would create one CAD/RMS and radio system instead of three. The geographical area that would encompass the TCPA would be able to: better coordinate responses to critical incidents through radio interoperability, readily share information with more police officers, provide a broader crime analysis base by its expansion into a larger geographical area, and with this, enhance its services to the public. In addition to these benefits, there are more. The City of Glendale has just purchased and installed a state of the art CAD/RMS system at a time when the other two cities are planning similar purchases with an estimated one-time cost of over 8 million dollars in the aggregate. The consolidation of the three police departments would make these purchases senseless as one system could be used for the TCPA.

The Special Operations Division

The three police departments all have similar special enforcement or investigative details that have redundant functions and overlap:

1. Helicopter Section
2. Detective Section

3. Special Enforcement Section (Gang Unit, Street Narcotics Unit)
4. Special Investigation Section (Vice Unit, Major Narcotics Unit)
5. Traffic Enforcement Section

The TCPA would combine many of these units, cutting out the fat and increasing effectiveness in many of the areas. These critical components of the authority are contained in the Special Operations Division.

Currently the Cities of Burbank, Glendale and Pasadena all deploy air support details for each of their cities. Only one helicopter unit would be necessary for the TCPA. It is easily conceivable for one air unit to cover the geographic obligations of the proposed regional police authority without lessening the overall service. By retaining the larger of the two air units (Pasadena), the TCPA would ensure it would have the personnel to cover its mission obligations. The reduction of personnel would include two sergeants, six pilots, six observers and two mechanics. The air assets (four helicopters) would be retained by the merged section and added to the current fleet of air ships. This reduction in personnel would equate to an annual savings of about \$750,000.

The three cities each have a similar composition of investigative assignments and personnel in their respective detective sections. The TCPA would not reduce the number of personnel assigned to this section, but would construct itself to better reflect current and future criminal trends, utilizing the additional personnel created from the merger of particular detective units, and reassigning them where they are most needed, making the TCPA more effective than the decentralized police model that each of the cities currently work under. For example, over the past five years, homicide

investigations in all three cities have decreased steadily but the personnel assigned to handle the investigations has remained constant or even risen. In Pasadena, there were six detectives assigned to the homicide and assaults unit in 1993 who handled thirty-two homicide investigations. For 2002, the department assigned the same number of detectives to the homicide and assaults unit who handled only four homicides. The other two cities have assigned a similar number of investigators to such cases under the same declining circumstances. To better serve the three cities, the homicide unit would reconfigure itself under the TCPA, assigning eight detectives and two sergeants for the three municipalities' homicide and assault investigations. With each of the three cities averaging only four homicide investigations per year, the total this new homicide unit would handle is approximately twelve per year. For each detective team, this would require only three investigations annually. The merger of the TCPA and the creation of this new homicide and assaults unit would result in the reassignment of those detectives that were previously deployed to the independent police departments' former homicide and assaults units. This would mean the TCPA would have eight detectives available to investigate those crimes that are increasing (i.e., computer crimes, identity theft, financial fraud, and terrorism). Currently, the three police departments have four administrators assigned to its three Detective Sections. The TCPA would decrease the total number of detective administrators from four to three, resulting in an annual savings of \$125,000.

The TCPA would have a need for retaining the same number of police officers assigned to gangs, street narcotics, and a special unit that may perform high profile, saturated street patrols in chronic crime areas. Currently, the three cities use such

groups of officers in the same or very similar manner. These specialized police officers would be assigned to the Special Enforcement Section within the TCPA. Each municipality would retain such a group of officers to engage the criminal element in an aggressive format.

From within the ranks of the Special Enforcement Section, a team would be formed in a Special Weapons and Tactical team (SWAT) format. Each of the three cities currently has such a team and requires approximately 16-20 hours of training each month in order for the team to remain proficient. For 2001, the three cities combined to deploy its tactical team twelve times. In light of the high number of training hours for personnel associated with these SWAT teams, and contrasting it with the low number of actual incidents handled, the TCPA would become more efficient as it would maintain only one SWAT team. A reduction in training hours would result in more police officers spending a greater amount of time on the street fighting crime.

The Special Investigation Section of the TCPA would merge all of the three cities high level narcotics and vice investigators, along with other undercover operations that target major crime targets. This group would be centralized and work from a single facility to serve all of the municipalities. The number of line workers would remain the same, but the section would be reduced as it pertains to supervisors and administrators. Currently, the three departments have a total complement of three lieutenants and five sergeants assigned to these types of investigations. The TCPA would assign one lieutenant and three sergeants to this detail. The reduction would result in an annual savings of \$450,000. The ratio of supervisor to line officer would continue to be manageable regardless of this reduction. Merging this highly specialized narcotics unit

would increase the number of personnel resources enough to enable staffing 7-days each week instead of the more common 4-days or 5-days per week.

The Traffic Section would be assigned to the Special Operations Division of the TCPA. The line officers who concentrate on traffic enforcement and investigations would be highly sought after as the three municipalities are currently experiencing an increase in their population which translates to more congested streets. Such line personnel will not be decreased. Most citizens project that individual neighborhoods and downtown areas have too many cars driving on the streets, causing a great deal of congestion. Many community members believe increasing traffic issues jeopardize quality of life (Pasadena Community Meetings, 2002). To provide quality services, the TCPA would deploy a traffic detail in each of the cities under the direction of supervisors who are assigned to a particular area. As citizens and officers commonly see traffic citations as a negative contact, the section would exist under the command and control of a single administrator. This management structure would lend consistency to the application of enforcement efforts and ensure that citizens would be treated the same in each area of the authority's jurisdiction.

The Patrol Operations Division

The philosophy of the TCPA would be to sustain or increase the same type of patrol operation that currently exists within each of the municipalities. Each of the three cities has vacant positions in their patrol deployment. It may be theorized that the average citizen would argue to increase the patrol ranks to provide greater service in a more timely and efficient manner. To provide more patrol officers, the TCPA would

utilize the total savings from the merger of the three police departments to fund more police officer positions in the Patrol Operations Division and form an Anti-Terrorist Section as described in the optimistic scenario in chapter 2.

The total annual savings outlined in this chapter equals approximately \$5,825,000 as a result of the proposed consolidation of police services. The savings in personnel resources would be able to fund 50 police officers, 6 sergeants, and 1 lieutenant for the TCPA. The additional personnel would make it possible to increase basic patrol staffing along with adding personnel in specialized assignments that, as independent police departments, the three cities would not be able to create.

This chapter represents only one option from the multitude of possible deployment options if a merger of police departments occurred in the future. It is meant to provoke debate of the issue. It is a starting point and descriptive aid to give more detail to predicted outcomes if the optimistic future scenario occurred.

The next chapter provides a summary of this project, identifies implications for leadership if the optimistic scenario occurs, and concludes by answering the question that was the impetus for this project: How will terrorism impact the formation of a consolidated regional police force in a large metropolitan area by 2010?

CHAPTER 5: Conclusion

Summary

The trend of municipal resource-sharing and consolidation, along with the trend of terrorism, were described in the initial chapter of this project. The idea of trend identification suggests the need to scan the horizon for slight changes that may indicate new and different futures that may be possible. This section of the project was designed to provide a background of how the project began and what was observed in the existing environment and how it was utilized to forecast a possible altered future.

A historical perspective of the development of the American police model was reviewed. This section was important as it provided a full understanding of how the current police system developed into such a decentralized model. With information from the past, it is easy to see why current communities and leaders feel the need to possess an independent police department. Several limited examples were identified where police mergers had occurred, were studied, or were even recommended for the future.

A Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was utilized to study the future. The NGT identified trends and possible events that would have an impact on the issue of municipal police consolidation. An analysis of how such events affected the trends was completed during this future study. The NGT panel believed that the sharing of resources by cities and police departments was an increasing trend that would continue, but would not lead to any form of merger unless it was seen as a necessity to overcome a specific, common nemesis. The panel believed the war on terrorism might be the impetus to cause such a change to the traditional police model that exists today. From

the NGT, three possible future scenarios were developed to demonstrate the different outcomes that might be possible given the effect an event had on a given trend.

The most optimistic of the three scenarios was identified as the one that had the most drastic potential for change. Because of this, strategic planning and transition management plans were proposed to bolster preparedness, ensuring an organization would be ready to take advantage of, or mitigate, the impact of occurrence.

Lastly, a conceptualized deployment plan for a tri-city consolidated police department was prepared to assist in the area of strategic planning. As stated earlier, such concept plans may be used to build the actual foundation of a real, operational plan to deploy resources.

Implications for Leadership

The consolidation of three municipal police departments, forming one large police authority, would have an array of implications for the affected leadership. Imagine merging the internal structures of three different entities and making them work in an effective cohesive fashion. The chief of police would be required to carefully navigate and manage this future scenario. In order to create a sense of buy-in and ownership, this leader would need to be inclusive with all stakeholders during the strategic planning phase. Just as important, the leader would need to strike a balance with mandating acceptance of change, while continuing to empower others in the organization to provide independent input and ideas.

In the optimistic scenario depicted in chapter 2, the merger of the three police departments occurs with a seamless transition. In truth, such a merger would be extraordinarily complicated and require leaders who are particularly unselfish. For

example, the chief of police who possess a futures perspective and initiates a plan of police consolidation, runs the risk of not being taken seriously as he or she puts forth such a non-mainstream idea to combat terrorism. Additionally, the chief of police who becomes involved in a merger of police departments may find him or herself out of a job or demoted, as the plan would most likely call for the reduction of leadership in top positions.

Lastly, there is one other implication that calls for unselfishness in leaders affected by police mergers. This last element is one that many leaders are not willing to identify, or willing to admit, but it has far-reaching impact on any facet of their job that involves decision-making: the ego of the leader. It is quite easy to project a scenario where a law enforcement leader takes action to oppose a police merger with the motive of protecting his or her longevity or legacy. Great leaders take the high road when making decisions, choosing to do the right thing for the right reasons. These leaders remove ego from decision-making and act in the best interest of the profession they represent. Some may say it is unrealistic to ask for this type of sacrifice from the top brass of the law enforcement profession. But, if society is truly looking at a future that comes with suicide bombers, biological weapons, and dirty bombs that propel nuclear waste, local law enforcement leadership must find a way to infuse itself in a proactive manner to protect local neighborhoods and not completely rely upon the resources of federal or state government agencies.

If the concept of a more centralized police model is accepted and more police mergers occur in the future, small police departments would become relatively large. The management of a larger organization is much different than a small one. With a

small organization, the leader has the ability to make easy contact with subordinate personnel during the daily routine. In fact, in many small police departments, the chief of police may be conducting some of the day-to-day operations that a sergeant would do in a larger police organization. In a smaller agency, this allows communication and interaction between the ranks to be less complicated and much more accessible. Hence, the smaller agency benefits with an internal communication system that has the ability to readily translate the vision, mission, and value expectations of the organization as the leader(s) of the organization have more contact with the line personnel. It would seem that if this occurs, the department culture would be more representative of what the leader was attempting to achieve. This seemingly would mean that such department culture would be more readily taught and eventually practiced. The leadership of the larger, merged police agencies would have to become more aware of the need to develop and practice greater skills in delegation and communication.

The creation of larger police forces through consolidation runs the risk of alienating the public that is served. This does not mean to suggest that large police departments by their very nature do not create and cultivate good relationships with their citizens. However, when citizens are used to working with a particular set, or group of officers, or if neighborhoods are satisfied with a particular service that its police department offers, a deletion of such police officers or programs may constitute a breach in the relationship. To be more direct, the formation of a larger police entity through the consolidation of several police departments would mean the personnel, structure, and philosophy of the police department would be in some type of flux. The

leadership of the new organization would need to create some sort of marketing campaign to educate the public of the coming change.

The last anticipated implication for leadership is the merger of the individual police unions that would have to occur before the new police entity would be formed. As some leaders in law enforcement have experienced, dealing with day-to-day union issues is time-consuming and complex. Imagine the leadership of the theorized TCPA attempting to convince the three individual police unions to consolidate in order to properly provide representation to the newly-formed police authority. Each of the three cities has separate contracts, benefits, negotiation tactics, and developed relationships that have occurred over a long period of time. The blending of the unions would be a crucial component in order to move forward on such a consolidation and the new leadership would play a crucial role in ensuring union leaders were cohesive in their desire to assist in changes essential to the new department's success. In this endeavor, the new leaders may find themselves having to compromise some of the issues they want in order to get the unions to agree to such a consolidation. For leaders of the TCPA and the unions, flexibility is the key to obtaining the results that both seek.

Conclusion

The ability to take advantage of, or mitigate, a specific identified future scenario demands continuous scanning for trends, along with analyzing such trends with likely events. Many of the things that will occur in the future are barely identifiable today and virtually go unnoticed to most persons. Recognizing those things that are occurring on the utmost edges of the horizon, or the ones that occur right under one's nose in new

paradigms, usually create great havoc to those organizations that are not prepared to deal with the change that will be caused when such items are suddenly cast into the mainstream.

Over the past two decades, a trend for California law enforcement to share resources, create joint task forces, initiate joint power agreements, and develop memorandums of understanding to join forces has slowly evolved. At a much greater pace, municipal governments have found great political and economic strength by joining other municipalities to achieve specific missions sought by all of those involved. How effective will the sharing of municipal resources be in the local effort to increase security, making neighborhoods safe from terrorism?

Prior to September 11, 2001, most Americans did not give much thought to terrorism, the Taliban, or Afghanistan. Certainly, the infamous Osama bin Laden was not a household name. It is well documented that many federal law enforcement agencies worked on collecting information on terrorism and even identified many trends and possible events that had certain probabilities of occurrence. However, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the system of law enforcement that had been set up to deal with terrorism was found to be wanting. Suddenly, terrorism was thrust into the mainstream of society. The executive branch of government, with the assistance of federal law enforcement executives, reorganized to deal with the new enemy. The measures initiated were meant to bring a sense of tranquility and a feeling of safety back to the nation's neighborhoods. Are the changes that have been put into place to fight future terrorist attacks enough to safeguard each citizen?

Future predictions of imminent terrorist attacks against the United States cry out for greater proactive involvement from municipal police departments. Most prognosticators have indicated that the future American free society may resemble the war-like characteristics of current day Israel. Perhaps the July 4, 2002, attack at the Los Angeles International Airport was a sign of things to come. If such attacks become the norm, and the prognosticators are correct, municipal police will be dealing with circumstances that will overwhelm them. With limited resources and shrinking budgets, the progressive law enforcement leader may find what is needed to fight against terrorism in a consolidation of police departments.

APPENDIX A

Nominal Group Technique Panel

Chief Bernard K. Melekian	City of Pasadena
Chief Lawrence E. Lewis	City of Alhambra
Captain Mark A. Lunn	California Highway Patrol
James S. Robertson	Southern California Edison
Nathaniel Trives	Cal State Los Angeles
Vice-Mayor Paul Little	City of Pasadena
Eugene P. Ramirez	Manning & Marder, LLP

APPENDIX B

Trends

1. Police personnel costs versus city revenue intake
2. The number of consolidated city services
3. Public perception of law enforcement integrity
4. The number of public entities extending their current boundaries
5. The politicalization of law enforcement
6. The number of cities dealing with the same issues
7. The change in demographics
 - a. The number of senior citizens
 - b. The number of juveniles
 - c. The change in races for each city
 - d. The number of languages spoken with each jurisdiction
8. Citizen involvement with police departments
9. Military technology applications to law enforcement
10. Releasing “local control” by police chiefs and politicians
11. Federal government involvement in local law enforcement
12. City boundaries blurred
13. Mergers by large business entities
14. Cyber crime investigations
15. Law enforcement jurisdictional overlap
16. Change in law enforcement employee’s view of career and job

17. Housing affordability for law enforcement in the city they work
18. Number of single issue community groups
19. Change in state and federal augmentation funding for law enforcement
20. Change in State laws regarding personnel issues
 - a. Workers compensation
 - b. Non-funded mandates
21. The number of early retirements for law enforcement leadership
22. Change in law enforcement vocabulary (hard to soft)
23. Liability exposure for law enforcement
24. Number of large police agencies absorbing small police agencies
25. Number of police agencies contracting with medium police agencies
26. Resource-sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs
27. Number of qualified persons applying for law enforcement jobs
28. Respect for law enforcement officers
29. Police unions taking on a decision-making role
30. Number of terrorist attacks in the United States

APPENDIX C

Events

1. Development of technology that links citizen at home to police department
2. Police officers form one union
3. Fire services consolidation successful in a large metropolitan area
4. Immigrant-born disease inhabits the United States
5. Legislation mandates universal chip identification
6. World War III begins
7. Suicide bombings in the United States
8. Legislation mandating the consolidation of law enforcement
9. Catastrophic communication failure between local police departments
10. Federal mandate forces local law enforcement to enforce immigration laws
11. Extended electricity shortage in the United States
12. Catastrophic natural disaster
13. State Attorney General given oversight over all law enforcement agencies
14. Federalization of local law enforcement
15. Dissolution of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
16. Domestic terrorism becomes largest threat in the United States
17. Minority becomes the majority in the United States
18. Mandate to elect police chiefs
19. First robotic police officer deployed
20. Second Great Depression

APPENDIX D

Sample Responsibility Chart

Action(s) or Decision(s) 	Actor(s)							

R = Responsibility; A = Approval; S = Support; I = Inform

APPENDIX E

Sample Joint Powers Agreement

This Agreement is made by and between the City of Burbank, City of Glendale, and the City of Pasadena, (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “Parties”), with reference to the following facts:

A. The Parties, pursuant to Article 1, Chapter 5, Division 7, Title 1 of the California Government Code (commencing with California Government Code § 6500) (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “Act”), have the power to acquire, operate, repair, maintain and administer a Joint Powers Authority for the purpose of providing police services to the Parties hereto.

B. It has been determined by the Governing Body of each of the Parties that the best interests thereof, as well as of the public in general, will be served if the Parties provide for a Joint Powers Authority to better provide mobilization, organization, and daily operation of all police services of the said cities and to minimize the effect of criminal activity and to provide the basis for the most effective mutual aid, mobilization and dispatch of available resources within the territory of the Parties.

C. The purpose of this Agreement is to establish a Joint Powers Authority for the Parties, which will provide specified contractual police services, and it is intended that other policy and operational protocols will supplement this Agreement.

D. Each Party will cease to maintain its own independent Police Department.

E. It is the intent of this Agreement that each of the Parties consolidate the separate police departments, merging them into one entity in order to collectively

provide increased protection to the public by increasing resources in sufficient strength to meet all normal, anticipated and unanticipated emergency needs on a day-to-day basis.

F. Pooling of police services under this Agreement is intended to reduce the number of overlapping resources, increase the number of patrol officers, create specialized policing units, provide a consistent community policing philosophy throughout the San Gabriel Valley, and reduce police expenditures.

G. All Parties hereto have cooperated in the past in the suppression and investigation of criminal activity and wish by their cooperation herein to enhance such mutual efforts.

NOW, THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE MUTUAL PROMISES, COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS HEREINAFTER CONTAINED THE PARTIES AND EACH OF THEM, DO AGREE HEREBY AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Establishment of Joint Powers Authority

Pursuant to their authority under Section 6500 et seq. of the California Government Code the Parties hereby establish a Joint Powers Authority to be known as the Tri-Cities Police Authority (the "Authority") to administer and to provide a more effective police service system utilizing the combined resources of the Parties. The Authority shall be a public entity separate and apart from the Parties and each of them.

Section 2. Board of Governors

The then serving Authority shall be administered by a Board of Governors (the "Board") composed of the City Managers and one designated elected city council

person of each of the Parties (individually, a “Director”) shall have the following responsibilities:

- A. Any member of the Board may designate an alternate to serve and vote on his or her behalf, provided such designation is made in writing and delivered to the Chair of the Board or the Secretary thereof prior to the meeting at which such designee appears.
- B. Board meetings shall be held at least once each week at such times and places as any of the Parties hereto may reasonably request.
- C. The Board shall have the powers and duties provided for in Section 4 of this Agreement. The Board shall also have the power to issue administrative policies and operational procedures relating to implementation of the powers granted by this Agreement.
- D. All meetings of the Board of Governors, including, without limitation, regular, special and adjourned meetings, shall be called, noticed, held and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Ralph M. Brown Act (commencing with Government Code §54950).
- E. Each Party shall have two (2) votes on all matters, such votes to be exercised by the respective City Managers of each city or their authorized designees. The votes of the Directors representing a majority of the cities who are Parties hereto will constitute official action by the Board. The Authority shall have the ability to incur indebtedness, seek bond approval from the electorate and enter into any contract, or exercise the power of eminent domain with the approval of two-thirds of the Board of Governors.

- F. The Officers of the Board shall be a Chair, Vice Chair, Treasurer and Secretary, all of who shall be elected by a vote of the majority of the cities, which are Parties hereto at its first meeting and thereafter at the first meeting of each succeeding calendar year. In the event that the Chair, Vice Chair, Treasurer or Secretary so elected resigns from such office or ceases to be a member of the Board, the resulting vacancy shall be filled at the next regular meeting of the Board held after such vacancy occurs.
- (1) The Chair who shall be a Director, who shall be elected as Chair by the Board, and who shall perform the duties normal to such office. The Chair may sign contracts on behalf of the Authority, and shall perform such other duties as may be imposed by the Board.
 - (2) The Vice Chair who shall be a Director and whom the Board shall elect as Vice Chair. In the absence of the Chair the Vice-Chair shall perform the duties of the Chair and shall perform all duties normal to such office.
 - (3) The Secretary who shall be appointed by the Board and shall perform all duties normal to such office.
 - (4) The Treasurer who shall be appointed by the Board as hereafter provided.
- G. The Board shall appoint a Treasurer in accordance with Section 6505.5 of the Act who shall be:
- (1) The Treasurer of one of the Parties;
 - (2) A certified public accountant; or

- (3) Such other officer or employee as the Board shall deem qualified to act as Treasurer of the Board. The Treasurer shall perform such duties as are set forth in this Agreement and such other duties specified by the Board.
- (4) The Treasurer shall be the depository, shall have custody of all of the accounts, funds and money of the Authority from whatever source, shall have the duties and obligations set forth in Sections 6505 and 6505.5 of the Act and shall assure strict accountability of all funds and reporting of all receipts and disbursements of the Authority.
- (5) Pursuant to Section 6505.1 of the Act, the Treasurer shall have charge of, handle and have access to all accounts, funds and money of the Authority and all records of the Authority relating thereto; and the Secretary shall have charge of, handle and have access to all other records of the Authority.

H. The Authority shall not provide compensation for the services of any Director or alternate in that capacity.

Section 3. Chief of Police

There shall be one Chief of Police who is responsible for the leadership and management of the Authority. The Chief of Police shall be responsible for creating the Authority's mission, vision, and values and ensuring that such organizational directions are carried out. The Board of Governors will select the Chief of Police. The Chief of

Police will be eligible to one 5-year term. The Chief of Police will report directly to the Board of Governors.

Section 4. Executive Committee

The Chief of Police shall be advised by an Executive Committee comprised of the ranking command staff personnel from each of the cities, selected by the Chief of Police.

- A. Executive Committee meeting shall be held each week at such times and places as any of the Parties hereto may reasonably request.
- B. The Executive Committee shall function as a committee of the whole, not requiring an election of officers.
- C. The Executive Committee shall recommend, and develop programs, priorities, organizational structure(s), staffing, training, equipment, facilities, and budgets as may be required for the effective operation of the Authority as approved by the Chief of Police.

Section 5. Powers & Duties of the Authority

A. The Authority shall exercise in the manner herein provided the powers common to each of the cities and necessary or appropriate to the accomplishment of the purposes of this Agreement, subject to the restrictions set forth in Section 4 (C).

B. The Authority is hereby authorized, in its own name, to do all acts necessary for the exercise of the foregoing powers, including but not limited to, any or all of the following:

- (1) To operate, contract for, maintain, repair and administer all police services as deemed necessary by the Chief of Police to serve the

Parties, and to undertake such other programs as the Board of Directors may authorize;

- (2) To make and enter into contracts;
- (3) To employ agents and employees;
- (4) To acquire, construct, own, manage, maintain dispose of, or operate any Public Capital Improvement, including the common power of the Parties to acquire any Public Capital Improvement by the power of eminent domain;
- (5) to sue and be sued;
- (6) to issue bonds and otherwise to incur debts, liabilities or obligations, provided that no such bond, debt, liability or obligation shall constitute a debt, liability or obligation of any or all of the Parties;
- (7) to apply for, accept, receive and disburse grants, loans and other aid from any agency of the United States of America, the State of California, or the County of Los Angeles, or any city therein;
- (8) to invest any money in the treasury pursuant to Section 6505.5 of the Act that is not required for the immediate necessities of the Authority, as the Authority determines is advisable, in the same manner and upon the same conditions as local agencies, pursuant to Section 53601 of the California Government Code;
- (9) to apply for letters of credit to secure the repayment of Bonds and enter into agreements in connection therewith;

- (10) to carry out and enforce all the provisions of this Agreement;
- (11) to make and enter into bond purchase agreements or other agreements necessary to carry out the purposes of this Agreement;
- (12) to exercise any and all other powers as may be provided in the Act;
and
- (13) to purchase obligations issued by any or all of the Parties.

C. The powers of the Authority shall be exercised in the manner prescribed in the Act and shall be subject (in accordance with Section 6509 of the Act) to the restrictions upon the manner of exercising such powers that are imposed upon any charter law city, in the exercise of similar powers, provided, however, that if each charter law city shall cease to be a member, then the Authority shall be restricted in the exercise of its power in the same manner as a general law city.

Section 6. Resources

The resources necessary to operate the Authority shall be purchased, installed, operated, maintained and administered by the Authority terms and conditions agreed to by each of the Parties. Any of the Parties may administer all or part of the Authority as may be agreed upon by all of the Parties.

Section 7. Unanimous Participation by Parties

No Party shall modify, delete, or add to the activities, resources and responsibilities of the Authority without the agreement of each of the other Parties. Such activity will include, but is not limited to, performing or refusing to perform

Authority services, or sharing or refusing to share Authority resources, with other intra-agency departments, or with other inter-agencies or cities.

Section 8. Additional Services

- A. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Chief of Police is authorized to permit the Authority to provide police services to a public entity, which is not a Party to this Agreement only upon a finding that an emergency situation exists with reference to that public entity. Emergency situations, as defined in this section, are extraordinary circumstances such as major fires, earthquakes, floods, and civil unrest outside the scope of normal patrol operations.
- B. The Authority will create a regional helicopter patrol service to provide seven nights per week air support to each of the member cities. The Authority may supply a police officer from each Authority member (observer) on a rotational basis, as to ensure all participating cities are receiving equal patrol time for each member city. The overall responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft rests with the pilot in command of the aircraft.
- C. The Authority will create a regional Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team that will respond to tactical situations as prescribed by the Chief of Police. The selection process for this team shall be determined by the Authorities procedures and policy manual.
- D. The Authority will create a regional canine unit that will respond as necessary to tactical situations as prescribed by the Chief of Police. The selection

process for this team shall be determined by the Authorities procedures and policy manual.

- E. The Authority will create an Anti-Terrorism Section that will provide the Authority with information on terrorists, conduct investigation on terrorists, and deter terrorists from carrying out violent acts against citizens. The selection process for this team shall be determined by the Authorities procedures and policy manual.

Section 9. Assistance to the Authority

Except as prohibited by law, and in accordance with this Agreement, the Parties, as authorized by the Board, may: (1) make contributions from their respective treasuries for the public purposes set forth herein; (2) make payments of such public funds to defray the cost of such purposes; (3) make advances of public funds for such purposes, such advances or payments to be secured and repaid, as provided herein; or (4) assign their respective personnel, equipment or property in lieu of other contributions or advances at a rate of valuation to be agreed by the Parties. Such sums shall be paid to and disbursed by the Authority, the method and manner of such payment, disbursement and repayment to be set forth in operating memoranda which shall first have been adopted by the Board. The provisions of California Government Code §6513 are hereby incorporated by reference into this Agreement.

Section 10. Funds

The Treasurer of the Authority shall have custody of all money and shall disburse Authority funds as instructed by the Board. Additionally, the Treasurer of the Authority shall assume the following duties described in California Government Code §6505.5:

- A. Receive, prepare receipts for and deposit in the Treasury of the Authority all money of the Authority;
- B. Provide for the safety, keeping and disbursement of all Authority money held by the Treasurer and the performance of such obligation shall be secured by the Treasurer's official bond;
- C. Pay, when due, out of money of the Authority held by the Treasurer, all sums payable on outstanding indebtedness;
- D. Verify and report in writing to the Authority and to each of the Parties on the first of July, October, January and April of each year the amount of money the Treasurer holds for the Authority, the amount of receipts deposited since the Treasurer's last report, and the amount of disbursements since the Treasurer's last report.

Section 11. Budget

- A. The Executive Committee shall prepare a proposed budget each year for the operation and maintenance of the Authority. The Board shall submit such proposed budget for review and formal action not later than January 1st of each calendar year.
- B. The budget shall be adopted by formal action of the Board. It shall constitute a ministerial duty on the part of each Party to include such budget in its own proposed municipal budget for the following fiscal year for consideration by each Party's governing body.
- C. The Board shall designate a continuous twelve (12) month period as the Authority's fiscal year.

- D. The Authority will combine all former police department budget amounts as established in the fiscal year 2002-2003, unless authorized differently by the Board.

Section 11. Term; Terminations; Dispositions of Assets

- A. This Agreement shall become effective upon approval and execution by all the Parties, and shall continue in full force and effect so long as any indebtedness remains outstanding or the Authority shall own any interest in Public Capital Improvements, or until terminated by a unanimous vote of the Board.
- B. Any Party may withdraw from its status as a Party to this Agreement at the end of any given fiscal year of the Authority provided that such Party has either discharged, or arranged for, to the satisfaction of the remaining members of the Board, the discharge of any pending obligation it has assumed hereunder, and further provided that written notice of intention to so withdraw has been served upon the Board and the City Clerk of each Party hereto not less than nine (9) months preceding the end of the Authority's fiscal year.
- C. The inclusion of additional Parties to this Agreement or the withdrawal of some, but not all, of the Parties to this Agreement shall not be deemed a dissolution of the Authority nor a termination of this Agreement. The Authority shall continue to exist and this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect so long as there shall be at least two (2) Parties to this Agreement.

- D. Upon the winding up and dissolution of the Authority, after paying or adequately providing for the debts and obligations of the Authority, the remaining assets of the Authority shall be distributed to the Parties to the Agreement. If for any reason the Parties to the Agreement are unable or unwilling to accept the assets of the Authority, said assets will be distributed to the Federal Government or the State of California or any local government for public purposes.

Section 12. New Member Cities

Cities other than the Parties hereto may apply for and be admitted to membership in the Authority only upon the unanimous consent of all the then-existing Parties hereto. The admission of new member cities shall be upon such terms and conditions as may be required by the unanimous action of the Board and any new member shall be required to execute this Agreement.

Section 13. Insurance

- A. Liability Insurance: The Authority shall procure and maintain in continuous effect for the duration of its existence the types and amounts of insurance listed herein against claims for injuries to persons or damage to property which may arise from or in connection with the performance by the Authority, its officers, agents, employees and contractors, of the duties set forth hereunder. Insurers licensed to write such policies in the State of California shall underwrite any such policies of insurance.
- B. Minimum scope of insurance: The insurance coverage specified above shall consist of the following coverage:

- (1) Insurance Services Office Commercial General Liability coverage (occurrence form CG 0001).
- (2) Law Enforcement Professional Liability Insurance endorsed for (or not excluded from) civil rights coverage.
- (3) Aviation General Liability Insurance endorsed for (or not excluded from) law enforcement activities.
- (4) Heliport Owners and Operator's General Liability Insurance endorsed for (or not excluded from) law enforcement activities.
- (5) Insurance Services Office form number CA 0001 (Ed. 1/87) covering Automobile Liability, code 1 (any auto) (applicable only if the Authority owns, leases, or rents any automobiles).
- (6) Worker's Compensation insurance as required by the State of California and Employer's Liability Insurance (applicable only if the Authority employs or leases any employees).
- (7) Director's and Officer's Liability Insurance.

C. Minimum limits of insurance: The coverage set forth in subsection B above shall contain coverage limits of not less than the following:

- (1) General Liability: \$2,000,000 per occurrence for bodily injury, personal injury and property damage.
- (2) Law Enforcement Professional Liability Insurance: \$20,000,000.
- (3) Aviation General Liability Insurance: \$50,000,000 per occurrence.
- (4) Heliport Owners and Operator's General Liability Insurance: \$20,000,000 per occurrence.

- (5) Automobile Liability: \$2,000,000 per occurrence for bodily injury and property damage.
- (6) Employer's Liability: \$1,000,000 per occurrence for bodily injury or disease.
- (7) Director's and Officer's Liability: \$1,000,000.

D. Each Party hereby covenants to provide Worker's Compensation Insurance and Employer's Liability Insurance coverage as required by California law, and to provide to the Authority endorsements equivalent to State Compensation Insurance Fund endorsements #2507 (waiver of subrogation) and #0015 (additional insured employer), which endorsements shall name the Authority. Each Party hereby agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless, at its own cost and expense, the Authority and each other Party, from and against any and all liability and costs, claims, demands, lawsuits, judgments, actions or causes of action, arising from breach of this subsection.

Section 14. Successors

This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall insure to the benefit of the successors of the Parties hereto, to the extent permitted by law.

Section 15. Severability

Should any part, term or provision of this Agreement be decided by the courts to be illegal or in conflict with any law of the United States of America or the State of California, or otherwise be rendered unenforceable or ineffectual, the validity of the remaining portions or provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 16. Indemnity

The Authority shall, at its own cost and expense, defend, indemnify and hold harmless the member cities of the Authority, their officers, agents, volunteers and employees, and each of them, from and against any and all liability and costs, claims, demands, lawsuits, judgments, actions or causes of action, whether sounding in tort, contract, strict liability or otherwise including any costs or attorneys fees for injury, death or other damage, direct or indirect, incurred or threatened by reason of any act or omission of the Authority, or of any person or entity performing any service for or on behalf of the Authority or discharging any obligation, task or duty, assumed by such person or entity under this Agreement. This duty of indemnification shall not be limited by the amount or type of insurance carried by the Authority.

Section 17. General Provisions

- A. Any notices required by or given pursuant to this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be delivered to both the Directors and the City Clerk of each of the Parties at the address of the principal business offices of the respective Parties listed in the introduction of this Agreement or at such other address as any Party may specify in writing to the Authority.
- B. This Agreement shall be deemed to have been made and shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
- C. The article and paragraph headings contained in this Agreement are for the convenience of reference only and are not intended to define, limit or describe the scope of any provision of this Agreement.

- D. Whenever any consent or approval is required by this Agreement, such consent or approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
- E. This Agreement may be executed on behalf of the Parties in multiple counterparts all of which collectively shall constitute one document.
- F. The Authority is hereby authorized to take any or all-legal or equitable actions, including but not limited to injunction and specific performance, necessary or permitted by law to enforce this Agreement.
- G. Should any part, term or provision of this Agreement be decided by any court of competent jurisdiction to be illegal or in conflict with any law of the State of California, or otherwise be rendered unenforceable or ineffectual, the validity of the remaining parts, terms, or provisions of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby.
- H. The effective date of this Agreement shall be the latest date of execution by a Party. This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the successors of the Parties, respectively. None of the Parties may assign any right or obligation hereunder without the written consent of the other Parties.

Section 18. Obligations, Immunities, & Beneficiaries

- A. Pursuant to Section 6508.1 of the Government Code of the State of California, the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the Authority (“Authority Obligations”) shall be solely the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the Authority. The Authority Obligations shall not constitute debts, liabilities,

and obligations of the Parties, and the Parties shall have no liability therefore.

- B. Pursuant to Section 6513 of the Government Code of the State of California, all of the privileges and immunities from liability, exemptions from law, ordinances and rules, all pension, relief, disability, workmen's compensation, and other benefits which apply to the activity of officers, agents or employees of the individual Parties when performing their respective functions within the territorial limits of their respective public agencies, shall apply to them to the same degree and extent while engaged in the performance of any of their functions and duties extraterritorially under the provisions of this Agreement.
- C. The Authority warrants that it will timely take all actions and make all filings required by Sections 6503.5 and 6503.7 of the Government Code of the State of California in order to ensure its ability to exercise its powers.
- D. This Agreement is intended solely for the benefit of the Authority and the Parties to this Agreement, and no third party shall be deemed to be a beneficiary or to have any rights hereunder against the Authority or any of the Parties as a result of the execution of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed and attested by the proper officers thereunto duly authorized.

REFERENCES

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