

HOW WILL AIR SUPPORT IN A LARGE URBAN AGENCY BE USED TO ADDRESS
DOMESTIC TERRORISM BY 2008?

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Peace Officer Standards and Training

by

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This Command College Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future; creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The view and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

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This project, written under the guidance and approval of the student's agency, mentor, and advisor, has been presented to and accepted by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, State of California, in fulfillment of the requirements of Command College Class Thirty Five.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	iii
Chapter I	
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION	1
Introduction.....	1
Historical Perspective	2
Air Support Uses.....	3
The Importance of Dealing with Domestic Terrorism.....	7
Chapter II	
FUTURES STUDY	10
Introduction.....	10
Nominal Group Technique	10
Preparation	11
Analysis of Trends	15
Event Analysis	17
Cross Impact Analysis	20
Alternative Future Scenarios	21
Scenario 1: Normative	22
Scenario 2: Pessimistic	23
Scenario 3: Optimistic.....	24
Chapter III	
STRATEGIC PLANNING	27
Vision and Goals.....	27
Organizational Description	27
Organizational Analysis.....	29
Internal Weaknesses	30
External Opportunities.....	31
External Threats	31
Internal Strengths.....	31
Stakeholder Identification and Analysis	32
Strategy Development.....	33
Development of Alternative Strategies.....	35
Chapter IV	
TRANSITION MANAGEMENT.....	37
Introduction.....	37
Commitment Planning	37
Commitment Charting	38
Intervention Strategies	39
Implementation of Change.....	39
Implementation Techniques.....	41
Evaluation	43

Chapter V

FINDINGS/IMPLICATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSIONS	44
Findings	44
Implications on Leadership.....	44
Budgetary Implications.....	45
Recommendations for the Future.....	46
Conclusions.....	47
ENDNOTES	49

LIST OF TABLES

Tables		Page
2-1	Trend Summary	15
2-2	Event Summary	19
2-3	Cross Impact Analysis	20

3-1	Stakeholders' Expected Roles	32
4-1	Critical Mass Commitment Chart	37
4-2	Responsibility Chart	42

CHAPTER ONE

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

Introduction

During the tragic events of September 11, 2001, domestic aircraft played a key role in rescue, recovery and surveillance efforts. Soon after the World Trade Center was attacked,

numerous helicopters arrived in the area equipped with medical supplies, medical personnel, and tactical response teams. Law enforcement and medical transport helicopters were just about the only aircraft flying in the New York area following the attack, and these images were prevalent in the media coverage that followed.¹

When the Pentagon in Virginia was attacked by a hijacked airliner a United States Park Police helicopter arrived within four minutes. This helicopter was equipped to evacuate as many as four injured people at a time. However, immediately after its arrival, its mission changed to being in command and control of the airspace above the pentagon. Shortly thereafter, a D.C. Metropolitan Police helicopter arrived and took over this assignment. The pilot of the D.C. Police helicopter would later say:

It was a hairy time, let me tell you. We were on station all day and must have been handling 20 helicopters at one point. We were duking it out with the F-16s and all the other aircraft, telling them where to go, where to park, what altitudes to hold, when not to come in. We were the only eyes up there, the only ones to tell our guys what was happening.²

It is clear that local law enforcement will have a role in the future efforts to prevent and respond to domestic terrorism. Law enforcement managers will need to develop the best strategies to impact this challenge. The issue statement for this project is: "How will air support in a large urban agency be used to address domestic terrorism by 2008?"

For this project, air support is defined as rotor craft (helicopters) and fixed wing aircraft (airplanes). Terrorism is defined as acts of violence and property destruction that are designed to place the population in fear or seriously disrupt vital infrastructures.

This project examines the issue of air support uses and technology related to law enforcement responses to terrorism. The information provided by this research is designed to be

used as organizational policy or as a strategic plan for any large urban law enforcement agency. No particular law enforcement agency is listed in the title of this project. However, the Fresno Police Department's air support unit will be used as the primary example of a large urban agency's air support unit. Information developed in this project is designed to be used for any large urban law enforcement agency.

Chapter I, Issue Identification, provides background information in the form of a historical perspective, as well as giving information about current uses of air support units. Chapter II, Futures Study, is a forward-looking approach that examines trends and events that assist in forecasting a probable future. Chapter III, Strategic Plan, is designed to create a plan that transitions air support use from its current state to a desired future state in law enforcement agencies. Chapter IV, Transition Management, explores the initiation, maintenance, and evaluation of change within an organization. Chapter V, Conclusion, includes a summary, recommendations for the future, and implications for leadership.

Historical Perspective

The first law enforcement agency to integrate helicopters into policing was the New York City Police Department in 1948. Bell Aircraft President Larry Bell convinced the NYPD to acquire helicopters for search and rescue missions, along with other police tasks.³ NYPD had used airplanes since 1929.⁴

In the late 1960s a study took place in Lakewood, California, regarding the effectiveness of routine helicopter patrol. The study, conducted by the Department of Criminology at California State University, Long Beach, showed that helicopter patrols were very effective.⁵ During this same period of time, turbine-powered helicopters came out on the market as viable

aircraft for local law enforcement to use. The combination of studies showing the value of air support and the availability of effective aircraft greatly increased the number of air support units in large law enforcement agencies.⁶

In 1970, 61 law enforcement agencies were operating 112 helicopters in this country.⁷ By 1986, there were 1400 helicopters being operated by 355 law enforcement agencies.⁸ By 1998, there were over 400 law enforcement agencies operating over 3,000 helicopters in the United States, thanks in part to the release of many military surplus helicopters to law enforcement.⁹

Air Support Uses

The uses and advantages to fixed wing and helicopter support in law enforcement agencies are many. These advantages can be broken down into the following categories: rapid response; aerial platform; surveillance; transportation; medical evacuation; patrol; night vision capability; tracking; and, pursuits.

- Rapid response. Typically, a helicopter is the aircraft chosen by agencies to respond to calls for service. Helicopters can travel in excess of 100 miles per hour and be relatively unimpeded on their way to calls. This enables them to arrive much faster than patrol cars. The average response time to calls for service by the helicopters in the Fresno Police Department is consistently around one minute, year after year. Studies have shown that when response time to crimes that involve suspects fleeing from the scene is reduced from four to two minutes, apprehension rates double.¹⁰
- Aerial platform. A fixed wing aircraft or helicopter can provide an unobstructed view of disaster and crime scenes from the air. Photographs and videotape can also be

taken of sites of future search warrants or tactical actions. Whether for tactical or intelligence purposes, information gained from the aerial platform can be relayed to interested personnel on the ground.

- Surveillance. Fixed wing aircraft allow for excellent covert and quiet surveillance from the air. The applicability of air surveillance to following suspected terrorists can clearly be seen.
- Transportation. Specialized teams, equipment, or commanders can be easily transported great distances in a minimal amount of time. SWAT teams and K-9s have been transported and inserted into locations in tactical situations, as have rescue divers.¹¹
- Medical evacuations. Air support can be used to access locations that are difficult or impossible for land vehicles to reach. Example include rural terrain or high rise buildings upon which a helicopter could land.
- Patrol. The visible presence of air support can act as a deterrent to criminal activity. Whereas a patrol car can only be seen from a block or less away, a police helicopter flying at 500 feet can be seen from a three-mile radius.¹²
- Night vision. Forward looking infrared devices are one type of vision enhancing equipment that can be used by air support. Powerful spotlights can illuminate large areas on the ground.
- Tracking. Emerging technology allows for forward-looking infrared devices and video cameras to lock onto a moving vehicle or person and track their movements.
- Pursuits. Air support can easily keep fleeing vehicles in sight, allowing ground units to terminate their pursuit. When the suspect vehicle has stopped its flight, the air

unit directs ground units to the best location to apprehend the suspect.¹³ In 1993, approximately 16% of all law enforcement agencies and 49% of large agencies (over 500 sworn officers) were sued as the result of police pursuits.¹⁴

After the events in the City of New York and at the Pentagon, it is obvious that local air support will play a large role in catastrophic terrorist events. However, local jurisdictions have been reluctant to allow the development of heliports throughout a city due to noise considerations.¹⁵

If large-scale terrorist attacks in urban areas becomes a trend, then the response to them may entail one of two options. The military may take on the role of civil response to these type of events in cities. Conversely, local law enforcement and its air support component may be depended upon to perform rescues and other reactionary measures. If the military assumes this role, then a great deal of training, educating, and preparing of the community must occur. Indeed, a paradigm shift of how public safety is viewed will be necessary. If local law enforcement assumes this role, additional resources will be necessary.¹⁶

Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia, believes that “air power is the wave of the future.” In this context, he is referring to military engagements. However, the applicability to law enforcement and its response to domestic terrorism can be seen in his follow-up comments. Thompson said that the advantages of aircraft go beyond strategic maneuvers and the firing of munitions. Specifically they have an advantage in moving troops (personnel) and they allow for tactical air mobility. Thompson said, “You don’t want to spend a lot of time moving vehicles across contested territory. You want to

conduct search and destroy missions from the air. It's faster; you're less vulnerable; and you have greater situational awareness."¹⁷

There are strong similarities between military use of air support and local law enforcement use. People were amazed with the U.S. military's quick and decisive victories in Afghanistan which were accomplished mostly by special operations units which were few in number. This effort was made possible in large part by the use of air support, namely helicopters. Violent land battles were avoided by air support moving personnel quickly and covertly throughout the country, day and night. Helicopters had the dual benefit of armed reconnaissance while providing battlefield intelligence.¹⁸

Air support units stand to benefit greatly as technological developments are made that can assist these units in their missions. Emerging technology promises to increase night vision capabilities of pilots and tactical flight officers through the use of more sophisticated goggles and night vision compatible display panels in the aircraft. Advancements are being made in searchlight capabilities, laser illuminators, color cameras, thermal imaging systems, and "moving maps" that display the aircraft's location in relation to its destination and indicate airspace and jurisdictional boundaries.¹⁹

The United States Park Police, which had two helicopters arrive at the Pentagon within six minutes of the September 11, 2001 attack, has the type of equipment on board that will be needed by local law enforcement agencies in the future. Items that the Park Police have on board include: mass casualty kits allowing for the treatment of four on-board patients, intubation kits, defibrillators, advanced cardiac kits, rescue hoists, life rafts, thermal bags, survival kits with enough food and water for three days, light and heavy body armor, rescue nets, canopy

penetrators, infrared cameras, searchlights, and gas masks.²⁰ Some of this equipment has less relevance to large urban agencies. However, the benefit of technological advancements that will improve the effectiveness of these items while reducing the space needed to carry them will be beneficial to air support units in all jurisdictions.

The concept of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) being used by local law enforcement agencies offers a provocative image of the future. These aircraft are in use by the military for reconnaissance and weapons delivery. “The mountainous terrain in Afghanistan cries out for helicopters and tactical UAVs”, said Dan Goure, a senior fellow at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia. “There’s really no better way to get around and pursue the enemy.”²¹

Recently, the United States Border Patrol has been using UAVs to assist in patrolling the U.S.-Mexico border. There could be many uses for UAVs by local agencies in their efforts to prevent and effectively react to terrorism. Imagine a UAV locking onto a terrorist's vehicle and monitoring its whereabouts unbeknownst to the occupants. The potential for a UAV delivering a deadly strike when lethal force was appropriate also presents serious logistical, legal, technological, and ethical questions. However, it can be reasonably forecast that law enforcement leaders in the future will be faced with issues such as this.

The Importance of Dealing with Domestic Terrorism

September 11, 2001, served as a wake-up call for American citizens, elected officials, and especially local law enforcement leaders. Previously, international conflict was viewed in terms of the cold war with the now-defunct Soviet Union, China, or the various conflicts in the Balkans. However, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon introduced the concept of asymmetrical warfare – on American territory. This created the realization that vast

destruction in any of U.S. cities could be caused by the nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological matter that could be secreted in a briefcase.

John Persinos, Editor-in-Chief of Rotor & Wing magazine wrote this compelling passage:

One big difference between the September 11 attacks and Pearl Harbor is that we don't have the benefit of a tangible foe. In the war against terrorism, victory will require more than a second Doolittle raid. Get used to it: Terrorism will be the ever-present threat of the 21st century. As Charles de Gaulle wryly put it, 'The future lasts a long time.'²²

In addition to law enforcement's need to prepare for attacks that are random as to time and place, there are targets that can be foreseen as being attractive to terrorists. These include bridges, dams, power plants, airports, interstate freeways, government buildings, and aqueducts. In March 2003, the California Wing of the Civil Air Patrol conducted an exercise in which they tested photo-reconnaissance equipment by photographing various structures and locations thought to be vulnerable to attack.²³ Local law enforcement agencies must collaborate with entities such as the Civil Air Patrol, as the future may see cross-application of various disciplines and a blurring of roles in the fight against terrorism.

Leadership will play a key role in the planning and preparation for reacting to large scale catastrophes. As part of the preparation for dealing with events involving weapons of mass destruction, law enforcement leaders should implement the following steps:

- Develop pertinent policy.
- Implement procedures.
- Train personnel.

- Rehearse possible events.
- Acquire equipment.
- Establish mutual-aid agreements and multi-jurisdictional protocols.
- Establish multi-discipline community service teams.²⁴

In this chapter, Issue Identification, the issue of air support use in law enforcement was introduced by recounting a brief history of the topic and providing an overview of current uses of air support units. The evolution of air support units can be assessed by examining changes in aircraft, equipment, training, and uses. The purpose of this project is to forecast and plan for future trends and events that will impact air support units.

Subsequent chapters of this project will explore the development of goals, creating a strategic plan, and managing the transition to a desired state of law enforcement air support. The project also includes an examination of threats which need to be effectively dealt with, as well as opportunities that need to be capitalized on, in the pursuit of the desired state of air support in law enforcement agencies. Chapter II, Futures Study, is a forward looking approach that examines trends and events that assist in forecasting a probable future.

CHAPTER TWO

FUTURES STUDY

Introduction

A certain future pertaining to how air support will be used to address domestic terrorism cannot be predicted. There are simply too many variables that inhibit the ability to foresee exactly what shape air support units will take and what challenges local law enforcement will have to face related to terrorism. In preparing for the future, it is much wiser to use a scientific method to project possible future scenarios, as opposed to trying to predict the future.

There is no magic crystal ball that can reveal what law enforcement leaders will be faced with in the future. Determining what may impact law enforcement in the future is best done by scanning the horizon by reading trends from social, economic, environmental, technological, and political sources.²⁵ This systematic approach to forecasting significant trends and events allows the projecting of a possible future. The issue and strategies developed to deal with it will be impacted by these trends and events. Estimating the impact and creating alternative future scenarios allows the commencement of the strategic planning process that will assist in achieving the desired future state of air support operations and their role in preventing and reacting to domestic terrorism.

Nominal Group Technique

The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used as a tool to identify possible future trends and events relating to law enforcement air support use to combat terrorism. The NGT process allows multiple participants the opportunity to influence group outcomes. It encourages equal participation and instills in group members a shared investment in the results of the brainstorming session.²⁶ Each member is asked to be as creative as possible as they plumb the depths of their imaginations and experience searching for possible trends and events affecting the issue in the future. NGT includes four elements: silent generation of ideas, round-robin

recording of the ideas, discussion, and prioritization of the ideas.²⁷

The preparation, process, and results of the NGT exercise are summarized in the following section of this chapter.

Preparation

A panel of nine people was selected to assist in the process. The panel members represented several criminal justice agencies, and although all members had an interest in combating terrorism, the level of expertise in air operations ranged from great to none at all. The NGT members were:

- Helicopter Pilot, California Air National Guard
- Chief's Administrative Lieutenant, Fresno Police Department
- Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Air Support Supervisor, Fresno Police Department
- Special Agent, U.S. Department of the Treasury
- Helicopter Mechanic, Fresno Police Department
- Fixed-wing Pilot, California Highway Patrol
- Air Support Supervisor, California Highway Patrol
- Helicopter Pilot, Fresno Police Department

The Nominal Group Technique meeting occurred in April 2003. An introductory presentation was given regarding the mechanics of the NGT process, the value of such a process, the context of the NGT relating to the issue, as well as the project's role in the Command College experience. An explanation was then given regarding trends, events, and cross impact analysis. Before each of the steps in the NGT, an explanation of the step was provided again.

Trends

Panel members began the NGT process by identifying trends that they believed would impact the issue. A trend was defined as a series of events occurring over time, which are related and can be forecasted.²⁸ Members were given turns to contribute several trends, which were recorded on flip chart paper then posted for all to view. Eighteen trends were identified.

Discussion then ensued to determine if the identified trends could be modified or combined. After all members understood the identified trends, they were asked to select the trends that they believed would have the greatest impact on how air support in a large urban agency will be used to combat terrorism by 2008. Members differed on the five trends that each believed would have the greatest impact. The following seven trends received the most votes from panel members:

1. Level of political support. Panel members expressed a general consensus that political support for air operations units rises after a terrorist attack, but then wanes as time passes. Irrespective of the direction of this trend, it was agreed that the amount of political support is a trend that will have great impact upon this issue.
2. Public relations efforts by law enforcement. Several panel members emphasized the need for air support units to market themselves in order to receive public support and funding. This trend was viewed as important to the issue because the level of public support will have considerable impact, and steps can be taken to influence this trend.
3. Funding level for air support units. Panel members linked funding levels to the

recency of terrorist attacks. All believed funding levels had the highest importance, yet only one member thought funding levels would increase. Most members thought it would remain constant, while three members thought it would decrease. Because of the expense of aircraft and the technology that may be deployed by them in the future, funding level was viewed as a trend that would greatly affect the issue.

4. Breadth of the air support mission. Measured in terms of the number of various activities engaged in by air support units, members forecasted a significant broadening of the air support mission in the future. This included surveillance, imaging, transport, immigration enforcement, and rescues. Broadening of the mission was seen as having an impact on training, equipment, and labor issues.
5. Level of privacy intrusion concerns. With increased use of air support and the broadening of the mission the panel also identified increased concerns about privacy issues from members of the general public as well as advocacy groups. The enhanced ability of air support units to see in the dark, detect heat levels from inside residences, locate and track citizens, provide down-linked photos and videos in real time to people on the ground, all have the potential to stir significant public debate.
6. Level of training. Panel members generally felt that the level of training related to air support operations would increase significantly to accommodate the broadened mission and increased flight hours. Some members pointed out that the potential of more training time being required while the mission was being

expanded was somewhat of a paradox.

7. Number of air support programs. Most panel members believed air support programs would increase in number and size with the increased need to combat terrorism. However three members believed the prevalence of air support programs would decrease because of funding and privacy issues.

The NGT panel did not bring up the coordination of activities and blurring of the lines between police and the military. This was interesting in view of the public discussion surrounding this issue since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

The NGT panel was then introduced to the concept of a trend summary table. Members were asked to assume that the current rating for each trend was 100. With this in mind, members were asked to place numerical values on each trend representing its ratings five years prior, five years in the future, and ten years in the future. A number below 100 would reflect a regression in the trend, whereas a number above 100 represented a progression in the trend. After the trend ratings were completed, the panel members were asked to assign a level of concern to each trend. A rating of 1 represented the lowest concern while a rating of 10 represented the highest concern. Table 2-1 reflects the median scores for each of the trends.

Table 2-1

Trend Summary Table

Trend Statement		Today	+5 years	+10 years	Level of
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	-5 years				Concern 1-10
1. Level of political support for air units.	80	100	90	90	10
2. Public relations efforts of departments regarding air support units.	80	100	120	120	9
3. Funding levels for air support units.	75	100	100	100	10
4. Broadening of air support units' mission.	75	100	120	150	8
5. Privacy concerns of citizens and advocacy groups.	100	100	110	120	5
6. Training level for air support units.	80	100	110	125	10
7. Prevalence of air support in large urban departments.	95	100	100	120	8

Analysis of Trends

The four trends with the highest levels of concern were:

- Level of political support for air support units
- Public relations efforts of departments regarding air support units
- Level of funding for air support units
- Training levels of air support units

Trend #1, Level of political support for air support units. The panel felt that political support was critical to enable air support units to be provided with the equipment and training necessary to accomplish their missions. The group estimated a twenty percent increase in political support in the last five years. However, panel members believed that support will actually diminish in the coming years if concerns about terrorism begin to fade. Only one

member believed political support will be greater ten years from now than it is currently. All members gave this trend the highest level of concern rating.

Trend #2, Public relations efforts of departments regarding air support units. The panel believed that it is critical for air support units to reach out to the public through presentations, civic involvement, and opening the units to public examination. Such efforts were viewed as being prerequisite for increased community support, which would offset diminished interests of elected officials. Panel members believed this trend has increased twenty percent in the last five years, and they forecast it increasing that much again in the next five years. None of the panel members believed the trend would decrease in upcoming years, and only one member forecast no increase.

Trend #3, Level of funding for air support units. The panel unanimously gave this trend a rating of ten regarding level of concern. They estimated a 25 percent increase in the last five years and forecast no change in funding level over the next ten years. Several members believed funding levels would decrease in the next five years, then rise back to previous levels by year ten. The panel discussed how political support, and thus funding, would taper off in the next few years if no significant terrorist attacks occur and the effects of 9-11-01 begin to diminish. Several members believed that another terrorism incident after five years had past would cause funding for air support units to be restored to previous levels.

Trend #6, Training levels of air support units. Panel members also gave this trend the highest rating for level of concern. Members believed this trend had increased twenty percent in the last five years and forecast that it would increase another twenty-five percent in the next ten years. The members were unanimous in this opinion and attributed it to the necessity of air

support members needing to acquire new technological skills and adapt to their mission of preventing and responding to acts of terrorism.

Event Analysis

The panel members were told that an event is defined as an incident that is a single, discrete occurrence that can potentially have a significant impact on an issue's future.²⁹ Through the nominal group technique the panel identified 19 potential events that could significantly impact this issue. Discussion and panel ratings further reduced the number of events to be examined to seven.

Panel members rated the events as to their probability of occurring and their subsequent impact on the issue. Four questions were addressed by the members: "How many years until the probability of the event exceeds zero?"; "What is the probability of the event occurring within five years?"; "What is the probability of the event occurring within ten years?"; and, "What is the impact the event would have on the issue, using a rating scale of negative ten to positive ten?" The results of the scoring are in Table 2-2. Median scores were used for the table.

Table 2-2

Event Summary Table

Event Statement	Years Until Probability Exceeds Zero	Probability +5 years	Probability +10 years	Impact on Issue if Event Occurred -10 to 10
1. Large event attacked	1	50	75	10
2. Chemical/biological attack from ground	1	25	75	8
3. Local air support consolidation	7	0	25	6
4. Attack on infrastructure	1	50	50	9
5. Air support interdicts terrorist attack	1	25	50	9
6. Ground or missile launched attack on airborne aircraft	2	25	75	3
7. Chemical/biological attack from air	1	50	50	4

The panel identified the following events as having the greatest impact on the issue:

Event #1, Large public gathering attacked by terrorists. Panel members discussed several scenarios in which a large public gathering was the subject of a terrorist attack. Examples included sporting events in a large stadium filled to capacity and outdoor festivals attended by thousands of people. They envisioned widespread casualties and damage causing mass hysteria and thus instilling fear in people planning on attending such events in the future.

Event #2, Chemical or biological attack launched on the ground. The panel discussed the potential for the ground release of a chemical or biological agent that would cause scores of citizens to die or become sick. Such a release could occur aboard mass transit or in a large gathering of people, indoors or outdoors. This type of attack would be problematic for first responders and might overwhelm local hospitals.

Event #3, Local air support consolidation. The panel discussed the possibility of a large agency's air support unit consolidating with the county's air support unit or the air support units

of nearby agencies. It was believed that this would be a cost-saving measure to improve efficiency.

Event #4, Attack on infrastructure. The panel discussed the potential for an attack on critical infrastructures such as dams, power grids, critical government buildings, computer systems, telecommunication systems, road, bridges, and freeways. This type of attack could have exponential consequences in relation to the actual physical damage that would be needed to wreck such havoc.

Event #5, Air support used to interdict a terrorist attack. The potential of local air support being deployed to actually interrupt a terrorist attack was discussed. The panel envisioned the rapid deployment of aircraft to intercept a convoy of vehicles headed to a planned attack, or the communication by air support personnel of vital information to ground units, leading them to the location of terrorists.

Event #6, Ground or missile launched attack on airborne aircraft. This refers to a scenario the panel envisioned in which an aircraft aloft is struck by either ground fire or missile fire from another aircraft. The panel thought the probability of this occurring in the next ten years was seventy-five percent. However, panel members believed such an event would have minimal impact on the issue because of the limitation of a response by local air support to such an event.

Event #7, Chemical or biological attack from the air. Similar to event number two, this would be the release of a toxic agent upon a public area. However, the panel forecast this event as being launched from the air, such as from a crop duster. The panel gave this a fifty percent chance of happening in ten years, but rated this impact on the issue as low due to limitations of

responses by local air support.

Cross Impact Analysis

The panel was asked to assess the impact the events would have on the trends. They assigned a rating of 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the highest degree of impact. They were also asked to classify the impact as positive or negative as it pertained to the trend, and as it related to the objective of combating terrorism. Knowing what effect the event will have on the objective will help law enforcement determine whether to encourage or discourage an event from occurring in order to achieve a desirable future.

Table 2-3

Cross-Impact Analysis

Event/ Trend	T1 Political Support	T2 Public Relations	T3 Funding	T4 Broadened Mission	T5 Privacy Concerns	T6 Training	T7 Prevalence of Air Support
E1: Large Event Attacked	5	0	5	5	-4	0	4
E2: WMD Ground Attack	4	0	3	3	-3	0	2
E3: Local Consolidation	2	3	-1	2	0	-4	1
E4: Infrastructure Attack	5	2	4	5	-4	-1	3
E5: Interdict Attack	4	3	2	0	0	0	5
E6: Aircraft Attacked	3	3	2	1	-2	2	2
E7: WMD Attack from Air	2	0	3	2	-3	0	0

Three of the events stood out from the rest as having significant impact on the majority of the trends should they occur.

Event #1, Attack at a large event. This was believed to have a positive effect on political support, and therefore on funding. The panel felt the reaction would be similar to those following September 11, 2001, with an outpouring of money coming in the wake of such attack. It was also believed that the mission of local air support would be broadened, and the prevalence of these units would increase. This event was felt to have a significant negative impact on privacy concerns as a result of the increased prevalence and broadened mission of air support.

Event #2, A ground launched attack using weapons of mass destruction was felt to have a significant positive impact on government funding for air support due to increased political backing for such units. The panel believed the broadening of the air support mission in this case would be slightly less than what would occur if a large public gathering was attacked. Again the panel felt that this event would have a negative impact on privacy concerns.

Event #4, An attack on infrastructure was viewed as having the highest level of impact on political support for air operations, as well as the highest impact on broadening the mission. The panel felt that a successful attack on a critical infrastructure would cause air support units to be more heavily involved in security and surveillance operations. Once again, privacy concerns were seen to be significantly negatively impacted as a result of air support response to an attack on the infrastructure.

Alternative Future Scenarios

Three alternative future scenarios were created based upon the scanning process and the nominal group technique process. The three scenarios are written as newspaper articles in the year 2008. The three scenarios are normative, pessimistic, and optimistic.

SCENARIO 1: Normative

Newspaper Article, January 1, 2008

“New Year’s Celebration Turns Tragic”

A large tractor-trailer truck exploded during last night’s New Year’s Eve celebration in the Civic Center Plaza, leaving over thirty people dead and scores of others seriously injured. Approximately 20,000 people had crowded into the plaza late last night to ring in the new year.

Approximately fifteen minutes prior to the explosion police had received an anonymous tip that a truck loaded with explosives was headed to the downtown area to disrupt the festivities in the plaza. The tip said the militant group “Abra-cadabra” was behind the attack.

Police immediately began to try to block roads leading into the downtown area, but quickly exhausted their resources without having every street blocked. The department’s helicopter was requested to respond. Due to budget cutbacks, the helicopter has been remaining at the heliport in between calls for service.

More officers were needed to block streets as the clock continued ticking on the truck’s arrival. There were several tactical officers available at a substation to be deployed downtown, however, it would have taken them more than ten minutes to arrive at the plaza. These officers could have made it downtown in less than five minutes had the helicopter been capable of transporting them. However, the department’s current helicopter is not capable of carrying anyone beside the pilot and one observer.

The police helicopter arrived in the downtown area just in time to see the large truck traveling down Main Street toward the plaza. With no means to stop the truck, all the observer in the helicopter could do was radio to ground units the exact location of the truck. Ground units

responded to block Main Street, however, the truck drove past officers as they stood powerlessly along the side of the road. The truck exploded at the plaza, killing and injuring over 100 people. Two suspects who jumped from the truck moments before it exploded were tracked by the helicopter's infrared cameras and arrested a short distance away.

SCENARIO 2: Pessimistic

Newspaper Article, January 1, 2008

"Multiple Snipers Kill 42 People at Football Game at Stadium"

Twenty or more terrorists armed with high powered rifles entered the college stadium from multiple locations and began firing randomly into the stands on all sides of the field. At least 42 people were killed and as many as 200 others were wounded.

Police received several anonymous tips minutes before the attack. The tips included information that numerous terrorists armed with sniper rifles were en route to the stadium in as many as 5 vans. Acting without haste, the police department, sheriff's department and highway patrol sent their helicopters into the air to look for any vans headed toward the stadium. Unfortunately, none of the agencies could communicate via radio with one another since they use different radio systems. No organized planning had occurred between the various agencies' air support units for cases such as this one.

Budget cuts have prevented the agencies' helicopters from flying in between calls for service. This delayed the response of the helicopters to the stadium. Only the highway patrol's helicopter is capable of carrying two or more passengers, so no significant movement of personnel to the stadium was possible in the minutes before the attack.

The sheriff's department's helicopter spotted one of the vans that was headed for the stadium. However, the van pulled to the side of the road and all occupants fled on foot into a nearby neighborhood. The helicopter's infrared video system was down for repair, thus preventing the tracking of the suspect's during this nighttime search. All of the suspects from this van alluded capture. The highway patrol helicopter also spotted a van headed for the stadium, however, was not able to cause it to stop prior to its arrival at the stadium. The helicopter crew watch helplessly as the five occupants headed into the stadium with high-powered rifles.

SCENARIO 3: Optimistic

Newspaper Article, January 1, 2008

"Police Interrupt Terrorist Attack at Stadium"

Acting quickly and using a plan that had been previously practiced, the police department, sheriff's department, and highway patrol combined forces to avert what was sure to be incredible carnage at the football stadium last night.

Police received tips that numerous terrorists in several vans were headed to the stadium armed with rifles. Immediately all three agencies alerted their air support personnel who were already on patrol around the metropolitan area. Increased funding for air operations in the past year have allowed for more flight time for the agencies, almost assuring that three helicopters are in the air each night.

The three helicopters immediately set into action the plan they have practiced before in which they respond to predesignated sections of the city and observe main streets looking for

any vehicles matching the description of vehicles alleged to be involved in criminal activity. The police department's recently acquired addition to its fleet, a five passenger turbine helicopter, was mobilized at the heliport and picked up four heavily armed tactical officers who had been on a special assignment in another part of town. These officers were flown to the stadium, where they were dropped off to deploy to strategic positions in case the terrorists made it to the stadium.

Within minutes, two vans were spotted by two of the helicopters patrolling the area. The helicopters used their tracking devices to "lock-on" to the vans' whereabouts, which allowed continual tracking even when the vans turned off their lights and led the helicopters on high-speed pursuits. Ultimately, the helicopter crews used vehicle-disabling technology to cause the vans to stop. The occupants exited the vans and fled into the darkness, however, the helicopters infrared video revealed the suspects' locations. The suspects were later taken into custody after SWAT was deployed to the area.

The highway patrol's helicopter spotted a third van as it reached the stadium parking lot. Five terrorists exited the van, armed with sniper rifles. As the suspects moved toward the stadium, the helicopter observer began saturating the area around the terrorists with "cover-fire" from his high-powered rifle. He had been supplied with the rifle and trained to use it by the military as a result of last year's cross-training and mutual deployment guidelines developed between the military and local police. The terrorists were locked down by the rifle fire from the helicopter, enabling the tactical team brought in by the police department's new helicopter to engage the suspects with their high-powered weapons. Three terrorists were killed and the other two surrendered.

Chapter II explored trends and events that were forecasted to have significant impact of the future of air support units. Alternative scenarios were created to assist in the development of a vision of a desired future state of air support. Chapter III will engage in organizational and stakeholder analysis, and propose a strategic planning process that will assist in the achievement of the optimistic scenario presented in Chapter II.

CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Introduction

In order to achieve a future that resembles the one described in the optimistic future scenario, it is crucial to engage in strategic planning. The purpose of this chapter is to focus on aspects of strategic planning that are needed to ensure an optimistic future. These aspects include the vision and goals of an effective air support unit, an understanding of the current state of air support, organizational and stakeholder analyses, and strategy development with three alternative strategies. The strategic plan will be used to prepare the organization for change and to minimize negative impacts. The desired changes include: increasing the capabilities of air support units' aircraft, technology, and personnel; broadening the air support mission; increasing public support for air support units; and, creating seamless linkage with allied agencies.

Vision and Goals

The expansion of the role of air support in the efforts to combat terrorism combined with increased technological capabilities promise to greatly increase local law enforcement's ability to prevent and react to terrorist events. A strategic plan that enables a department to fully capitalize on the benefits that air support can offer is vital in allowing the agency to achieve a desired end state. The goal is the prevention and effective reaction to acts of terrorism, which will result in a safer community.

Organizational Description

It is important to understand the current state of an organization as part of strategic plan development. The issue of local law enforcement air support was examined previously through scanning, literature review, nominal group technique, and alternate future scenarios. Prior to

designing a strategy to move the Fresno Police Department to a desired state of having increased capabilities of its aircraft, technology, and air support personnel capabilities, accompanied by increased public support, an assessment of the current state is in order.

The Fresno Police Department's air support unit consists of a sergeant, a chief pilot, three pilots, two tactical flight officers (observers), a lead helicopter mechanic, and a helicopter mechanic. The commander of the unit is a lieutenant who is in command of several other special units. The unit has three piston-driven helicopters, one of which will soon be sold, and a recently acquired turbine helicopter. The unit has no fixed-wing aircraft. Flight hours are not as high as the department would like. Helicopter repairs and lack of pilots available to fly has attributed to the lack of flight time in the past. Personnel issues, training commitments, and military commitments have caused a reduction in the amount of hours that the unit has been on patrol the past few years.

In order to make the air support unit more attractive, sworn members switched to a four-ten work week in 2002 and received raises commensurate with their pilot experience. Pilot availability is expected to increase with these changes. The recent acquisition of the turbine helicopter will also allow for more aircraft availability.

The air support unit is responsible for patrolling over 100 square miles of Fresno. The piston-driven helicopters have been limited to approximately 90-100 miles per hour, although performance deteriorates further during the hot summer months. The piston-driven helicopters can only carry the pilot and the tactical flight officer. Only minimal payload can be carried by these helicopters. The new turbine aircraft can carry up to five people and significantly more payload than the older helicopters in the fleet. The helicopters are equipped with forward-

looking infrared devices (FLIR) to view images at night, as well as powerful “night-sun” spotlights.

The air support members have not received special training related to terrorism. The unit does not regularly train with allied agencies’ air support units, nor with any other special units in the department. There is no ability to currently use the aircraft as a shooting platform or otherwise deliver offenses weapons to the ground. Technology aboard the aircraft is currently limited to the FLIR and tools related to the flight of the aircraft.

Organizational Analysis

To best analyze the current state and its potential to changing to a desired state, an assessment of organizational weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and strengths may be used. Known as the WOTS-UP model, an inventory can be taken in a systematic fashion. Strengths and weaknesses are viewed as being internal to the organization and are either positive conditions or possible obstacles to achieving the desired future state. Positive conditions that could assist the agency in advancing the capabilities of its air support unit could include a work group that sees personal and professional benefit from having a broader mission. A culture that welcomes technological advances and values public support would also help implement the change to a desired state or air operations. Conversely, change that is seen as upsetting the existing working conditions in the unit, or change that resembles past failed attempts at improvement, are likely to be resisted by current unit personnel. Opportunities and threats are elements external to the organization. These could include events and trends.

Internal Weaknesses:

- ▶ There is a shortage of licensed pilots in the Fresno Police Department.
- ▶ Full staffing in the air support unit is difficult to maintain due to training time and military obligations.
- ▶ Training an officer to become a helicopter pilot can take over one year when done internally.
- ▶ Lack of mapping and GPS technology.
- ▶ Only one turbine helicopter. There are three helicopters that are piston-driven and cannot carry the payload nor have the performance ability necessary for certain missions associated with preventing and reacting to terrorist events.
- ▶ Air support members have not been specifically trained in threats posed and activities engaged in by terrorists.
- ▶ Commanders and line personnel have not been trained in best uses of air support pertaining to catastrophic events or prevention of terrorists acts.
- ▶ Acquisition of technological equipment and improved aircraft have not been budgeted.
- ▶ The department does not have its own fixed wing aircraft.
- ▶ There has been a lack of training with allied agencies.
- ▶ There has been a lack of training with other special units in the department.
- ▶ Coordination with the military has been absent.
- ▶ Video down-link capability to patrol vehicles does not exist.
- ▶ Broadening of mission may overtax the unit.

External Opportunities:

- ▶ Public perception of the unit is positive.
- ▶ Local elected officials support the growth of the unit.
- ▶ The sheriff's department and highway patrol have air support units located near the police department's unit.
- ▶ Federal funding for anti-terrorism efforts may become available.
- ▶ Local grassroots group is supportive financially of air support efforts.
- ▶ Local air and army guard bases are located nearby.

External Threats:

- ▶ There are budget deficits at federal, state, and local levels.
- ▶ There is an inability to link allied agencies' efforts together.
- ▶ There are raised concerns nationally about government intrusion as a result of anti-terrorism campaign.
- ▶ Aggressive measures by local law enforcement may be seen as the militarization of police.
- ▶ Closer liaison with military pertaining to training, equipment, and deployment may be viewed as a suspension of posse comitatus, which prohibits the military from assuming the role of local law enforcement within the United States.

Internal Strengths:

- ▶ Recent acquisition of turbine helicopter.
- ▶ Support of police department leadership for the air support unit.
- ▶ Strong core of personnel within the unit in all positions.

- ▶ Air support unit enjoys good reputation in the community and with elected officials.
- ▶ Air support unit has a comprehensive operations manual, training program, and on-going training.
- ▶ Department is a regional leader and has vast experience developing and using technology.
- ▶ There are a number of special units with potential for training and deploying with the air support unit.
- ▶ Members of the air support unit are forward-looking.

Stakeholder Identification and Analysis

A critical part of the strategic planning process is the identification of key stakeholders and the analysis of their expectations pertaining to the issue at hand.³⁰ Stakeholders may be individuals or groups who are impacted by, or have an impact on, what the organization seeks to accomplish. Stakeholders can have a positive or negative impact upon an issue. It is crucial to identify all stakeholders in order to avoid “snail darters”, a term which has come to mean stakeholders who were not identified beforehand. These unidentified stakeholders can have a significant adverse effect on the strategic plan, especially if they arise late in the transition. Once all stakeholders are identified it should be determined how they potentially can impact the strategic planning process.

The following table lists potential stakeholders in the issue of how air support will be used to combat domestic terrorism. The table reflects the desired place the stakeholder should be

during the strategic planning process. The community is a possible snail darter because of the potential backlash against a perceived increased intrusion into personal privacy by air support units. Therefore, the community should be included early in the strategic planning process to avoid last minute intrusion into the process, thus delaying and perhaps even thwarting the process.

Table 3-1

Stakeholders and their Expected Role in the Strategic Planning Process

STAKEHOLDER	INCLUSION	RECOGNITION	INFORMATION	LEADERSHIP
City Council		X	X	
City Manager		X	X	
Chief of Police	X	X	X	X
Police Management	X	X	X	X
Air Support Members	X	X	X	X
Fresno Police Officers Association		X	X	
Community	X	X	X	
Allied Agencies	X	X	X	
Military		X	X	

Strategy Development

Part of the strategic planning process is to develop a plan that meets the expectations of the various stakeholders. Some stakeholders will have common expectations while others may have expectations that are solely their own.³¹

In this issue, the City Council, City Manager, and Chief of Police would have the common expectation that the plan would be cost-effective, or low investment/high yield. There would need to be measurable benchmarks of performance that reflected the level of success the air support unit was having. The plan needs to show cost consciousness when it comes to personnel allocation, equipment, and maintenance expenses. The council, manager, and chief would also expect a plan that is palatable to the community in terms of intrusion tradeoffs for increased security.

Police management's interests would be that other aspects of the agency were not sacrificed for a sheer increase in the budget of the air support unit. Managers would need to see the connection between the strategic plan for the air support unit and the direct and indirect benefits provided to units under their command. Integration of their units into the operations and training of the air support unit might go a long ways toward garnering department-wide support.

Air support members' expectations would be enhanced ability of the aircraft, improved technological tools, increased training commensurate with their expanded mission, and a hands-on role in the development of the improved air support unit. They would also expect to be included in the development, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the transition.

The Fresno Police Officers Association would expect the air support unit members to

receive compensation that reflected any expansion in their duties. There would also be expectations of adequate safety provisions and enhanced training. To avoid this group from becoming a possible snail darter, they should be recognized and kept informed during the transitional process.

The community would expect that any increased intrusion into their lives due to increased surveillance and vision enhancements, tracking capability, and increased flight time would be justified by the increased public safety provided by the air support unit. The community would also expect that any increase in funding be justified publicly and that a system of monitoring effectiveness be put into place. Recognition and information are two things the community requires if their support of the transitional process is expected.

Development of Alternative Strategies

In order for the agency to create a desired future state of its air support unit, it must do more than create a vision and goal, conduct an analysis of the organization, and consider stakeholders' interests. The agency must also develop alternative strategies.³² The strategy that offers the best opportunity for creating the desired future state is the strategy that should be pursued.

Referencing the three alternative scenarios that were developed pursuant to the Nominal Group Technique process that was conducted, three alternative strategies can be designed to parallel these scenarios.

Strategy 1. Parallel to the normative scenario is the strategy that leadership is willing to participate in change, but does not take a leadership role. The organization is buffeted about by external changes, does not resist them, but does not act as a catalyst for change. The

drawback to this strategy is that the agency does not influence the change.

Strategy 2. This strategy goes with the pessimistic scenario. It is characterized by leadership that resists change and strives to maintain the status quo in the face of external changes. This causes isolation of the agency and prevents the opportunity for interagency collaboration. The external environment simply passes the agency by, causing the internal environment to reflect frustration. A loss of employee and public confidence cause the effectiveness of the agency to be called into question.

Strategy 3. This strategy is a companion to the optimistic scenario. In this strategy leadership takes a proactive role toward change, capitalizing on external opportunities and internal strengths. A shared vision is created amongst stakeholders, the desired end state is communicated internally and externally, and alliances with allied agencies are capitalized upon.

In order for Strategy 3 to be implemented the leadership in the department must act as change agents and assert themselves in the evolutionary process of moving the air support unit forward. Rapid recognition of opportunities and strengths must occur. Decisions about personnel allocations, equipment procurement, training, policy, and deployment must reflect the vision of the desired future state.

Chapter III explored the current state of the organization and opportunities and threats that are present. Stakeholders were analyzed for their expected role in the strategic planning process, and alternative strategies were developed. The purpose of these areas of research is to assist in developing a strategy that propels the organization to change the mission, capabilities, and interagency operations of its air support unit. Another desired change is the increase of public support for air support units based upon increased effectiveness in combating terrorism.

Chapter IV will examine successful transition management through commitment planning, dealing with the critical mass of stakeholders, and effective change implementation.

CHAPTER FOUR

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Organizational transformation from its current state to a desired future state is best achieved through the effective management of transition. Elements of successful transition management include commitment planning, implementation of change, and transition evaluation.³³

Commitment Planning

It is essential that parties who will have impact on the degree of change that will occur within the organization lend their support to the transition. Effective commitment planning involves identifying those parties, creating a plan of how to gain their commitment to change, and monitor progress. In chapter III the following stakeholders were identified as playing a key role in the transition process:

- ▶ City Council
- ▶ City Manager
- ▶ Chief of Police
- ▶ Police Management

- ▶ Air Support Members
- ▶ Fresno Police
- ▶ Officers Association
- ▶ Community
- ▶ Military
- ▶ Allied Agencies

Commitment Charting

Commitment charting is a method of determining where a party is currently in the transition process and mapping where they should be to maximize the chance of the desired change occurring. It is not essential that every party be totally committed to causing the change to occur. It may be desired that a particular party simply move from blocking the change to allowing the change to occur. The critical mass of stakeholders does not include every possible stakeholder. The critical mass consists of the minimum number of stakeholders needed to make the change happen. The following table illustrates who these stakeholders are and where they need to be to make the change happen:

Table 4-1

Critical Mass Commitment Chart

X = Current position

O = Desired Position

Critical Mass Member	Block Change	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
City Council		X	O	
City Manager		X	O	

Chief of Police			X	O
Police Management		X	O	
Air Support Members			X O	
Fresno Police Officers Association		X O		
Military		X	O	
Allied Agencies		X	O	
Community		X	O	

Intervention Strategies

Moving the parties to their desired position entails presenting them with a cost-benefit analogy. The governing political body and the city manager need an explanation of the need for change that includes the projected effectiveness of the change, while showing cost-consciousness. The Chief of Police would need to see the value to the agency in terms of better use of staff, increased public safety, and a system of monitoring success. Police management should be shown the direct and indirect benefits to their units if the department had a more effective air support unit.

Air support members and the Fresno Police Officers Association would need to be shown that compensation would be commensurate with their duties and that safety was a paramount consideration. They would also need to be impressed with the gravity of their mission in the fight against terrorism.

The military and allied agencies should be informed of the cross-application of an improved air support unit within the agency and the air support units in their own organizations. A spirit of cooperation should be fostered as opposed to creating traditional turf wars.

The community would have to be educated on the purposes for the change and the

minimal negative impact it would have on private lives.

Implementation of Change

To achieve successful change an organization must have support from higher levels, participative planning, and flexible implementation.³⁴ J.P. Kotter outlined in an article in the Harvard Business Review entitled, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail”, eight steps for successful organizational transformations:

19. Establish a sense of urgency.
 - Examine realities.
 - Identify crisis and opportunities.
2. Form a powerful guiding condition.
 - Assemble a group with enough power to lead the change effort.
 - Encourage the group to work as a team.
3. Create a vision.
 - Create a compelling vision to help direct the change effort.
 - Develop strategies for achieving that vision.
4. Communicate the vision.
 - Use all available means to communicate the new vision and strategy.
 - Have the guiding coalition teach the new behaviors by example.
5. Empower others to act on the vision.
 - Remove obstacles to change.
 - Change systems or structures that present obstacles.
6. Create short-term wins.

- Plan for visible performance improvements.
 - Create those improvements.
 - Recognize and reward employees involved in those improvements.
7. Consolidate improvements and produce further change.
- Use increased credibility to change systems, structures, and policies to pursue the vision.
 - Hire and develop employees who can implement the vision.
8. Institutionalize the new approach.
- Articulate the connection between the new behaviors and organizational success.
 - Ensure leadership development and succession.³⁵

These guidelines would be very helpful for an agency leader who is seeking to transform an air support unit in a large urban law enforcement agency to meet the challenges of the threats posed by terrorist attacks.

Implementation Techniques

A transitional team is helpful in ensuring that meetings are held, deadlines are met, and the transition remains on pace. But most important, someone should be designated to lead the transition. This person must have the capacity for forming a vision, the creativity to make the vision compelling, and the persuasive ability to keep the transition team cohesive, dedicated, and on task.

The transitional leader must be in a position to advocate for and make the change happen. The transitional leader should begin setting up policy, training, and procurement procedures that

will become fully implemented upon the change taking effect. As such, it is helpful if they have the power to reward activities and decisions that further the desired change, and sanction actions that maliciously block the change.

Responsibility charting

It is important to clarify the roles of people involved in the implementation phase of organizational change. Involved parties, or actors, can be people directly involved, bosses of those directly involved, groups or individuals, and people inside or outside of the organization. The required level of involvement in decisions and actions that an actor must have for the change to occur can be classified into four categories for the purpose of charting: responsibility; approval; support; and, informed. The chart below reflects the suggested role of key actors in various decisions or acts affecting change in the organization's air support unit.

Table 4-2

Responsibility Chart

Decisions or Actions	City Council	City Manager	Chief of Police	Police Management	Union	Community	Allied Agencies
Set goals and priorities	A	A	A	R	S	S	I
Decide strategies	S	S	A	R	I	I	I
Decisions on equipment	A	A	A	R	I	I	I
Provide resources	R	A	A	S	S	S	I
Public relations	S	S	A	R	S	-	I
Design training	I	I	A	R	S	I	I

Allocate personnel	A	A	R	S	I	I	I
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R = responsibility A = approval S = support I = inform

The value in responsibility chart is realized when all actors agree upon their role and appreciate the role of the other actors. To enable this to occur the actors, or representatives of groups, should be brought together to participate in responsibility charting as part of the implementation process. Agreement on where responsibility lies in each decision or activity should be the first step. More than one actor or group having responsibility for a decision or action is problematic.

Evaluation

Just as critical as the strategic planning and implementation process is the evaluative component. An on-going evaluation should be done to ensure the transition is occurring at the pre-planned speed. Everyone involved in the process deserves to know the status of the transition process and any shortcomings that need to be rectified. Likewise, reports of successful aspects of the transitional process can serve to buoy the stakeholders' attitudes. The evaluation of the change process will serve to verify that time lines and benchmarks are being met throughout the process. Procedures for remedy must be established when shortcomings in the process are identified. People or groups must be designated for ensuring the problems are corrected.

An evaluation component must also be established for when the transitional process has been completed and the desired future state is in place. Monitoring the effectiveness of the change must be constant and reliable. This will serve to justify the change as well as identify what additional changes, fine-tuning, or major revisions of the new state of the organization are

needed to achieve a desired state of operations.

Chapter IV addressed commitment planning, change implementation, and evaluation as techniques for optimum transition management. Each step in the transition is designed to ease the change to a more capable air support unit providing more effective services to combat terrorism at the local level. Chapter V will present findings of the research into desired future uses of air support units and its implications on leaders and budgets. The chapter concludes with recommendations for the future and conclusions.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS/IMPLICATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSIONS

Findings

As a result of speaking to experts on the issue, examining past performance of air support units, and recognizing the chances for increased terrorist attacks in municipal areas, it is apparent that there is great potential for air support units to play a vital role in preventing and reacting to terrorist events.

Improved technology will allow for better surveillance and tracking of suspected terrorists. Improved aircraft will become effective aerial command posts. Movement of people, equipment, and supplies can be made much easier. Implications for medical evacuations and control of the skies abound. Expense and lack of familiarization with potential uses of aircraft have impeded the achievement of a desired state of air operations in local law enforcement agencies. Training and interagency coordination have been lacking.

There are many potential uses of law enforcement air support units that stretch the current bounds of the imagination, yet these need to be forecast and planned for. These include:

close alliance with their military counterparts; using aircraft as a shooting platform for air to ground weapons, or even air-to-air strikes; employing vehicle-disabling technology to stop fleeing vehicles; locking onto a vehicle and continually broadcasting video of it to down-linked monitors in patrol vehicles; and, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Implications on Leadership

Leadership will play a tremendous role in developing air support capabilities to combat domestic terrorism. There is great potential for leadership within the organization to step forward with a bold vision and challenging goals, then create an environment that is conducive to the achievement of the desired future state. Leadership must use their attributes of persuasion, motivation, empowerment, and coalescence to foster the transition.

The transitional process offers the opportunity to enhance the organization through a futuristic approach to air support. Proper planning and effective transition management by agency leadership regarding equipment, technology, training, interagency cooperation, and community support provide the best chance for creating a positive future. Agency leadership is also in a position to act as pioneers in this field and become the catalysts for other agencies to create improved future states of their air support operations. Agencies that fail to plan and do not begin to transition to improved air support capabilities may be flirting with disaster if trends and events in domestic terrorism increase.

Budgetary Implications

Creating the desired future state of air support operations comes with increased financial costs. This research has shown that resistance from governing bodies and appointed officials may be encountered due to funding issues. Alternative methods of funding such as grants, public

donations, and sponsorships should be explored to mitigate the direct burden to municipal finances.

President Bush's administration has vowed to provide federal money for local public safety agencies, which are the first-line of defense against local attacks and the first responders should an attack occur. The FY03 federal budget for domestic security nearly doubled to over \$37 billion, with \$3.5 billion designated for local public safety agencies.³⁶

The Fresno Police Department's air support unit was created in the late 1990s with the help of a grass roots organization called "Citizens for a Safer Fresno County." This non-profit organization is apolitical and self-funding.³⁷ The organization raised enough money by soliciting all facets of the community to help make the purchase of the department's first helicopter. This is an example of the potential for private sources of funding to be mixed with government allocations as an alternative funding strategy.

The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986 allows law enforcement agencies to acquire surplus military equipment. The similarities between the military and law enforcement missions pertaining to terrorism may increase the interoperability of equipment used by the military, thus allowing future law enforcement use of these items.³⁸

The Fresno Police Department's new turbine helicopter was financed using asset forfeiture funds pursuant to narcotics arrests. This is another example of unconventional financing that is available to large urban agencies.

Though the costs associated with acquiring new technology and aircraft can be quite high, these costs may pale in comparison to costs associated with a terrorist event. Overtime costs in the aftermath of such an event, repair costs, debris removal costs, medical costs, and

investigative costs could easily pose an insurmountable burden on local government.

In addition to the dollar cost of a terrorist attack, the cost to public confidence and ultimately the cost to public support of local law enforcement could be devastating. This points to the necessity of identifying efficiencies in the spending plan needed to create the desired future state.

Recommendations for the Future

Leadership in local law enforcement agencies must be forward thinking and aggressive in creating and sustaining a vision of the desired future state of its air support operations. A strategic plan must be formulated that involves all stakeholders and moves them toward a position on the commitment chart that offers the best chance for a successful transition to the desired state.

Elected officials should be initially informed of the reason for the desired change, then solicited for support, kept apprized of the progress of the change, and updated on the evaluation of the change. Allied agencies should be consulted and included in the transition process.

Best practices from other agencies should be assessed and incorporated into the change process as appropriate. Alternate sources of funding should be explored.

Liaison with the military should be established to coordinate efforts and share technological and tactical developments.

Internal research should be continually conducted to determine the best technology available and to decide which aircraft would best serve the community's needs.

In service training should be ongoing and relevant to current and future technological and terrorist issues. Other units in the agency should train with the air support unit in order to

become familiar with how the unit could be advantageously deployed in various operations.

Conclusions

Domestic terrorism has shown itself to have the potential for devastation in large urban areas. Local law enforcement air support has shown that it can play a role in patrolling the skies, transporting people and equipment, serving as an aerial command post, doing reconnaissance, conducting surveillance and tracking, and providing better visuals of the disaster scene.

Technological developments and aircraft improvements provide an excellent opportunity for the forward looking leader to act as a visionary and a conduit for positive change which leads to the desired future state of air operations. Strategic planning is the vehicle through which the desired transformation can take place. A spirit of inclusiveness in designing and implementing leadership's vision will minimize the obstacles to change that are encountered.

Nothing less than community safety is at stake in the future efforts to prevent and react to acts of domestic terrorism. The financial costs of developing an effective, future-oriented air support unit will be burdensome to local government. However, the cost of being ill prepared to deal with a catastrophic terrorist event could be devastating not only to the local economy, but to the emotional health of the community.

The possible future state of law enforcement air support units promises to be incredibly more effective than the current state. Potential applications for surveillance, reconnaissance, tracking, aerial command posts, transportation of personnel and equipment, vehicle disabling technology, and as a weapon delivery system challenge the imagination of even the most forward looking air support officer. Future-oriented, bold, inclusive leaders are the best hope for achieving the optimistic future that all local law enforcement agencies' air support units -- and

more importantly the community -- deserve.

ENDNOTES

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